The Construction of European Identity among Ethnic Minorities

‘Euro-Minorities’ in Generational Perspective

Natalia Waechter

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429775369
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book is concerned with European identities among ethnic minorities who live along the eastern border of the European Union. Based on findings from quantitative and qualitative empirical research conducted with minority groups in eight nation-states on both sides of the new eastern border of the EU, it investigates their attitudes and perceptions of the EU based on their constructions of European identity. Adopting a comparative approach, the author explores different processes of identity construction across several age and ethnic minority groups, to develop a theory of European identities in which ethnic identities can be seen as a missing link in explaining relationships between different national, regional and supranational identities. With new insights regarding the political, cultural and instrumental contents of European identity and its emergence, this volume will appeal to scholars of sociology and politics with interests in ethnic identity, European integration and identity research.

1 Introduction

1.1 Why study European identities?

European identities are the focus of much recent research in social sciences, above all in political science but also in many other disciplines that are concerned with questions of where people feel belonging to. This book addresses core issues in the field which are the emergence and the content of European identities, and its interplay with other geographically ethnically politically defined identities. Scholars believe a common European identity among European citizens to be a condition for the legitimacy of the European Union (Bruter, 2003; Habermas, 2004). However, for a long time, the European Union has been considered a project for the elites and was perceived as distant by ordinary citizens (Smith, 1992). Only from the 1990s on, the “European project” has increasingly allowed people who are not particularly concerned with European institutions to develop a sense of being European. Since then about half of the population across Europe identifies with their nation as well as with Europe (Fligstein, 2008; Risse, 2010). However, there are different views if the glass is to be considered half full or half empty, which in the case of Europe means that some researchers are optimistic that European identity will continue to grow and to become strengthened whereas others share a more pessimistic view saying that there is no stable common European identity that could be assumed to become reinforced. Both sides have expressed surprise that European identity was able to emerge at all, considering that it is not only unclear what European identity is but also what Europe means at all. Even if we consider Europe to be the European Union, which is more and more how people understand Europe, it is not easy to determine its borders and to explain who belongs and who does not. Currently, in 2018, there are 28 member states of the European Union with five candidate countries and two more potential candidate countries, but there is also the Schengen Area, including the non-EU members Iceland, Norway, Liechtenstein and Switzerland and excluding other EU member states (Croatia, Romania, United Kingdom, etc.), the Eurozone which includes only 19 EU members, the Council of Europe including Russia, Azerbaijan and other Eurasian countries or the OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe), even including the USA and Canada, and since recently and surprising to many, Australia’s participation in the Eurovision Song Contest, one of the great symbols of the EU (and Australia even almost won in 2016). Furthermore, as the British referendum on the “Brexit” (exit of Great Britain from the EU) in June 2016 has shown, once a member does not necessarily mean always a member.¹ As Eurobarometer data leads to assume, despite Europe’s blurred borders, people seem to have some common ideas of what it means to be European and what makes them feel European. Research has found that people’s identification with Europe can be based on political, cultural and instrumental considerations (Bruter, 2004; Jiménez, Górniak, Kosic, Kiss, & Kandulla, 2004; Schilde, 2014) but there is no agreement regarding which considerations are more or less important than others, or, what exactly is the content of these considerations. There is also some dispute if the rise of European identity decreases national identity, or if national and European identities have a complementary relationship. Both issues have been addressed in my work and the findings of my studies will be presented in this book.

One of the indicators for the assumption of the continuation and growth of European identity is the amount of solidarity among European citizens from different nations. Considering the EU an “imagined community” (Anderson, 1991) where, unlike in small communities such as villages or neighborhoods, people do not know each other, leads to question if and how much solidarity is possible “among strangers” (Habermas, 2011, p. 49). Research further assumes that in order to allow people to show solidarity it is necessary that they do not only having feelings of belonging to a group but that they also have a sense of belonging together with other group members. A community that is based on a sense of belonging together implies horizontal relations between group members and an understanding of each other as equals (Kaina, 2013). When the global economic and financial crisis hit Europe in 2007, followed by the European debt crisis with lasting recession and with some countries being more affected than others and needing financial support, questions of solidarity were not theoretical ones any more but became part of the national and European political agenda. Just shortly after the project of EU enlargement was implemented successfully, the “Euro crisis” was at the time the most profound challenge for the EU since its establishment (Risse, 2015). Research shows that the crisis led to a decline of European identity among Europeans; for example, it resulted in less political trust in national and European institutions and in rising Euroscepticism (Gomez, 2015; Karloweski, Kaina, & Kuhn, 2016; Sojka, 2015). But it has also changed the relationship between the member states: the political redistribution measures created “donor” or “creditor countries” against “debtor countries” (Grande & Kriesi, 2015; Hobolt & Wratil, 2015), and it has generated fear and mutual distrust between member states (Zielonka, 2014). There is empirical evidence that instrumental considerations and cost/benefit calculations have become more important among European citizens as a consequence from the Euro crisis (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015). This all has also led to assume that several European identities may emerge (Karloweski, Kaina, & Kuhn, 2016). In this respect, the Euro crisis and its consequences for the community of Europeans and a possible common identity has challenged optimistic views. However, several authors express hope that even such a substantial crisis has its upsides: Such crises provide a chance for more cohesion by withstanding together the challenges (Karloweski et al., 2016); they may raise awareness that problems are transnational ones and not be solved by single countries (Kaina, 2013); they may strengthen the European’s perception of a community of fate (Giddens, 2014); they contribute to a general politicization of European issues, which has been considered supportive regarding European identity in the long run, regardless if European politics become acknowledged or criticized by the population (Checkel & Katzenstein, 2009; Risse, 2010; Risse, 2015). Empirical results suggest that Europeans consider the EU still to be most effective compared to other (national) institutions in taking action against the crisis (Hobolt & Wratil, 2015).

The financial and economic crisis has not stayed the only one. The more recent “refugee crisis”, even though related to external problems and people coming outside of Europe, still became an internal crisis because of the member countries’ controversial disputes (within and between states) of how to handle the incoming waves of refugees from Syria, Afghanistan and other countries from the Middle East and Northern Africa, and how to allocate tasks and resources (and refugees). A common European policy has failed, and countries have ignored European agreements and instead more and more enforced their own strategies. Also, external challenges, such as the annexation of the Crimea by Russia, did not produce a common European position against the Russian invasion, and some countries still collaborated with Russia, thereby circumventing the EU sanctions. Eurosceptic political leaders used the “Schengen crisis” to bring forward a new European identity based on exclusionary politics and promoting the “fortress Europe” (Börzel & Risse, 2018).

The two major internal European crises seem to disclose differences between people and between countries, and their leaders while before the common idea was to promote equality between EU members; for example, the new poorer member states were meant to follow the richer states’ successful economies. Now there are creditor and debtor states; there is core Europe and its periphery; there is also a division regarding national governments and their politics (at the moment best represented by French President Emmanuel Macron versus the Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán) with the right-wing populist and nationalist powers gaining importance (Hentges & Platzer, 2018). The division line in political attitudes and social values does not only separate countries but also separates people within and across countries. There seems to be an increasingly stronger division between those left-wing (or liberal) oriented emphasizing “solidarity among strangers” (Habermas, 2011, p. 49) by demanding open borders or less strict policies concerning asylum seekers and claiming a stronger focus of the EU on social politics and those right-wing (or illiberal, reactionary) oriented shouting for a “Europe for Europeans” without “others”. The conception of such “others” depends on ongoing incidents and the public discourses around those. Currently, this applies to the discussion of EU membership of Turkey as well as to debates about reception of asylum seekers from the Middle East or Africa, but also long before, research (Smith, 1992) has expressed concerns about a common essentialist European identity based on cultural exclusiveness distinguishing Europe from a disaggregated Third World. Research has found that construction of identity works well through differentiation from others, and it has considered problematic for European identity development that European citizens do not really have a commonly shared relevant “other” (Kaina & Kuhn, 2016). Other than economic arguments that are used for explaining why certain “others” cannot belong to the EU, in the public discourse, out-groups have become also characterized as culturally different. While in the process of enlargement, the countries in CEE have been evaluated regarding their market economy and their level of democracy, the discourse about Turkey is about culture and values (Rumelili & Cebeci, 2016). Most recently, in fall 2018, Hungary is threatened to be sanctioned by the EU because of counter-democratic political values and practices such as cutting back independent press, academia, and judges. The general polarization into two factions of values across Europe leads to assume that cultural considerations may have a more important role in processes of European identity construction than existing literature suggests.

Most empirically informed research on European identity relies on Eurobarometer data, which is periodically collected in large surveys covering all EU member states. It shows developments over decades, differences by countries (Brexit did not come as a surprise considering the comparably low values of European identity over years) and differences within the population that apply across all countries. Research indicates that identification with Europe is more likely for those who are male, young, more left-wing than right-wing and who are privileged regarding education and income (Fligstein, 2008; Risse, 2010; Zakota, 2011). However, European identity has reached the ordinary citizen. More than half of the European population has developed a sense of being European, and more Europeans consider themselves belonging to their nation and to Europe than there are Europeans just identifying with their nation (Fligstein, 2008; Risse, 2010). Few identify with Europe in the first place or only with Europe (see also Cirlanaru, 2016). From a theoretical perspective, regarding geographically defined identities this shows that people tend to have multiple identities, i.e., individuals identify with several regional, national or supranational “territories” at the same time (Bauman, 2004; Waechter, 2016b). Furthermore, those identities are believed to be intertwined (Risse, 2010; Delanty, 2003). Regarding European and national identity this means that they influence in each other, for example if and in which ways someone identifies with Europe is related to the national context. Empirical research shows, for example, the more one trusts in national political institutions, the more one identifies as European (Verhaegen & Hooghe, 2015). Research on effects of the Euro crisis further reveals that people’s negative (and objectifiable) perception of a negative national economy leads to more trust in the EU, which is explained by the multilevel system of governance and the connectedness between the national and supranational institutions (Sojka, 2015, p. 339). It has also been argued that national identities have become “Europeanized”, which means that the content of national identities is informed by an understanding of being European (Risse, 2010).

In the scholarly debate on European demoi-cracy (Nicolaïdis, 2003; Nicolaïdis, 2013; Cheneval & Schimmelfennig, 2013), it is argued that the EU should not be based on a common identity which emerges from a merged variety of national and ethnic identities but on the “mutual recognition, confrontation and ever more demanding sharing of our respective and separate identities” (Nicolaïdis, 2003, p. 5). The model of demoi-cracy means that the EU should be regarded as “community of others” (ibid.) and that it acknowledges the plurality of its different demoi, not only by recognizing different national identities but also by emphasizing regional differences (Mouffe, 2012). It is also argued that the people’s commitment and belonging to Europe should be less founded on “being” than on “doing”, which means that shared projects and common goals should be established. Those shared goals, whether materialistic or idealistic, are believed to contribute more to a European bond than instrumental benefits (Nicolaïdis, 2003). In a similar vein Kaina (2013), suggests that for understanding European identities, we have to differ between people having “a sense of belonging to a group” compared to having “a sense of belonging together”, which implies that they share something with other group members (p. 191). She argues that feelings of “belonging together” are more relevant and valuable in terms of a common European future. Only by being aware of belonging together, solidarity and personal sacrifices can be expected for the well-being of other Europeans.

In existing literature it is assumed that there are particular life-circumstances, usually job related, that involve much traveling in Europe which makes people more “sensitized” to Europe (Miller, Domecka, Schubotz, & Svašek, 2012). Those with most “exposure” to Europe, e.g., by having lived in several “Eurocities”, such as London, Brussels or Amsterdam, have also been called “Eurostars” (Favell, 2008, 2009). One of the groups, who is also more “exposed” than average, is the young European population. Data suggests that young people are more likely to identify with Europe than older generations (Eurobarometer, 2013). Research assumes that this is due to more travel experiences, foreign language skills and more transnational contacts and interactions (Fligstein, 2008; Spannring, Wallace, & Datler, 2008).

While research using Eurobarometer data has allowed gaining much knowledge about majority populations and larger trends, it clearly has its limitations. In the following, I will point out two main limitations: the focus on ethnic majorities and the focus on quantitatively informed research. Regarding the first limitation, Eurobarometer research does not pay special attention to ethnic minority populations that have become more relevant, just regarding numbers, since the Eastern Enlargement in 2004. In many new member states in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), there are large groups of the population that have become ethnic minority groups literally over night when after the fall of the Soviet regime new nation-states emerged. These groups located in the border regions between Europe and Russia are particularly relevant for studying identities because there we find “a ‘battlefield’ of identity-building processes” with various and competing identity claims coinciding to an especially strong extent (Pichler, 2008a, p. 14; see also Pfoser, 2014).

Before the accession, the general population in Central and Eastern European countries had high expectations regarding EU membership and their economic development, as well as political stability and the strengthening of their young democracies. There was some disillusionment right after the accession (described as “post-accession blues” by Risse, 2010, p. 100) and disappointment appeared again when many new member states suffered from the financial and economic Euro crisis. Not all countries in CEE were affected to the same extent, but recession hit them more (with the exception of Poland) than it did most of the older member states (Sojka, 2015, p. 331). In the CEE countries, working against trust in the institutions of the EU was the perception of a weakening European economy but also the perception that the western member states were responsible for the Euro crisis. Slovakia, for example, even contributed to the rescue fund constituted to save Greece (ibid.). However, not only have instrumental factors been found for explaining the level of European identity in CEE. Other research assumes that in the countries of CEE, cultural considerations are more relevant for European identity construction than in Western European countries (Schild, 2014).

Regarding questions of European identities, members of ethnic minority groups, in the following also referred to as “Euro-Minorities”, are of special interest since there is reason to assume they have to be considered a “sensitized” group (Miller et al., 2012) due to their dual affiliation to their ethnic home country (titular nation) as well as to their resident country. Compared to ethnic majorities, they are also more likely to be and feel more affected by European policies concerned with equality rights and particularly with ethnic minority rights. Ethnic minority rights had already become an important field of policy in the EU in the early 1990s when the war in the former Yugoslavia was considered a threat to security in Southeastern Europe and beyond. Also the political and economic transition in CEE together with ethnic tensions were perceived as a threat to European security, which lead to the establishment of specific EU policies, bodies and agreements by the EU, the Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (COE) (Agarin & Brosig, 2009; Riedel, 2009). The COE has passed the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities as first international legally binding agreement formulating minority rights but if international agreements also get implemented into national policies always depends on the member states’ willingness. In the meantime, the minority politics of the EU are less based on fear of ethnic tensions² but on questions of non-discrimination and social and political equality between ethnic minorities and majorities. This concerns equal labor market participation, participation in political decision making, self-government in areas of compact settlement, protection of minority language and culture, as well as ethno-centric education (Agarin & Brosig, 2009). Above all, the EU policies have been criticized in two respects: The policies should focus on “positive action”, which would be needed to compensate for inequalities, instead of just focusing on non-discrimination. Furthermore they are most concerned with participation in the labor market while measures of cultural rights are largely missing (Riedel, 2009).

Despite of the described scholarly concerns, members of ethnic minority groups may recognize and acknowledge the EU minority policies, and therefore become more attached to Europe than ethnic majorities. Considering that young people generally tend to be more Europeanized than older generations and that some of the researched Eastern European countries have high rates of out-migration, leads to the question: Could young members from ethnic minority groups become the new “Eurostars”? This is another question that will be addressed in this book by applying a generational perspective based on empirical evidence from both quantitative and qualitative research.

Second, another limitation of the common use of Eurobarometer data is that, so far, theory development of European identity in general has hardly been based on qualitative research, even though it has been criticized that it is unclear what the items into which European identity gets operationalized typically really mean to the people surveyed (Latcheva, Datler, & Rossbacher, 2012). There are several qualitative studies on members of EU institutions (Wodak, 2004) or EU correspondents (Siapera, 2004) but with some exceptions (Jiménez, 2004; Meinhof, 2004; Miller & Day, 2012) not ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 Theories and state-of-the-art
• 3 Beyond the state-of-the-art
• 4 Methodology and empirical design
• 5 Historical, political and social contexts of ethnic minorities in central and Eastern Europe
• 6 Quantitative results
• 7 Qualitative results
• 8 Conclusions: what do we learn from Euro-minorities?
• Appendix 1: questionnaire (selected questions)
• Appendix 2: interview transcript rules
• References
• Index