Intuitionism

David Kaspar

• Publisher: Bloomsbury Academic
• Year: 2012
• Print ISBN: 9781441179548
• eBook ISBN: 9781441196255
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Is the way to moral truth through theory? Or do we already know what's right and wrong? Throughout modern history philosophers have tried to construct elaborate moral systems to determine what's right. Recently, however, some have revived the position that we have intuitive knowledge of right and wrong. In this book, David Kaspar introduces and explores the perspective known as 'Intuitionism'. Charting intuitionism's fall in the twentieth century and its recent resurgence, Kaspar looks at the intuitionist approach to the most important topics in ethics, from moral knowledge to intrinsically good moral action. David Kaspar defends intuitionism against criticisms from competing metaethical schools, such as moral nihilism and ethical naturalism. It also takes on normative rivals, such as utilitarianism, Kantianism, and virtue ethics. By consolidating the stronger claims of both early analytic and contemporary intuitionists, Kaspar goes on to make a robust case for a rigorously intuitionist approach to explaining morality. Intuitionism also includes chapter summaries and guides to further reading throughout to help readers explore and master this important school of contemporary ethical thought. This is an ideal resource for undergraduates and postgraduates taking courses in ethics, metaethics and moral philosophy.

CHAPTER ONE

Thinking about morality

Introduction

Intuitionism is an old view that has only recently been revived. What is especially exciting about it is that, despite its age, intuitionism has a wide range of promising yet unexplored theoretical possibilities. Its explanatory power covers a surprising number of areas. That power is firmly rooted in its foundational knowledge. The first order of business, then, is to bring you into the kind of basic moral reflection that establishes intuitionism’s foundations. Since many who oppose it go astray right at the initial stage of moral inquiry, such elementary reflections form an important part of the case for intuitionism.

This chapter outlines a big picture perspective of intuitionism and provides an opportunity to test our moral intuitions. What I will establish here are intuitionism’s foundations, the methods by which they are secured, as well as its basic doctrines. Beyond that I do not present the main arguments to support it or vigorously defend it from any of many attacks. All that will come later. I do, however, clear up a number of prevalent misunderstandings of the view. My purpose in all this is to give both novice and expert ethicists the best opportunity to understand intuitionism.

One previously unexplored topic is explored here. Intuitionism explains why we have the moral beliefs we do, in fact, have. More specifically, it explains why each of us has our moral beliefs, as well as why civilizations over millennia have consistently adhered to certain moral principles. The task of explaining our actual moral beliefs is one philosophers previously relinquished to psychologists. And many moral theories have good reason for not taking a position on the matter. But if moral knowledge is genuinely within the reach of all of us, as intuitionism asserts, then our psychological histories are only one part, and a less important part, of the explanation for why we have the moral beliefs we have. I will conclude this chapter by reviewing some of the many things that intuitionism explains.

1. Moral beliefs and intuitionism

We all have moral beliefs. We tend to think that assaulting others is wrong and that helping others in need is right. As we seriously reflect on such beliefs, we also think of potential complications, especially in extraordinary circumstances. Although assaulting a stranger sitting on a park bench seems obviously wrong to us, assaulting the guard of a terrorist haven to stop a terrorist attack seems right. We believe we have a duty to help others in need, but recognize limitations to that duty. We are certainly free to donate so much to the needy that we have to sell our house. But we don’t believe it’s our duty to do so.

Intuitionism begins by looking at our moral thought and moral experience. What we really think about morality is something to be investigated, not dismissed.¹ On the basis of our genuine moral thoughts, intuitionism holds that, in general, we know what’s right. That means that moral knowledge is something we bring with us to ethics, not something born whole from ethical inquiry. Our knowledge that lying is wrong, for example, is explained as follows. The proposition that lying is wrong is self-evidently true, and we grasp that truth. Just as we do not believe that the chair we are sitting on exists on the basis of a particular metaphysical theory of material objects, so we do not believe that lying is wrong because of a moral theory called intuitionism. Rather, intuitionism strives to explain what we already know.

Many reading this book, I am sure, believe they know what’s right, but do not know how they know it. Also, they might think they know certain acts are wrong, but be unsure about others. Other readers, I am equally sure, are surprised to learn that they have moral knowledge, for they are not aware of having any! Since the basis of intuitionism is what we really think about morality, and since we obviously have very different beliefs about morality, it seems best to start our investigation with each reader’s personal beliefs. So let us start with what you believe about morality.

Let us think carefully together about the moral statements listed below. As you think about each one, try to determine, first, whether or not you believe it. Having done that, ask how strongly you hold your belief. Do you feel certain of it? Are you only somewhat convinced? Or is your confidence in a particular judgment weak? Later I will assess these moral statements. Here is the list:

Depriving others of liberty is wrong.

Morality is subjective.

Abortion is morally permissible.

There are moral facts.

Keeping promises is required.

Harming others is wrong.

Animals have no right to life.

Thinking about these claims provides material for moral reflection. But there are other reasons for each of us to examine what seems to us to be true in morality. By beginning with the truths, and providing theoretical support later, I begin with what intuitionists regard as most important, giving you the best opportunity to take on the intuitionist perspective.

Intuitionists and their critics have often been working from different sets of data. As I aim to show, intuitionism is able to account for all of the data moral theorists must deal with. But the data intuitionists consider most important, what we really think about morality, are ignored or devalued by many critics. So by considering our genuine moral thoughts we open the prospect of taking into account all data relevant to moral inquiry. And besides, can you think of any good reason not to consider how moral matters appear to you?

2. Methods of intuitionism

An intuition is an intellectual appearance. It is how things really seem to our minds concerning a given abstract subject or about an abstract feature of a particular concrete situation. We have intuitions about geometry, logic, arithmetic, and their applications. And we have intuitions of moral principles and of the moral situations in which they find application. A moral intuition is what we really think about a moral issue. That genuine moral thought is the basis of intuitionism will strike many as unpromising. Given our widely divergent personal moral beliefs, how can it be asserted that by starting with what we think about morality we can ever arrive at secure moral knowledge?

Regard this entire book as an answer to that question. But the initial response is that intuitionism deals with moral thoughts that survive critical reflection. We are primarily reflecting on three things: the moral content of moral propositions, the logical relations between them, and their practical applications. Any method of reflection that makes what we really think about morality of the first importance and by which we can determine whether one of our moral thoughts should be considered an instance of moral knowledge may be called a method of intuitionism.

Reflection on morality must begin in our moral experience. To know what our moral intuitions are requires beginning where morality really counts: in actual moral situations. Actual moral situations are the primary context of moral knowledge. Think of the following circumstances:

We make promises to others. When the time comes to make good on one, we should reflect on what thoughts we have about keeping it. At other times we find ourselves in situations in which, to avoid an inconvenience, we are tempted to lie. Observing how we actually think about lying will give us useful information for our inquiry. Drawing from such experiences and reflecting on what we think is right will provide the first data of ethics: what we think our actual duties are.

Most works in ethics begin by plunging into theory immediately. Intuitionism holds that both the starting-point and the end-point of moral theory is what we really think about morality. This is not to say that intuitionism eschews theory for mere moral self-reflection. Rather, intuitionism recognizes that if we do not have some moral knowledge to start with, theorizing will, in the final analysis, be futile, and that there is no alternative ultimate touchstone for accepting or rejecting abstract moral principles to what we really think about morality.

Why is initial moral reflection so crucial to intuitionism? It holds that the basic moral principles like “Lying is wrong” are self-evident truths.² If we start by making the theoretical case for self-evident truths, we will eventually reach the following impasse. Suppose we have somehow shown that there are self-evident truths. That would certainly be a coup for intuitionism. But just because there are self-evident truths does not show that there are any self-evident moral truths. And even if it were recognized that there are self-evident moral truths, that would not by any means show which moral principles are self-evidently true. That is why we must first attempt to establish which moral thoughts appear true through moral reflection.

3. The first data of ethics

An effective way to determine the first data of ethics is by way of contrasts, through what is called epistemic appraisal.³ Consider the situation in which you are tempted to lie. As you are experiencing the situation, or soon after, give some thought to the following judgments: (1) You should not lie, (2) You should lie, (3) You may lie. Reflecting on these contrasting judgments will help you to determine what you really think concerning what is moral in the situation. To make sure that we are dealing with what we really think, after we have made our initial judgment concerning propositions (1), (2), and (3), we should double-check all our options. So if we have determined, say, that we should not lie in this case, we should ask, “Do I really think that I should not lie in this situation? Am I certain of it?”

Considered thoughts of what we should do in actual moral situations are the first data of ethics. The next thing to determine is why we believe we should so act. Whatever answers the question of why we should perform a certain moral act, which we experience as having some authority, is a moral reason. Initial inquiry on our moral reasons will, as previously, be aimed at determining what we really think. And it will continue to be crucial that we think about what our moral reasons are in the context of actual moral situations.

Contrasting various moral reasons in thought will help us to assess their relative epistemic strengths. If, given the situation you just considered, you thought it was your duty not to lie, then why was it? One straightforward answer might have been that “It’s just wrong to lie” gave you sufficient reason not to lie. An alternative reason might have been that lying would not have produced the most good possible. That is, you considered that not lying would have been productive of greater good overall than lying. Lastly, consider whether the reason why you decided not to lie was because you thought that lying was not an action that you could will as a universal law. You thought that, as a matter of logic, a world in which everyone, including you, consistently lied is not a possible world.

4. Assumptions to avoid

As we examine our moral beliefs some assumptions must be avoided. Many thoughts that will occur to us, intrude upon our reflections, or even pester us must temporarily be set aside. Since we are initially unsure which of our moral beliefs is true, or even which moral beliefs we really hold, we cannot make any assumptions about the ultimate results of our moral reflections. Consequently, we cannot assume that there is one supreme principle that implies, justifies, or explains all our other moral beliefs, or that there is no supreme principle at all. At this stage, we are unsure.

Besides avoiding assumptions that can misdirect our inquiry, we must also keep a watchful eye on our responses to our reflections. Biases, wishful thinking, hidden antipathies and affections, all must be acknowledged, and temporarily put aside as we proceed. Such self-watchfulness is especially important in moral inquiry, where our subjective preferences are most apt to be lazily reinforced or easily threatened. In particular, we must guard against responses to moral thoughts that might move us to abandon them without giving them their due.

Some other responses of which to be aware: at several points we are likely to doubt that we know a particular moral proposition that seems correct to us. Doubting whether we know a given proposition is almost always salutary in philosophical inquiry. But the important thing now is merely what seems correct to us. So doubts should be registered, then let go. As we sift through what we really think of moral propositions, we will likely want to justify the beliefs we currently hold. Justification of beliefs is a central task of philosophy. But once more, we are trying to determine what our moral thoughts really are. Also, any thoughts of whether our reflections fit or contravene today’s social norms must be abandoned for now. Lastly, many people have a desire to reform society. This desire is not inherently bad, but it cannot influence our initial moral reflections.

5. Divisions in moral theory

We can now connect several previous points. I will state which of the moral propositions we have been examining are self-evidently true, and which are not, according to intuitionism.⁴ This sorting of propositions provides an opportunity to explain the different kinds of issues investigated in moral theory, and clarifies the character, structure, and extent of intuitionism’s claims of moral knowledge.

What we really think about morality can be divided along certain lines. Under each head I’ll place the moral propositions which fall under it. According to intuitionism, what we really think about morality can mean: (A) What we know is moral, (B) What some at best rationally believe is moral, or (C) What some really think morality is.

We know that (A):

1 Depriving others of liberty is wrong.

2 Keeping promises is required.

3 Harming others is wrong.

Some at best rationally believe that (B):

4 Animals have no right to life.

5 Abortion is morally permissible.

Lastly, what some really think morality is (C):

6 Morality is subjective.

7 There are moral facts.

Intuitionism holds that our basic moral knowledge is of fundamental moral principles, such as depriving others of liberty is wrong. Moral propositions that apply the fundamental moral principles are applied moral propositions. Among them are the following pairs: animals have no right to life and animals have a right to life; abortion is morally permissible and abortion is morally impermissible. In the current state of ethics, these applied propositions are matters of opinion, and open for debate. Finally, what we think morality is, such as morality is subjective, consists of metaethical propositions.

“Harming others is wrong” is a fundamental moral truth. We know this, and we are secure in our knowledge of this. We are not apt to disagree about moral propositions of this sort. The reason why, according to intuitionism, is that such propositions are self-evidently true. And the reason we know them is that ou...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Introduction
• 1 Thinking about morality
• 2 The story of contemporary intuitionism
• 3 Moral knowledge
• 4 New challenges to intuitionism
• 5 The grounds of morality
• 6 The right and the good reconsidered
• 7 Intuitionism’s rivals
• 8 Practical and ultimate moral issues
• Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index