Part I
Understanding Publicity: Theory and Practice
2
The Theory of Image and Publicity Rights
I. The Legal Landscape
The social practice of publicity exploitation and the subsequent legal recognition of publicity rights have generated a vast literature. Articles and case commentaries abound in the Western world, from jurisdictions as far apart as Finland and New Zealand, California and Italy. Despite, or perhaps because of, the quantity of literature in this area, it is very difficult to draw together a comprehensive review of the theory and practice in this area, and the jurisprudence remains âdisturbingly unsettledâ.1 The purpose of this chapter is to identify the key theoretical approaches to publicity rights through an analysis of publicity rights across Western jurisdictions.
Whereas established fields of law, such as contract, benefit from a common terminology and understanding which enables analysis and development of the law to take place in a transnational and comparative framework,2 when one turns to publicity there is seemingly little common ground, despite the wealth of literature, academic commentary and case law. For some, publicity is the âcommercialisation of popularityâ3 or the right to control commercial use of identity,4 while for others it is media exploitation of privacy.5 Case law reveals a wide range of publicity-type circumstances, from the publication, without consent, of an innocent photograph of a young girl taken without her consent,6 to the interference with a commercial licence for use of a baseball playerâs image, arising from the defendantâs use of the playerâs image with his consent.7 The opinions, terminology and conclusions resulting from the practice of publicity are far from harmonious.
Nevertheless, it is possible to construct three broad interpretative categories in which to site the academic and judicial material. These categories attempt to recognise that authors are not necessarily tackling exactly the same thing under the umbrella terms of âimage rightsâ or âpublicity rightsâ. While it may be desirable to rationalise their approaches, it is not possible to do so within a single scheme. Unlike previous analyses, these categories should not be seen as mapping directly on to different jurisdictions. Instead, they reflect higher-level, theoretical understandings which can be illustrated by material from a range of Civilian and Common law jurisdictions.
With the caveat that any reductionist approach risks over-simplification, and with the acknowledgment that there will always be overlaps, three approaches or categories of publicity rights can be identified as follows:
(a)the âpublicity as propertyâ approach;
(b)publicity as a subset of personality rights; and
(c)appropriation of personality.
II.The âPublicity as Propertyâ Approach
The emphasis in the âpublicity as propertyâ approach is very much on commercial exploitation of identity as a whole and on the commercial interests at stake in exploitation of popularity. The three key unifying factors in this category are (i) the treatment of the commercial value in identity as a property right; (ii) the centrality of commercial use; and (iii) a tendency to define in wide terms the âassetâ being exploited, typically âidentityâ, rather than narrower notions of name or image. The commentators whose work fits into this broad canon are primarily American, and certainly Common lawyers.
This approach can be regarded as the culmination of legal developments since the early 1950s, stemming from two critical events at that time: the judgment of Frank J in Haelan Laboratories v Topps Chewing Gum8 in 1953 and the seminal article by Nimmer on âThe Right of Publicityâ,9 published a year later.10
In 1954, Nimmer recognised that
although the well known personality does not wish to hide his light under a bushel of privacy, neither does he wish to have his name, photograph, and likeness reproduced and publicized without his consent or without remuneration to him.11
Where the only legal rights available to the well-known personality look to privacy interests, the celebrity is unlikely to achieve the legal protection he or she seeks. Nimmer examined the doctrines of privacy, unfair competition and contract, and concluded that they were all inadequate to protect this publicity interest.12 Instead, he argued that the right of publicity âmust be largely determined by two considerations: first, the economic reality of pecuniary values inherent in publicity and, second, the inadequacy of traditional legal theories in protecting such publicity valuesâ.13
Comprehensive legal protection for such values had been granted in a judgment of the âhighly respected Second Circuitâ14 the year before, Haelan Laboratories.15 The influence of this case has been strongly felt ever since, with the words of Frank J echoing through much academic work in this area:
We think that, in addition to and independent of the right of privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has a right in the publicity value of his photograph⌠Whether it be labelled a âpropertyâ right is immaterial; for here, as often elsewhere, the tag âpropertyâ simply symbolizes the fact that courts enforce a claim which has a pecuniary worth.16
In the decades since Haelan, the right of publicity has âmatured and taken on its own distinctive identity as an altogether separate legal categoryâ.17 By 2001, McCarthy was able to state that âthe right of publicity is simply this: it is the inherent right of every human being to control the commercial use of his or her identityâ.18 This wide concept of âidentityâ, whereby âcertain celebrity identities can be appropriated as effectively or even more effectively via other meansâ19 and not merely their name and image, is an inherent part of this approach to publicity. Westfall and Landau suggest that the âvague principle initially underlying the right⌠as expressed in Haelanâ20 has meant that there have been no obvious parameters to the right to guide (or limit) judicial or legislative development,21 resulting in protection being extended to ever-wider elements of identity.
Those who adopt this wide approach to publicity regard it as a âcommercial and business rightâ22 which should be treated as a kind of intellectual property right and, preferably, a property right.23 Academic writing in this category is rich in the language of property and commodification,24 while legislation also reflects this approach. In those American states that have passed legislation to regulate publicity rights, a number of them have explicitly stated that publicity is a property right.25
Coombe has stated that âpersonality rightsâ (in her terminology) extend:
to encompass the tort of appropriation of personality as it has developed at common law, the proprietary right of publicity that has developed in American law, and rights to prevent the appropriation of, inter alia, names and likenesses that have been enacted in provincial and state statutes as well as federal trademark legislation.26
Coombe relies not only on legislation and case law to inform her understanding, but also on urban legend and popular perceptions of publicity,27 and this is typical of the Common law approach in its breadth and practical scope. One distinction that is highlighted by Coombe is the difference between the âright of publicityâ per se and appropriation of personality. This distinction is reflected in the American Law In...