Value and Vulnerability

An Interfaith Dialogue on Human Dignity

Matthew R. Petrusek,Jonathan Rothchild

• Publisher: University of Notre Dame Press
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780268106683
• Topic: Théologie et religion
• Subtopic: Déontologie et religion

Value and Vulnerability brings together scholars of many religions—including Catholicism, Buddhism, Judaism, Hinduism, Eastern Orthodoxy, Protestantism, Islam, and Humanism—to identify and examine conceptions and interpretations of dignity within different religious and philosophical perspectives and their applications to contemporary issues of conflict, such as gendered, religious, and racial violence, immigration, ecology, and religious peacemaking. Value and Vulnerability also includes response chapters that clarify and refine these interpretations from interfaith perspectives. Through this volume, Matthew R. Petrusek and Jonathan Rothchild offer recommendations for advancing the conversation about dignity within and among traditions and for addressing urgent global issues and threats to dignity. Together, Petrusek, Rothchild, and the contributors create a comparative framework constituted by seven questions: What sources justify dignity's existence, nature, and purpose? What is the relationship between the divine and human dignity? What is the relationship between dignity and the human body? Is dignity vulnerable or invulnerable to moral harm? Is dignity inherent or attained? Is dignity universal and equal? Is dignity practical? Through its systematic, comparative, interdisciplinary, and practical dimensions, Value and Vulnerability fills in the gaps in contemporary theological, philosophical, and ethical discourses on dignity.

Contributors: Matthew R. Petrusek, Jonathan Rothchild, Darlene Fozard Weaver, Kristin Scheible, Karen B. Enriquez, Elliot N. Dorff, Daniel Nevins, Christopher Key Chapple, David P. Gushee, Aristotle Papanikolaou, Zeki Saritoprak, William Schweiker, Hille Haker, Nicholas Denysenko, Terrence L. Johnson, William O'Neill, Victor Carmona, Dawn Nothwehr, OSF, and Ellen Ott Marshall.

Part I

TRADITIONS

INTRODUCTION TO PART I

The contributors in part I examine human dignity from the lenses of eight traditions. Each represents an interpretation of a tradition, but all the authors engage key concepts, themes, and thinkers that have shaped that tradition’s conception of dignity. Some treatments chart typologies or trajectories of thought, and others include practical applications and case studies. Traditions are compared by twos, and there is a response for each pair that comparatively addresses and analyzes the pairing with an eye to conceptual and methodological similarities and differences.

In “Dignity: A Catholic Perspective,” Darlene Fozard Weaver draws on major papal encyclicals and contemporary theologians to describe and analyze a fourfold meaning of dignity: affirmation of human worth, encapsulation of the human good, moral criterion that constrains and entitles, and moral expression of Christian humanism. She views dignity as a value commitment of inclusive regard for the equal moral worth of fellow beings and a corresponding responsibility to dignify our own and others’ lives. Unpacking anthropological, practical, and revelatory dimensions of dignity and their dynamic connections to sin and grace, she argues that Catholic perspectives seek to defend dignity and all stages of life and to bring together prophetic resistance and moral consensus. Weaver notes certain tensions within Catholic perspectives (e.g., regarding human capacities, the role of experience in moral judgments), and she identifies Catholic and philosophical critiques of various expressions of human dignity. She concludes that a relational understanding of the imago Dei captures a broader range of thinking about dignity than the more substantialist account, which is capacity-based.

In “Dignity: A Buddhist Perspective,” Kristin Scheible systematically addresses the challenges of describing a Buddhist conception of dignity in light of Buddhism’s foundational rejection of the existence of a permanent “self ” and the existence of, in Scheible’s words, a “creator/adjudicator” God. In seeking to identify conceptual resources for comparison with other religious and philosophical traditions on the question of dignity’s existence and nature, Scheible identifies a number of possibilities, including priya/piya (what is most dear), sattva/satta (sentience, or sentient being), anātman/anattā (no-self), pratītyasamutpāda (interconnectedness), and pāramitā/pārami (perfections or virtues), among others. Scheible concludes that although “dignity” as it is typically conceived in Western theological and philosophical thought may not be native to Buddhism, it is not entirely foreign, either. Moreover, she argues that the vulnerability inherent in the distinctively Buddhist conception of “self-less dignity” provides a promising possibility not only for (re)defining dignity but also for demonstrating how and why dignity urgently needs protection and nourishment.

In “Catholic and Buddhist Perspectives on Dignity: A Response,” comparative theologian Karen Enriquez examines their analogous descriptions of being human, including a distinctive value or worth to being human that is tied to some innate capacity or potential to fulfill what is seen as the “good” in each of the two traditions. She also puts their differences in constructive dialogue; she asserts, for example, that Weaver’s discussion of the role of perception could be complemented by dialogue with Buddhism and its analysis of the human condition in terms of ignorance or mis-knowing. Enriquez contends that exchanges regarding spiritual practices are a fruitful activity for Buddhist – Catholic dialogue.

In “Dignity: A Jewish Perspective,” Elliot Dorff and Daniel Nevins provide a close textual analysis of Hebrew scripture and various classical and contemporary rabbinic writings to demonstrate how central the principle of dignity—ultimately grounded in the affirmation of the imago Dei present in each human being—is to Jewish moral reasoning. Indeed, Dorff and Nevins highlight how considerations of dignity can frequently allow for actions that might otherwise “violate” rabbinic law, especially to avoid situations of potential humiliation. Though “divine dignity,” as Dorff and Nevins describe it, always supersedes human dignity, they argue that the tradition has made it clear that humans must never be treated as if they only had instrumental value, especially the most vulnerable. Dorff and Nevins conclude the chapter by identifying how this conception of dignity informs Jewish moral thinking on questions of war, domestic abuse, abortion, homosexuality and gender identity, and genetic engineering.

In “Dignity: A Hindu Perspective,” Chris Chapple provides a broad overview of classical and contemporary sources to highlight the various meanings of dignity within the Hindu tradition. Hinduism, Chapple explains, identifies inherent value within each individual, yet, unlike many more Western conceptions of dignity, locates that value in relationship to other individuals, often within a complex and sometimes hierarchical web of social, culturally mediated relations. Above all, he emphasizes, Hinduism conceives of dignity as the state of being in which the “self ” is freed from false identities and worldly attractions. In light of his analysis of the Bhagavad Gītā, the practices of yoga, and the theology of Mahatma Gandhi and his contemporary followers, Chapple demonstrates the promise—and limitations—of the Hindu conception of dignity for helping us address many of the conflictual issues that Western understandings of dignity have helped generate—for example, the modern economy (and its excesses), technology, and the definition of “medicine.”

Chapter 6, “Jewish and Hindu Perspectives on Dignity: Responses,” consists of responses by Elliot Dorff and Chris Chapple to one another’s chapters. In his response, Dorff suggests that putative differences between Hinduism and Judaism may not be as clear-cut as imagined. Dorff outlines areas of divergence and convergence between the two traditions with respect to a wide range of issues. He undertakes detailed comparative analysis involving Hindu and Jewish conceptions of the uniqueness of identity, work, medicine, education, law, character education, marriage, endogamy, infertility, children, groups within the community, changing social status, and humans and other animals. In his own response, Chapple similarly explores the similarities and differences between Judaism and Hinduism. He focuses on historical developments, distinct sources, and theological assumptions that inform the two traditions’ understandings of dignity. Chapple comparatively discusses the practical cases of war, domestic violence, marital and family patterns, abortion, sexual orientation, and genetic engineering.

In “Dignity: A Protestant Perspective,” David Gushee takes as his point of departure that dignity is linked to the central claim that life is sacred, which he locates in the nexus of the biblical faiths of Judaism and Christianity. He addresses questions of agency and justification in order to develop a warrant for human dignity. Contrasting his position with approaches in Catholicism, social constructionism, and the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Gushee grounds his warrant for human dignity in a theocentric account of divine freedom and the incarnate Christ whereby humans cannot forfeit their dignity. In revisiting his earlier normative account of dignity in The Sacredness of Human Life,¹ Gushee considers the case studies of torture and LGBT rights in light of his divine revelation – based account of dignity. As he wrestles with ideas about theological warrants, he concludes that the robust conception of human dignity and sacredness of life is only the beginning of moral inquiry and action.

In “Dignity: An Orthodox Perspective,” Aristotle Papanikolaou critically analyzes the construal of dignity in an official document—The Russian Orthodox Church’s Basic Teaching on Human Dignity, Freedom and Rights—on human rights issued in 2008 by the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC). The document critiques Western, liberal understandings and secularized standards of human rights and dignity. Papanikolaou argues that the document attempts to define a morally homogenous account of the person that distinguishes it from the West’s account; moreover, he disagrees with the ROC’s Orthodox notion of human rights. He marshals arguments regarding the Orthodox theology of personhood, drawing on the work of Lossky and Zizioulas and examining the distinction between image and likeness in Orthodox theology. He assesses whether or not the ROC’s conclusions are the inevitable result of Orthodox understandings of the human person in terms of equal worth and irreducible particularity. He determines that the ROC’s mistake is in eliding the ecclesial and the political and seeing the latter as that whose purpose is to facilitate divine–human communion.

In “Protestant and Orthodox Perspectives on Dignity: A Response,” Matthew Petrusek argues that dignity offers an excellent heuristic for identifying the two traditions’ underlying theological similarities and differences while demonstrating, more broadly, how much theology makes a difference for ethics. He contrasts Gushee’s appeal to the image and likeness of God with Papanikolaou’s differentiation between image and likeness to assert that Gushee appears to advance a “relational” conception of dignity, while Papanikolaou advances one that is both “relational” and “inherent.” Through a detailed analysis of the arguments developed by Gushee and Papanikolaou, Petrusek notes subtle features that challenge facile assumptions about these traditions.

In “Dignity: An Islamic Perspective,” Zeki Saritoprak appeals to classical Islamic sources, especially commentaries on the Qur’an, to express dignity as supplication to and relationship with the divine and as the superiority of human beings over other creatures. Concepts such as al-ins (humankind, but also intimate friend), khalifa (God’s representative on earth or God’s vicegerents), and the children of Adam convey a rich anthropology whereby human beings strive toward perfection, use reason to distinguish between right and wrong, and deserve—both believers and nonbelievers, as illustrated by the Prophet’s concern for the other—respect and honor. Human dignity is dynamic because it is linked to learning and freely developing one’s capacities, yet it is also vulnerable because of Satan and the dualistic nature of humanity (angelic and satanic). Saritoprak notes passages in the Qur’an where human beings remain accountable to God, fellow human beings, and the environment. Respect for dignity must be universal; the Qur’an repudiates claims of superiority through ancestors or tribes.

In “Dignity: A Humanistic Perspective,” William Schweiker situates the idea of human dignity within the networks of thought and life broadly called “humanistic,” including religious, secular, and “antihumanistic” forms. He maps a typology of humanistic positions with respect to whether dignity is a term of “status” or “constitutive” of the human being and conjointly whether it is conceived in religious or nonreligious terms. Schweiker argues that what is distinctive about a humanist conception of dignity is the framework of convictions that motivate a life dedicated to respecting and enhancing the dignity of human lives. Engaging conceptual and social paradoxes related to dignity, Schweiker charts ways in which humanists affirm responsibility for the integrity of life as basic mode. He describes the ontological, epistemological, existential, and axiological convictions shared by humanists, and he concludes by advocating for a form of humanism that interrelates human dignity with the worth of nonhuman life.

In “Islamic and Humanist Perspectives on Dignity: A Response,” Jonathan Rothchild thinks that the accounts of Schweiker and Saritoprak similarly uphold two central assumptions: (1) dignity is intrinsic but vulnerable, and (2) upholding dignity requires attending to personal aspects (cultivating virtue) and interpersonal aspects (granting respect and undertaking responsibility). He then assesses the ethical implications of these assumptions in light of Protestant perspectives on disability. He explores the history of Islamic humanism and contemporary debates about human rights. Rothchild contends that a conversation between humanism and Islam is needed in our contemporary context for at least two important reasons: it can help mediate current disagreements between Islamic thinkers and Western, liberal thinkers on the nature and status of human rights, and it can challenge long-standing, Eurocentric biases embedded in Western humanistic accounts of dignity.

NOTE

1. David Gushee, The Sacredness of Human Life (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2013).

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DIGNITY

A Catholic Perspective

Darlene Fozard Weaver

Every day and across the globe, human life and well-being are violated on a massive scale. As many as 1.6 billion people live in poverty, many of them children.¹ More than 11 million Syrians have been killed or forced to flee their homeland; many refugees who survive their journey face considerable challenges in camps or in receiving countries.² Millions of people face unimaginable horrors from racism, homophobia, vi...