Problems in Value Theory

An Introduction to Contemporary Debates

Steven B. Cowan

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781350147393
• eBook ISBN: 9781350147416
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Problems in Value Theory takes a pro and con approach to central topics in aesthetics, ethics and political theory. Each chapter begins with a question: What Makes Actions Right or Wrong? Does Morality Depend on God? Do We Need Government? Contemporary philosophers with opposing viewpoints are then paired together to argue their position and raise problems with conflicting standpoints. Alongside an up-to-date introduction to a core philosophical stance, each contributor provides a critical response to their opponent and clear explanation of their view. Discussion questions are included at the end of each chapter to guide further discussion. With chapters ranging from why the government should never wage war to what is art and does morality depend on God, this introduction covers questions lying at the heart of debates about what does and does not have value.

PART ONE

Problems in Ethics and Aesthetics

Introduction to Part One

Steven B. Cowan

Axiology (or Value Theory) is the branch of philosophy that studies value. Broadly speaking, it asks questions like “What has worth or value?” and “What kinds of things are valuable?” and “What are the different sorts of value?” As for the last of these, philosophers usually make a distinction between intrinsic value and instrumental value. Something has intrinsic value if it is valuable for its own sake; it is valuable in and of itself, apart from anything else. Something has instrumental value if it is only valuable for gaining something else. A good example of something that has merely instrumental value is paper money. People value paper money not for its own sake but for what they can do with it, namely, buy other things that they value more.

But what has intrinsic value? This is the subject of intense debate among philosophers. Some argue that nothing really has intrinsic value. People might treat some things as if they had intrinsic value—that is, they may attribute intrinsic value to something, say fame or fortune or human life, but this attribution is simply a matter of preference, a preference that not everyone will share. Those who take this perspective on intrinsic value hold what is called value subjectivism. Other philosophers hold to value objectivism, contending that there are things that are intrinsically valuable in themselves independently of our preferences. Of course, value objectivists differ on what they think is objectively valuable. Some—those called value monists—think that there is only one thing that is intrinsically valuable, but they differ on what that one thing is. For example, hedonism is the view that the one intrinsically valuable thing is pleasure, while perfectionism is the view that developing those traits (whatever they are) that are distinctive of human beings is the only intrinsically valuable thing. Most philosophers, however, adhere to value pluralism, which holds that there are multiple things that are intrinsically valuable such as happiness, knowledge, human life, etc.

Besides addressing fundamental questions about the nature of value, the field of axiology has three major subdivisions. They are ethics, aesthetics, and political philosophy. Since political philosophy is a very large and complex discipline in its own right, I have devoted Part Two of the book to addressing problems in that area. Here in Part One, we will focus on matters related to ethics, aesthetics, and the difficult-to-classify but deeply existential problem concerning the meaning of human life.

Ethics

The philosophical discipline of ethics is typically divided into three subfields. Metaethics deals with fundamental questions concerning the meanings of ethical concepts such as “good,” “bad,” “right,” and “wrong,” as well as the metaphysical status of moral values (e.g., Are they subjective or objective?). Normative ethics seeks to develop and justify an ethical theory about what makes actions right or wrong and therefore delineate what our actual moral obligations are. Finally, applied ethics applies normative ethical theories to resolve real moral issues such as abortion, capital punishment, affirmative action, and so on. Part One will not include any discussion of issues in applied ethics (though the political issues discussed in Chapters 7 and 8 of Part Two could count as ethical issues). However, we will address two metaethical problems: the question of the status of moral values (specifically, the question of whether or not they are relative or objective) and the problem of the relationship between God and ethics. In between those issues, we will deal with a key debate in normative ethics over what makes actions right or wrong.

Moral Relativism versus Moral Objectivism

Surely you have noticed that people seem to have disagreements about what is right and wrong. Some people believe that abortion on demand is morally permissible, but others strongly oppose abortion. Many people believe that capital punishment is the penalty that murderers deserve while many others think the death penalty is atrocious. Homosexuality is believed by some to be morally offensive, yet others claim it is a perfectly acceptable alternative lifestyle. In some African societies, the practice of female genital mutilation is believed to be morally obligatory, but people in most other cultures find this practice to be barbaric. People in most Western and Eastern societies believe that the elderly should be protected and cared for until they die of natural causes. But in earlier Eskimo culture, the elderly were expected to leave home and family and wander into the wilderness to freeze to death when they could no longer contribute to the survival of the clan.

All these differences of opinion on moral issues have led many people to embrace moral relativism, the view that what counts as right and wrong is a matter of individual or cultural preference. For the moral relativist, there are no universally binding moral principles or values. Nothing is objectively or intrinsically right or wrong. As the definition suggests, however, there are two versions of moral relativism. Moral subjectivism sees morality as based on individual preferences. Whether or not a particular course of action is right or wrong is up to each individual person to decide for himself. Conventionalism (or cultural relativism) places the focus on groups of people, organized societies or cultures. For the conventionalist, whether or not an action is right is determined by the preferences of the culture as a whole.

The most common justification given for either subjectivism or conventionalism is the phenomenon noted earlier: there are lots of disagreements over morality. So, for example, a conventionalist might offer the following argument for his view:

Premise: Different cultures have different systems of morality.

Conclusion: Morality is a matter of cultural preferences.

There is an obvious problem with this argument, however. It is logically invalid. That is, even granting that the premise is true,¹ it simply does not follow that morality is relative to cultures. It’s possible that some cultu res get morality right and others just get it wrong. An analogy may help to get the point. It’s a fact that people disagree over the shape of the earth. The so-called Flat Earth Society (yes, it really exists) believes that the earth is flat, while the rest of us (I’m assuming that includes you) believe that the earth is round. But none of us believes that the fact that this disagreement exists implies that whether the earth is flat or round is a matter of cultural preference! No, one group has simply gotten the geological facts wrong. Likewise, the mere fact of disagreement about moral issues does not by itself prove that there is no objective truth in morality. So, despite all the apparent moral disagreement that exists, moral objectivism—the view that there are objective, universally binding moral principles—could be true.

Still, we have not proven that moral relativism is false. Morality could still be relative even if disagreements don’t prove it so. Nonetheless, the majority of philosophers (and probably most nonphilosophers, too) embrace moral objectivism. Why? Well, one reason is that moral relativism, as we have defined it, comes at a very great cost. Let us assume for the sake of argument that conventionalism is true. And let us ask, on this assumption, what else would be true? In other words, let’s ask what implications follow from conventionalism. It turns out that the implications are very difficult to accept. (Most of what follows applies, with some minor adjustments, to subjectivism.)

First, if conventionalism is true, then we cannot say, for example, that Hitler and the Nazis did anything morally wrong when they invaded and enslaved other countries and murdered six million Jews (and many millions of others, too). Why not? Because the Nazis were acting in accordance with the moral principles accepted by their culture. And as long as their culture believed that their violent actions were moral, then—if conventionalism is true—they were moral! But, surely, that cannot be right, can it?

Second, if conventionalism is true, then moral progress is logically impossible. Moral relativism will not allow us to say that one moral perspective or lifestyle or action is morally better or worse than another. So, for example, when the United States abolished slavery, we did not, indeed could not, have improved morally as a society. But, we did improve morally, didn’t we? If so, then conventionalism must be false.

Third, conventionalism implies that there are no moral disagreements. This is because moral relativism of either variety reduces moral statements to mere statements of preference. To say, for example, “Capital punishment is wrong,” simply means, for the relativist, “I (or we) don’t like capital punishment,” and to say, “Capital punishment is right,” is to say, “I (or we) like capital punishment.” But this is just like when one person says, “I like chocolate ice cream,” and another says, “I like vanilla.” They are not disagreeing with each other. They are simply stating their preferences. This implication is somewhat ironic given that the major reason given in favor of conventionalism is the fact that people of different cultures seem to disagree about morality! In any case, most of us think that people do have genuine moral disagreements (which explains why people can get very emotional about the moral issues that divide us). If real moral disagreements exist, then that spells trouble for conventionalism (and subjectivism).

There are other adverse implications and criticisms of moral relativism but these will do to show that it is problematic at best. And this is why few philosophers defend it. Nevertheless, there are many related questions that are still worth exploring. Even if we grant that moral objectivism is true, for example, it might be helpful to know why that is so. And perhaps there are other forms of moral relativism and/or other challenges to objectivism that are not subject to the criticisms outlined above.

With this in mind, in Chapter 1, Michael Ruse (Florida State University) rejects the problematic kind of moral relativism discussed above for some of the same reasons. At the level of “substantive ethics” it is not the case that “anything goes.” He argues, however, that evolutionary biology presents us with a more nuanced but real form of moral relativism. On the Darwinian theory of evolution, morality is an adaptation that aids survival just like every other human feature that has evolved. Morality, on this view, is not objective in the sense that the principles and values that comprise it have to be what they are. Morality takes the form it does because of the kinds of beings that we have evolved into. If evolution had made us different—say, more like insects—then our moral beliefs would be different and they would be “right.”

Moral objectivism is defended by Francis Beckwith (Baylor University). He begins by delineating several moral propositions—such as “It is wrong to kill human persons without justification,” and “One should not take another’s property without good cause”—that everyone (or almost everyone) intuitively knows are true. He then argues that any disagreements associated with these propositions actually presuppose an objective morality and are concerned not with the truth of the propositions per se, but with their proper application.

Normative Ethics: Consequences versus Principles

Suppose you have a friend who has just lost his job and he desperately needs some money to pay his rent this month. Out of compassion and friendship, you give him the money he needs. Your friend ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• PART ONE Problems in Ethics and Aesthetics
• PART TWO Problems in Political Philosophy
• Index
• Copyright