Starting with Kant

Andrew Ward

• Publisher: Continuum
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9781847061850
• eBook ISBN: 9781441152831
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Immanuel
Kant is undoubtedly one of the most important thinkers in the history of
philosophy. He is also notoriously difficult for beginners to understand. Starting with Kant offers a genuinely
accessible introduction to the metaphysics, theory of knowledge, and moral
philosophy of this hugely influential figure. It assumes no prior acquaintance
with his ideas.
Thematically
structured, the book opens with a completely non-technical overview of the
development of Kant's mature thought, resulting in a wide-ranging understanding
of his famous and ground breaking 'Copernican revolution in metaphysics'. The
book evaluates the basic framework of his metaphysical outlook, and sets out
its implications for his theory of knowledge and moral philosophy. Kant's
position in these fields is related to other philosophers of his period so that
a number of his seminal ideas can be clearly understood through an appreciation
of their opposing views. This is the ideal introduction for anyone coming to
the work of his hugely important thinker for the first time.

PART I

The Revolution in Metaphysics – Critique of Pure Reason

Part I attempts to identify and explain the main claims of the Critique of Pure Reason. In the opening chapter, dealing with the Transcendental Aesthetic, we will see why Kant holds that space and time must be equated with our forms of sensible intuition, and why, in turn, this explains how the synthetic a priori judgements of mathematics are possible. The second chapter will take up the major issues that Kant discusses in the Transcendental Analytic. It is here that he offers his explanation of how, in general, there can be synthetic a priori knowledge of objects; and it is here, too, that he provides proofs of the synthetic a priori principles lying at the foundations of natural science. If these proofs are successful – and we will be examining the most important ones – he will have shown that all spatio-temporal objects must obey universal and necessary laws that derive from our own mind. In the final chapter, which considers issues discussed in the Transcendental Dialectic, we will see why Kant rejects the claims of metaphysics to provide us with any knowledge that transcends experience, in particular any knowledge concerning God, freedom or the immortality of the soul.

1

The Transcendental Aesthetic: space, time and mathematics

We saw, in the general introduction, that Kant’s plan of campaign is to begin by finding out how it is possible for mathematics and pure natural science to provide us with synthetic a priori knowledge of spatio-temporal objects (as, he holds, they undoubtedly do). Once this initial step has been accomplished, he will proceed to see whether metaphysics can provide us with any synthetic a priori knowledge of objects. Since our capacity to have any perceptual knowledge of spatio-temporal objects requires that representations are first presented to us in sensibility, Kant starts his investigations into our synthetic a priori knowledge of these objects by examining the relationship between our forms of sensibility (outer and inner sensible intuition), on the one hand, and space and time, on the other. This opening part of the Critique of Pure Reason is entitled the ‘Transcendental Aesthetic’.

In the course of the Aesthetic, he will argue that space and time must be equated with our forms of outer and inner sensible intuition respectively. He takes it that, at best, there can be only three plausible views concerning the status of space and time, and he briefly describes them in the following passage:

What then are space and time? Are they real existences? Are they only determinations or relations of things, yet such as would belong to things even if they were not intuited? Or are space and time such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the subjective constitution of the mind, apart from which they could not be ascribed to anything whatsoever?

(A 23/B 37)

According to the first view, space and time exist not only independently of our possible consciousness, but independently of any objects (things in themselves) in space or time. This is, or at least is taken to be, the Newtonian or absolute view of space and time; and it is the view being referred to when it is asked whether space and time are ‘real existences’. The second view is that space and time do exist independent of our possible consciousness (like the first view), but not independently of objects (things in themselves). This is taken to be the Leibnizian or relational view; and it is what is being referred to when it is asked whether space and time are only relations of things [in themselves], yet such as would belong to these things ‘even if they were not intuited’. The third view is that space and time belong only to our mind’s forms of sensibility (outer and inner intuition respectively), and hence can have no existence independent of our possible sensuous consciousness. This is Kant’s own view; and it is what is being referred to when it is asked whether space and time belong only to the subjective constitution of the mind.

Kant presents two different types of argument in favour of his own view and against the alternatives. First, arguments are presented that depend on how we think of objects in space and time, independently of any particular empirical data that these objects may manifest. These arguments are all listed under what he calls ‘metaphysical’ expositions. Second, arguments are presented that start with the synthetic a priori judgements of mathematics and, from these judgements, certain key conclusions are drawn about the status of space and time. These are termed ‘transcendental’ expositions. (By the time of the Aesthetic, Kant takes it that we will acknowledge that mathematical judgements are synthetic a priori: he has already argued for this position in the introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason. I will be outlining why he adopts the position later in this chapter.)

Since the arguments concerning space and time are, in general, closely analogous, I will take them together. This should help to illuminate some of Kant’s individual arguments because, sometimes, remarks that he makes about time help to clarify his position with regard to space or vice versa.

Metaphysical expositions of space and time

(A 22/B 37–A 25/B 40 and A 30/B 46–A 32/B 49)

In discussing the four arguments of the metaphysical expositions, I will follow the numbering in the B edition, not the A edition.

The first two arguments in the metaphysical expositions of space and time are designed to show that our concepts of space and time are not acquired a posteriori (through experience), but rather exist in us a priori (independent of experience). These first two arguments are numbered 1 and 2 both with respect to space and time. The second two arguments are designed to show that space and time must be sensible intuitions – that is immediate sensuous presentations – and not general concepts. These second two arguments are numbered 3 and 4 with respect to space, but, confusingly, they are numbered 3 and 5 with respect to time.

Argument 1 for space

If we acquired our concept of space a posteriori, this would have to be on the basis of appearances (since even the transcendental realist acknowledges that our only immediate consciousness, in any case of the experience of objects, is of the content of representations given in sensibility). But, argues Kant, we could not possibly have arrived at our notion of space through consciousness of the relations between appearances – relations like alongside of, at a distance from, and so on – because the very capacity to think of given appearances in these relational ways presupposes thinking of them as existing together in space.

In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant will defend this claim further. He will argue that the very ability to apprehend a manifold of representations as an outer appearance (or appearances) already requires that this manifold be conceived together in a single spatial continuum (by the application of the a priori concepts of the understanding). No empirical consciousness of any given appearance(s) would be possible without the manifold constituting the appearance(s) being first thought together in space. There could be no question of starting with the consciousness of given appearances as ‘at a distance from one another’ or whatever, and acquiring the notion of space from this relational consciousness. There could be no question because only in so far as the representations of the manifold have been conceived together in a single extended (and so spatial) continuum could there be any consciousness of given outer appearances at all, and hence the empirical consciousness of these appearances in any particular relation to one another.

Argument 1 for time

A parallel argument goes for time. We could have no consciousness of given appearances as co-existing or in succession without having placed the representations, constituting the particular succession or co-existence, together in time. The very possibility of experiencing any particular change of state or co-existence presupposes that the manifold of representations, constituting the given appearances, has been conceived as existing in time (by application of the a priori concepts of the understanding). Consequently, we could not derive our conception of time from an empirical consciousness of succession or co-existence among given appearances (and hence a posteriori). Again, this argument does not presuppose the correctness of Kant’s own position. For the transcendental realist accepts that our only manner of acquiring our conception of time a posteriori is through appearances. The difference between Kant’s own position, transcendental idealism, and the transcendental realist’s is this. The latter believes that we think of time as attaching to things in themselves, and that this thought is made possible by means of our consciousness of succession and co-existence among appearances. Kant, on the other hand, holds that the very possibility of perceiving given appearances as existing in a particular relationship of succession or co-existence requires that the representations, out of which these appearances are constituted, have already been conceived as existing together in time. The consciousness of given appearances existing in a particular succession or coexistence cannot precede our conception of time, since this very empirical consciousness itself depends on thinking of the given representations together in a single temporal continuum, i.e. in time.

In sum, neither our notion of space nor time can be derived from our empirical consciousness because, in both cases, what is alleged to be the required relational consciousness among appearances presupposes that the representations, out of which the appearances are constituted, have already been thought as existing in space and/or time. (When we come to the Transcendental Analytic, we shall consider Kant’s detailed grounds for this claim, most conspicuously with regard to time: see especially the discussion of the three Analogies of Experience. However, he defends the claim for both space and time, in a highly condensed form, at B 162–4.)

Argument 2 for space and time

This argument seeks to prove that both space and time must be given a priori (independent of experience). It is claimed that while space can be thought of as empty of appearances – when we engage in geometrical constructions – no outer appearance can be experienced without thinking of it as in space. Hence, space cannot be dependent on appearances for its existence, but must be a condition for their very existence (and hence must exist prior to, and independent of, experience). Analogously with time: time can be thought of as empty of appearances (when engaging in arithmetical calculations or pure mechanics), but no appearance whatsoever can be thought of except as existing in time. Accordingly, time must be a condition of all appearances, and given a priori, i.e. independent of the consciousness of any appearances.

Argument 3 for space and time

Here, it is contended that space and time are pure intuitions and not general concepts. If space were a general concept, it must be possible for it to have multiple instances (as the concept inhabited planet can have multiple instances). But space is thought of as essentially one continuum. Talk of ‘multiple spaces’ does not imply that there is more than one space: only that we can talk, and be conscious, of different parts of one and the same spatial continuum. Space, therefore, cannot be a general concept; hence, it must be a sensible intuition, that is, an immediate sensuous presentation (the only alternative). Yet it cannot be an empirical intuition, as is the sensation of a given colour expanse. For whereas we can experience different patches of red (with no requirement that they must each be part of one and the same all-encompassing red expanse), there can be no question of one subject experiencing different spaces (which may or may not turn out to be parts of one and the same space). Space must be thought of as a single intuition – with the parts of space contained within it – and hence the intuition of space must be a priori. If space were an empirical (or a posteriori) intuition, fabricated from a series of empirical intuitions, there could be no requirement that all these different intuitions are thought of as parts of one and the same single intuition.

Similarly with time: time cannot be a general concept, since all the parts of time are thought of as necessarily parts of one and the same temporal continuum and, as Kant puts it, ‘the representation that can be given only through a single object is intuition’ (A 32/B 47). Only an a priori sensuous presentation – a pure sensible intuition – can provide us with the idea of something that is singular (a continuum) within which all empirical temporal states must be located.

(Later, in the Transcendental Analytic, Kant will seek to account for why – as he claims – we think of space and time as essentially singular intuitions. In the Refutation of [Empirical] Idealism, he argues that each of us can only be conscious of ourselves as a single, temporally continuous subject in so far as there is one spatio-temporal continuum in which empirical objects can be intuited.)

Argument 4 for space and argument 5 for time

We think of space and time as given to us as unlimited magnitudes. But, if space and time were general concepts, they could not be so thought, because although concepts can have an unlimited number of instances falling under them, no concept can contain an unlimited number of parts in virtue of which it is applied. On the other hand, when we imagine drawing a line in space or following a series of changing positions of a point, we are engaging in an activity in intuition (constructing a line, etc.); and in doing so we can always think of extending these activities without limit. It is these intuitive progressions alone that can give us the idea of space and time as limitless in extent (see Prolegomena sect. 12). Hence it is by means of intuition, indeed a priori intuition, that we are enabled to think of space and time as given to us as unlimited magnitudes. The intuition is a priori because the mathematical activities here required (constructing a line, etc.) do not have recourse to any empirical intuition.

*

Collectively, then, the metaphysical expositions of space and time have contended that both are a priori (or pure) sensible intuitions. That is, they are sensuous presentations belonging to the mind’s own faculty of sensibility, and the presentations are independent of any empirical data (that is why Kant calls them ‘pure’ as an alternative to ‘a priori’ intuitions). More strictly, they are pure intuitions when the mind is engaged in mathematical constructions. When we are conscious of sensing empirical data (as in e.g. perceiving a boat going downstream), the spatial and temporal expanses become empirical intuitions. But, even then, space and time are still the forms of our intuition: they make possible the structural nature of the empirical data – that the data are always sensed as spatially and/or temporally structured in a single continuum – and these forms reside in the mind (in our faculty of sensibility) a priori.

Transcendental expositions of space and time

(B 40–1 and B 48–9)

Kant regards the transcendental expositions as providing the strongest case for his claim that space and time are a priori (or pure) intuitions. These expositions, he says, serve to make his position on space and time ‘completely convincing’ (A 46/B 63). However, in order to appreciate their force, we need to understand why Kant maintains that geometry and arithmetic are bodies of synthetic a priori judgements, with geometrical judgements describing the structure of space and the judgements of arithmetic, as well as pure mechanics, describing the structure of time. I shall concentrate – as Kant does – on geometry.

He takes it as uncontentious that geometry is not only a body of true (and proven) judgements but also that it describes relations of extension and of shape, and, as such, it is concerned with demonstrating the properties of space. Moreover, he argues in his introduction that its judgements are synthetic a priori (B 14–17). For example, consider the judgement ‘A straight line is the sho...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Series
• Starting with Kant
• Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations and conventions
• Chronology
• General introduction: Kant’s Copernican revolution
• Part I: The Revolution in Metaphysics – Critique of Pure Reason
• Part II: The Revolution in Ethics – Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals and Critique of Practical Reason
• Endnote
• Bibliography
• Index