Part I
SPORT AND CHRISTIANITY: PRACTICES FOR THE MIND
Chapter 1
HOW MIGHT THEOLOGY OF PLAY INFORM THEOLOGY OF SPORT?
Robert K. Johnston
Why should we care about our sports?
As a theologian of culture, I have spent a significant part of my career reflecting on the Christian value of play, particularly the experiences of reading a novel or watching a movie. My doctoral dissertation was on a constructive theology of play (later published as The Christian at Play, 1983). This study has served me well. Throughout my career I have put various play experiences into dialogue with Christian theology, and I have done so as someone who enjoys play activities, himself, both as a participant and as a fan. With regard to sports, I enjoy bodysurfing in the Pacific Ocean near where I live. And with Michael Novak, I have also asked myself, how I can be 40, then 50, then 60, and now 70, and still care what happens to the Los Angeles Dodgers (Novak 1976: xi). I also have inherited the cherished rights to my fatherâs seats for the University of Southern California (USC) football games, something I have attended for over 60 years with quasi-religious devotion. Why is it that I am slightly depressed for an entire weekend when the Trojans lose? After all, isnât it just a game? With Michael Novak, this question, in fact, might be the focus of my reflection in this chapter. Why should we care about our sports?
Learning from a theology of play
So though my focus for the last three decades has been on how oneâs play experiences at the movies, or while reading a novel, might be theologically important for the Christian, I would like to take those insights and ask, âHow might a theology of play inform a theology of sport?â For donât playing a game of basketball, watching a movie, listening to Mozart, going to a U2 concert, binge watching a TV show like âBreaking Bad,â hiking in the mountains, bodysurfing, getting caught up in a football game, and playing hide-and-go-seek as children all share something in common? And if they do, what is it? And what results from it?
In The Christian at Play, I opened my book with two epigraphs. I have already mentioned the one from Michael Novak about being immersed in watching a baseball game such that it carries back into oneâs ongoing life. The other is from the theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. In a letter that he wrote from prison to his friend Eberhard Bethge months before he was executed for his part in a plot to assassinate Hitler, Bonhoeffer asked:
I wonder whether it is possible (it almost seems so today) to regain the idea of the Church as providing an understanding of the area of freedom (art, education, friendship, play), so that Kierkegaardâs âaesthetic existenceâ would not be banished from the Churchâs sphere, but would be reestablished within it? ⌠Who is there, for instance, in our times, who can devote himself with an easy mind to music, friendship, games, or happiness? Surely not the âethicalâ [person], but only the Christian. (Bonhoeffer 1971: 198)
For Bonhoeffer, play was understood as part of that area of freedom, along with the arts and friendship that could be associated with aesthetics. And even the extreme situation of Nazi German in 1944 could not cancel out its value and possibility for the Christian. We are to work for justice, but we are also meant to enjoy music and friendship and play, for this is Godâs world.
Given lifeâs injustices, given the need to right lifeâs wrongs, which are âoft so strongâ (How can we help the millions of immigrants from the Middle East who are seeking new lives anywhere that will have them? What should be our response to those in Kabul who are burying their dead, the funerals for the five Dallas policemen who were assassinated in cold blood by a sniper, or the innocent black man in Minneapolis who was stopped in his car for a broken tail light and tragically killed by the quick trigger of a policeman? And what of the protests in the United States in support of âBlack Lives Matterâ that are being held on campuses and in cities across the United States, including at Fuller Seminary where I teach?), who is it that can play? Bonhoefferâs suggestion is a surprising one: it is particularly the Christian. Do we agree?
Given the growing racial and religious intolerance across the globe, who is it that can afford to pause and appreciate the beauty of a curving penalty kick by Lionel Messi that finds the upper corner of the goal, or a forty-foot shot by Stephen Curry of the Golden State Warriors? Can one really afford such aesthetic moments? How can one devote himself or herself in our troubled times to music or games or movies? Surely not the âethicalâ personâthe person whose very humanity is defined by acts of justice, but only the Christian, whose humanity is defined not by what we do, but by who we are, children of God. For Christians believe that play, as an event of the inventive human spirit, finds ongoing validation as an expression of humankindâs God-given nature alongside our actions on behalf of others in the world. Though the wrong, which is âoft so strongâ must be addressed, the life of Godâs creation and creatures also deserves celebration.
Two core questions
There are two core questions a Christian theologian might ask of cultureâtwo questions that will define oneâs understanding of a theology of sport as well: âWhat the hell are they doing?â is the first and perhaps the most common. This is the question which lies behind Andy Crouchâs 2016 editorial in Christianity Today where he challenges what he believes is the myth of engaging the culture, arguing that we should resist being bound and tempted by the culture around usâthat is, we should resist being âconformed to this worldâ (Romans 12:2) and instead should âlearn to care for what is lasting and valuable in our particular time and place, and begin to create alternatives to things that are inadequate and brokenâ (Crouch 2016: 33â34). Here is Kierkegaardâs âethicalâ individual. It is consistent with Eugene Petersonâs paraphrase of Romans 12:2 in his The Message, where he includes in Paulâs warning concerning not becoming too well adjusted to our culture the phraseââalways dragging us down to its level of immaturityââeven though this is not in the biblical text. Petersonâs addition is a conclusion of those asking the question, âWhat the hell are they doing?â Certainly this was one question central to Bonhoefferâs last five years of his life, when the wrong threatened to overpower everything else. In our context today, the question might be phrasedâgiven Donald Trump, or Paris, or the poverty of Rio, should we even be thinking about, let alone participating in something as unimportant in the larger scheme of things as sports? Surely that could have been Bonhoefferâs question too, as he sat in Hitlerâs jail cell in a world hell bent on destruction. But surprisingly, it was not.
When applied to our reflection on play, âWhat the hell are they doing?â raises the tragic reality of a fallen worldâa world of competition, violence, consumerism, power, sexism, racism, idolatryâa world of which sport is a part and which cries out for righteousness and justice, a world in need of redemption. As one surveys current studies in a theology of sport, much of the literature focuses here. As Robert Ellis rightly summarizes our contemporary situation, âThere is this sinful sporting worldâ (Ellis 2014: 81). Shirl Hoffmanâs wonderful study Good Game: Christianity and the Culture of Sports might also be mentioned in this regard (Hoffman 2010). The book seeks those âgoodâ games, while offering a cautionary look at competitive sports today and noting much that is bad. For Hoffman, too, âthe wrong seems oft so strong.â And he is no doubt correct. Professionalism in sport with its âwin at any costâ attitude threatened even the Rio Olympics, as the drug scandals involving the Russian team, as well as other athletes, repeatedly revealed.
But there is also a second fundamental question central to the Christian theologian of culture, one that also pertains to the world of sport. That is, âWhat in heavenâs name is going on?â And which question one chooses to focus upon will, of course, shape oneâs understanding of and response to the culture we live inâincluding our theology of sport. To ask, âWhat in heavenâs name is going on?â is to focus on playâs aesthetics, not its ethics. Rather than a hermeneutic of suspicion and separation consider Peter Leithartâs review of Robert Ellisâs The Games People Play in which he concludes, âEllisâs tempered Victorianism might best be tempered further with a strong dose of Pauline and patristic and Puritan skepticismâ (Leithart 2014). The question, âWhat in heavenâs name is going on?â invites a hermeneutic of engagement and appreciation. What is the compelling power of our play, including sport? For Ellis, as Leithart rightly notes, every âhuman activity [including our sport] can be done in union with Christ and in the power of the Spirit.â Rather than focus on the question of sin, this alternate question centers on playâs ability âto make us more fully human, more fully in the image of the playful, powerful, Creator.â When we are truly at play, we participate in Godâs creative life; it is a foretaste of heaven.
The one question a theologian of culture asks, âWhat the hell are they doing?â looks at much in the sportsâ world today and with Karl Barth cries, âNeinâââNo.â The other question we ask of culture, âWhat in heavenâs name is going on?â discovers in sport, what Friedrich Schleiermacher recognized as the sense and taste of the Infinite in the finite. With Paul Tillich it seeks to illuminate the spiritual lines that, otherwise, too often remain hidden within our human activity. There is, surely, Christian truth to be discovered in both perennial lines of questioning. The one focuses on how evil might be overcomeâon redemption; the other recognizes in creation and creature that this is âmy Fatherâs world.â The one filters its theological observations through Christology; the other, through creation, recognizing the Spiritâs presence not only as the paraclete, the Comforter, whom Christ has sent, but also as the Spirit of Life, sent from God the Creator to give breath, sustenance, and verve to his creation.
Perhaps a well-known example from the world of play can illumine this second option. C.S. Lewis, in his autobiography, Surprised by Joy, highlights a number of play experiences that were formativeâeven transformative, in his life: listening to his mother read to him from Beatrice Potterâs Squirrel Nutkin, playing with a toy garden he made in a biscuit tin, hearing Wagnerâs music, reading Longfellowâs Saga of King Olaf or later in university, the Greek play Hippolytus. Lewis had a number of these sporadic play experiences that each seemed to him more real than ordinary life. He said these events produced in him stabs of âJoy.â When they first occurred, Lewis believed the âJoyâ he experienced to be what he really desired. But as he grew up, he realized that his joy was actually only the by-product of something or someone more fundamentalââa pointer to something other and outer.â It was only when Lewis gave his full attention to his experience of play, and not to what it produced in him, that paradoxically play opened him outward to something external to the play experienceâto the Transcendent. It was when Lewis became a player that such surprises of joy sometimes came, causing him to ask, âWhat in heavenâs name is going onâ (Lewis 1955: 72, 168, 170).
This joyââthis pointer to something other and outerâ as he described itâwas only a distant longing until he read George MacDonaldâs Phantastes, A Faerie Romance. As he read this book, he recounted that he was simply changed:
It was as though the voice which had called to me from the worldâs end were now speaking at my side. It was with me in the room, or in my body, or behind me. If it had once eluded me by its distance, it now eluded me by proximityâsomething too near to see, to plain to be understood, on this side of knowledge.
Lewis went on to clarify that reading this fiction had been the occasion for him of a Divine encounter. He wrote: âThat night my imagination was, in a certain sense, baptized; the rest of me [for Lewis this meant his intellect and will], not unnaturally took longer. I had not the faintest notion what I had let myself in for by buying Phantastesâ (Lewis 1955: 238, 180â81).
Like all true players, Lewis had simply immersed himself fully in the play experience of reading MacDonaldâs science fiction. He had no larger or ulterior motive. Rather in playâs parenthesis to life, entering fully into the storyâs new space and time, freely accepting its ârulesâ as the operating procedures and caring about those in its world, he nonetheless found himself ushered into the Presence of that which was and is basic to all life, his own included. As Paul Tillich wrote of a similar play experience he had, when after being on the front lines in the First World War he stood in a Berlin museum before a Botticelli painting titled Madonna and Child with Singing Angels, âA level of reality was opened to me which had been covered up to this moment, although I had some feeling before of its existence.â Tillich, not unlike Lewis, understood himself to have had âan encounter with the Power of Being itselfâ (Tillich 1966: 27â28; cf. Tillich 1987: 12). What became crucial for both theologians in their lives and thought were these foundational encounters with the Divine that occurred not within the church or with explicit reference to Jesus Christ, but while at play.
But lest we get too far afield from our focus on a theology of sport, though the connection should be clear to most of you, let me give a final example from the world of sport of how we might consider play from the standpoint of âheaven,â not âhell.â It comes from an essay in the New Yorker by the American novelist John Updike. He wrote:
There is a goodness [he might also have said âa beautyâ] in the experience of golf that may well be ⌠a place where something breaks into our workaday world and bothers us forevermore with the hints it gives. (Updike 1972: 76â78)
Those familiar with Updikeâs novels will immediately recall the conversation in Rabbit, Run between Harry, or Rabbit, and Eccles, the humanitarian minister with little, if any, faith in God who is cynically questioning Rabbit as to why he is so restless in life: âWhat is it? What is it [that you want]? Is it hard or soft? Harry. Is it blue? Is it red? Does it have polka dots?â Eccles is belittling Rabbitâs quest for transcendence amid the traumas of life, and Rabbit has no answerâthat is, until he steps up to the tee and for the first time hits a perfect drive. ââThatâs it!â Rabbit cries, and turning to Eccles with a smile of aggrandizement repeats, âThatâs itââ (Updike 1960: 112â113).
Two potential criticisms
Playâs and, thus, sportâs fundamental anchorage in the Transcendent has, of course, not been without its critics. Theological arguments within the Christian community against this axiological orientation have usually taken one of two trajectories: (1) some have thought that such a claim reduces play to a âmeans to an end,â effectively aborting the play experience, and (2) others have claimed that play cannot have such restorative possibilities, for redemption is only in Christ Jesus and sin has blurred beyond recognition any revelatory possibility for the play experience. Let us look at each challenge in turn:
Does play become instrumental?
Although play has proven notoriously difficult to define, descriptors are more easily come by. Johan Huizingaâs description of playâs characteristics in his classic Homo Ludens (1938; EV 1955) remains the gold standard. He wrote:
Summing up the formal characteristics of play we might call it a free activity standing quite consciously outside âordinaryâ life as being ânot serious,â but at the same time absorbing the player intensely and utterly. It is an activity connected with no material interest, and no profit can be gained by it. It proceeds within its own proper boundaries of time and space according to fixed rules and in an orderly manner. It promotes formation of social groupings which tend to surround themselves with secrecy and to stress their difference from the common world by disguises and other means. (Huizinga 1955: 13)
Central to Huizingaâs description is the recognition that play is an activity that is freely entered into, complete in itself and outside âordinary life.â Play is, in this sense, the complement of work. As such it is disinterested, though as a complement to work it adorns life and amplifies it. Put most simply, the whole point of play is playing. Most theologians of sport have stressed this point, noting playâs autotelic nature. As Lincoln Harvey observes, for example, âWe should simply accept that play is what it is: it is radically unnecessary but internally meaningful. It is genuinely free from the serious business of lifeâ (Harvey 2014: 69). But we also know the issue is more complex than this, for someone might play a game in order to work out, or to make a business contact, for a paycheck or an Olympic medal, but yet once in the game be captured by it, so that the sport activity becomes what it is, actual play.
But while Huizingaâs description is helpful, it is also limited, for play is also more than this. Written during the Nazi buildup when play was being manipulated for political purposes, Homo Ludens mistakenly sought to divorce play from the larger world. For though radically unnecessary, playâs meaning, nonetheless, extends beyond the playtime back into the everyday world (that is why Novak and I both remain sad when our sportâs teams lose). Theologians of play and sport have struggled to describe this paradox. I have described play as ânon-instrumental, yet productive.â For this reason, I critiqued Jurgen Moltmannâs understanding of play which was printed in English as Theology of Play for instrumentalizing play. I wrote:
Moltmannâs hermeneutical predilections for promise over fulfillment, for ethics over aesthetics, and for mission over rest ⌠cause him to ignore playâs self-contained meaning and inste...