Prospective Philosophy of Software

A Simondonian Study

Coline Ferrarato

• Publisher: Wiley-ISTE
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781786304438
• eBook ISBN: 9781119686781
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy & Ethics in Science

Computer software (operating systems, web browsers, word processors, etc.) structure our daily lives. Comprising both a user interface and the electronic circuits of the machine it is printed to, software represents a hybrid object at the crossroads of materiality and immateriality. But is it, strictly speaking, a technical object? By examining the status of software against the criteria of philosophy of classic techniques, in particular that of Gilbert Simondon, this book lays the groundwork of a philosophical reflection on this subject. Further, in order to help introduce readers to problematics, lines of code and explanatory schemas have been provided.

1
Simondon’s Philosophy of Technics: A Work Program

To reproduce Simondon’s gesture, we must clearly establish our position relative to his philosophy of technics. Our discussion, therefore, begins with a conceptual characterization of Simondon’s philosophy that draws from a dialogue between the two works of our corpus.

Stated as generally as possible, our claim is as follows: Simondon’s philosophy of technics is a philosophy of technicity and the methodological gestures that update this technicity.

1.1. A philosophy of technicity

The two texts of our corpus enable us to understand the specific nature of Simondon’s philosophy of technics more precisely: a dynamic field that welcomes questioning and reappropriation.

Thus, On the Mode of Existence of Technical objects (MOET) and psychosociology of technicality both study the relationship between humankind and technical objects, but from two different perspectives – the objective perspective of the genesis of the object itself (MEOT) and the objectal perspective of the life of objects within a psychosocial setting (PST).

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THE OBJECTIVE/OBJECTAL DISTINCTION.– The distinction between objective/objectal was established by J.-Y. Chateau in the introduction of the collection Sur la technique [SIM 14b]. Although MEOT discusses the essence of technical objects and their objectivity, PST considers how the same objects become independent once projected into the social world, according to an “objectal” mode that is distinct from – albeit dependent on – the first. Once the technical production of an object is complete and this object has fulfilled its objectivity, it becomes detachable from its producer and is invested with psychosocial meaning.

To be more precise, the necessity of reconciling culture and technics is the starting postulate of MEOT. The first few sentences of the introduction state the raison d’être of an entire book seeking to legitimize technical objects ontologically¹: “This study is motivated by our desire to raise awareness of the meaning of technical objects”. If raising awareness is necessary, there must effectively be some form of divorce: “culture has constituted itself as a defense system against technics” [SIM 12, Introduction, p. 1]. A dialogue is thus created between the reflections of MEOT and PST. The latter accepts the ontological framework as a starting point without attempting to develop it, aiming instead to further explore the psychological aspects of the relationships between humans and technical objects. The psychological and philosophical reflections of both papers call and answer one another.

One might object that this connection between MEOT and PST is arbitrary; perhaps it would have been just as effective to contrast the secondary thesis with another lecture from the same collection; in response, we would observe that PST is unique among the other lectures in that it presents a very complete and systematic framework of thought. Its architecture, while somewhat underdeveloped as a result of the limited format, is just as ambitious as MEOT. The theoretical scope of this lecture on psychosociology extends the scope of the ideas advanced by MEOT; furthermore, it questions and modulates some of the analysis of the latter. This questioning, three years after MEOT was published, is fundamental. As a further justification of the coherence of this corpus, observe that the two texts are not just complementary; their reconciliation is problematic. PST questions the conclusions of MEOT on two interrelated points: technicity and the status of its representatives.

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ON THE IMPORTANCE OF PST.– In his introduction, J.-Y. Chateau writes that PST provides the missing perspective for Simondon’s “three-part” ontology, which aims to “reposition the individual within the being according to the three levels of physical appearance, vitality, and psychosociality” [SIM 13, p. 32]. Although PST is in principle subordinate to the two theses (as a lecture, an oral format, therefore less precise, shorter), it effectively extends the first two perspectives in terms of principal concepts (objectality, open/closed objects) that open toward more general considerations, such as the concept of network. The importance of PST was also emphasized by the editors of the collection; PST was chosen as the inaugural lecture. J.-Y. Chateau makes a typographical distinction from the other lectures. In his introduction, he cites various texts of the collection; the majority (excluding fragments, notes and interviews) are also lectures, but only PST is italicized (and therefore recognized as a text in its own right); the other texts are cited in quotes. This editorial decision is suggestive; PST was granted a leading status among the new texts of the collection. Indeed, the content of the other texts in the collection is more localized than the topics developed by PST and does not directly dialogue with the two principal theses. L’effet de halo en matière technique, for example, only attempts to supplement PST on a single specific topic, the question of quasi-religious and asymmetric community (there is “something religious” in the halo) of users that forms around the technical object. This contribution extends the general theoretical framework established by PST.

Contrasting these two perspectives gives rise to a dual line of inquiry. These two open questions that we shall reevaluate make our corpus a cohesive entity whose questions may be taken as a starting point for new reflections. Simondon’s philosophy of technics is a “work program”² in the sense that many of its problems are stated more than they are solved by the author.

1.1.1. Simondonian functionalism

For Simondon, the essence of technical objects lies in their technicity, and their technicity is functionality.

1.1.1.1. The benefit of Simondonian functionalism by comparison with the utilitarian and hylomorphic conceptions

The idea that technical objects should be understood in terms of their functionality is a radical claim that gives Simondon’s analysis a particular status in the philosophy of technics.

Simondon is explicitly positioning himself relative to two classical schools of thought on technics. On the one hand, a tradition rooted in Aristotelian philosophy employs what Simondon describes as a “hylomorphic schema” to understand technical objects. The other approach follows the utilitarian and enframing conception of technics defended by Heidegger. Both define technics through the lens of the objects that it produces. In Aristotelian philosophy, the technical object is that which relates to the tekhnê. In physics, Aristotle distinguishes between tekhnê and phusis to establish the ontological superiority of natural facts. Although natural beings contain the principle of motion and rest within them “immediately and essentially” [ARI 73], the products of art and artificial objects essentially take on a contingent existence:

“They none of them have in themselves the source of their making, but in some cases, such as that of a house or anything else made by human hands, the source is in something else and external, whilst in others the source is in the thing, but not in the thing of itself, i.e. when the thing comes to be a cause to itself by virtue of concurrence” (Physics, II 1, 196b28–196b32) [ARI 73].

This shows the inherent meaning of the hylomorphic schema; the technical object is matter on which a human agent has imposed a frame from the outside³. Technical objects are not characterized by themselves (they belong to the wider class of artifacts, artificial objects); if they are, it is merely “by virtue of concurrence” (by accident). Their essence is only defined contingently.

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PARALLELS TO KANT AND MARX.– The seeds of such a hylomorphic schema can be found in Kant’s writings:

“[It is true that] if, as sometimes happens when we search through a bog, we come across a piece of hewn wood, we say that it is a product of art, rather than of nature, i.e., that the cause which produced it was thinking of a purpose to which this object owes its form” [KAN 15, paragraph 43].

Similarly, for Marx: “[…] what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality” [MAR 68a].

The second schema from which Simondon distances himself is the utilitarian scheme; he calls this the “utensil” usage of technical objects. Here, Simondon is directly targeting Heidegger. In The Question Concerning Technology, Heidegger asserts that “the truth of the world of technics is found in a power that is not itself a technical reality” [CHA 94]. The enframing power of technics is independent of any human will or power. It is “a device (Einrichtung), in Latin an instrumentum”. The unity of technical objects arises by their relation to shared essence, the Gestell [HEI 58], which could be translated as the “device”⁴. Heidegger defines technics precisely by its lack of essence: “the essence of technology is by no means anything technological” [HEI 58]. At most, it is a symptom, a hint of the unveiling of metaphysics.

One aspect shared by the hylomorphic and utilitarian schools of thought is that they both define the essence of technics by the negative space around it – this essence is contingent, secondary; it does not exist for itself.

Departing from both approaches, Simondon attempts to give technical objects an essence that is intrinsic and irreducible; his approach provides a positive characterization of the concept. We wish to defend the hypothesis that the openness and positivity of Simondon’s positioning enables reappropriation. It would seem that Simondon offers a suitable framework of thought for contemporary technics, whereas the two classical approaches unfold within a conceptual framework that is a priori excessively restrictive. We will seek to demonstrate in what ways Simondon’s functionalism can be radicalized and validated a posteriori by confrontation with contemporary technical objects, where the two other theories appear to offer insufficient insight.

1.1.1.2. A conception of the genesis of objects

The technology⁵ deployed in the first part of MEOT is a continuation of his primary thesis. It takes the heavy conceptual equipment of L’individuation à la lumière des notions de formes et d’information as a postulate. Thus, technical objects are “that which has a genesis”. Simondon is not talking about a genesis in the general sense, but rather a specific genetic...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 Simondon’s Philosophy of Technics: A Work Program
• 2 Genetic Study of Technology: the Software Program, A Technical Object?
• 3 Psychosocial Study of Free Software
• Conclusion
• Glossary
• References
• Index
• End User License Agreement