The Art of War Landmark Edition

The Classic of Strategy with Historical Notes and Introduction by PEN Award-Winning Author Mitch Horowitz

Sun Tzu, Mitch Horowitz, Lionel Giles

• Publisher: G&D Media
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781722500979
• eBook ISBN: 9781722521967
• Topic: Personal Development
• Subtopic: Business Skills

Discover the True Meaning of Victory
The Art of War is one of the most widely read classics of history—and one of the most practical works of philosophy ever written. Now, for the first time, this "landmark edition" presents the unparalleled 1910 translation by British sinologist Lionel Giles (1875-1958) along with Giles' equally potent 1905 translation of the Tao Te Ching, the work upon which The Art of War stands, for a complete and transformative experience of martial wisdom.

PEN Award-winning historian Mitch Horowitz introduces and annotates this volume, highlighting the complementary insights of The Art of War and the Tao Te Ching. Mitch's footnotes clarify the meaning and context of The Art of War, as his introduction—a compelling study in itself—explores the relevance, history, and authorship of these ageless classics. This volume also features an integrated index of The Art of War and the Tao Te Ching, helping the reader locate commonalities between them.

"My hope is that your reading The Art of War alongside Giles' translation of the Tao Te Ching," Mitch writes in the introduction, "will provide you—at times joltingly—with a powerful new estimate and measure of personal behavior…The Art of War is a book of ethical power—not force, which dies with its user, but power which is generative and renewable."

"To fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting."—Sun Tzu, The Art of War

THE ART OF WAR

I.

Laying Plans

1. Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State.

2. It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected.

3. The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one’s deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field.

4. These are:

(1) The Moral Law;¹

(2) Heaven;

(3) Earth;

(4) The Commander;

(5) Method and discipline.

5,6. The Moral Law causes the people to be in complete accord with their ruler, so that they will follow him regardless of their lives, undismayed by any danger.

7. Heaven signifies night and day, cold and heat, times and seasons.

8. Earth comprises distances, great and small; danger and security; open ground and narrow passes; the chances of life and death.

9. The Commander stands for the virtues of wisdom, sincerity, benevolence, courage and strictness.

10. By Method and discipline are to be understood the marshaling of the army in its proper subdivisions, the graduations of rank among the officers, the maintenance of roads by which supplies may reach the army, and the control of military expenditure.

11. These five heads should be familiar to every general: he who knows them will be victorious; he who knows them not will fail.

12. Therefore, in your deliberations, when seeking to determine the military conditions, let them be made the basis of a comparison, in this wise:

13. (1) Which of the two sovereigns is imbued with the Moral law?

(2) Which of the two generals has most ability?

(3) With whom lie the advantages derived from Heaven and Earth?

(4) On which side is discipline most rigorously enforced?

(5) Which army is stronger?

(6) On which side are officers and men more highly trained?

(7) In which army is there the greater constancy both in reward and punishment?

14. By means of these seven considerations I can forecast victory or defeat.

15. The general that hearkens to my counsel and acts upon it, will conquer: let such a one be retained in command! The general that hearkens not to my counsel nor acts upon it, will suffer defeat: let such a one be dismissed!

16. While heading the profit of my counsel, avail yourself also of any helpful circumstances over and beyond the ordinary rules.

17. According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one’s plans.

18. All warfare is based on deception.²

19. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near.

20. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him.

21. If he is secure at all points, be prepared for him. If he is in superior strength, evade him.

22. If your opponent is of choleric temper, seek to irritate him. Pretend to be weak, that he may grow arrogant.

23. If he is taking his ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them.

24. Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.

25. These military devices, leading to victory, must not be divulged beforehand.

26. Now the general who wins a battle makes many calculations in his temple ere the battle is fought. The general who loses a battle makes but few calculations beforehand. Thus do many calculations lead to victory, and few calculations to defeat: how much more no calculation at all! It is by attention to this point that I can foresee who is likely to win or lose.³

¹ This is sometimes translated as the Tao, or the Way, as explored in the introduction.

² This is Sun Tzu’s key strategic point; most tactics in the book stem from this principle.

³ Sun Tzu had no respect for the commander who acted out of emotion or haste. Research, foreknowledge, deliberateness, and information-gathering are central to his system of warfare and are, he argued, the best guarantors of victory. See chapter IV of the Tao Te Ching: “The best soldiers are not warlike; the best fighters do not lose their temper.”

II.

Waging War

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li,⁴ the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men’s weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.⁵

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.⁶

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people’s substance to be drained away.

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy’s provisions is equivalent to twenty of one’s own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one’s own store.

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.⁷

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one’s own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people’s fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

⁴ A traditional Chinese unit of measure, a “li” is about 500 meters.

⁵ As seen in the ensuing lines, Sun Tzu warned against the drain of extended campaigns or drawn-out occupations. Compare to chapter VI in the Tao Te Ching: “The good man wins a victory and then stops; he will not go on to acts of violence.” Also in that chapter: “Where troops have been quartered, brambles and thorns spring up. In the track of great armies there must follow lean years.”

⁶ Sun Tzu thought it vital to “live off the land”—no army or exploratory mission can possibly bring all of it...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction: Nature and Conflict
• The Art of War
• Tao Te Ching: (The Sayings of Lao Tzu)
• Integrated Index
• About the Authors