1
Silence Being Thought
Paul Celanâs ineloquence
In an endnote to Logics of Worlds (2006/2009), Alain Badiou declares his philosophical debts to Samuel Beckett and StĂ©phane MallarmĂ©. He asserts that two concepts fundamental to his philosophy â âgeneric truthâ and âsubtractive ontologyâ, respectively â continue to be shifted, modified, âsharpenedâ by his readings of these writers; Badiouâs philosophy, he claims, is âunder conditionâ of Beckettâs prose and MallarmĂ©âs poetry. Further, without irony, Badiou declares that understanding the âstoriesâ produced by Beckettâs late prose work How It Is and MallarmĂ©âs poem âA la nue accablante tu ⊠â is âperhaps the only goal of [his] philosophyâ.1 Badiouâs writings on these two figures comprise a book-length collection, published in English as On Beckett, and a sustained engagement with MallarmĂ© spread out over the course of thirty years, from Theory of the Subject (1982/2009) to Being and Event (1988/2005) and the books of the 1990s that would further elaborate its central claims, especially Handbook of Inaesthetics (1998/2005), and then throughout the philosophical shift marked by Logics of Worlds (2007/2010) and Second Manifesto for Philosophy (2009/2011). In stark contrast, the page-time afforded to the German-Jewish poet Paul Celan over this writing period consists of about twenty pages, disparately placed among ten or so publications. And, this is to be further contrasted with the time dedicated to Celan by certain of Badiouâs philosophical contemporaries, most notably Jacques Derrida, both in his posthumously published Sovereignties in Question: The Poetics of Paul Celan and at a distance through his friendship with Celanâs close friend and interpreter Peter Szondi.2 As well, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe has dedicated a book, Poetry as Experience, to Celan and his strained relationship with Heidegger.3 Badiouâs relatively modest engagement with Celan is not in proportion to the overall importance of his poetry to Badiouâs project at large, especially when they are used as interface with which to open up the complexities of Badiouâs departure from Heideggerian thinking. Badiouâs most thorough investigations of Celanâs poetry take place in Handbook of Inaesthetics (1998/2005) and The Century (2005/2007). It is more useful to start, however, with the importance afforded to Celan in Being and Eventâs complementary treatise, Badiouâs Manifesto for Philosophy (1989/1999). One of Badiouâs most provocative claims therein is that, following Hegel, the willingness of philosophy to relinquish its independence to the imperatives of science or politics, or in Peter Hallwardâs words, philosophyâs preoccupation with âthe sterile hypotheses of scientific positivism and historical materialismâ,4 gave rise to an âAge of Poetsâ in which poetry was burdened with an ostensibly philosophical task. For Badiou, the Age of Poets is a philosophical category pertaining to a specific âepochâ, stretching from StĂ©phane MallarmĂ© to Paul Celan, for which âpoetic saying not only constitutes a form of thought and instructs a truth, but also finds itself constrained to think this thoughtâ.5 A moribund philosophy finds its central theses concerning being, truth and subject outsourced, then, to a specific poetic enterprise engaged in the reflexive interrogation of its own thinking. For Badiou, this operation, by which philosophy settles itself within the bounds of the poem, is termed a âsutureâ: philosophy stiches itself to, or perhaps within, the poem.
Beneath these claims lies an important theory concerning how philosophy relates to, broadly speaking, that which is not philosophy. Oriented by the desire to restore the question of âTruthâ to the centre of philosophical endeavour, Badiou insists that, far from having âtruthsâ of its own with which to work, philosophy âthinksâ the truths produced by its âconditionsâ, of which there are four: love, science, art and politics. For Badiou, an adequately contemporary philosophy must be able to think its own time, by engaging not only the singular instances of truth produced by its conditions but also their âcompossibilityâ, or how the truths produced by local experiments in emancipatory politics might interact with those borne by innovations in formal mathematics, or those produced in poetry or theatre with psychoanalytic accounts of love, for example. When Badiou claims that philosophy following Hegel has subsumed itself to science or politics, then, he is gesturing towards, for example, the elevation of scientific knowledge in nineteenth-century scientific positivism and its legacy in contemporary Analytic philosophy from Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell to Rudolf Carnap and Willard Van Orman Quine or the exclusive relation between philosophy and politics expressed during the development of orthodox Marxism from Marx through to György LukĂĄcs and Bertolt Brecht. Badiouâs claim is that the danger of these intimacies between philosophy and either one of its conditions is its confinement of âtruthâ to the chosen productive discourse. This is detrimental both to the other conditions, whose own productions of what philosophy would call âtruthâ are passed over, and philosophy itself, which gives up its autonomy, or its ability to learn from and traverse multiple fields of thought.
The claim of any âsuturedâ philosophy is that âtruthâ may only arise within the condition it binds itself to. In its âsuturesâ to politics and science, philosophy relinquishes its vocation, but for Badiou, it is the poem that then takes on the role of philosophical thinking. Although one of the desires central to Badiouâs own philosophical intervention is to ensure that philosophy is restored, as he has it, to its role as the âthinkerâ of the compossibility of truths produced elsewhere, the âAge of Poetsâ is still an âepochâ of significant importance. Badiouâs âAge of Poetsâ, in which poetry does philosophical work, is anticipated by Friedrich Hölderlin, begins in earnest in the work of StĂ©phane MallarmĂ© and Arthur Rimbaud and is then borne by Georg Trakl, Osip Mandelstam and Fernando Pessoa, before finishing, crucially, with Paul Celan. Against philosophical assertions of a fundamental consistency, whether via scientific method or in the teleological promise of âHistoryâ, these poets, for Badiou, understood the essential disorientation and âinconsistencyâ of their time:
The fact is that there really was an Age of Poets, in the time of the sutured escheat of philosophers. There was a time between Hölderlin and Paul Celan when the quavering sense of what that time itself was, the most open approach to the question of Being, the space of compossibility least caught-up in brutal sutures and the most informed formulation of modern Manâs experience were all unsealed and possessed by the poem. A time when the enigma of Time was caught up in the enigma of the poetic metaphor, wherein the process of unbinding was itself bound within the âlikeâ of the image. An entire epoch was represented in short philosophies as a consistent and especially oriented one. There was progress, the sense of History, the millenarian foundation, the approach of another world and other men. But the real of this epoch was on the contrary inconsistency and disorientation. Poetry alone, or at least âmetaphysicalâ poetry, the most concentrated poetry, the most intellectually strained poetry, the most obscure also, designated and articulated this essential disorientation.6
For Badiou, these poets âsubmitted to a kind of intellectual pressureâ to take on the role of philosophy itself (i.e. devoid of its âsuturingâ to science or politics), and their work is ârecognizable as a work of thought ⊠at the very locus where philosophy falters, a locus of language wherein a proposition about being and about time is enactedâ (MP, 69). Not only this, such poetry â[constructs] the space of thinking which defines philosophyâ. Badiouâs general claim concerning Paul Celan, then, is that his poetry âthinksâ (like those of the other figures in this Age of Poets) and that this poetic thought, through âthe art of binding Word and experienceâ, is guided by âthe question of Beingâ, by âthe real of the epochâ. However, a further claim specific to Celanâs poetry is that it closes or ends the Age of Poets, and this is a claim inextricably bound to the philosophy of Martin Heidegger: for Badiou, indeed, Celanâs poetry âcompletes Heideggerâ(MP, 77).
Badiou admits that Heidegger was successful in âphilosophically touching an unnoticed point of thought detained in poetic languageâ. Yet, in order to go beyond the âpower of Heideggerian philosophyâ, Badiou claims, it is imperative to reconsider the âcouple formed by the saying of poets and the thought of thinkersâ profuse in Heidegger (C, 36). That is, following a period of near-exclusive intimacy between poetry and thought (or philosophy, as Badiou would insist), it is once more necessary to radically distinguish their respective discourses; there is to be an irreducibility between poetic thought and its subsequent thinking in philosophy. It seems clear that, for Badiou, the poetry of Celan embodies this movement through and beyond Heidegger, both in its departure from the âindistinctionâ between the âpoetâ and the âthinkerâ and in its ultimately disjunctive relation to the exploration of being, pervasive throughout the Age of Poets. Badiouâs argument is that the poet/thinker couple is broken by Celan, and in the process of this break the site in which being may be thought is recast beyond Heideggerâs demands for poetry. For Badiou, âthe fundamental criticism of Heidegger can only be the following one: the Age of Poets is completed, it is also necessary to de-suture philosophy from its poetic conditionâ (MP, 74).
It is worth noting at this point a second temporalizing claim made in Badiouâs The Century. Badiou understands Celan to be the last to fulfil the poetic task of ânaming the centuryâ the âshort century preceding the Restoration of the last twenty yearsâ.7 This claim is inextricable from Celanâs attempt to construct a poetics capable of engaging with the Holocaust. Celanâs engagement with Heidegger, a member of the Nazi party between 1933 and 1945, appears peculiar and compelling in light of this poetic task especially given their protracted relationship, manifest in their long-term correspondence, in Celanâs serious theoretical and practical engagement with Heideggerâs thought, and finally in their meeting at Todtnauberg in 1967, but it is also helpful when interrogating Badiouâs claim that Celanâs poetry heralds a fundamental departure from Heideggerâs dictates for thought. Badiouâs assertion here is of no small importance with regard to his own philosophy too, for Celan marks not only the saturation of Heideggerâs thought but also the gateway into Badiouâs philosophical break with much that precedes him.
A primarily philosophical encounter with Celanâs poetry cannot be exercised without caution, for it threatens to mirror the flippant responses his poetry garnered when it first came to prominence in Germany and France. For a philosopher like Badiou, unafraid to posit âstrongâ philosophical readings of the artists he privileges, this is a pressing concern,8 not least due to the potential resonance of any encounter between philosophy and poetry with Martin Heideggerâs notorious readings of Friedrich Hölderlin: poetry is made into the aesthetic vehicle for the grand political inauguration of a specifically âGermanâ peopleâs hitherto deferred emergence into history â a subject to which this book returns in some depth in Chapters 2 and 3. Describing the German reception of Paul Celanâs work in the 1950s, John Felstiner argues that all too often a blind eye was turned towards the trauma and loss at the heart of Celanâs poetry, critics choosing to emphasize instead his âsurrealismâ or his âspecial gift for imageryâ, âas ifâ, Felstiner argues, Celan were not âa Chagall but an effete Whistlerâ, not an artist whose work is grounded in historical trauma but an artist purveying âart for artâs sakeâ. Felstiner writes that, in the Hamburg journal Die Zeit, for instance, âa German friend of Celanâs was sympathetic yet made no mention of âTodesfugeâ or the realities conditioning the poetry â loss, death, Jewishnessâ.9 Badiouâs claims that they produce a âthought of beingâ aside, Celanâs poems, however, despite this inextricability from concrete experiences of loss, of course address philosophical questions, not least in their rendering of a thorough, dedicated engagement with Heideggerâs writings.
This chapter is oriented primarily by Badiouâs assertion that âCelan completes Heideggerâ as well as by a broader philosophical attempt to understand the nuances of what Badiou terms the poemâs âthought of beingâ. But in what immediately follows, I want to give some of the coordinates of Badiouâs engagement with Celan, starting with one of his two most in-depth readings of Celanâs poetry from Badiouâs collection of lectures The Century, including passages to which I will return at some length in Chapter 3 when discussing the particular subjective movement at stake in Badiouâs encounter with Celan here. In The Century, Badiou extrapolates his understanding of some of the constituent parts of Celanâs poetics from a comparative study of his poem âAnabasisâ (1963) and an earlier poem of the same name (from 1924) by the francophone poet Saint-John Perse.10 There are several ways in which Badiou specifies the divergence in poetics across this forty-year span, and across languages, though at all times such difference is conditioned by their respective experiences of twentieth-century violence. Badiou presents, perhaps reductively, an essentially pre-Holocaust poetics in Perse, in which a âdisjunctive synthesisâ of âspiritual vacancyâ and âepic affirmationâ sustains, in poetry, a bathetic encounter with early twentieth-century nihilism, understood by Badiou as a figure of the saturation of ânineteenth century conditionsâ (TC, 84â85). It is with undisguised disdain, some of it self-deprecating given his own colonial background, that Badiou draws out details of Perseâs childhood in Guadeloupe, as the white West-Indian son of plantation owners, followed by his six-year appointment as Secretary-General at the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as well as his self-imposed exile in 1940 to the United States. After this, claims Badiou, Perse becomes the heir to ValĂ©ry, the âofficial poet of the Republicâ, a writer of state-sanctioned poems. Perseâs biography is intended to reveal a certain orientation within language towards the violent innovations in political subjectivity emerging primarily out of Russia from 1917 onwards; he is able, in Badiouâs words, to âclearly perceiveâ âthe centuryâs epic dimensionâ, but only âfrom the recesses of his gilded armchair in a waning republicâ.
For Badiou, Perseâs poetry represents what is already deemed to exist with a verbose eloquence adequate to the engorged and self-satisfied persistence of âthe era of tranquil imperialismâ (TC, 85). Though Perse recognizes the centuryâs âepicâ dimension, the qualitative magnitude of the century is imbricated in his work only with the persistence of this imperialist âbenevolenceâ or of âwhat already isâ. In Badiouâs contemporaneous âThird Sketch of a Manifesto for Affirmationist Artâ (2003), his fifteenth axiom for âaffirmationistâ art states, contra Perse, that âit is better to do nothing than work formally toward making visible what the West declares to existâ.11 Badiouâs claim is that Perseâs poetry reinforces what is already deemed visible and i...