1973: The Road to War

Yigal Kipnis

• Publisher: Just World Books
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9781935982319
• eBook ISBN: 9781935982388
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

Israeli historian Yigal Kipnis delves deep into the Israeli and American archives and reveals in this book that the big October 1973 war between Israel and its Arab neighbors could almost certainly have been avoided.  Avoided, that is, if in the months preceding October 1973, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir, who was facing elections, had not been so determined to block the ongoing peace negotiations with Egypt, and if U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (despite his misgivings) had not backed up her diplomatic hard line. Kipnis contradicts the conventional wisdom, arguing convincingly that it was Israeli political intransigence, not a failure of Israel's military intelligence, that set the stage for the 1973 war.
The Hebrew-language original of 1973: The Road to War made great waves when it was published in Israel.

1

In Israel—Fear of an American Initiative

“In my assessment, we have gained a considerable amount of time for the United States not to act in the Middle East.”

—Ambassador Rabin to Prime Minister Meir¹

At the beginning of 1973, with a clear lack of enthusiasm, Israel awakened to a new political reality. Since the Six-Day War had ended, the Middle East had been humming with attempts to set a peace process in motion and to reach an agreement, but apparently only an informed few could distinguish between the missions, various attempts at mediation, documents and plans, and range of initiatives. For many, concepts like the “Jarring mission,” “Rogers plan,” “Rogers initiative,” “Sisco initiative,” and others were all one and the same. All were consolidated in the memory as one chapter in the period of unsuccessful attempts. They were all pointless moves inasmuch as, in the reality of the period, decision-makers in the White House were interested in not reaching a peace agreement in the Middle East. This reality began to change at the beginning of 1973, but many observers still err and include the first nine months of that year within the preceding years of sterility. In order to understand what changed, the spotlight must first be turned on the leader who initiated the change—President Anwar Sadat of Egypt.

The Challenge of Sadat

When Anwar Sadat was appointed president of Egypt following the death of President Gamal Abdel Nasser in September 1970, no one considered him Nasser’s heir, only a temporary caretaker. His advantage was his weakness. There were no expectations that he could, either sooner or later, reach the status of his predecessor as one of the major leaders of the Third World countries, as the principal leader of the Arab world, and as a figure who was admired by the masses. No one expected that Sadat would be successful in dealing with the severe internal problems of Egypt or, even less, in coping with the legacy of the Six-Day War—the national necessity of returning Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, a mission at which Nasser had failed, both diplomatically and through the use of force. Only a month before he died, Nasser had accepted the failure of his military attempts with regard to the Suez Canal when he signed the ceasefire agreement. The agreement put an end to the War of Attrition, which he had initiated in order to lead the superpowers to impose an agreement on Israel to withdraw from Sinai. Sadat, Nasser’s successor, was not perceived as a military leader in war, nor as a personality who could force Israel into an agreement it did not desire. As a person widely believed to be without much political power, Sadat seemed likely to be at best a transitional figure until Egyptian politics would eventually bring to the fore a stronger figure.

Sadat was a surprise. As 1973 approached, two years after he had been chosen without much credit, it appeared that he was surviving successfully, removing his political rivals, and strengthening his status in Egypt as an authoritative president. However, at the same time, in Israel, the United States, the Soviet Union, and the world community, Sadat was not perceived as being endowed with the unique combination of three qualities: first, the ability to observe, to consider, and to plan for the long term, well beyond the ability to view either the internal Egyptian environment or the external political conditions; second, the ability to maneuver and navigate his moves in the immediate and short terms as well as on the long road to achieving his objectives; and, third, courage. His arrival in Israel in November 1977 is one example of these three qualities. His ability to carry out his threats and to initiate war in 1973, a war which appeared to many to have no chance of achieving results, is another example.

The goal Sadat set for himself upon assuming the presidency may seem simplistic—to advance Egypt. All of his moves should be judged in light of this aim. After 1971, his first year in office, which he defined as “a year of decision,” ended with no results, Sadat began to adopt a new line of action. Its objective was to solve Egypt’s problems and develop the support and patronage of the United States, in addition to assistance from the Arab oil states, which were under US influence. Already in April 1972, even before he cut off the Soviet umbilical cord, Sadat initiated communication with Henry Kissinger with the help of the CIA; clarifications between them continued throughout June and into the beginning of July.²

Anwar Sadat and Henry Kissinger in Egypt, November 1973

In order to advance in his new direction, Sadat had to take three difficult preliminary steps. First, he had to disengage Egypt from Soviet influence and from its dependence on the Soviet Union; second, he had to reach an agreement with Israel. These were necessary conditions for building ties to the United States and for making the US an ally. The third step, returning Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty, was essential in order to moderate internal opposition in Egypt so that he could survive in office and receive support for his actions.

The return of Sinai to Egyptian sovereignty could not be achieved militarily. Sadat, like the heads of the Egyptian armed forces, knew this well. Only negotiation could return the territory conquered by Israel in June 1967. In order to advance this goal, Sadat initiated two alternative courses: the first, which was preferred, was the political track. The second, only necessary in the absence of conditions leading to diplomacy, was a military move which would set a political process in motion.

The Expulsion of Soviet Advisors

As the first essential step to execute his strategy, Sadat made a swift and aggressive move. On July 6, 1972, Sadat hosted his vice president, Dr. Mahmoud Fawzy, at his farm and surprised him by informing him, with no preliminary discussion, that he had decided to expel the Soviet military personnel and advisors who were active in Egypt. On July 17, his decision was publicized and was immediately implemented.

This dramatic and significant step is an example of the interdependence of the political and the military tracks. As long as Egypt was dependent on the Soviet Union, Sadat could not earn the trust of the United States and expect it to advance negotiations impartially for an agreement in the Middle East. In addition, to strengthen ties to Saudi Arabia, he would have to distance Egypt from the Soviet Union. And considering the longer term, Israel, as well, would be unwilling to risk an agreement as long as the Soviets had influence in Egypt and army personnel and experts on Egyptian soil.

However, Sadat had no doubt, nor did the commanders of his armed forces, that if military action was required, it could not be carried out without increased Soviet assistance. In the opinion of the army commanders, insulting the Soviet Union and undermining the links between the two states would take its toll on military activity. They were surprised by Sadat’s move, had difficulty understanding its meaning, and disagreed with it. “You certainly understand how dangerous this decision is,” Chief of Staff Saad el-Din el-Shazly responded to the Egyptian defense minister when he was told about Sadat’s decision. “No one can doubt that this will significantly affect our operational capabilities,” he added. In order to moderate their opposition, Sadat had prepared them in advance to accept his decisions submissively. “We must separate politicians and military people.” he stated on June 6, 1972, to the small group of members of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in Egypt. “You, as the military, must concentrate your efforts on preparing the army for the war which is to come.” In order to focus them on their role, he emphasized that he was aware that it was not possible to initiate war as long as Egypt could not defend the home front or use weaponry capable of harming the Israeli home front (to deter it from attacking in Egypt as it had done in 1970, during the War of Attrition). Thus, he said, “The problem facing us is what we should do if the political situation forces us to go to war before we have achieved this deterrence.”³ As mentioned, one month later, it became clear to the army commanders that they would have to respond to this question after the Soviets, on whose weaponry and assistance Egypt relied, had been expelled in disgrace from Egypt.

It was not only the heads of the army who viewed Sadat’s move as greatly damaging Egypt’s preparation for war. Both the United States and Israel had difficulty in understanding Egypt’s action and estimated that it had lessened the chances of a resumption of war. As in other cases, Sadat had made this move without consulting with his advisors or close associates.

Sadat severed relations with his patron, the Soviet Union, without backing himself up by any commitment from the Americans. This was unheard of in the political system, and there are those who believe it was also irresponsible. But turning his back on the Soviet Union was calculated not just to open doors to the White House (and this indeed occurred slowly to begin with) but also to open the purse of Saudi Arabia, and more importantly, to access the weapon of oil which was made available to him.

On July 19, 1972, immediately after he announced the expulsion of the Soviets from Egypt, Sadat turned to the United States and requested an open discussion. Secretary of State William P. Rogers and his associates in the State Department immediately responded positively, but National Security Advisor Henry Kissinger reacted with coolness and proposed that the president delay the Egyptian initiative until after the US presidential election in November.⁴ There were additional important reasons for Kissinger to ask Egypt to wait: the formulation of a peace agreement in Vietnam, which demanded most of Kissinger’s time, his desire to take responsibility for dealing with the Middle East, and his hope to be appointed Secretary of State during Nixon’s second term.⁵ Sadat accepted the postponement of discussion with understanding and even preferred that Nixon be elected for a second term. He was especially anxious that his partner in discussions be Kissinger. He too had already learned that, at the time, two policy systems were operating in the United States (the State Department, headed by Rogers, and the policy directed from inside the White House by Kissinger) and that they were not in coordination. He understood that his interests would best be served by the system operating from the White House, and if necessary, behind the back of the State Department, despite its sympathy for Egypt’s position.

Up until the elections, Kissinger and Sadat exchanged letters via the Egyptian intelligence chief at the time, Ismail Ali, in order to coordinate expectations from the track which was to be created. “All Egypt wanted … was some assurance that we would meet with ‘open hearts.’”⁶ Kissinger heard Egypt’s demands and replied in this spirit of modest expectations—to meet in an atmosphere of goodwill, to clarify all possibilities, and to begin a continuing exchange of serious and open opinions. However, when the Egyptians proposed two possible dates in October 1972, Kissinger, still involved in the last stages of the Vietnam negotiations, managed to put them off until early the next year.⁷

Sadat waited until after the US elections and then again initiated direct contact with the White House. On December 19, 1972, his national security advisor, Hafez Ismail, requested a meeting with Kissinger in a third country in Europe. Kissinger responded positively, confirming that the meeting would be secret and could take place at the beginning of January.⁸

Despite the promise of secrecy, the Egyptian initiative did not remain unknown to Israel. Rabin, who was well acquainted with Kissinger’s schedule, reported to Golda Meir on the following day: “Shaul [Kissinger] is extremely busy and it appears that he has no time for any other subject at this critical stage in the external and internal struggle over Robert’s [President Nixon’s code name] policies in Vietnam.” On the previous days, he had already reported to her: “Perhaps it is unpleasant or immoral to say this, but as long as the president is busy with Vietnam matters, the United States will not be able to find the time to deal with the Middle East…. In my estimation, we have gained a considerable amount of time for the United States not to act in the Middle East.”

Despite Israeli optimism, Kissinger brought Rabin up to date at their meeting on December 22, after he had accepted Ismail’s request, “in order to prevent Egyptian requests to others.”⁹ It is possible that he was referring to “others” in the American government rather than persons or entities outside of the United States. As Rabin had estimated, Kissinger did not have time to meet with Ismail at the beginning of January, but on January 23, precisely the historic date on which a ceasefire agreement was signed in Vietnam, he initiated an attempt to set a date for a meeting between them. For the next two weeks, the two exchanged a series of messages in which Ismail at first pressed for a meeting that month in London and Kissinger postponed the date of the meeting to a month later, at the end of February, and requested to have it at Camp David rather than in Europe. Kissinger explained to Rabin that he had insisted that the meeting take place in the United States and not in a third country in order to reduce any responsibility he might have for the long process of setting a date for the meeting.

In the end, they decided on two days of meetings in the United States. The meetings were coordinated and organized by the CIA for February 25 and 26. It was agreed that they would be completely secret; Secretary of State Rogers and his associates would not know about them. But Rabin, and as a result, Golda Meir and her cabinet did know about the meetings. Kissinger even determined the dates after conferring with Rabin, who preferred that they take place before Meir’s visit to Washington. Moreover, Israel acted to prepare Kissinger for the meeting with the Egyptians and had great influence over the content—and, especially, the results.

Simultaneous to these secret moves, Sadat opened a public “diplomatic attack” during which, on January 12, 1973, he met with President Josip Broz Tito of Yugoslavia on the idyllic island of Brijuni in the norther...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Epigraph
• Title Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• A Note on Sources
• Introduction
• 1. In Israel—Fear of an American Initiative
• 2. Four Days in February
• 3. From Armonk to Golda’s Kitchen—March–April 1973
• 4. To Paris and Back—May 1973
• 5. Dayan: Gentlemen, Please Prepare for War—June–August 1973
• 6. Dayan’s Political Conception—September 1973
• 7. Six Days Before the War—Who Was Responsible?
• 8. Yisrael, What Do We Do Now?
• Appendix: The Story of Ashraf Marwan and the Yom Kippur War
• Dramatis Personae
• Timeline of Events
• Bibliography
• Acknowledgments
• Notes