The âresponsibility to protectâ (R2P) doctrine was developed in 2001 in response to a question posed by then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to States: âIf humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica â to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?â1 Here, Annan was referring to the international communityâs failure to react in a timely and effective manner to the genocides perpetrated in Srebrenica (in the former Yugoslavia) as well as in Rwanda in the 1990s.2 Equally significant in this respect was the North Atlantic Treaty Organizationâs (NATO) military intervention in Kosovo in 1999 in response to ethnic cleansing committed by Serb forces against Kosovar Albanians, conducted without United Nations Security Council (UNSC) authorisation given the threat of the impending Russian veto.3 Together, these cases exposed compelling weaknesses within the international legal system â and within the UNSC framework in particular â to respond effectively and consistently to gross breaches of human rights norms. R2P thus emerged to put words to deeds regarding the international communityâs commitment to ânever againâ allow mass atrocities to occur. With a central purpose of ensuring human protection from mass atrocity crimes (defined as genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing4), the doctrine has succeeded in stirring a significant amount of international debate surrounding the roles that host States (those in which the atrocities are perpetrated) and third-party States (those that have no direct link to an atrocity situation) can or should assume in preventing and responding to mass atrocity situations.5 It is within these debates that this book emerges.
1.1 This book at a glance
R2P was endorsed unanimously by States in the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as part of the 2005 World Summit Outcome document, although there is widespread agreement that it does not (yet) represent an international legal norm.6 Nevertheless, analysing R2P as a purely political or âsoft lawâ tool short-changes the legal value that the doctrine possesses or has the potential to impart. This book seeks to unpack R2Pâs basis within international law and to situate its tenets within wider existing and emerging norms, drawing upon diverse legal regimes â including the laws of the UN, laws of international organisations, international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, international environmental law, and laws of State responsibility â to determine which aspects of this doctrine are grounded within existing international legal norms, and those which require further development in order to fully actualise the doctrineâs ideals and aspirations.
This book furthermore examines the doctrineâs application in the two contemporary and highly significant case studies of Libya and Syria, in which non-violent anti-government protests within each of these States beginning in February and March 2011, respectively, deteriorated into mass atrocity situations following brutal government crackdowns. The choice of these case studies stems from two primary considerations. First, both conflicts are widely recognised as compelling R2P situations with far-reaching ramifications with respect to the doctrineâs operationalisation. Namely, they appealed to the doctrineâs full scope so that robust measures, including the use of force, were required to counter seemingly deliberate and gross failures of the respective governments to protect their populations. These cases can be asserted, perhaps boldly, to challenge the very viability of R2P, namely, whether this is a doctrine that can or does indeed deliver upon the promise of ânever againâ allowing mass atrocity crimes to be committed. As such, the Libyan and Syrian cases can be branded as contemporary watershed moments for R2P with the potential to impart a distinct trajectory upon the doctrineâs future progression (or lack thereof).
The second reason for the choice of Libya and Syria is that they share a number of fundamental similarities that make them prime situations for comparison: both emerged within Arab States with similar histories of repressive governments.7 Both commenced within a month of each other and within the wider context of the Arab Spring,8 meaning that the international community was, generally speaking, reacting to two relatively similar cases at roughly the same time.9 Most importantly, in both situations, the governments failed in their responsibilities to protect their populations by committing war crimes and crimes against humanity against them.10 As per the R2P doctrine, this then shifted the responsibility for the protection of these populations upon the international community. However, as detailed throughout this book, the international reactions to these two situations were widely inconsistent. An analysis of these differing reactions helps to extrapolate legal conclusions regarding the doctrineâs strengths, limitations, gaps in enforceability, acceptance by States, and anticipated future trajectory.
6 See, for example, S. Pandiaraj, âSovereignty as Responsibility: Reflections on the Legal Status of the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protectâ (2016) 15 Chinese Journal of International Law 795.
7 See, for example, Tarik Kafala, âGaddafiâs Quixotic and Brutal Ruleâ (BBC News, 20 October 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12532929>; Martin Asser, âThe Muammar Gaddafi Storyâ (BBC News, 21 October 2011) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-12688033>; HRC, âReport of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the Situation of Human Rights in the Syrian Arab Republicâ (15 September 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/18/53 Para 22; Ghayath Naisse, âA Revolution on the Marchâ (International Viewpoint, 2011) <http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article2272>.
8 The term âArab Springâ refers to a wave of popular anti-government protests that emerged within the Middle East and North Africa region (specifically, in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Bahrain, Yemen, and Syria) beginning in December 2001 which led to the overthrow of dictatorships in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen.
9 The Libyan uprising began on 15 February 2011 while that of Syria began on 6 March 2011. HRC, âReport of the International Commission of Inquiry to Investigate all Alleged Violations of International Human Rights Law in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriyaâ (12 January 2012) UN Doc A/HRC/17/44 Para 27; âBashar al-Assad: Criminal against Humanityâ (International Federation for Human Rights, July 2011) at 6 <http://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/reportsyria2807eng.pdf>.
10 As further detailed in Sections 6.1 and 7.1 of this book.
This book adopts a distinct approach to examining the Libyan and Syrian R2P cases. First, it endeavours to highlight the multitude of actors that were (or could have been) involved in the doctrineâs implementation. A significant set of scholarly works, for example, focus upon the UNSC (and its role in authorising the use of force) when assessing international responses to the Libyan and Syrian crises.11 Other pieces restrict their investigations to the reactions of individual States or regional or international organisations.12 In exploring the actions of a diverse set of international actors, however, this book allows for an analysis of each actorâs unique contributions to the implementation of R2P in Libya and Syria, respectively, as well as an understanding of how their joint responses through various international legal frameworks (could have) facilitated a reaction that transcended any one of their individual contributions. This is important as it emphasises that R2Pâs enforcement is not contingent upon any single actor within the international system, but that it rather integrates the actions of a range of entities and requires collective and wide-ranging responses in order to present an effective front against mass atrocities.
11 See, for example, Justin Morris, âLibya and Syria: R2P and the Spectre of the Swinging Pendulumâ (2013) 89 International Affairs 1265; Andrew Garwood-Gowers, âThe Responsibility to Protect and the Arab Spring: Libya as the Exception, Syria as the Norm?â (2013) 36 University of New South Wales Law Journal 594.
12 See, for example, Colin Warbrick, âBritish Policy and the National Transitional Council of Libyaâ (2012) 61 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 247; Alex de Waal, âAfrican Roles in the Libyan Conflict of 2011â (2013) 89 International Affairs 365; Tilman Rodenhäuser, âHuman Rights Obligations of Non-State Armed Groups in other Situations of Violence: The Syria Exampleâ (2012) 3 International Humanitarian Legal Studies 263; Kurt Mills, âR2P and the ICC: At Odds or in Sync?â (2015) 26 Criminal Law Forum 73; Olivia Flasch, âThe Legality of the Air Strikes against ISIL in Syria: New Insights on the Extraterritorial Use of Force against Non-State Actorsâ (2016) 3 Journal on the Use of Force and International Law 37; Alex Whiting, âAn Investigative Mechanism for Syria: The General Assembly Steps into the Breachâ (2017) 15 Journal of International Criminal Justice 231.
Second, this book devotes extensive consideration to non-military means through which R2P can be invoked, whereas the traditional approach has been to assess R2Pâs success or lack thereof in Libya and Syria through the lens of military intervention.13 Importantly, the book does engage with some of the more traditional debates surrounding R2Pâs application, most notably those pertaining to the use of force (or lack thereof), but it also, crucially, investigates some of the less-researched non-military methods that were or could have been pursued by States and international organisations to uphold the doctrine. Such means include, for example, the suspension of States from regional and interna...