Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies

Claire L. Adida,David D. Laitin,Marie-Anne Valfort

• Publisher: Harvard University Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9780674495302
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Amid mounting fears of violent Islamic extremism, many Europeans ask whether Muslim immigrants can integrate into historically Christian countries. In a groundbreaking ethnographic investigation of France's Muslim migrant population, Why Muslim Integration Fails in Christian-Heritage Societies explores this complex question. The authors conclude that both Muslim and non-Muslim French must share responsibility for the slow progress of Muslim integration."Using a variety of resources, research methods, and an innovative experimental design, the authors contend that while there is no doubt that prejudice and discrimination against Muslims exist, it is also true that some Muslim actions and cultural traits may, at times, complicate their full integration into their chosen domiciles. This book is timely (more so in the context of the current Syrian refugee crisis), its insights keen and astute, the empirical evidence meticulous and persuasive, and the policy recommendations reasonable and relevant."
—A. Ahmad, Choice

PART I

Introduction

THE PURPOSE of Part I is to situate our study in the larger debate about Muslim immigration in Christian-heritage societies. Chapter 1 documents the reality of “Islamophobia,” that is, the fear of Muslims in these societies. The chapter outlines the negative implications of Islamophobia—especially in Europe—for security, economic growth, and political solidarity. We point out that research has yet to pinpoint the mechanisms driving Islamophobia and the degree to which its thrust is against Muslims or more generally against the wave of foreign migrants in the past generation.

In Chapter 2, we introduce our research design that enables us to isolate a Muslim effect in France. Relying on that research design, we demonstrate that the French, despite a century of resolute secularism, condition their behavior on the religion of the people with whom they interact. Moreover, and here relying on an experiment, we demonstrate that Muslim households, in comparison with matched Christian households, suffer from this discrimination in terms of income. Part I therefore sets the stage for analysis as to why this discrimination exists and what might be done to ameliorate it.

1

The Challenge of Muslim Migrants into Christian-Heritage Societies

If all the Arabs … of Algeria were considered French, how could they be prevented from settling in France? My village would no longer be called Colombey-les-Deux-Eglises but Colombey-les-Deux-Mosquées.

—Charles de Gaulle¹

CAN MUSLIM IMMIGRANTS integrate into the Christian-heritage societies of the West?² In view of recent international events, many citizens of the host societies would answer with a resounding no.

Although tensions involving Muslim immigrants in Europe’s Christian-heritage societies had been brewing throughout the 1980s, the fatwa issued by Iranian revolutionaries in 1989 against Salman Rushdie for his supposedly anti-Islamic novel marked a clear violent turn in what came to be known as “political Islam.”³ Several failed attempts at terrorist attacks by Islamicist groups on European targets followed. But successful ones occurred, too: bombings in Paris and Lyon in 1995–1996; the 2001 al-Qa’ida attacks in the United States; the 2002 terrorist acts in Bali in which Australians suffered the bulk of the casualties; the Islamicist-inspired bombings in Spain (2004) and London (2005); the murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004 for his depiction of Muslim sexuality; the unceasing violence against Kurt Westergaard for his unflattering portrayal of the Muslim prophet in a Danish cartoon published in 2006; the brutal attacks on soldiers in Britain and France by Islamist militants in 2013; the evidence of Muslim citizens from Christian-heritage societies joining jihadist militias in Syria and Iraq in 2014 with some anxious to deploy their newly developed murderous skills upon their return to Europe; and the hideous murders in the editorial offices of Charlie Hebdo and in the Hyper Casher supermarket in Paris perpetrated by self-proclaimed jihadists in the name of Islam in 2015. These events all have contributed to portray Muslims as posing a threat to Christian-heritage societies.

It is no wonder, then, that a spate of books depict a clash of civilizations, with images of the Crusades permanently setting a boundary between the worlds of Christian and Islamic cultures. Even the most secular European elites—as exemplified by the epigraph from President de Gaulle—see their society as fundamentally Christian. The clash today is portrayed as that between Muslim immigrants and their host populations (Caldwell 2009). Such accounts justify the Islamophobia of ordinary citizens in Christian-heritage societies by presenting it as a rational response to a clear and present danger.⁴ In this context, Islamophobia would simply be the host populations’ legitimate answer to a real Muslim threat.⁵

Survey-based evidence confirms that Muslims are widely perceived as a menace by host populations in Christian-heritage societies. In France, 43% of individuals interviewed in 2012 in a survey sponsored by the newspaper Le Figaro agreed with the statement that the Muslim community in France is “a menace to the identity of France.” Only 17% thought of this community as “a factor that culturally enriches our country” (the remaining 40% could not decide between these two options) (Institut français d’opinion publique [IFOP] 2012). In Germany, the Religion Monitor⁶ found that 51% of those interviewed in 2013 believed that Islam poses a threat to their way of life.⁷ Even young Europeans, who are supposed to be more tolerant than their parents toward immigrants (see Ford 2012a, 2012b), express anti-Muslim sentiment. Of the 1,000 18- to 24-year-olds interviewed in Britain by BBC Radio 1 Newsbeat in June 2013, 27% said they do not trust Muslims (this proportion is only 16% concerning Hindus or Sikhs, 15% concerning Jews, 13% concerning Buddhists, and 12% concerning Christians).⁸ The justification of such distrust by one of the respondents is revealing: “When you hear about terrorism, more often than not it is Muslims that have carried it out. I just feel they’re all out to do that, they’re all the same” (Kotecha 2013).

This book puts the assumptions driving Islamophobia to test. Evidence to date leaves two questions unanswered: First, is the host population in Christian-heritage societies really Islamophobe? Many experimental studies have shown that Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries—that is, those with greater than 50% of the population and here listed in Table 1.1—are discriminated against relative to natives on an everyday basis. But it is not clear whether such discrimination is due to religion per se (Islamophobia) or to confounding factors, such as region of origin (xenophobia). Caldwell’s (2009) widely acclaimed book provides a good example of this confound. He illustrates his claims of a Muslim challenge to France with an incident involving a Congolese immigrant. While traveling by train in France without a ticket, this immigrant was stopped by the police, shouted for help, and found solace among a crowd chanting “Nique la France” (Fuck France). Yet the incident in no way illustrates a Muslim effect. Not only was the Congolese man, whose name is Angelo Hoekelet, not likely a Muslim; the incensed crowd was also not necessarily Muslim (Laitin 2010). Identifying whether religion is, in and of itself, a special source of discrimination against Muslim immigrants from Muslim-majority countries carries important implications for how we frame the issue and seek solutions. And yet, research to date has assumed, rather than shown, that religion is the source.

Second, if Islamophobia is confirmed, is it indeed a rational response to a real threat? Or is Islamophobia at least partly nonrational, meaning that the rooted populations in Christian-heritage societies discriminate against Muslims even when they do not expect any particular hostility from the Muslim immigrants with whom they interact?

Table 1.1 Share of the Muslim population in Muslim-majority countries

Country		Share of the Muslim population (%)		Country		Share of the Muslim population (%)
Asia-Pacific				Lebanon		59.7
Afghanistan		99.8		Libya		96.6
Azerbaijan		98.4		Morocco		99.9
Bangladesh		90.4		Oman		87.7
Brunei		51.9		Palestinian territories		97.5
Indonesia		88.1		Qatar		77.5
Iran		99.7		Saudi Arabia		97.1
Kazakhstan		56.4		Sudan		71.4
Kyrgyzstan		88.8		Syria		92.8
Malaysia		61.4		Tunisia		99.8
Maldives		98.4		United Arab Emirates		76.0
Pakistan		96.4		Western Sahara		99.6
Tajikistan		99.0		Yemen		99.0
Turkey		98.6
Turkmenistan Uzbekistan		93.3 96.5		Sub-Saharan Africa
				Burkina Faso		58.9
Europe Albania				Chad		55.7
		82.1		Comoros		98.3
				Djibouti		97.0
Middle East/				Gambia		95.3
North Africa				Guinea		84.2
Algeria		98.2		Mali		92.4
Bahrain		81.2		Mauritania		99.2
Egypt		94.7		Niger		98.3
Iraq		98.9		Senegal		95.9
Jordan		98.8		Sierra Leone		71.5
Kuwait		86.4		Somalia		98.6
Notes: This table displays the share of the Muslim population in the forty-seven Muslim-majority countries (i.e., countries where more than 50% of the population is Muslim), as reported by the Pew Research Center Forum on Religion and Public Life (2011) for the year 2010.

Answering this question is vital for devising policy prescriptions. Islamophobia is likely to be self-perpetuating, whereby both Muslim immigrants and the host population are encouraged in their hostility toward the other group. To break it, one must identify all the mechanisms that sustain it. Otherwise, we are doomed to draw policy recommendations that will surely fail. For instance, identifying only the rational component of Islamophobia puts all the blame of Muslims’ integration failure on Muslims themselves. In this context, policy prescriptions will aim exclusively to influence Muslim behaviors ...