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Religion and the Gulf Wars
Probably no event, or series of events has been more divisive during the last two decades than the Gulf wars. They have divided opinion within Britain and Europe and have had a detrimental effect on relationships between Muslim and Western countries. With emotions beginning to calm with a new generation of political leaders, now is perhaps a good time to seek to examine events and decisions using the time honoured Christian criteria for the âjust warâ, which since the time of Thomas Aquinas in the thirteenth century has provided rulers and ruled with a benchmark to consider whether it is right to go to war or engage in a rebellion against civic powers. It might be thought that the concept of the just war is rather dated when considering modern warfare and weaponry, but it is on the syllabus of military academies as well as theological colleges and, as we shall see, gives us a very helpful perspective in judging the wisdom or otherwise of engaging in the Gulf wars.
The criteria for the just war are well known. Because Christian teaching honours both human life and a society working for the common good, it sees the killing of individuals as a serious sin which we should strive to avoid. Because of this many Christians, amongst others, refuse to take up arms whatever the cause. This has not been the mainline position of the Church, however. Rather taking up arms in self defence or in the face of an oppressive regime has been seen as a legitimate last resort with several provisos.
First of all, other methods of ending the dispute must have been attempted and failed. Secondly, there must be legitimate and lawful authority for going to war. Thirdly, the war must be fought with the right intention; material gain for example, is not a just purpose. Fourthly, because all war causes suffering, there must be a reasonable belief that the war will have a successful outcome; if there is doubt here, it might be better to live with some injustice and oppression, rather than cause great suffering to no human benefit.
If it is judged that these conditions have been met and that going to war is legitimate then other criteria kick in concerning the conduct of the war. As far as is possible war must only be fought against enemy soldiers and civilian casualties should be avoided. Once enemy soldiers have surrendered and have been disarmed they must be treated with respect. With modern weaponry getting more and more powerful it might be thought that the avoidance of civilian casualties is a vain hope, but it has been claimed that the development of âsmartâ weapons gives military commanders more control over the destruction they cause. In any event, another criteria within war is that the force used must be proportionate to the wrong that has been done and the possible good that can come out of the war; a wasteland of burning oil fields, for example would be to nobodyâs benefit. In general, the force and weaponry used should be the minimum necessary to achieve the desired outcome.
There are further criteria for a just cause to end the war. The stated desired aim should have been met and terms of surrender negotiated: also, even a war having a just cause can be ended if it is clear that victory cannot be achieved. Peace terms must be negotiated and agreed between legitimate authorities and should be proportionate to the original reason for going to war and should not be the cause of such grievance, resentment or hardship such as to plant the seeds of a further future conflict. There must be no revenge taken and any punishment should be limited to those who were directly responsible for the conflict.
Unpacking the events of the Gulf wars within the perspective of these criteria is instructive, not least because the messy outcome of the First Gulf War simmered throughout the next decade and overlapped with the given causes of a Second Gulf War. Eight âThoughtâ scripts are included here from different times during these disputes and illustrate how, at the time, I was trying to interpret day-by-day events.
The first âThoughtâ comes from January 1991, six months after Iraqâs invasion of Kuwait. Of course this invasion came out of turmoil in the region in earlier years. Almost one million people died in the IraqâIran war from 1980 until 1989. In 1981 Israel had bombed the Iraqi nuclear plant near Baghdad. In 1987 there had been reports of Iraqi chemical attacks on Kurdish villages, and soil samples confirmed the use of mustard gas and the nerve agent Tabun.
The immediate response to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 was a series of UN resolutions calling for Iraqi withdrawal, stating that the annexation had no legal validity, demanding the release of foreign nationals that Iraq was detaining and, in some cases, using as hostages in Iraq and Kuwait. At the same time the UN called for economic sanctions against Iraq. In September 1990 Iraq called for the overthrow of leaders in Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and there was US military build-up in Saudi Arabia. On 9 September there was a joint USâSoviet statement affirming the principle that âwe must demonstrate beyond any doubt that aggression cannot and will not payâ. Finally, at the end of November, UN resolution 678 authorized the use of âall means necessaryâ after 15 January 1991 to enforce previous UN resolutions, including that requiring Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
With all of this it would seem that all the just conditions for going to war had been met. The invasion of Kuwait by Iraq had been ruled by the UN to be illegal and illegitimate. Other diplomatic and economic pressure had been attempted and force would be being used as a necessary last resort, with legitimate authority and with the aim of forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. This thinking was behind the âThoughtâ script, delivered on 2 January 1991, which anticipated the use of allied force, yet expressed the hope that ânow the world community, having shown its willingness to shoulder bravely its load of care, find a way of ensuring freedom and justice without precipitating itself into the horror of warâ. This hope was not realized and âOperation Desert Stormâ began with an Apache helicopter strike on 17 January 1991.
ZULU, 2 JANUARY 1991
Within six weeks the fighting was over but not before Scud missiles had hit Israel. The aftermath of the war was to prove to be rather more controversial than the war itself. The UN resolution 687 in April established the peace terms, including the return of Kuwaiti property, economic sanctions and Iraqi disarmament. Iraq was to provide a list of all weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in its possession. United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspectors were to ascertain that the arms had been surrendered. Here lay the seeds of a future war, for there never was agreement that Iraq had declared or surrendered all of its WMD.
President George Bush (Sr) was criticized by some for halting the war as soon as its objectives had been achieved, the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. Many felt that the allied forces should have gone on and finished the job with the expulsion of Saddam Hussein from power. In terms of just war criteria, however, President Bushâs action was quite correct, for the UN had not given authority for regime change. This would clearly have been seen as an illegal action with little support from neighbouring countries.
However, another consequence of careless planning following the ceasefire could be criticized. At the end of March, with US encouragement, the Shia in the south of Iraq and the Kurds in the north rebelled against the Saddam Hussein regime. The Iraqi army and air force had not been disarmed and within a month the rebels were crushed with approximately one and a half million Kurds fleeing into neighbouring countries.
The âThoughtâ of 9 April 1991 speaks to this peace plan that has gone astray. It compares the Shiite and Kurdish rebels to a classâs pet snake. During the half-term holidays the teacher left a live rat for food in the snakeâs tank. Unfortunately for the snake, the cleaner turned off the heat and the snake went into a deep sleep. When the class returned that snake had not eaten the rat, the rat had eaten the snake. Following the war, Saddam Hussein, the rat, was very much alive and dangerous. As events in Iraq unfolded, the just war criteria of giving just as much attention to building a just peace as to planning and waging a just war are well illustrated, and because, with the best will in the world, there will be unforeseen consequences, those waging war must always be ready to generously contribute to the care of the casualties, not only of the war, but of the peace.
SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE SNAKE, 9 APRIL 1991
For the next three years occasional skirmishes occurred until in November 1994 the Iraq National Assembly officially acknowledged Kuwaiti sovereignty with Saddam Hussein ratifying the decision the same day.
It was in this year that David Steele, now Lord Steele, and I paid a humanitarian fact-finding visit to Iraq to seek to judge how sanctions were effecting the life of Iraqâs schools and hospitals. With air links cut, we travelled across the desert in an ancient taxi from Amman. We were met in Bagdad by the Baath party official who was to be our constant and attentive âminderâ. This was useful in arranging visits to institutions and government ministers, but it was quite obvious that nobody was going to be at all critical in his presence. At 2 p.m. each afternoon, however, he delivered us to our rooms for an afternoon nap, collecting us later at 4.30 pm. We used the afternoon not in sleep but in slipping out to meet NGOs and Church members who fed us with useful and perceptive questions to ask of ministers the following day. I mention this visit in my âThoughtâ of 4 February 1998 when military action was once more being discussed.
IRAQ, 4 FEBRUARY 1998