Left-Wing Populism

The Politics of the People

Óscar García Agustín

• Publisher: Emerald Publishing Limited
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781839092060
• eBook ISBN: 9781839092053
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Politische Freiheit

In the aftermath of the economic crisis, left-wing parties and leaders began to consider themselves populists or were labelled as such in media and public discourse. This trend can be witnessed in instances such as Syriza in Greece, Podemos in Spain, France Insoumise in France, DiEM25 at the European level and even Corbyinism in the UK. However, the problem still remains as to how we define left-wing populism in contemporary Europe as well as the main characteristics. 

This book conceptualizes left-wing populism as a combination of the populist impetus of expanding representation, through the appeal to "the people" against "the elites" and the agenda of the left to promote equality and social justice. This study undertakes an in-depth exploration into the concepts of sovereignty, class identity and "the people". 

Moreover, this book also discusses the institutional dimension of left-wing populism, in dialogue with republicanism and the international sphere, reflected in the debate between sovereignism and transnationalism. The result is an open conceptualization of left-wing populism in which populist parties acquire a hybrid form and incorporate different traditions and influences such as socialism, populism and republicanism in order to reach a social majority and expand democracy. This recent phenomenon of left-wing populism has showed potential to re-define the left-project, but also demonstrates its shortcomings regarding the scope of the political change and its capacity to make politics in a different manner, by and for the people. This invaluable text will prove an essential read for those in the fields of political theory and contemporary political studies.

1

The Left-Wing Populist Wave in Europe

Although the populist turn from left parties in Europe can be traced back several years, the window of opportunity opened up by the post-2008 left-wing populist moment (Jäger, 2019) sharply strengthens that tendency. The combination of economic and political crises made it possible for radical left-wing parties to expand their electoral support. Those parties assumed a populist appeal (March & Keith, 2016) combining the popular disaffection toward political leaders with the rejection of austerity politics. In the beginning of 2015, left-wing populism reached its peak. Syriza won the elections in Greece, and Podemos was leading some polls in Spain and pursued to be the alternative to the government of the conservative Popular Party. The political environment was permeated by the irruption of a new generation of politicians, contrary to the establishment parties, and the creation of a new political space (adding the bottom vs top approach to the traditional left vs right wing) which traditional parties should learn how to address. It became quite evident that populism was not a far-right wing phenomenon in Europe anymore and the option of a progressive populism shook the political stage. Marina Prentoulis and Lasse Thomassen capture the political vibrations of that moment and the impression that left-wing populism could introduce an alternative path to be followed by the European left:

Three days before the election, on 22 January, a big Syriza rally in Athens was addressed not only by the leader, Alexis Tsipras, but also by the leader of the Spanish Podemos party, Pablo Iglesias. Both represent a new discourse putting democracy, participation and the rights of the people at the centre of their rhetoric. They speak neither in the name of invisible market forces nor in the name of particular classes. They do not claim to represent only particular groups - the unemployed, students, workers, women, and so on - instead they speak in the name of the people. This is what makes them populist, and this is what infuriates other parties, both right and left. (Prentoulis & Thomassen, 2015)

Luke March and Daniel Keith (2016) comment that times of crisis usually do not benefit the left because the voters opt for the safety and stability attributed to right-wing parties and shun any type of “radicalism.” Moreover, the left tends to emphasize the ideological content and programs and lack the focus on identities and people's emotions, which is the political terrain of the right and far-right parties. The strong ideological identity of the radical left hinders larger identifications, despite the general disenchantment with the mainstream political parties. The populist appellation offers a different way of dealing with the crisis by embracing a more pragmatic approach and by enabling the creation of a new political space through the sharp distinction between “the people” and “the elite,” the transversal and across-classes project, the mitigated ideological factor, the introduction of a less militant language, and the openness to discussing controversial left topics such as patriotism.

Populism became then part of the left-wing parties' strategies, values, and sometimes organizational form but did not replace the core left principles or identity. There is not a single party which can be characterized as purely populist. Both the national context and the internal dynamics within each party are important to understanding the differences between left-wing populist parties. Furthermore, the transnational dimension should not be ignored. The mutual inspiration between these parties, the contact between their leaders, and the shared atmosphere of struggling against a common enemy, incarnated especially until 2015 by the Troika, have contributed to developing a common ground for a European left-wing populism. There are, indeed, four moments which define the left-wing populist practices in Europe and the scope and influence achieved during the 2011–2019 period:

• The electoral victory of Syriza in January 2015 in Greece, completing the move from a marginal radical left party to a mass popular party;
• The spectacular irruption and growth of Podemos in Spain in 2014 as a brand-new political party connected with the previous anti-austerity and pro-radical democracy social movements;
• The good electoral results obtained by France Insoumise (Unbowed France) in 2017 after a tight competition. The main adversaries were the extreme center by Emmanuel Macron's new party En Marche! and the right-wing populism by Marine Le Pen;
• Jeremy Corbyn became the new leader of the Labour Party in 2015, supported by the activists of Momentum and defeating the establishment within the party.

These parties present commonalities but also their own specificities as left-wing populist, including different degrees of populism which have been somewhat debated in the case of Corbyn. Other radical left parties (following here Luke March's term) adopted left-wing populism with more or less success: from parties increasing their parliamentary representation, e.g., Red-Green Alliance (RGA) in Denmark, to those who obtained low electoral support, such as Razem (Together) and LIVRE in Portugal, highly influenced by Podemos. However, until now mainly those four parties (Syriza, Podemos, France Insoumise, and Corbyn's Labour) have steered the course for left-wing populism in Europe. The case of DiEM25 (Democracy in Europe Movement) as transnational left-wing populism should be added to the list as a step toward developing populism beyond national borders. Finally, left-wing populism exists at the municipal (like Ada Colau in Barcelona) and regional levels (with Más Madrid, the party established by the founder of Podemos, Iñigo Errejón, in Madrid). I will present some of the main features of European left-wing populism, but before it is necessary to refer briefly to Latin American left-wing populism because it has been very influential in Europe and represents the attempt to develop populism in government, and not just in opposition.

1.1 From Latin America to Europe

When left-wing populism in Europe gained visibility, the cycle of the progressive governments in Latin America was in crisis and the new right was on their way to take power. The Latin American experience was interesting because left-wing populism was developed while Europe witnessed the emergence of right-wing populism, and populism was only associated with nationalism and xenophobia. Furthermore, left-wing populism went beyond protest and became parties in government, including a wide ideological diversity from radical to pragmatic or center-left. In this regard, populism was understood as a progressive force to expand the demos and radicalize democracy and aimed to govern, not resigned to be a mere symptom of outrage or discontent without any institutional translation.

When analyzing the causes of the emergence of left-wing populism in Latin America, some characteristics looked quite akin to postcrisis Europe: the economic crisis (and the role played by international organizations), the crisis of representation, de-ideologization, electoral volatility, and the indifference or lack of trust of people in party politics (Roberts, 2012). However, the political translation from one continent to another is quite complicated. Parties like Syriza, Podemos, and France Insoumise mirrored the populist governments in Ecuador, Bolivia, Brazil, Venezuela, or Argentina. The connections have been particularly close in the case of Podemos and of Mélenchon. Besides the political contacts and inspiration, the intellectual exchange has also been crucial. Left-wing populism in Europe expected to learn from the journey from opposition to government as made in Latin America. The main aspect adopted by the European left-wing populism is the hegemonic operation depicted by Álvaro García Linera, the Bolivian vice president, as the transformation of the social majority into political majority (Schavelzon & Webber, 2018). The populist appellation was identified as an efficient way of articulating social demands and obtaining a sufficient electoral majority.

Three differences have impeded reaching a similar electoral success. The first is the existence of multiparty and two-party systems (or two-party systems in transition to multiparty ones) instead of presidential systems where the president possesses more power. In the French case, Mélenchon's party, despite the good results, was still the fourth most voted force and could not make it to the second electoral round. The second is the stronger institutional and constitutional framework in Europe which would make it difficult to see constituent processes like those of Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador when new constitutions were enacted by constituent assemblies. The possibilities of legislative change look more modest in Europe and limited probably to reforms of the preexisting order. Finally, the progressive cycle in Latin America had a regional dimension in which new regional organizations such as ALBA, UNASUR, and CELAC were promoted to develop regional interdependency and political autonomy and enhance an international platform for the progressive governments. In Europe, the international cooperation happens within the EU and the lack of left-wing governments, with the exception of Syriza, does not contribute at all to imagining a different kind of regional cooperation. Nor is there a strong conflictual relation with an external country, as it happens in Latin America with the United States.

The Latin American roots of the European left-wing populism are relevant, despite happening in different spaces and times, but the connection with governments from Latin America has been used as an easy tool by the media to discredit left-wing parties. Podemos has often been accused of working for dictatorships and trying to import the Bolivarian model to Spain. The current situation in Venezuela under Nicolás Maduro's government has frequently been used in the media to illustrate which disastrous consequences populism would have in Spain. The European politicians have not been capable of projecting a more critical approach to the Latin American experience. The focus on the hegemonic articulation to gain political power or some measures like the negotiation of the debt might have led to the lack of critical considerations regarding issues such as the predominant role of the leader, the difficulties for populism in the government to articulate and respond to new democratic demands (Mazzolini, 2015) or the reduction of any form of participation to the plebiscite. The Latin American legacy has also been discussed between those who warn against the devastating consequences of left-wing populism in Latin America (Rovira, 2018) and those who advocate for a more complex debate without generalizations (Wolff, 2018). In any case, although the conditions of both types of left-wing populism are different and they cannot reproduce the same trajectories, it is important to notice the relevance played by Latin American left-wing populism as a project for social majorities with less ideological footprint. From the experience of parties like Podemos, it is clear that they bring to Spain some refreshing and original modes of reformulating left politics but also some of the most problematic ones, like reducing the political struggle to the hegemonic one and the combination of the socialist and national popular. These aspects have hindered the exploration of other paths such as cosmopolitanism and transnationalism (Cava, 2015), barely weighed by the European left-wing populism.

1.2 European Left-wing Populism: Main Features

Based on the experiences of the main left-wing populist parties, there are a series of features which cannot be applied to all the populist practices but which nonetheless point to a new political direction. I consider these five characteristics - although more can be added - to be useful to understanding the extent of left-wing populism in Europe: the response to the crisis of social democracy; the close relation with social movements and activists and the experimental forms of party organization; the positioning toward right-wing populism; the possibility of a populism from the center-left and not exclusively from the radical left; and the central role attributed to political leadership.

1.2.1 Alternative to Social Democracy

Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) dominated the political stage in the late 1970s and early 1980s, but later, say Yannis Stavrakakis and Giorgos Katsambekis (2014), the party moved during the 1990s “from populism to modernization.” The demands for non-privileged and the defense of popular sovereignty and national independence against the establishment were abandoned, and PASOK gradually embraced neoliberalism. It exemplifies the overall shift in Europe from social democracy to social liberalism whose major representative was Tony Blair and his Third Way. The Greek party system was a polarized two-party system where the center-left PASOK and the center-right New Democracy (ND) rotated and ended up collaborating after 2011 (Kioupkiolis & Katsambekis, 2018). The victory of Syriza entailed the end of years of the two-party system, and the term “Pasokization” (Douzinas, 2017) entered the international political lexicon to designate the collapse of the social democratic party Pasok. Based on the crisis of social democracy in Europe, left-wing populism developed the idea of Pasokization applicable to other countries. Yanis Varoufakis (2016a) warned that the best option for Podemos in Spain was to manage to rise from third to second place and push the Socialist Party to a similar situation to the one of PASOK or the Socialist Party in France.

The possibility of social democratic parties ending as an irrelevant electoral force would provide the opportunity to shape a left-wing populism for the majority. Being still a radical left party but undertaking a transversal and expansive electoral strategy, left-wing populism aspired to occupy and redefine the position of the social democracy. Although some social democratic parties lost electoral support and their centrality within the party system, like in Greece and France, the social democracy has proven to have a consolidated electoral basis and has returned to the government as in Denmark and Spain. In other countries, the disastrous electoral results of social democracy have not led to a left-wing breakthrough, as it happened with the extraordinary results by the Greens in the Netherlands and the social democratic downturn. The failure of the hypothesis of Pasokization (left-wing parties becoming the first or second most voted political force) reduced the ambitions pursued by left-wing parties to be capable of defeating the “parties of the establishment” like left-wing populism did in Latin America.

1.2.2 Alternative to Right-wing Populism

The decline of social democratic parties in some countries invited to explore electoral terrains beyond those, more marginalized, expected for the radical left. However, there is an important factor to take into account. Besides the loss of electoral support by social democracy, the far right, embracing right-wing populism, has become, in some countries, a remarkable political force through the combination of antimigration and xenophobic attitudes and the reference to the lack of security suffered by the “losers of globalization” or the working class. France Insoumise has dealt with the complicated panorama of distinguishing itself from the declining social democracy and right-wing populism and, at the same time, appealing to their voters or former voters. Moreover, Macron reacted quite quickly to the crisis of the center-left and center-right and settled his own personalized party (Rahat & Kenig, 2018) and competed electorally with a more flexible, participatory, and vertical platform in contrast to the traditional parties. The situation of France thus illustrates the increasing personalization of politics.

Jean-Luc Mélenchon was member of the Socialist Party from 1976 and was Minister of Vocational Education (2000–2002) in the government of Lionel Jospin. He left the party and launched the Left Party, was candidate for the Left Front in 2012, and ran for the France Insoumise in 2017. He is a career politician, coming from mainstream politics, and always on the left-wing of the Socialist Party (Marlière, 2019). Since the shift from Left Front to France Insoumise, Mélenchon abandoned strong ideological left identities and decided to compete within the axes bottom vs top and old vs new politics instead of the left vs top opposition (Fernández-Vázquez, 2019). The irony, highlighted by Philippe Marlière (2017), is that sociologically Mélenchon's electorate is left-wing and their vote is a class vote against the right and extreme right. This shows how the axis left vs right is still sociologically relevant, although the populist discourse can appeal to disenchanted or abstention voters. The main issue at stake is whether left-wing populism is the alternative to right-wing populism. The best option for Mélenchon is to reach the two-candidate round and compete with Le Pen (Lichfield, 2018). The possibilities of defeating a moderate candidate, like Macron, look quite remote. The opposition between left- and right-wing populism, even in the case of the presidential system where the options are better, fosters the opposition extreme vs moderate and blurs the left vs right or bottom vs top confrontation. Therefore, it would be wrong to reduce left-wing populism to the contention of the right-wing populism or the appropriation of their tools. Some social democratic parties have already incorporated some of the right-wing populism visions and values on migration (Agustín & Jørgensen, 2019), and that can hardly lead to an alternative. Left-wing populism is a response to the crisis of representation and an attempt to expand the demos (and obviously the electoral basis), whose project is anchored in the left when appealing, at the same time, to larger constituencies that do not necessarily identify themselves with the left.

1.2.3 Center-left Wing Populism

Left-wing populism is usually applied to parties placed on the radical left, but the question of whether it can be expanded to the center-left and how is relevant to address. The immediate reaction would be positive since populism is present in varying degrees in all kinds of politics (Hansen, 2017), and center-left parties are not an exception. The issue is rather how populist center-left parties are and can become; which features they integrate; and how they relate to other left-wing populisms. The use of populism can be quite temporarily limited to certain political conjunctures. The example of Pedro Sánchez (Agustín & Briziarelli, 2018b) from the Spanish social democratic party illustrates not only how the populist strategy was deployed to defeat the internal establishment within the Socialist Party and winning the general secretary seat but also how he later returned to more traditional discourses and strategies characteristic of the social democratic party.

Sánchez was inspired by Jeremy Corbyn who has provoked the discussion about a center-left populism. On the one hand, Corbyn was supported by Momentum, self-defined as “a people-powered, grassroots movement working to transform Britain in the interests of the many, not the few” (n.d.). Momentum connects with the idea of movement party promoting participation and doing politics from below. On the other hand, Corbyn has targeted austerity politics as responsible for the crisis and divided the political conflict between the few and the many. Doreen Massey made a populist reading of Corbyn, in line with Laclau, as signifier for a “whole range of pent-up demands” (2015, p. 10). Corbyn's first speech of the 2017 General Election reflected the division between “the people” and “the establishment” and the fixation of a chain of equivalences:

But of course, they [the media and the establishment] do not want us to win. Because when we win it is the people, not the powerful, who win. The nurse, the teacher, the small trader, the build...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Endorsement
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• About the Author
• Why Left-Wing Populism?
• 1. The Left-Wing Populist Wave in Europe
• 2. The People and Popular Sovereignty
• 3. Class and Migration
• 4. Nationalism and Patriotism
• 5. Institutions and Republicanism
• 6. Sovereignism and Transnationalism
• Five Dilemmas of Left-Wing Populism
• References
• Index