1 Introduction to Indian soteriology and Vaiśeṣika studies
Introduction
It might be appropriate perhaps to introduce our theme by setting out clearly from the beginning that the English term ‘salvation’ – which came to us from Latin (salvēo) ēre) via old French1 – is, in the context of Indian philosophy, ambivalent, not least because like its Greek equivalent (σῴζειν), it refers to a ‘material upgrading’,2 on the one hand, and on the other hand, to a radically ‘static ontological state' from whence there is no return.3 The latter view pays tribute to a prevalent view which had been disseminated during Antiquity, which regarded soul as a superior sub-stance, and consubstantial with a higher original principle from which emerged and must return or be absorbed to, after body’s dissolution.4 As the term salvation has acquired, in the common parlance, a predominantly theological underpinning, not least because of the impact of Latin scholasticism upon our language, we are then nowadays forced to request first, from comparative philosophy, further elucidations. In this vein, the ancient etymology of the Latin adjective 'salvus' is indeed relevant and intriguing because it appears to be etymologically related to the Greek word ὅλος5 and the Sanskrit sárvaḥ,6 which in both cases indicates the ontological characteristic of being ‘complete’ and ‘whole’. This meaning is from a philosophical point of view significant. If we read ‘salvation’ under the lenses of concepts like ‘complete’ and ‘whole’, it may lead us to inquire whether the ‘Indo-European mind’7 had really believed that liberation is the medical, onto-theological connotations which Biblical and Classical Greek gave us to see The conjecture of salvus-ὅλος-sárvaḥ points to a predominant European Indo-European ontological-existential understanding of salvation, which is not necessarily religious or heaven-related. The study put I forward stretches methodologically over the ancient Indo-European world and investigates some of its philosophical and religious linkages. As this analysis will show, ‘salvation’ proves to be a term where the tension between ‘change’ and ‘static’ is coextensive with that of ‘plurality’ versus ‘individuality’; it also debates whether ‘whole’ refers to the integrity of a substance, to multiple pluralities, or to an idealistic communitarian status quo, as theories of Platonist, Vedāntic, or Gnostic origin would maintain. Both Indian and Greek philosophy begin quite symptomatically from the puzzling observation of the plurality of cosmos, its composite and corruptible nature, its constrictions, and the aloofness in which the self is either trapped or inescapably thrown in. Self is seen as very subtle, and often static in nature, while body and matter are continuously changeable or trapped in a cosmic bondage which can be summed up to be a ‘revolving mental, or naturalistic existence’8 (saṃsāra). Its resolution can be settled by a gnostic description, not only through lenses of the theory of change (karma theory) but also through a gnostic description of world’s fundamental elements whose description comes under many forms: plurality of worlds (loka) (Vedas),9 subtle bodies (sūkṣmaśarīra) (Upaniṣads),10 25 tattvas (Sāṃkhya),11 ‘aggregates’ (Vaibhāṣika), an ‘indistinct world’ (māyā) with ‘numerous modifications’ (vikāra) (Vedānta), a cosmos composed and recomposed by atomic theories (Jaina, Vaiśeṣika), or by cosmic subtle layers (bhūmi) (Buddhism), all of which submitted under a driving force, the karmic theory, which almost all Indian systems acknowledge, a theory whose origins can be traced back to the Vedic concept of Ṛta, against which the self (ātman) must find its final ‘liberation’. Indeed, ‘liberation’ should not be confused with the generic Vedic term ‘heaven’ which indicates an unstable, dynamic condition of the self; in fact, Indian philosophical systems (darśana) develop their own static soteriologies as a critique against such a Vedic dynamic-driven unsatisfactory ‘salvation’. As we shall see, Indian philosophy, that which sprang out from an early Śramaṇic and later Upaniṣadic movement, represents a major shift in worldview, namely from a dynamic to a static perspective of things. This is at least the first feature that characterises almost all systems, regardless of their idealistic-mentalistic or realistic-existential outlook; the intellectual description is generally essentialist ontological, and in certain cases, it reaches the dazzling heights of absolute dialectics and nihilistic standpoints (Mādhyamika). Thus, Vedic philosophy, with its emphasis on heaven, should be distinguished from the soteriological view of the various systematic Indian schools, and for the sake of convenience, we shall start this work from the presuppositions of an anti-establishment tendency in the Śramaṇic and Upaniṣadic movements, that there is indeed such thing as a real difference between ‘salvation’ (of Vedas) on the one hand, and ‘liberation’ (of the Indian philosophies) on the other hand; this current study, however, focuses on the latter.
This first chapter seeks to achieve two objectives: first, to define some of the views on salvation and liberation which the Classical12 (Indo-European) world formulated, and second, to introduce, explain, and critically assess the ancient and modern literature on Vaiśeṣika darśana, one of the oldest orthodox (āstika) systems of Indian philosophy.13 Although the general theme of this study is focused on several ‘Indian theories of salvation’, the main focus remains Vaiśeṣika, which I describe (in Chapters 3 and 4) mainly with the help of an old and important untranslated Sanskrit commentary: Candrānanda’s Vṛtti (VSc). In Classical India. Vaiśeṣika is a philosophical naturalism with a significant record of intellectual debates, being known mostly for a realistic presentation of cosmology as well as for its ontology of the world, whose constituents (e.g., dravya, guṇa, karma) are condensed within six major categories (padārtha).14 The system eventually into oblivion during the syncretic age (11–12th AD) and now counts among the least popular and known systems, both the India and abroad, partly because is sources are scant. For the description, reconstruction, and understanding of this system, I have called on the support of the comparative method, both philological and inter-commentarial. Hence, this study looks primarily at Vaiśeṣika’ distinctive theory of salvation (soteriology) and the current chapter will address the following questions: 1) what does ‘soteriology’ stand for in the context of Indian philosophy more generally, and in Vaiśeṣika, more specifically? 2) What is the place of VSc commentary within Vaiśeṣika source-literature and scholarship, and why has this been chosen as gauge to evaluate the soteriological doctrine (niḥśreyasa) of the system? 3) What does the term ‘nature’ designate, and does its ‘function’ refer to? Each of these questions will be subsequently treated within one chapter15. As will be shown, the chapters deal with comparative, philological, ontological, and epistemological aspects of the Vaiśeṣika system in general, and Candrānanda’s Vṛtti in particular.16 The general method is comparative, and throughout this study seek I to engage the early Vaiśeṣika soteriological doctrine with parallel concepts within the broad spectrum of Indian classical philosophy (nāstika and āstika systems), as well as outside it (Patristic, Classical Greek, and Hellenistic sources), as shown by this very first chapter. The period I cover is the second half of the first millennium AD, the timespan within which VSc composition falls. shall I look at Candrānanda as contemporary to a series of important śāstric classical texts formulated in the ‘Patristic-Sūtra period’ (325 to 800 AD) and developed after.17 In the following, propose I to clarify what ‘soteriology’ signifies in the context of Religious Studies and Indian philosophy by drawing some terminological and conceptual distinctions between two worldviews, ‘Indian’ and ‘European’;18 likewise, I wish to fill a gap within Vaiśeṣika studies, namely with a treatment on the theory of liberation, a topic left aside or dismissed for too long by inadequate ‘scientific positivist’ assumptions made by certain Indologists (e.g., Frauwallner).
Soteriology: definition
As the method of this present book is comparative, shall I begin with Paul Masson-Oursel for whom the soteriological knowledge in Indian philosophy is two-fold: on the one hand, it is ontological, and on the other, epistemological.19 The onto-logical section inevitably leads us to inquire what is meant, in the present title by the ‘nature of soteriology’. As this study fits into the boundaries of the emergent discipline of ‘Comparative Philosophy and Religion’, it must respond to the question as to the meaning of soteriology as applied in the Indian philosophical context. From the start should I point out that soteriology as understood in Classical Mediterranean context is different from that of Vaiśeṣika, though some interesting similarities can be traced, hence the rationale behind this comparative section Within the field of the ‘Study of Religion’, the term ‘soteriology’ is known as ‘salvation’. As Flood puts it, ‘all religions have arguably a doctrine of salvation that claims that the human condition of death and suffering can be overcome'.20 Within Indian traditions, Vaiśeṣika, alongside unorthodox systems (nāstika) such as Jaina and Buddhism, show explicit commitments to formulate a robust doctrine of salvation; their commentarial literature packs debates related both to the means as well as to the state, of such liberation. Within the remit of this philosophical and religious study the term ‘soteriology’ (to which salvation belongs) is a concept charged with rather Greek and Christian theological implications, hence the task of this chapter is to explain the term ‘soteriology’ in the context of Vais̄eṣika and Classical Indian thought, by drawing first and foremost an outline of the various ontological and religious denotations which the concept possesses in other fields such as Theology, Greek classics, and Gnosticism. As will I show, the problem of ‘salvation’ in Vaiśeṣika (niḥśreyasa, mokṣa) is considerably different from the ‘soteriology’ expounded in Christian theology, yet it is closer to soteriologies of a gnostic and Eleatic kind.21 Soteriology in Vaiśeṣika does not acknowledge a form of ‘reconciliation’ with God, by which the soul might reunite ‘homologically’ with the Higher Soul (as in Gnosticism),22 nor is it an already established fact due to its consubstantiality with Brahman as in Vedānta.23 Even in terms of ethics – that is to say the ‘funct...
