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CHAPTER 1
The Build-up to War
The roots of the Battle of Britain go back long before the outbreak of the Second World War. Some authors on the Battle even go back to the German raids on mainland Britain in the latter part of the First World War. The mighty Zeppelin airships and Belgian-based Gotha heavy bombers had struck terror into the civilian populace, generating a demand for effective air defences, while causing little physical damage. These raids were certainly one of the factors which led to the establishment and survival of an independent Royal Air Force, but their further relevance is at best questionable.
There is little doubt, however, that the punitive and humiliating peace (and the impossibly swingeing reparations bill) imposed on Germany at Versailles in June 1919 left a festering sense of resentment and a simmering desire for revenge, and for the recovery of areas like the Saar and Alsace Lorraine. But many in Britain and France had wanted to âSqueeze Germany until the Pips Squeak!â and were unable to see that they were creating perfect conditions for totalitarianism and dictatorship. Against this background the rise of Adolf Hitler and the Nazi party should not be surprising.
Once Hitlerâs Nazi party became the largest force in the German Reichstag in 1932 (a democratic achievement, it should be noted), German rearmament gathered pace. It became increasingly likely that war would result from Germanyâs efforts to overturn what was seen by many as an unjust and humiliating peace treaty. Germany withdrew from the League of Nations Disarmament Conference on 14 October 1933, and a new air force, the Luftwaffe, began to be formed under Herman GĂśring (one of Hitlerâs most trusted Nazi lieutenants) and Erhard Milch, then the head of the German airline Lufthansa. Trainee pilots were given rudimentary military training (initially in secret) at gliding schools or in Russia.
Hitler, already the leader of the largest party in the Reichstag, became Chancellor in 1933 at President von Hindenburgâs invitation, on the resignation of von Schleicher. The Chancellor was the effective head of government in Germany, though the ageing and ailing von Hindenburg remained the nominal head of state. Hitler combined the offices of President and Chancellor when he became FĂźhrer in August 1934 on the death of Hindenburg. German rearmament and militarisation gathered speed, and soon became sufficiently frightening to draw a response in the rest of Europe. Pacifism seemed to have had its day, and comfortable assumptions like the ten year rule (the assumption, renewed annually, that there would be no war for a decade) were abandoned.
When Hitler announced the existence of his Luftwaffe on 27 March 1935, he claimed parity with Britainâs Royal Air Force (though this was an idle boast, since most of the Luftwaffeâs aeroplanes were trainers) and stated his intention to achieve parity with France. The British and French failed to differentiate propaganda from fact, and Hitlerâs boasting merely served to spur further, and rather more serious, expansion.
Hitlerâs aims to re-establish a âGreater Germanyâ with borders broadly equivalent to those existing before 1918 were achieved without much bloodshed. He gained control of the Saarland following a plebiscite, and marched into the Rhineland unopposed. But this represented the re-incorporation of areas which most observers viewed as being ârightly Germanâ and few made a fuss. Unfortunately, the lack of opposition encouraged Hitler to annex Austria in the so-called âAnschlussâ of March 1938. The Austrians were, of course, a Germanic people, speaking German, and the Nazis (and their Anschluss) did enjoy considerable support there. There was thus little international reaction.
The next step was taken in September 1938, when the German army marched into the Sudetenland, border areas of Czechoslovakia occupied by so-called Sudeten Germans. This was arguably Hitlerâs biggest gamble, since many believed that he would have had to back down had Britain and France stood up to him. But instead, a cynical promise not to invade the remainder of Czechoslovakia ensured British and French complicity in this latest piece of German aggression. Britainâs Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, returned to Croydon from the negotiations at Munich waving his worthless piece of paper and prophesying âpeace in our timeâ. Whether or not he believed Herr Hitlerâs assurances is perhaps a moot point, since Britain was similarly unprepared for war.
Five months later, in March 1939, Hitler did invade the rest of Czechoslovakia, whose border defences had already been lost along with the Sudetenland. But although Czechoslovakia was a sovereign country, on which Germany had no legitimate claim, it was a relatively new invention, and the international community again stood by and watched as Hitler invaded.
Hitler was then in no position to fight had Britain or France intervened, and the invasion of Czechoslovakia is sometimes seen as having been his greatest gamble. The lack of response from Britain and France was noted, and virtually condemned Poland to the same fate. In 1939, when briefing his commanders for the assault on Poland, Hitler reassured them by saying: âI have witnessed the miserable worms Churchill and Daladier in Munich; they will be too cowardly to attack and will go no further than blockade.â
EUROPE AT WAR
By mid-1939, Hitlerâs biggest remaining grievance was the continued separation of East Prussia from the rest of Germany, the two countries separated by Polandâs occupation of the German-speaking port of Danzig and the corridor of territory to it. Had Hitlerâs growing threats against Poland been acceded to, there is some doubt as to whether war was inevitable. Some would suggest that his subsequent campaigns against Britain, France and the Low Countries were a direct response to the Anglo-French declaration of war, and that he was essentially content with his western borders. Others would maintain that Hitlerâs ambitions were more grandiose, and that he always harboured designs on the whole of Poland and on a swathe of territory further east to provide Lebensraum (living space) for the Germanic, Aryan people. It is also argued that his hatred of Bolshevism was sufficient to make war with Russia inevitable. But any analysis of Hitlerâs war aims is fraught with difficulties. His stated intentions were often confused and contradictory, and there was little to differentiate planning options from concrete intentions. Compounding the problems of interpretation, the Third Reich operated with an astonishing degree of freedom from written orders, with Hitlerâs subordinates often left free to interpret their masterâs wishes.
But, at the end of the day, such speculation is no more than an interesting diversion. Much to Hitlerâs astonishment, especially after their failure to react to his seizure of Czechoslovakia, Britain and France fulfilled their treaty obligations when he invaded Poland on 1 September 1939. Britain issued an ultimatum for Germany to withdraw, and then declared war on 3 September. This was something of a forlorn gesture, since Britain felt that it could not actually do anything to intervene directly on Polandâs behalf. Britain thus found itself forced to stand by and watch impotently as Hitlerâs Blitzkrieg began. It is arguable that with Hitlerâs attention turned to the East, Britain and France could, and should, have attacked Germany in the West, forcing him to dilute his attack on Poland. Whether that would have changed the outcome, and whether the British or the French were in any position to intervene in September 1939 will forever be a matter for speculation and debate. But the Franco-British declaration of war changed the whole situation. Even this half-hearted response forced Hitler to plan a knock-out blow in the West before he could turn his attentions towards what had always been his primary target â Russia.
Hitlerâs previous territorial gains had been made without a shot being fired, and the Luftwaffe had played only the most minor part (transporting 2000 troops to Vienna during Germanyâs annexation of Austria in 1938, for example). But in Poland the Germans expected, and met, fierce resistance.
Without assistance, Poland succumbed quickly, although the efforts of its armed forces (cavalry against tanks, obsolete PZL P-11 open-cockpit fighters against Messerschmitt Bf 109s) soon became the stuff of legend. But it would be wrong to accept the simplified view of the campaign, since the battle for Poland was far from being a walkover. The out-numbered and out-gunned Polish air force imposed heavy cost on the invaders, particularly when the fighters were cut free from their rigid links to specific regionally deployed ground formations. Even though the PZL P.11 was slower than any of the frontline German combat types (with the exception of the Junkers Ju 87 and Henschel Hs 123 and Hs 126), it performed surprisingly well. Only 12 P.11 pilots were killed, seven posted missing, and 11 wounded, while 116 of the aircraft were downed (including eight to friendly ground fire). In turn, they accounted for 116 enemy aircraft, and on one occasion a P.11 pilot (Lt Col Pamula of No.114 Squadron) shot down a Ju 87, and a Heinkel He 111 before running out of ammunition. He then rammed an escorting Bf 109 and baled out to fight again! Poland lost 264 aircraft to enemy action, with 116 more fleeing to Romania, and it lost 234 aircrew killed or missing in action. Some pilots escaped to France and Britain, where many continued the fight. The Luftwaffe lost 285 aircraft (with 279 more suffering severe damage), and 189 aircrew killed, 224 missing, and 126 wounded. But while the campaign was not quite the walkover that has sometimes been portrayed, the end was inevitable, even before Russia invaded from the east on 17 September. Warsaw finally fell on 27 September.
Hitler next turned his attentions to Scandinavia, launching an invasion of Norway aimed at safeguarding supplies of Swedish iron ore to the Ruhr, and at securing his left flank for his planned assault on Russia. Hitler launched his invasion of Denmark and southern Norway on 9 April 1940, and six days later British land forces went ashore at Narvik. Britain had already planned a limited occupation of northern Norway to deny Germany the use of Narvik, a strategically vital port giving open access to the North Sea and a potential base for German naval raiders. Most of the British Gladiator aircraft supporting the troops were destroyed on the ground during the next few days, and most of the force was evacuated between 30 May and 2 April. The Gladiators did fly 49 sorties, however, recording 37 attacks on enemy aircraft and achieving six confirmed victories and eight âprobablesâ. The last three aircraft had been destroyed by 27 April.
The assault on Narvik was renewed with newly arrived Gloster Gladiators and Hawker Hurricanes, and a mixed force of Norwegian, British, Polish and French units finally took the port. The new batch of No.263 Squadron Gladiators flew 389 sorties and gained 26 kills in 69 combats, while the Hurricanes clocked up 26 combats, achieving 11 confirmed kills and eight probables. Hitler was furious, and on 5 May, with the deadlines for his offensive against France and the Low Countries getting closer, he ordered General Stumpff to intensify his attacks on the British enclave at Narvik. Even without the Battle of France diverting away resources and attention, sustaining the isolated garrison at Narvik was never going to be a long-term option, and it was evacuated on 8 June. The eight surviving Gladiators and 10 remaining Hurricanes were flown onto the aircraft carrier HMS Glorious on 7 June, but unfortunately the ship was sunk the next day, and only two of the pilots survived.
Even while the Norwegian campaign reached its closing stages, and on the very day that Chamberlain resigned (10 May), the Wehrmacht launched another lightning offensive (Blitzkrieg), this time against France and the Low Countries.
WAR IN THE WEST
Apart from the German invasion of Denmark and Norway (seen by many as a prelude to wider European conquests), things remained ominously quiet on the Western Front following the fall of Poland. At one time, Hitler had hoped to launch his assault in the West on 12 November 1939, but was persuaded to delay. During this delay each side studiously avoided overtly hostile actions, shying away from bombing enemy territory (though enemy warships and military ports were considered fair game) and conducting cursory reconnaissance missions. German bombers attacked Royal Navy warships at sea and in open harbours, but great care was taken to avoid bombs falling where they might harm civilians. Thus when Ju 88s set out for Scotland to bomb HMS Hood in the Firth of Forth on 16 October 1939, but found it in harbour at Rosyth amidst more densely populated areas, they attacked other targets still in the Firth to avoid civilian casualties. RAF bombers operated under much the same constraints in their attacks on German naval targets. Referred to in Britain as the âPhoney Warâ or âSitzkriegâ, and in France as âla DrĂ´le de Guerreâ (Joke War), the period saw Britain and France strengthening their defences. The UK provided a massive Expeditionary Force in France, including an Air Component of fighter and bomber squadrons, and a separate Advanced Air Striking Force.
CHURCHILL BECOMES PRIME MINISTER
The reputation of Neville Chamberlain, the British Prime Minister, was by now tarnished by the fiasco of the Munich negotiations (though many at the time had supported his attempts to avoid the onset of war). He came under increasing criticism in the House of Commons as the war in Norway raged. Even the Liberal leader and former Premier David Lloyd George (who had himself visited Germany and returned warmly endorsing âMr Hitlerâs great achievementsâ) commented that âThe Prime Minister has appealed for sacrifice â he should now sacrifice the seals of office.â Others were more direct. âIn the name of God, Go!â, he was told. Bowing to the inevitable Chamberlain resigned, and his Conservative government was replaced by a âNational Coalitionâ led by the Conservative First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill.
As time passed it became increasingly clear that Hitler was planning a massive attack on France, driven partly by the need to avoid fighting on two fronts when he launched his attack on Russia, and partly motivated by his desire to avenge the humiliations of the Versailles Treaty which had ended the First World War. Many Germans harboured a strong desire to take revenge on France, and to humiliate the French as they felt they had been humiliated in 1918. Starting with the Franco-Prussian War of 1871, France and Germany (or more accurately Prussia) had already fought twice within less than a century, and âround threeâ was eagerly awaited by the more bellicose members of German society and the military.
But while these attitudes were well known in France, and while even French intelligence was able to detect the massive build-up of forces along its borders, there was an underlying assumption that the vast fortresses of the Siegfried and Maginot Lines would produce a stalemate, and that any German assault would be enormously costly and doomed to eventual failure.
Thus throughout the autumn and winter of 1939 and the spring of 1940, activity on the Western Front was largely limited to the interception of enemy reconnaissance aircraft. Flying Officer W.O. âBoyâ Mould of No.1 Squadron drew first blood for the RAF, downing a Dornier Do 17 over his own airfield on 30 October. Flying Officer E.J. âCobberâ Kain shot down another on 8 November, opening what was to be an impressive score. This first engagement took place at 27,000ft and marked the highest air combat recorded to that date. On 23 November, Kain downed another Do 17 and on that same day No.73 Squadron accounted for three Do 17s, while No.1 Squadron bagged a pair of Heinkel He 111s. The tempo of air fighting increased in March 1940, giving Kain the chance to become the RAFâs first âaceâ of World War II, downing a single Bf 109 on 3 March, followed by two more on 26 March.
While Nos 1 and 73 Squadrons served with the Advanced Air Striking Force in France, and Nos 85 and 87 with the BEFâs Air Component, Fighter Command units in the UK were also getting to grips with the enemy. Nos 43, 111 and 605 Squadrons in particular saw action against German bombers and reconnaissance aircraft attempting to attack Scapa Flow, several Hurricane pilots opening their scores with Dornier Do 17s and Heinkel He 111s.
Early British Success
A number of pilots gained victories during this period, some of whom subsequently passed on their experience during the early stages of the Battle of Britain. Those who gained large numbers of successes included Flying Officer Leslie Clisby, Flight Lieutenant Peter Prosser Hanks, Flight Lieutenant Peter âJohnnyâ Walker of No.1 Squadron, Flying Officer Newell (âFannyâ) Orton, Sergeant Harold Paul of No.73 Squadron. By the time the âPhoney Warâ ended, No.1 Squadron had accounted for 26 enemy aircraft, while No.73 had downed 30.
The period of genteel jousting over the French borders came to an end on 10 May 1940, when Hitler revealed his strategy for avoiding a frontal assault on Franceâs heavily fortified frontier. He attacked through the Netherlands and Belgium, ignoring the neutral status of the two countries. The Netherlands fell after only four days, its air force being virtually annihilated on the ground, while Belgium lasted little longer. The supposedly impregnable Fort Eben Emael fell to a 55-man glider-borne assault force, cracking open the entire Belgian defences.
The Germans captured the key crossings of the Albert Canal and this allowed the Wehrmacht to continue its advance. The German forces involved in the offensive (136 Divisions) were actually smaller than those of the combined British, French, Belgian and Dutch armies which faced them. Yet they were better equipped, considerably more mobile, with more and better arm...