The Commons in a Glocal World

Global Connections and Local Responses

Tobias Haller, Thomas Breu, Tine De Moor, Christian Rohr, Heinzpeter Znoj, Tobias Haller, Thomas Breu, Tine De Moor, Christian Rohr, Heinzpeter Znoj

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9781138484818
• eBook ISBN:
  9781351050968
• Topic: Diritto
• Subtopic: Diritto sulla proprietà intellettuale

This volume focuses on how, in Europe, the debate on the commons is discussed in regard to historical and contemporary dimensions, critically referencing the work of Elinor Ostrom. It also explores from the perspective of new institutional political ecology (NIPE) how Europe directly and indirectly affected and affects the commons globally.

Most of the research on the management of commons pool resources is limited to dealing with one of two topics: either the interaction between local participatory governance and development of institutions for commons management, or a political- economy approach that focuses on global change as it is related to the increasingly globalised expansion of capitalist modes of production, consumption and societal reproduction. This volume bridges the two, addressing how global players affect the commons worldwide and how they relate to responses emerging from within the commons in a global- local (glocal) world. Authors from a range of academic disciplines present research findings on recent developments on the commons, including: historical insights; new innovations for participatory institutions building in Europe or several types of commons grabbing, especially in Africa related to European investments; and restrictions on the management of commons at the international level. European case studies are included, providing interesting examples of local participation in commons resource management, while simultaneously showing Europe as a centre for globalized capitalism and its norms and values, affecting the rest of the world, particularly developing countries.

This book will be of interest to students and researchers from a wide range of disciplines including natural resource management, environmental governance, political geography and environmental history.

Part I

Key reflections

New theoretical issues on the commons and their transformations

Top left: The communal soup kitchen of Ins (Switzerland), oil on canvas, painting by Albert Anker 1893. Source: Kunstmuseum Bern. More on the impact of common property institutions and their impact on the political culture of Switzerland through the time, see Chapter 1.

Top right: Institutions for the management of the commons are often contested. Picture by Tobias Haller. Pastures in Kafue Flats, Zambia, illustrating the NIPE approach, see Chapter 5.

Bottom left: Discussing poverty, access to the commons and climate change in Senegal. Picture by Tobias Haller. See Chapter 2, Jesse Ribot.

Bottom right: A women’s group that is part of the SPP (farmers union) in Tasikmalaya district, Indonesia, September 2018. Picture by Elisabetta Cangelosi. For the role of commons, between human rights, resistance, and social change see Chapter 4.

1Shared ownership as a key issue of Swiss history

Common-pool resources, common property institutions and their impact on the political culture of Switzerland from the beginnings to our days

Daniel Schläppi

These days we tend to advertise “commons” as counter projects to capitalism and state power. Switzerland has one of the highest concentrations of globally acting banks and corporations. It has a pole position in the competition for locational advantages. All the same, many very ancient “common property institutions” with partially medieval origins exist. It is astonishing and in need of explanation that so many cooperatives and an extreme political federalism have survived in Switzerland. Most of the ancient commons institutions not only outlasted the great epochal upheavals in the transition to the modern era but also the so-called “Dekorporierung” as well as the long-term change of society during the nineteenth and twentieth century (Stuber 2018). In contrast to the situation in other European countries, corporate organizations and common ownership had a very strong tradition in Switzerland. In addition they were firmly anchored in the Swiss collective consciousness. For these reasons cooperatives and similar institutions were able to defend their political autonomy. Up to our days, even the smallest communities with just a few hundred inhabitants dispose of a wide scope of decision-making.

The “Alte Eidgenossenschaft”, the “Old Swiss Confederacy”

In historical comparison, Switzerland has developed differently from European monarchies and princely states. The so-called “Old Swiss Confederacy”, die “Alte EidGENOSSENSCHAFT” – “Genossenschaft” means “cooperative” − was composed of 13 politically independent states. These so-called cantons were connected by an intricate system of alliances. Each single canton failed to centralize the administration of its territory, to install a tax regime and to build a standing army. There was no standardized jurisdiction or monarchic concentration of power.

How was it possible that such a mellow institution remained politically stable for centuries in spite of confessional schism and manifold external threats?

This paper shows how a strong tradition of “commoning” in politics, economics and everyday life affected the political culture of this small country as a whole. In my view, common property is responsible for the centuries of Swiss institutional constancy (Schläppi 2017).

In the beginning, there was cooperation for peace

The Old Swiss Confederacy started as a peace project. So-called “Landfriedensbündnisse” like the famous “Federal Charter” of 1291 – the German term “Landfriede” is also used in English − were very common at that time. Manifold partners made arrangements to further security and peace within their home territory and to stabilize the relationships with their neighbours.

In the territory of present-day Switzerland, agrarian and civil elites were behind this process. They aimed to defend themselves against incursions from feudal lords, lower nobility, monasteries, and against blood feuds of hostile clans.

The single cantons did not have enough combat power or money to hire mercenaries. Their weakness made them stand to mutual agreements on how they would help each other in the event of war. Nobody should start a war against third parties on his or her own. The obligation of military assistance was only valid under the premise of codetermination concerning the decision for or against a war. The treaties provided procedures and institutions like arbitral tribunals to settle quarrels.

The practical advantages of these alliances were obvious for all involved parties. The network of coalitions grew bigger and denser over time, even though the participants always acted egoistically and autonomously. However, some of their selfish goals could only be achieved by collective action.

A key role in the institutional consolidation of the Old Swiss Confederacy was played by the subject territories, which were conquered since 1415 and governed by the cantons together. These so-called “Gemeine Herrschaften” (common subject territories) were administrated by the congress of the confederate cantons, the so-called “Tagsatzung”, the “Federal Diet”.

It is obvious that common property had a massive influence on the political activities of the Federal Diet. The administration of the common subject territories and the sharing of the profits accounted for one third of all agenda items of the Federal Diet.

The so-called “Jahrrechnung” − the get-together for the annual financial statement of the subject territories − was even assembled in times of war between the confessional parties of Switzerland and it was drawn up every year from 1470 up to 1797. This makes the Federal Diet a unique example of institutional continuity in Europe and elsewhere (Würgler 2013).

Figure 1.1The Federal Diet of Baden (not before 1597).

Source: Chronik von Andreas Ryff, Circkell der Eidtgnoschaft, fol. 173v–174r, Musée Historique de Mulhouse, coll. SIM, © photo Ville de Mulhouse (Christian Kempf).

The commons-state − cooperative structures as foundations of politics and society

On the one hand, the willingness to split power surprises in relation to the early modern period. On the other hand, various types of common property institutions were managed cooperatively in every of the 13 cantons. Here you can see a list of some of the associations that provided the institutional foundation of politics and society:

Bürger-, Nachbar- und Bruderschaften, Land-, Tal-, Allmend-, Wald-, Alp-, Säumer-, Arbeits-, See- and Brunnengenossenschaften, Korporationen, Gemeinwerke, Uerten, Tagwen, Roden, Bäuerten, Genossamen, Viertel, Zünfte, Handwerke, Stiftungen, Gesellschaften, Gerichts-, Schwellen-, Kirch-, Abendmahl-, Territorial-, Personalgemeinden, Fideikommisse und Familienkisten.

The power elites learned as aldermen or simple officials in their local communities that decisions always had to be made and supported by groups. There were certain limits to individual displays of power, the expectations and interests of regular members had to be considered, and the profits made from public goods had to be distributed squarely.

Since all decision makers were socialized this way, we should not be astonished that the Federal Diet decided in 1551, in view of a tapering poverty problem, that in the future the communities in all the cantons should take care of their needy members. It took several generations until the communities had saved up the necessary means. Many among them were never able to cope with the additional burden in their own right.

But still this fundamental change brought a huge empowerment for the communities in the long term: During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, communities and cooperatives took more and more charge of state functions at their own expense (such as market regulation, fire brigade, maintenance of infrastructure, residence registration office and welfare institutions). In consequence, important parts of the state administration and public services were based on collective resources. Taxes were only levied in case of emergency.

One could see the Swiss model as a perfect example of “co-production of statehood”, as a “commons state” rather built bottom-up than top-down (Schläppi 2007).

Collective resources as a means of existence for private households

The subsistence of private households depended on collective resources such as grazing rights, donations of crop and firewood, social welfare and also building materials as well as financial contributions for real estate, building loans and raw materials for commercial production. Fundamental to daily provisioning were the rights to gather food in the common forest, to fish in ponds and creeks plus the permission to pick fruit and nuts from trees on the common land. Some cooperatives took precautions against war, tried to keep stable prices in times of inflation, or helped providing for their old consociates. Viewed in this light, it was existential for many people to have access to collective resources.

Alongside primary care, communities rendered further services. Some kept a breeding bull, or held properties (for instance school buildings, mills, washhouses, smithies). Cooperatives built and maintained flood protection works, bridges and roads, and acquired fire buckets and fire engines. They paid for mousers, herdsmen or foresters. They recorded and imparted knowledge to future generations in the form of apprenticeships or the recurring organizing of collective work.

Cooperatives also provided their members with immaterial goods and created a symbolic world of emblems, flags, valuables, houses and collective memories. They practiced their own rituals and a living sociability financed by common assets. Reputation, honour and prestige of individuals were directly connected with the good reputation of their peer group.

Cultural achievements like a new chapel, church extensions, a modern organ, an attractive reliquary, the clubhouse at the gun range, the music culture, church singing, pilgrimage, pastoral care and commemoration of the dead were financed and allocated by pooling and collective action (Schläppi 2018b).

The economic logic behind cooperative housekeeping: husbandry and austerity

Cooperative strategies were necessary and successful when essential necessities could not be satisfied by individuals or single households because of their limited opportunities of action. Good examples are irrigation or drainage of agricultural land. Often it was just cheaper to cover elemental necessities by common effort. That is, for example, why communities sent their poor to eat from house to house or run a soup kitchen.

Sometimes precariously situated families were allowed to lay out small gardens or potato fields on the common land or they were even allocated a building plot. Of course, it was taken into consideration that their households should no longer depend on financial support from the communal poor relief fund. Communities also sold illegitimate children or orphans to wealthy farmers as cheap labour.

One might call this kind of charity ‘slavery’. Of course, it may have reduced the worst hardships. However, at the very end well-off classes profited most from it, because they would have had to pay for welfare costs. Anyway, providence was the highest precept. Taxes, which could only be paid by the rich, were to be avoided. Therefore, communal welfare oriented itself more to the revenue of the poor relief fund than to actual misery. The current costs should be financed by investment income only. Money reserves were not to be touched: The ancestry’s legacy had to be taken care of (Schläppi 2018a: 37–41).

Marginalization and exclusion

Less well-off households were forced to keep their spending restraint. If families slid below subsistence level and the community considered their housekeeping not to have been sparing enough, their rights of participation were cancelled. That is, the regular contributions were suspended, and the head of the household was no longer allowed to participate in political assemblies and convivial events.

Troublesome members of the community could easily be expelled from political and economic communal life by labelling them as so-called “Übelhauser”, which means “bad housekeeper”. The accusation of somebody damaging the “gemeinen Nutzen” (the “common good”) because of his or her economic behaviour – the most important justification for communal punishment of ordinary people − stigmatized the accused person permanently. In addition to that, they were threatened with withdrawal of the minimal basics of existence as a penalty for needed support.

In the welfare system, the propelling concern of the commoners for maximum proper benefit manifested itself in the suppression of those who harmed the public interest. Permanent peer pressure against poor people even justified brutal interference with their biographies. Prohibition of marriage because of lacking financial resources, revocation of citizenship because of petty misconducts or prolonged job-related absence, criminalization of illegitimate maternity, removal of children born to unmarried mothers, horrendous fees for marriage with women from other communities: manifold harassments reduced the opportunities in life for small means members. People who were considered to be risks of welfare, and therefore represented potential expenses for the community funds, would better not expect any tolerance from their commoners. Swiss communities actively sponsored the overseas emigration of poor members. By signing standardized contracts, emigrants renounced poor relief not only for themselves but also for their descendants even if they would return just a few years later. Collective mistrust towards deviant concepts of life and patronization were the flipside of the positive achievements that the communities rendered for their well-incorporated members – that is, the settled and saturated centre of society.

The marginalization of unpopular people within the group corresponded with the strict dissociation with the exterior. To keep the circle of members as small as possible, the communities closed up hermetically since the seventeenth century and hardly accepted any new members. On rare occasions, a community member might have sold its citizenship to a rich immigrant because of monetary tightness.

Therefore, in every community there were more and more second-class citizens, the so-called “Hintersassen”. This led to social tensions and conflicts about resources. Communities and cooperatives usually struggled resolutely against the claims of outsiders and defended their privileges successfully.

Inequality among equals

In spite of common interests, latent conflicts also festered among the privileged. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries are considered to be the era of aristocratization: This means that the social elites grew apart from common people. They endeavoured to distinct themselves culturally by wardrobe, furniture and architecture. They also tried to increase their power and private gaining by political functions. Thanks to a cooperative polit...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Illustrations
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Commons in a ‘glocal’ world
• Part I Key reflections: New theoretical issues on the commons and their transformations
• Part II European examples from past and present
• Part III Features and effects of global (e.g. European) investments on commons in the world
• Part IV Commons, privatisation and international law: The right to water
• Index