Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War

The Collapse of an Empire

Peter Wetzler

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781350246799
• eBook ISBN: 9781350120839
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: History

Informed Western understanding of Imperial Japan still often conjures up images of militarism, blind devotion to leaders, and fanatical pride in the country. But, as Imperial Japan and Defeat in the Second World War reveals, Western imagination is often reductive in its explanation of the Japanese Empire and its collapse. In his analysis of the Emperor, Imperial Japanese Army and Navy during the Second World War, Peter Wetzler examines the disconnect between nation and state during wartime Japan and in doing so offers a much-needed nuanced and sensitive corrective to existing Western scholarship. Rooted in the perspective of the Japanese, Wetzler makes available to readers vital primary and secondary Japanese archival sources; most notably, this book provides the first English assessment of the recently-released Actual Record of the Showa Emperor. This book is an important advance in English-language studies of the Second World War in Asia, and is thus essential reading for all those wishing to understand this crucial period in Japanese history.

1

Wartime Events, Historical Hindsights and Insights

The following is an analysis of the fall of Saipan, the Tôjô Cabinet, and related wartime events. The accent is on the Shôwa Emperor and General Tôjô Hideki, prime minister 1941–44, and some of the important sources dealing with their activities as war leaders.¹ This chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 emphasizes historical sources and part 2 focuses on the Emperor’s authority. Herein the distinction “state” versus “nation” is clearly seen, as the Emperor’s role in decision-making is depicted in various ways depending on the source. The Emperor could not be ignored, and he was not. He was one of the elites involved in the decision-making process, but his principal role was to sanction that which was decided, not to dictate policies or military operations. Also, the very existence of the Emperor allowed others to sanction policies in his name that he had not approved, which on occasion were contrary to his wishes. The decision not to try to retake Saipan immediately after its loss, seen below, is but one example. The events, the Emperor’s participation in them, and the sources about them are intertwined. It is impossible to completely separate these factors and still have a realistic, if not always tidy, history. The emphasis in this chapter is on varying perspectives, of which there are many. The focus is on specific events crucial to ending the war.

The fall of Saipan in mid-1944 was a major step toward ending the war, and the battle itself greatly influenced how the war ended. The United States announced securing the island on July 9, but the successful US invasion on June 15 signaled to many Japanese leaders its loss, which stimulated a heated debate involving the Emperor about retaking the island. In the end, however, Imperial Headquarters announced on July 8, the “honorable deaths” (gyokusai) of the troops there one day earlier. A headline in a newspaper from that time states: “Our troops on Saipan, all die heroically in battle.”²

Here, among others, the “Actual Record of the Shôwa Emperor” (Shôwa Tennô Jitsuroku, STJR) and the “War History Series” (Senshi Sôsho) are examined as historical records to help illustrate these events and problems with the available sources. The former chronicles Hirohito’s life, including developments during the Shôwa era, 1926–89 and Japan’s response to external political and military pressures. The latter is a series of narratives based on documents and commentaries treating various military actions by the Imperial Army and Navy during the Second World War.³ Differences in information included and the usefulness of these works as historical sources are addressed as they are referenced along with other records and books covering these events. Where specific events are covered in more than one source, emphasis is on the source’s content and consistency, not a strict chronological ordering of events. The story begins with the events leading up to the fall of Saipan. Both records show the Emperor’s dependence on, as well as increasing wariness of, his military leaders. The leader of the nation came to harbor suspicions about the veracity of the information he was receiving from state military leaders.

Part 1. Sources

The Shôwa Tennô Jitsuroku (Actual Record of the Shôwa Emperor)

The completion of this record was announced with much fanfare on September 9, 2014. It was featured in the major Japanese newspapers including the Asahi Shimbun. The following information is taken from that publication. The STJR, with some 12,000 pages in 61 volumes, took 24 years and 5 months to complete and involved 112 people. In Japan and overseas 3,152 sources were examined.⁴ It forms a chronological record of Emperor Hirohito’s life (1901–89), compiled under the auspices of the Imperial Household Agency. It is a secondary source containing many references to secondary as well as primary sources—diaries and records of persons involved in these events. A number of copies of the original were available at the Imperial Household Agency Archives from September 9 to November 30, 2014. During this time I examined specific parts of the record that dealt with events well known to me. The publication of the record was completed in 2019.

After examining the Actual Record of the Shôwa Emperor focusing on the subject of this book and the beginning of the War in the Pacific, I met with one of the experts who reported on it in the Asahi Shimbun, Hosaka Masayasu. Hosaka is a nonfiction writer who has written many books on the war. I ventured, and he agreed, that there is very little new information in the record. Since then he has published a two-volume work on the record in which he is very critical of the manner of presentation, as is the historian Hara Takeshi.⁵ Besides their works a number of other books have been published describing and analyzing the record. Several, but not all of them, will be referred to below.

The STJR is neither objective nor a swindle. Rather, the parts relating to topics covered in this book show that given the publication of many of the sources used, this record is an attempt to balance published “facts” with a positive image of the former emperor as the head of the nation: the image the Imperial Household Agency officials wish to transmit to the public now and to posterity. The priority is on serving the Imperial House as the pinnacle of the national cult, not the state.

New implications

Although the STJR contains little new information, one aspect of the Record’s contents is very new. In this work the Emperor’s knowledge of, and at least tacit sanction of, certain military campaigns, which up until his death Emperor Hirohito denied knowing the specifics about, is clearly documented. The implied acceptance of imperial imprimatur of controversial war operations by the Imperial Household Agency, a bastion of defense of Imperial House tradition, will change the landscape of discussion about specific actions and, more generally, the Emperor’s participation in war planning and execution. Turning back the clock, one particular example is taken up since it is well known and universally condemned (at least in the United States): the attack on Pearl Harbor December 7, 1941.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was mentioned in an Imperial Conference November 5, 1941. This was a very long conference that began at 10:30 a.m. and extended into the late afternoon. The Emperor was not present the entire time. War with the United States was deemed “inevitable” (yamu wo einai). At 3:25 p.m. the army and navy chiefs of staff met alone with the Emperor. The army chief of staff presented plans for opening a war with the United States, Great Britain, and Holland. The navy chief of staff did not present the plan in detail, but he did tell the Emperor that among others an “air attack” (kûshû) on Hawai’i was planned:

Also, the emperor received a report from the Navy Chief of Staff about deliberations on Imperial Navy operations plans for a war with the United States, Great Britain and Holland. Employing a mobile attack unit with six aircraft carriers as the main element, an air attack on the main enemy fleet stationed in Hawai’i is planned.⁶

Twenty-seven different sources are listed documenting this Imperial Conference. However, one of Hosaka’s criticisms of the record is illustrated here: the citations are vague and unreliable. Only titles are listed, one after the other, with no hint of where the information in each might be found or which source refers to a specific event.⁷

On December 1, the attacks were sanctioned at an Imperial Conference. The Conference began according to the STJR at 11:38 a.m. and extended into the late afternoon. In the beginning Prime Minister Tôjô summarized previous cabinet discussions saying the (intractable) situation between the United States and Japan had not changed, and he requested that the Imperial Conference decide to open war with the United States, Great Britain, and Holland. At 2:00 p.m. after long discussions with the cabinet and Imperial Headquarters the president of the Privy Council, Hara Yoshimichi (1867–1944), summarized the proceedings and came to the conclusion that war was inevitable (yamu wo einai). The phrase is repeated several times. The Emperor entered at 3:45 p.m. He listened to further discussion and sometime after 4:30 p.m. he too came to the conclusion that war was inevitable. Hirohito sanctioned the decision and ordered the army and navy to cooperate closely, not without reason. Army and navy enmity went back many years in Imperial Japan.⁸ Despite this order, and many more during the war, as related below, their hostility only ceased with the collapse of the empire.

On December 3, at 10:45 a.m. orders were sent to Commander of the Combined Fleet Admiral Yamamoto as an Imperial Decree (chokugo). Therein the Emperor says the fate of the nation hangs on success or failure. The Combined Fleet’s responsibility is very heavy, and he expects them to annihilate (shômetsu) the enemy.⁹ Here one vividly sees Emperor Hirohito’s situation: he sanctioned starting a war beginning with attacks on Pearl Harbor and various other places in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. He knew full well what was going to happen. But he did not participate in planning these operations and formally ordered implementing them after being presented with a fait accompli: the general staffs and cabinet both had decided that war was inevitable and this was the best way to go about it.

Later on December 8, 1941, the results of the attacks opening the Pacific War were reported to the Emperor. Among them it was reported that the “surprise attack” (kishû) on Hawai’i was a success:

The emperor received a report concerning the landing of our forces on the Malay Peninsula, the success of the surprise attack on Hawai’i, the bombardment of Singapore, the military situation after air attacks on Mindanao, Guam, and Wake.

Eight different sources document this report, with the same problems as noted above.¹⁰ Although the attack on Pearl Harbor began before an official notice from Tokyo was delivered to officials in Washington, DC, (possibly) indicating that war was coming, this provocative blunder is not mentioned.

That the Emperor was informed of the plan to attack Pearl Harbor well before it took place is nothing new.¹¹ That a work sponsored by the Imperial Household Agency confirms he was informed in this manner, however, is new and significant. In the November 5, Imperial Conference the phrase “air attack” was used in the navy operations report to Emperor Hirohito concerning Hawai’i; in the December report to the Emperor this action was labeled a “surprise attack.” As seen above, among the six operations cited only the Hawai’i attack was called a surprise attack. In another record of the Imperial Audience of November 3, from the Imperial Army General Staff the operation was termed a surprise attack.¹² Perhaps this difference in terminology—an air attack becoming a surprise attack—went unnoticed, or perhaps the compilers of the STJR would like the Emperor to be treated more favorably in future histories, i.e., he supposedly did not know a surprise attack was planned.

Similar discussions between the Emperor and Imperial Japan’s military leaders, and reports on proposed as well as ongoing military operations can be found in the STJR. For example, as shown below, this record reports on establishing the “absolute national defense perimeter” in September 1943, the decisive defeat on Saipan, and the subsequent resignation of the Tôjô Cabinet in mid-1944. The affirmation by the Imperial Household Agency that the Shôwa Emperor was informed of specific military operations prior to their execution and that he subsequently received reports on their success or failure immediately after they were carried out is significant; however, this information does not show that the Emperor ordered the planning or execution of these actions. It does show that he was well aware of what was being planned, took part in discussions about military matters, and knowledgeably as well as formally sanctioned military operations including those that marked the beginning, continuation, and finally the end of the Pacific War.

The Senshi Sôsho (War History Series)

The source used in many accounts of Japanese wartime activities is a reliable work, the War History Series, 102 volumes put together at the Bôeichô Bôei Kenkyûsho Senshishitsu (Defense Agency, Institute for Defense Studies, War History Office), now the Japanese National Institute for Defence Studies, Center for Military History (Bôei Kenkyûjo Senshi Senta). Similar to the STJR it also is a secondary source in which many primary sources are cited. Different from the STJR, it was compiled by former military—read state—leaders. The work is arranged by themes. One of the first volumes is on the Pearl Harbor attack (hawa’i sakusen). Other themes have various volumes devoted to them, for example the Imperial Headquarters, Army Department (10 volumes) and the Imperial Headquarters Navy Department, Combined Fleet (7 volumes). The information is arranged within each theme in chronological order, but the various volumes were not published in sequence.¹³ Since most of the volumes were compiled in the 1960s and 1970s some may be somewhat dated. However, they are based for the most part on primary sources from the Military Archives of the National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Tokyo, many of which have not been published but may be seen there; therefore this series is still important. Primary sources cited by the authors indicate that Hirohito was extensively informed about military matters, including the importance of Saipan. This is also discussed in the STJR, but in places the two sources contain dissimilar commentaries on these events.

The War History Series has been examined extensively, likewise a number of unpublished sources cited therein. Two sources often quoted in various volumes of the series are the “Sanada Jôichirô Shôshô Nikki” (Major General Sanada Jôichirô Diary) and the “Nakazawa Gunreibu Daiichi Buchô Nôto” (Navy General Staff, 1st Department, Department Head Nakazawa Notes). Both are available in the NIDS Military Archives. In mid-1944 Major General Sanada was Head of the Imperial Army Operations Department (Sanbôhonbu Daiichi Buchô) and Rear Admiral Nakazawa was Head of the Imperial Navy Operations Department (Gunreibu Daiichi Buchô). Sanada (1897–1957) and Nakazawa (1894–1977) were active in rival services, and they both spent many years on their respective general staffs. The writings of each were compared with relevant volumes in the War History Series.¹⁴ There are no practical differences between the primary source materials and the contents of the respective series volumes. These examples illustrate my experience generally when consulting this work: it is very reliable. Also, the staff in the Military Archives at the NIDS are very helpful in locating and explaining source materials stored there.

The Imperial Headquarters

Finally, a very interesting collation of primary source materials must be noted: the Imperial Headquarters Army Department Records Relating to Imperial Audiences.¹⁵ Here the various types of audiences with the Emperor involving the Imperial Headquarters are explained, and selected copies of the handwritten records are presented. The Imperial Headquarters was organized around the two chiefs of staff and existed to lend dual (army and navy) support to the Emperor in military matters. Decisions were reached at an Imperial Headquarters Conference. There were no civilian members. Not even the prime minister or foreign minister attended these conferences. The members from each service who formally attended included the chiefs and vice-chiefs of staff, the heads of the respective operations departments, and the army and navy ministers. If the Emperor was present he was accompanied by his chief aide-de-camp, and it was called an Imperial Headquarters Imperial Conference (daihon’ei gozenkaigi), which was not the same as the generally known Imperial Conference (gozenkaigi). Other lower-ranking members of the general staffs were called to attend when s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle Page
• Title Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents 
• Note on Text
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. Wartime Events, Historical Hindsights and Insights
• 2. Kamikaze Attacks, Planning before and after the Fall of Saipan
• 3. Tôjô Hideki, Man of his Times
• 4. Failing Strategy, Lack of War Materials, and Tôjô’s Fall
• 5. Capitulation: Hubris and Unquestioning Belief in a Religious Ideology, some Conclusions
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Imprint