![]()
Part 1
INTRODUCTION
![]()
Introduction, Framework and Definitions
The first half of the twentieth century was not a happy period for China. It began with the disastrous Boxer Rebellion (1900), which saw the country invaded by the world’s eight greatest powers, followed by an extremely humiliating ‘protocol’ the next year. It ended with the victory of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), after a long period of warlord rule, Japanese invasion and civil war.
Historians nowadays are more conscious of the continuities in modern China than was once the case. In particular, the CCP’s victory, and hence the year 1949, no longer seems quite as crucial in China’s overall history as it once did. Yet both the Boxer Rebellion and the CCP’s victory are quite important enough to justify them as boundaries for a book such as this.
The first half of the twentieth century was a period of great importance for China. It witnessed achievements in cultural, social, economic and even political respects. In contrast to several other great pre-twentieth-century empires (such as the Hapsburg and Ottoman), China held together politically, more or less. This was a period when modernization became accepted as an ideal by governments. It saw the blossoming of nationalism to form a powerful political and social force. It saw great reforms at least attempted, albeit haltingly, in several major fields, including education and the status of the peasantry, youth and women. Above all, this period saw the continuation and climax of a revolutionary process that had begun in the middle of the nineteenth century. For all the conservatism and corruption of the Chinese elite, this was a period of enormous and deep-seated change – hence the title of this book, China in Transformation.
THEMES IN CHINESE HISTORY, 1900–49
In his introduction to the Cambridge History of Republican China, the distinguished historian of China, John King Fairbank (1907–91), placed his focus for treatment of the period on civil war, revolution, invasion and foreign influence, accompanied by ‘change and growth in the economic, social, intellectual and cultural spheres’ [Doc. 1, p. 118]. His view forms part of the theoretical framework of the present book. But, in addition, the concepts of nationalism and modernization are of crucial importance in understanding the period.
The basic framework revolves around four basic tensions. In summary form, these are:
• revolution, reform, change and reaction;
• nationalism and imperialism;
• modernization and tradition;
• foreign impact and internal dynamic.
These tensions, or dichotomies, are related to each other, although they are also quite distinct and separate. Like much historical debate, they involve judgements over who should receive credit and blame for the actions they take and the policies they follow. What influences such value judgements will depend on the sympathies of the observer, as well as the time and place of making them. The intensity of political debate, disagreement and conflict in the first half of the twentieth century in China was so great that political sympathies – towards imperialism, Chinese or Asian nationalism, socialism or communism – create an inevitable impact on the attitudes that an observer will adopt towards the events and trends of China in the period of focus, and towards the policies, ideas and actions of such notable personalities as Sun Yat-sen, Yuan Shikai, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong and Wang Jingwei.
Apart from political sympathy, the time and place in which an observer lives cannot help but influence the attitudes adopted towards historical events. An English person in the early twenty-first century is likely to view matters very differently from one in the 1950s, simply because concerns and priorities at the two times were different. And in addition, the history of the intervening decades will certainly have something to tell us about that of the first half of the twentieth century. And as for place, somebody living in Japan is likely to see things differently from the resident of France or Australia, simply because culture, attitudes and values are influenced by national surroundings and events. The globalization that has gathered momentum in the late years of the twentieth century naturally creates its own impact, and in general towards a convergence of opinion. But in the twenty-first century, there is no sign at all that national differences of attitude are disappearing, let alone divergences of political sympathy. And the likelihood is that the significance of the chronological standpoint will persist. It will be surprising indeed if a German of the year 2020 adopts the same attitudes and priorities in judging Chinese history from 1900 to 1949 as a conational at the end of the twentieth century.
REVOLUTION, REFORM, CHANGE AND REACTION
There were several revolutions in China in the first half of the twentieth century. The Revolution of 1911 overthrew the Qing dynasty (established in 1644) and, even more importantly, the Chinese monarchy that had lasted for thousands of years. Subsequent attempts to restore the monarchy in China have all proved only temporary or disastrous failures, and in the early twenty-first century it looks as though the republican system in China will survive. The 1911 Revolution was consequently an event of the utmost importance, signalling very dramatic change. The Revolution of 1949 was the one that brought the CCP to power. In terms of the extent of political, economic and social change it wrought, it was an even more significant revolution than its 1911 predecessor. However, in the way it played itself out after its triumph in 1949, it is beyond the scope of the present book.
Apart from these two, there is a range of other series of events that are sometimes described as revolutions. These include the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, the ‘Second Revolution’ of 1913, the May Fourth Movement of 1919, and the Nationalist Revolution of 1925–7. And there are also revolutions in the field of culture, economy or society, a particularly significant one for China in the first half of the twentieth century being the rural revolution.
These various revolutions have provoked reactions, often amounting to intense hostility. Yet the implications of terms like revolution or revolutionary sometimes depend on the user. Some of China’s most significant twentieth-century political leaders regarded themselves as revolutionaries, but were seen as symbols of reaction by their enemies. The most prominent illustrative example was Chiang Kai-shek, who used the term ‘Nationalist Revolution’ enthusiastically but whom the CCP regarded as an arch-reactionary.
What, then, does the term revolution mean in the context of China in the first half of the twentieth century? The International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences defines a revolution as ‘a radical change in the system of government’ often involving ‘the infringement of prevailing constitutional arrangements and the use of force’ (Sills, 1968: XIII, 501). A particularly famous Chinese definition is that of Mao Zedong (1965: I, 28), who wrote in March 1927 that ‘a revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence whereby one class overthrows another’.
A political revolution typically involves not merely the overthrow of the government but of the system itself. The essence of a revolution is radical change, which is usually implemented rapidly and with violence. While there is argument over whether a revolution really needs violence to make the term appropriate – the encyclopedia definition refers not to violence but to force – the realities of twentieth-century Chinese history make it reasonable to define a revolution in that context as ‘a movement involving violence which brings about radical, and probably rapid, change’. Mao’s suggestion that part of a revolution is the overthrow of one class by another is obviously influenced by the Marxist idea of class struggle. While it is very definitely applicable to his own revolution, it is too narrow for the general purposes of this book.
The terms reform and reaction, both important for the topic of this book, carry implications very different from revolution. By comparison with a revolution, a process of reform involves more gradual, less deep-seated and much less violent, or even totally non-violent, change. The antithesis of revolution is not reform, but reaction, which generally sets itself against everything revolutionaries wish to achieve.
NATIONALISM AND IMPERIALISM
The significance of the term nationalism (minzu zhuyi) in Chinese history from 1900 to 1949 is obvious from the name that the most dominant political party of the period gave itself: the Nationalist Party. It obsessed influential thinkers such as Liang Qichao [Doc. 7, p. 122] and political leaders like Sun Yat-sen, who made it the first, and most important, of his three principles of the people [Doc. 15, p. 128]. Nationalism was a core component of the succession of student movements occurring over the three decades from 1919 to 1949. Although CCP leaders never spoke of nationalism, they certainly espoused the related concept of patriotism and were in fact nationalist in their behaviour.
It is doubtful if any other single emotion characterizes this period politically in China more strongly than nationalism. The main reason for this is that the Chinese were reacting against their experience of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. A succession of wars and defeats inflicted on China by imperialist countries ranging from Britain to Japan culminated in the Boxer Rebellion. But there was more. The fact is that, when the twentieth century dawned, China was not actually ruled by the most populous people of China, called the Han, but by the Manchus who had conquered the country in the seventeenth century. So what the Han Chinese had to bear was a double domination: of foreign imperialism and a non-Han dynasty.
What are nationalism and imperialism? The notion of nationalism derives from that of ‘the nation’, a modern European concept. A nation refers to the group of peoples residing inside closely defined borders and owing loyalty to the state that rules the resulting territory. Nationalism is very much more than patriotism, which is simply love of country, because it is based on the supposition that the nation is the primary focus of political allegiance. So the people within the nation should give their loyalty not to the emperor or family, as had earlier been the case in China, but to the state that represents the nation. It follows that, by introducing the concept of nation, the European powers actually created the seeds of imperialism’s decline in China, because nationalists like Sun Yat-sen, who arose in reaction to imperialism, did indeed strive for the people’s loyalty to their own nation.
In contrast to the nation and nationalism, the ancient world knew about empires and their expansion beyond their borders. However, the modern forms of imperialism that concern this book actually derive from the Industrial Revolution in Europe in the late eighteenth century, being taken up later in Asia, notably by Japan. Imperialism involves the aggression of one country against another or others, and consequently has a bad reputation in the early twenty-first century. However, its results have been very broad, some of them being either necessary or good. The process of modernization in China resulted in large part from imperialism. Although the imperialists did not treat the Chinese as equals, yet there is irony in the fact that it was they who introduced such concepts as liberty, equality and democracy, which proved very attractive to some Chinese.
MODERNIZATION AND TRADITION
The reference to modernization brings us to another of the main dichotomies of China from 1900 to 1949: that between modernization and tradition. Virtually all Chinese leaders of the period have seen the quest for modernization as the way to save China. This path would enable China to catch up with the West, defeat imperialism and establish for China a respected position in the world community. One of the principal obstacles to achieving modernization is the force of tradition, or feudalism, the heavy weight of China’s past.
Despite pejorative tags like feudalism, most Chinese are proud of the fact that China was once ...
