The Reign of Elizabeth I

1558–1603

Stephen J. Lee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9780429603914
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

Covering the period from 1558–1603, The Reign of Elizabeth I looks at all the important aspects of the reign of the last of the Tudor monarchs. The volume gives students the critical tools to enable them to perform to their best ability, drawing together the main issues on each topic and providing an accessible guide to the period. Using extensive sources and historiography, Stephen J. Lee explores:

• the religious settlement
• government and foreign policy
• the economy
• Elizabeth's relationship with Parliament
• society and culture.

Also including a glossary of key terms and a helpful chronology, this is an essential tool for any student of British history.

1
ELIZABETH AND HER GOVERNMENT

BACKGROUND

Elizabeth is generally seen as one of the most popular monarchs in the whole of English history. From the time that she ascended the throne she was always far more accessible to the people than were other rulers. She courted popularity more directly and assiduously than any of her predecessors or successors, partly through official propaganda, partly through her own actions and speeches (see Source 1.3 below).

Her attributes have been extensively documented in many biographies. Her key strength was a strong intellect. She was a classical scholar, adept in both Latin and Greek, and also acquired linguistic skills in French, Italian and Spanish. Such academic abilities and skills could be put to direct practical use. She was able to bring sharp powers of analysis to the political process and therefore saw through carelessly constructed arguments. Similarly she was able more than most other monarchs – and certainly more so than Mary or Henry VIII – to disconnect her own personal feelings from the political issues over which she presided. In this respect her intellect was very much in control of her emotions. She also displayed total self-confidence, although she was cautious and circumspect in her dealings with officials or with foreign ambassadors. She was able to castigate verbally anyone from ministers of state down to members of her household, and had a particular dislike of the obvious pursuit of self-interest. By and large, she recognised qualities in others and was a good judge of character when it came to making a choice of ministers. She was also inclined to pragmatic opportunism and was instinctively distrustful of positions based on ideology.

Elizabeth did, however, possess a number of serious defects which at times impeded the process of effective government. She frequently became involved in minor issues, finding it hard to delegate. It was also very difficult to obtain a decision from the Queen: she was notorious both for her procrastination and for her sudden changes of mind. This was partly because she was able to see so many different sides to an issue and wanted to explore the intricacies involved. There were also contradictions in her personality: she combined nervous energy and occasional lethargy; charm and irritability; resolution and indecision; self-control and temper. Although she has been praised for her religious moderation, she could as easily fall behind draconian measures: for example, her reign (1558–1603) produced 65 per cent of the documented cases of torture during the period 1540–1640. Examples of all these areas of her personality will be found throughout this book.

In the absence of the modern system of party politics and prime minister, government was in a very real sense conducted by the Queen herself. She was directly responsible for all the state departments, including the Privy Council, Exchequer and Chancery. Like all monarchs of the period, her right to this power was uncontested, as can be seen in an extract from Mirror for Magistrates (see Source 1.1 below). Whether or not she had a significant impact on the governing institutions of the time is the subject of Analysis 1. She was served by five prominent ministers. William Cecil (from 1571 Lord Burghley) was Principal Secretary (1558–72), then Lord Treasurer (1572–98). He also held the post of Master of the Court of Wards (1562–98). Robert Dudley (Earl of Leicester) was a prominent member of the Privy Council, with aspirations to Cecil’s offices. Sir Christopher Hatton served as Lord Chancellor between 1587 and 1591. Sir Francis Walsingham was second Secretary of State from 1573 until his death in 1590; he had also been ambassador to France (1570–73) and was sent on a special embassy to Scotland in 1583. Robert Devereux, Earl of Essex, was not given any of the key offices of state, although he became a Privy Councillor in 1593 and, as Earl Marshal, was given command of the Queen’s armies in 1597. Their roles and importance are compared in Analysis 2.

ANALYSIS 1: ASSESS THE CHANGES IN AND EFFECTIVENESS OF ELIZABETH’S GOVERNMENT.

The Queen’s servants presided over and operated institutions which had existed for centuries. At the centre was the Privy Council, the history of which was one of continuity. As with her predecessors, Elizabeth maintained it as the single most important institution in decision-making and the formation of policy. Yet she did introduce one major change, which was really a reversion to the practices of Henry VIII: the Privy Council was returned to the smaller size of the days of Thomas Cromwell, after its expansion to forty members under Edward VI and fifty during the reign of Mary. How well did this work?

On the one hand, a more compact Council was more likely to produce an agreed and coherent policy. A small inner ring, usually of five, developed within the broader membership of between nine and thirteen. Elizabeth clearly thought this helped the formulation of coherent policy when she said that ‘a multitude doth make rather discord and confusion than good counsel’.¹ The Privy Council was able to develop a convention whereby the Queen did not attend meetings but considered it her main function to receive its recommendations and, upon this basis, to make a decision. This enabled a small body of Councillors to go through the preliminary stages of open discussion without being either distracted by numbers or constrained by the royal presence. The smaller Council also had sufficient self-confidence to impose its control over the House of Commons. At times it could even pressurise the Queen, either by mobilising public opinion or by activating Parliament.

On the other hand, smaller numbers within the Council meant that there was likely to be more factional infighting. This was especially the case during the second period of Elizabeth’s reign. In the immediate term this might be an attempt to discredit a specific minister, like Cecil, who was bringing stability. Over a longer period rivalry was lubricated by patronage. This meant that recommendations were made by some individuals within the Council for reasons of personal gain rather than in the national interest. For example, the differences over whether England should intervene in the Netherlands were due as much to the rivalry over personal patronage from the Queen as to genuine differences of foreign policy. At the same time, patronage did not act as a means of polarising positions into a more stable and predictable form of support and opposition; factions based on patronage were not, therefore, the early equivalent of party politics. Overall, the smaller Council tended to accentuate the advantages and disadvantages. When it worked well it was quite exceptional and there is no real equivalent in the whole century to the work of the four great statesmen associated with it. Conversely, its size meant that any real factional conflict was likely to be particularly destabilising, which tended to exacerbate crises.

Local government also saw considerable continuity. It still depended largely on the co-operation of those members of the local aristocracy who served in the capacity of Justice of the Peace or Lord Lieutenant. JPs were responsible for enforcing statute law by deciding on disputes. Elizabeth also continued the use of special commissions. These were very much in line with the work of the commissioners of Henry VIII in the dissolution of the monasteries. Elizabeth used a similar process in enforcing the 1559 religious settlement. However, the reign also saw some changes, particularly the expanding role of existing officials. JPs were given extra duties such as the enforcement of the Poor Law, economic regulation and the maintenance of highways. Lords Lieutenant also assumed a larger role. Their initial responsibility during the reign of Henry VII had been for local militia. Under Elizabeth, they were appointed to every county and were given responsibility for supervising the work of JPs, raising loans and enforcing the orders of the Privy Council.

How effective was this pattern of local government? There were certainly advantages. It was, for example, administration on the cheap, which therefore fitted into the financial constraints of the Elizabethan system. At this stage there was no real alternative since that would have involved a professional and paid bureaucracy. In any case, this would have been inappropriate during the period since the social hierarchy was dominated by the magnates. The JP system by and large ensured their loyalty, whereas the insertion of an impersonal bureaucracy would have created considerable resentment. There was also a series of natural checks and balances. The local potential for rebellion was normally neutralised by two influences. One was the centrifugal force of nationalism, stronger during the Elizabethan period than before, partly because of the increased external threat and partly because of the propaganda from the court and the growth of the Elizabethan cult. The other was the centripetal force of conflicting local interests. Whenever there was the threat of a local uprising it was quite likely to collapse because of the intrusion of local rivalries. This was evident in the Northern Rising of 1569 and the Essex revolt of 1601.

But there were also deficiencies. One was the problem of implementing the decisions of central government. Many JPs were reluctant to become fully involved in their duties, seeing their position largely as a social adornment. The tendency of officials to misuse their position to accumulate personal profit was always likely in a period in which there was no official remuneration. And, despite the obstacles in the way, rebellion could never be discounted. There was always the problem of the questionable loyalty of some of the magnates: the Earl of Derby, who was sympathetic to the Catholics, was in charge of the militia in Lancashire – England’s most consistently Catholic area. The 1590s saw a decline in the overall efficiency of local government as carrying out normal functions was complicated by a run of bad harvests, increased poverty and higher assessments for militia rates and ship money.

Elizabethan financial administration saw virtually no changes. Elizabeth’s policy was the strictest possible budgeting rather than the extension of the range of financial administration or the scope of its institutions. Hence her reign was far from innovatory: indeed, it could be said that there were fewer alterations during the period covered by this book than at any other time – certainly by comparison with earlier monarchs. For example, the tendency of the Yorkist kings, together with Henry VII and Henry VIII, had been to divert financial management from the Exchequer to the household. The reigns of Edward VI and Mary saw the revival of the Exchequer, a development which continued during the reign of Elizabeth until the Exchequer had largely recovered its former influence.

The main strength in financial policy was the control over expenditure to produce an increase in ordinary revenue from £200,000 to £300,000 per annum; at certain stages there was even a moderate surplus on the annual account. Elizabeth managed to settle the debts left by Mary and to develop a substantial cash reserve. Tight budgeting was complemented by the increase in revenue through the sale of crown lands worth more than £600,000, more frequent parliamentary taxation, and forced loans. Elizabeth avoided the more drastic expedient, favoured by some of her predecessors, of debasing the coinage – even though she had to finance a war with Spain and the conquest of Ireland.

Any defence of the Elizabethan finances should not, however, conceal the defects. These related to a lack of any real vision in the overall supervision of the administration. Little attempt was made to gain a complete perspective of the relationship between revenues and inflation: it has been estimated that, while inflation increased by 75 per cent during the reign, the revenues were increased by only 25 per cent. Hence Elizabeth was forced to resort especially to parliamentary taxation. This, of course, might have become an alternative source of regular supply. But no steps were taken to convert the extraordinary into the ordinary. Historians have also criticised the roles of the Privy Council and the Exchequer. The Council had the ultimate responsibility for the economy. It did receive information and statistics from the Exchequer, but generally speaking it was unable to handle the details of financial business. This was strange, since it was quite capable of handling the minutiae, even trivia, of individual judicial cases. According to J.D. Alsop, the Council remained ‘relatively unused to its role as the principal superintendent of state finance’.² In addition, ‘The Exchequer was adrift, moving where the currents of economic change, vested interests, the blossoming patronage system, and so on, would take it’.³ Here, as elsewhere, Elizabethan administration might well have benefited from a greater degree of innovation.

Even so, we should not be too ready to blame the problems of Elizabeth’s reign, even of its last decade, for the eventual collapse of the Stuart regime. The crises confronting James I and Charles I were usually more immediate, and recent historiography has rightly moved towards a shorter-term view of the origins of the Civil War and away from connecting it up with the Elizabethan period.

Questions

1. ‘Little innovation and not much consolidation.’ Is this a fair comment on the development of administration under Elizabeth?
2. How much did Elizabethan administration depend on Elizabeth?

ANALYSIS 2: COMPARE THE ROLES AND IMPORTANCE OF ELIZABETH’S MAIN POLITICAL SERVANTS.

Elizabeth’s officials make for interesting comparison in terms of how they conceived their respective roles; the strength and consistency of their views; their political and administrative effectiveness; the extent to which they were able to work with others; and their relationship with the Queen.

The one minister who was quite clear as to his role was Cecil, who pursued a line of moderation in all things. His family had its origins in the gentry and had established its reputation as servants of the crown. This was a tradition which Cecil himself was determined to continue. ‘Serve God’, he said, ‘by serving the queen, for all other service is indeed bondage to the devil.’⁴ This meant a low-key approach to the pursuit of personal interests and a patient harmony with others. Although he did occasionally risk alienating his colleagues by battling for his own views, as for example in the 1590s over Essex, he usually settled for a line of less resistance. This was in contrast to the Earl of Leicester. Of less humble origins, he had risen through the court. His family had been more prominent than the Cecil’s in royal service, Sir Edmund Dudley under Henry VII and the Earl of Northumberland as Lord President of the Council under Edward VI. As a result, Leicester was far more conscious of his personal position and was prepared to resort to devious means to undermine that of Cecil. Even further along the spectrum than Leicester was the Earl of Essex, who inherited his title at the age of nine. He has been seen as the incarnation of aristocratic chivalry and culture. He was, however, highly volatile, spent extravagantly and was always in debt. Walsingham was the reverse – closer to Cecil. He was private, withdrawn, and highly organised and methodical in his work. At the same time, he was more interested than Cecil in the arts and was a patron of Spenser and others.

There were also significant contrasts in attitudes and ideas. Cecil was inclined towards pragmatism and moderation in religious matters, although he instinctively favoured the Edwardian variant of Protestantism. Walsingham preferred the aims of the Puritans. It is arguable that he was more genuine in his views than Cecil, but the latter was more in tune with the views of the Queen, who therefore found his support indispensable. Leicester was also more inclined towards the radical Protestant position, although he was equally prepared to play the cons...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• CONTENTS
• Introduction
• 1 Elizabeth and her government
• 2 Elizabeth and Parliament
• 3 The 1559 religious settlement
• 4 Catholicism and the Catholic ‘threat’
• 5 Puritanism and the Puritan ‘threat’
• 6 Foreign policy
• 7 The development of the economy
• 8 Society and culture
• 9 The ‘British’ question
• Notes
• Select bibliography
• Index