The English Civil War 1640-1649

Martyn Bennett

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2014
• ISBN:
  9781317880936
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

The English Civil War (1642-53) is one of the most crucial periods in British history. Martyn Bennett introduces the reader to the main debates surrounding the Civil War which continue to be debated by historians. He considers the repercussions both on government and religion, of Parliament's failure to secure stability after the Royalist defeat in 1646, and argues that this opened the way for far more radical reforms. The book deals with the military campaigns in all four nations, placing the war in its full British and Irish context.

Part One: The Background

1 The Anglo-Scottish War and the Short Parliament

During the 1630s, Charles I had reigned without the aid of a Parliament, At the same time he had embarked upon major religious changes and sought to create an impression of vigour and power abroad, without becoming embroiled in the wars on the Continent. He had financed his government by means of a series of revamped and exhumed medieval financial measures. The efficacy of his rule dubbed the 'Personal Rule' or the 'Eleven Years' tyranny', depending upon the standpoints of contemporaries and historians has been much debated. Some historians point to the increased effectiveness of the fleet, upon which Charles had spent the income of Ship-money* levies, and the concomitant increase in prestige; others to the unpopularity of the tax and the resistance which all Charles's levies provoked [56; 95; 100; 104]. There can be no doubt that the religious imperialism of King Charles, the attempt to create a uniformity of worship or at least of order in the Church throughout his three kingdoms, was at best provocative, at worst destructive, not only of the religious independence of the three kingdoms, but potentially of the monarchy itself. It was clear to many Scottish people in 1637 that the attempt to impose religious change upon Scotland was misplaced and ill considered; Charles had not only challenged the Scottish Church, the Kirk, but throughout his reign had threatened Scottish law and property rights [91; 104], Such was not clear to Charles, who ignored the resistance which he had provoked from many sections of Scottish society, and saw only a challenge to the elevated view of the monarchy which had led him to refrain from giving any explanation of his motives in his dealings with Scotland during the previous twelve years of his reign. His persistence in stressing his authority and his insensitivity to the popular will in Scotland drove his northern kingdom to take up arms in defence of itself and its Church. The war which followed in 1639 was brief and militarily inconclusive. Both sides showed themselves to be at least superficially willing to prevent further escalation and negotiations were entered into. Whilst this gave rise to a truce - the Pacification of Berwick, June 1639 - it was clear that the basic issues had not been resolved.

The war of 1639 petered out in a way that was not really satisfactory for either side. Charles I was convinced, along with others, that he could have won a military victory with just one more push. The Scots were convinced that Charles had not relinquished what he saw as his right to force a unified religion on his British kingdoms - although this view has been challenged by John Morrill, who sees Charles insisting upon order, and in particular an Episcopalian* order, in the Scottish Kirk (and in Ireland) rather than upon an imperial uniformity across the Churches of all three of his kingdoms [91]. It was Charles's attempt to impose a revised version of the Book of Common Prayer* on Scotland which provoked the revolt which united all sections of Protestant Scotland aside from the minority Episcopalians [57; 74; 107]. The war left Charles in dire financial straits, yet it was in the spirit of a war-maker that Charles summoned his first parliament for eleven years. It met on 13 April 1640 as the Pacification of Berwick finally collapsed and amidst the Crown's chronic financial problems; the projected resumption of war was estimated to require £100,000 per month, which the King did not have. There existed a range of expectations of the new parliament very different from those held by the King. For Charles, it was there solely to support him by providing money in the face of what he portrayed as Scottish rebellion and aggression; he and some members of his Privy Council believed that Parliament would rally behind him and provide the means to continue the war. As encouragement and an example the King had already, through the work of Thomas Wentworth, Lord Deputy in Ireland, gained the vote of subsidies* from the Dublin Parliament. Alongside this Charles had proof positive that the Scots were acting in a traitorous manner: a copy of a letter from prominent Scots to Louis XIII of France, asking for assistance. These circumstances explain why the King, in summoning Parliament, did not - as the Lord Keeper, Baron Finch, explained, 'require their advice but immediate vote of supplies'.

Others, however, were not so convinced. Some MPs placed no trust in Charles and gave no great attention to the infamous letter. Instead of voting supply, and supported by the many petitions which had preceded them to Westminster, MPs turned to the issue of grievances. On 17 April a speech by John Pym proposed a virtual manifesto or programme for the House of Commons [Doc. 1]. Under a series of headings, Pym outlined what were the central issues of contention. First, the liberty of Parliament; second, the subversion of the true Protestant religion by the agents of the popish Church; and third, the defence of property against illegal taxation. These issues underpinned the latent conflict between Charles I and a significant section of Parliament and the country at large which dated from the beginning of his reign. Members decided to deal with these grievances first, and not supply. The Commons began with discussion of the events of May 1629, which had led Charles to imprison several members of the House for defying his order to dissolve. Sir John Eliot, one of those arrested, had died in prison and two others, William Strode and Benjamin Valentine, had just been released as a gesture of good will on the eve of this new parliament in which they now sat. Charles halted the progress of discussions by attempting to put pressure on the Commons through the Lords by insisting upon an early discussion of supply. The Commons reacted angrily and instead turned to debate the perceived breach of their privilege [10].

As the Commons continued this debate, Charles tried again to alter their course by sending Sir Henry Vane, Treasurer of his household, to impress upon them his desire that they turn to supply and give 'present answer'. In return he offered to compromise on Pym's third point, the defence of property against taxation such as Ship money, by abolishing the tax. However if, as many MPs held, Ship money was illegal, then in fact this was no concession at all. Nevertheless, the Commons did move some way towards discussing supply, but before they had got very far, the King peremptorily dissolved Parliament on 5 May. In his published justification for what he rightly understood would be a much criticised action, he put the blame on factious spirits who had impeded the true work of the parliament. The dissolution came as a shock to some and a disappointment to many. The Earl of Clarendon later recalled that (as Mr Edward Hyde, MP) he had met other members of the House, ones Charles would probably have classified as seditious and factious, who saw things very differently [Doc. 2]. For them, the principal points at issue had been defined, and they were not downcast; rather, they were hardened and given impetus by the King's action. Mr Hyde's companions believed that a new parliament was inevitable and was now more likely to be radical.

Time was actually on the side of the radical members. The ensuing drive to a renewed war was just as unpopular outside Parliament as it had been inside. Moreover, the costs continued to mount. Returns from Ship money and also from the Coat and Conduct money* levied to support the forces raised for Scotland, identified by some MPs as the main sources of financial grievance, were declining [91]. The summoning of Parliament and its evident reluctance to supply the King had destroyed any chance that the taxes might be paid willingly or at least submissively. Recently, revisionist historians have played down the significance of what has become known as the Short Parliament. It has been blamed by some as engendering its own dissolution, and for not acting responsibly in solving the political crisis in 1640 [104]. Yet this seems to underplay the role of the King. His ideas and actions did not change and, as they stood, were incompatible with the beliefs of many MPs and at least a significant section of the people in each of Charles's three kingdoms. It can be argued that it was his intransigence which precipitated the end of the Short Parliament, leaving him with the probability of a war which he could not afford. The King had not really moved a jot on the issue of what many saw as insufferable taxes and there was no guarantee that he would have done so, despite his promise to take action, once the war was over. If the King could not be trusted whilst he was in a tight corner, then what was the possibility of trusting him were he to become victorious over the summer? Expecting Parliament to co-operate fully in spring 1640 was almost akin to asking it to dissolve itself for another long period. Rather, it had played a game in which the King made all the wrong moves.

When the Short Parliament ended, it had established the rules by which the future dealings between Parliament and monarch would be conducted: there was to be no supply until grievances had been ended and no interference with business by the Lords or by the King. It had defined three main thrusts of policy: assertion of the rights of Parliament and redress for past infringements; a dismantling of the Laudian Church 'reforms'; and the control of taxation by Parliament. Moreover, it was clear also just how out of line the monarchy was. As Parliament met, so did Convocation*, which set a Laudian stamp on the English Church at the same time as the Scots were in arms against it and the English Parliament had declared its opposition to it. Despite the unpopularity of Archbishop William Laud and the changes in ritual and doctrine with which his name was associated, all the King could promise was more of the same. Was it any wonder that a broad consensus of opinion was against him?

2 The Summer of 1640

Dissolving the Short Parliament left Charles in dire financial difficulties and with a war to fight. Preparations for war had begun before Parliament met and naturally this had cost money. Ship money and Coat and Conduct* levies were not coming in. There is evidence that in some counties the Quarter Sessions courts were full of cases involving default, whilst in others there were protests and also wrangles between the different arms of county government over the collection of the taxes [7; 91]. Parliament's attitude to tax, coupled with 'the late discomfortable newes of the parliament's dissolucon', had stiffened resistance [92 p. 147, citing Mr Hughes, Sheriff of Flintshire], Further, by late 1639 government income had already been mortgaged for two years. Thus Charles had to rely upon his own meagre resources. Some credit had been gained upon the anticipation of the subsidies* Parliament was expected to give, but this was not enough. Military preparations had to be frozen, and county musters of the trained bands* planned for 10 May were postponed for a month. When they were mustered, troops rioted, deserted, looted, broke into prisons, killed deer and initiated enclosure riots. By means of loans and cost cutting, an army was raised in the summer months, but bringing it together proved difficult. By August, whilst some troops had congregated around Newcastle, a major section was still moving through Yorkshire. Even this, as Conrad Russell has demonstrated, was woefully underarmed. It was clear also by the summer that the principal task of Charles's army would not be to inflict defeat upon the Scots, but rather to defend England from invasion.

The Scots knew that the English political nation was divided and that many people in England supported their position. Unlike the situation in England, there was something more akin to a political will behind Scotland's war preparations. There was a reform programme which went beyond the Covenant* and the defence of the Presbyterian* Kirk and drove on a revolution in government. Episcopacy, restored by James I and VI and strengthened by Charles, was declared to be in contravention of God's will. It was regarded as a return to popery. Archibald Johnston of Warriston was a little more forceful when he declared in his diary, 'if we licked up this vomit of Romisch superstition again, the Lord in his wrayth wald vomit us out and was not lyke man, to returne to his vomit againe' [24 p. 267], The Edinburgh Parliament had carried through a revolution, replacing the King's executive body - known as the 'Tables'* - with a committee of the estates* which should continue meeting when Parliament was not sitting. Moreover, the Scottish Parliament now sat of its own volition and not at the whim and will of the King. A Triennial Act had provided for the election of the assembly every three years, and further electoral reform was being undertaken. This Parliament then carried its revolution further by ensuring the protection of Scotland from English intervention. A war tax was approved, and, using the English fleet's blockade of Scottish ports as an excuse, an invasion of England was proposed.

When General Alexander Leslie led the Scottish forces south over the border on 20 August 1640, the army ranged against him was still divided in two and the strategically important town and port of Newcastle still undefended to the south. The line of the Tweed had to be abandoned by the English to ensure the safety of Newcastle. It is possible that the Scots were deliberately induced to invade England to create patriotic fervour against the invader, but if so, things quickly got out of hand. Leslie forced a passage of the Tyne, defeating the English army at Newburn on 28 August, and went on to take Newcastle.

With a good degree of synchronisation, and, it is suggested, a good deal of co-operation, a petition was presented to the King requesting that he call a new parliament [Doc. 3]. This petition, presented at the very moment when the Scots were crossing the Tyne, had been drafted by John Pym and Oliver St John but its signatories were twelve peers. These represented a broad range of views, not just those of their class but of a social spectrum stretching from the nobility downwards.

Nehemiah Wallington, a wood turner in London, saw the Scots as allies in the fight against the ungodly and was convinced that only God's forbearance and patience had so far protected an apostate England from His wrath. Wallington gloried in the non-payment of Ship money and the failure of the military effort against the Scots [103]. He, and others around him, had no wish to behave like Johnston's dogs returning to their own vomit, and saw the summoning of Parliament as the only means of salvation from a resurgence of popery which could be discerned on the Continent. Others had more secular concerns, like the grand jury of Berkshire which, on the eve of the renewed war, had petitioned the King for redress of the grievances outlined in the third section of Pym's speech.

Charles still hoped to circumvent the need for a parliament by summoning only the peers to York, where he had gone to lead the now redundant campaign against the Scots. However, it quickly became clear that the nobles summoned to the Council of Peers were in sympathy with the opinions of the twelve petitioners. In reality they had little choice, for the Scots had included the summoning of Parliament in England as one of their basic demands. The City of London petitioned for a parliament in early September, and on 16 September the Privy Council gave similar advice to the King. As a result, when Charles met the Council of Peers on 24 September he announced the summoning of Parliament.

3 The Long Parliament

Hitherto parliaments (as Conrad Russell has reminded us) had been a political event rather than a permanent feature of the political scene: indeed, there was no statutory obligation for a monarch to have one at all. Now times were changing, and the initiative which had been taken by the Scottish Parliament was about to be followed in England. Whether or not parliaments had been developing into a permanent institution of government since the previous century, there is no doubt that a wide cross-section of British society recognised the desirability of having frequent and regular recourse to them by 1640. With a Scottish army in support, that view was to have the upper hand.

It is clear, however, that Charles was still of the belief that a Parliament should and would rally patriotic sentiment against the rebellious Scots. To achieve this unlikely outcome he would have had to work hard. But in fact he and Thomas Wentworth, now Earl of Strafford, had failed to control the elections to the Short Parliament, and they were to have even less success with the new elections in October 1640. The writs had been issued in haste, to give the minimum forty days' notice of the opening of Parliament, in an effort to limit the time available for a coherent opposition to organise itself. The Court, in the words of Bulstrode Whitelocke, 'laboured hard to bring in their friends, but those who were favoured at Court had least respect in the country' [39, i, p. 107].

One example will suffice here. The Earl of Huntingdon was hardly a Court figure, but as Lord-Lieutenant he was the King's representative in Leicestershire and had been responsible there for implementing the distraint of knighthood - whereby Charles exacted a fine from every eligible man who had failed to attend the coronation in order to be knighted. This was enough to ensure that the Earl's men were opposed and defeated at the county and borough elections in the autumn of 1640 [39; 139]. In the end, the King failed to secure the election of a large enough group of adherents to win control of the House of Commons; indeed, of the 501 members, under 12 per cent were prepared to support him some six months later [51]. He was faced with a parliament which he had called to undertake actions to which its members would not consent.

As with the earlier parliament, the MPs who gathered at Westminster for the opening on 3 November were awaited by a collection of petitions from their counties and boroughs. It was the support expressed by these petitions, and the way that they accorded with many MPs' views of the rule of Charles I, which bonded the opposition and gave them the moral force necessary to the carrying forth of the political programme of the next ten months. When Parliament convened, Charles laid down his agenda: money for the army; aid for the invaded counties of the north; and restoration of trust between him and Parliament. Only after these had been achieved would he consider redress of grievances. When Charles called the Scots rebels, the Earl of Bedford bluntly commented that he had not the means to enforce his view. Power lay with the Scottish army, as Conrad Russell has pointed out, and that power was to help force the pace of the British Revolution of 1640-41 [100; 1591.

It can be argued that the parliament which met in November 1640 had an agenda already in place. Pym's speech in the Short Parliament had provided the outline and he embellished it only slightly in his first major speech in November. On the first full day of the session, after the procedural business, Benjamin Rudyerd stated what for many represented the line which the new parliament would take: no money should be offered to the King until he had changed his counsel. Pym took this further the following day, claiming that the root of all the problems lay with a popish conspiracy which was being fomented by the agents of Archbishop Laud. Pym's broad religious aims were supported by petitions which had been received in Westminster, demanding that religious innovations introduced by Archbishop Laud and the Arminian bishops be removed. Some counties went further, more than a dozen of them requesting the abolition of episcopacy in England as in Scotland. During November, a petition was drafted on behalf of London and several counties, and it was presented in Parliament on 11 December. It became known as the Root and Branch petition because it required that the government of the Church - the archbishops, lord bishops, deans and archdeacons - 'with all its dependencies, roots and branches, may be abolished' and replaced by a government based on God's word.

The basis of the Root and Branch petition rested on the belief that the Church was drifting dangerously towards the Roman Catholic faith and that many of its clergy were ill qualified in a 'godly' as distinct from an academic sense. Among the Root and Branch petition's twenty-eight complaints were some secular ones: for instance, the King's use of monopolies, patents and customs was attacked along with the levying of Ship money. However, most of the clauses dealt with religious affairs, from the excesses of the Church courts to the assertion that the Book of Common Prayer was too closely derived from popish doctrine to permit full reformation.

Such criticisms were made in the wider public sphere over the ensuing months. For example, John Milton attacked episcopacy in Of Reformation in England and the Causes that have Hitherto Hindered It in early 1641, suggesting that the reform of the English Church in the previous century had not yet been completed. Religion in seventeenth-century Britain could not easily be divorced from politics and wider social issues. In the same year as Milton published his tract, Hansard Knollys, a Lincolnshire minis...