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1 Populism and heritage
Populism in Europe has become a contested term. Is it a threat to European democracy? Is it the cause of the societal conflicts emerging in Europe? Is it rather the outcome of ongoing structural social, economic and political changes at both local and global levels such as deindustrialization, unemployment, mobility, diversity and neo-liberal governance? This chapter discusses the theoretical debates on populism in Europe and in other parts of the world. It begins by attempting to define what populism might mean. Bearing in mind that populism is a local phenomenon, which needs to be understood in its local manifestations, I will not develop a very generic, descriptive and all-embracing definition of the term. This is the main reason for there always being an emphasis on the localities in which the interviews were conducted. One of the main assumptions of this chapter is that the appeal of populist rhetoric should be analysed at a local rather than national or global level. Although, from time to time, reference is made to the states and societies covered by this empirical study, the reader should bear in mind that this is purely due to habit. Following the definition(s) of populism, three theoretical positions are analysed in detail to shed light on the studies of populism. Subsequently, there is a more nuanced analysis of one of these theories, considered more explanatory than the others; that is, populism as a political style.
The chapter, then, will establish a correlation between the rise of populist rhetoric in Europe and the ‘end of ideology’ paradigm. The main argument here is that the intensification of neo-liberal attempts to culturalize, ethnicize, religionize and civilizationalize what is actually social, economic and political, has created fertile ground for the augmentation of a Manichean populist rhetoric, which creates polarized societies divided between in-groups and out-groups. Correspondingly, Chapter 1 offers another theoretical lens for understanding the social, economic, political and psychological elements of the cleavages between in-groups and out-groups, or between native communities and immigrant-origin, or Muslim-origin migrants and their descendants. To this end, ethnic competition theory and intergroup contact theory will be discussed in detail to offer different ways of investigating emerging cleavages, hostilities, animosities and hatred in European cities in the time of global financial and refugee crises. This chapter subsequently considers the main drivers of right-wing populist rhetoric in Europe: Islamophobia, multiculturalism and Europeanization. In these sections, there is a critical gaze on Islamophobia, and the term Islamophobism is introduced as a way of explaining the passionate emphasis of right-wing populist parties on anti-Muslim discourse to mobilize native constituents and to mainstream their parties. The final three sections of this chapter will consider why individuals with right-wing populist inclinations feel lost among discourses of both diversity and unity in the European space.
What is populism?
In 1967, some researchers at the London School of Economics, including Ernest Gellner, Isaiah Berlin, Alain Touraine, Peter Worsley, Kenneth Minogue, Ghita Ionescu, Franco Venturi and Hugh Seton-Watson, organized a conference with a specific focus on populism. The proceedings of this notable conference were subsequently edited by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner (1969) in a rather descriptive book which includes several contributions on Latin America, the US, Russia, Eastern Europe, and Africa. One important conclusion of the book, which still carries meaning and significance, was that ‘populism worships the people’ (Ionescu and Gellner 1969: 4). However, the conference and the edited volume could not really bring about a consensus beyond this axiom, despite having adequately displayed particularist characteristics of each populist case. In one of the first attempts to conduct an extensive comparative analysis of the concept, Gellner and Ionescu write (1969: 1):
There can, at present, be no doubt about the importance of populism. But no one is quite clear just what it is. As a doctrine or as a movement, it is elusive and protean. It bobs up everywhere, but in many and contradictory shapes. Does it have any underlying unity? Or does one name cover a multitude of unconnected tendencies?
More recently, Cas Mudde (2016a) attempts to answer the following question to understand the rationale of the populist masses in the wake of Brexit and the rise of Donald Trump, Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders, and many others: What is driving their resentment? Much discussion has concerned the question of which recent event – the Great Recession or the European refugee crisis – has done most to fuel the rise of right-wing populism. Accordingly, a follow-up question asked by Mudde is whether the resentment is primarily economic or fundamentally cultural. His immediate answer to the first question is that neither event explains the phenomenon, which, after all, predates them both. He reminds the reader that in 1999, the right-wing populist Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) received nearly 30 per cent of the national vote and that Jean-Marie Le Pen was able to participate in the run-off vote for the French presidential election of 2002. Hence, one could argue that the recent economic crisis and the refugee crisis have played a role; yet, they are at best catalysts, not causes. After all, if resentment as a social concept posits that losers in the competition for scarce resources respond in frustration with diffuse emotions of anger, fear and hatred, then there have been several other factors in the last three decades which might have triggered the resentment of the European public, such as de-industrialization, unemployment, growing ethno-cultural diversity, multiculturalism, terrorist attacks in the aftermath of 9/11, etc. (Berezin, 2009: 43–44).
There are various approaches to analysing the typologies of populism in Europe as well as in other parts of the world. The most common approach is to explain the populist vote using socio-economic factors. This approach argues that populist sentiments are symptomatic of the detrimental effects of modernization and globalization, which are more likely to enchain working-class groups in unemployment, marginalization and structural outsiderism through neo-liberal and post-industrial policies (Betz, 1994). Accordingly, the ‘losers of modernization and globalization’ respond to their exclusion and marginalization by rejecting mainstream political parties and their discourses, and by generating a sense of ethnic competition against migrants (Fennema, 2004). The anti-globalization approach was reaffirmed by an extensive quantitative survey conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in 28 member states of the EU with a sample of 14,936 people in the 14–65 age bracket, interviewed in August 2016 (de Vries and Hoffmann, 2016). It was found that 78 per cent of the right wing Alternative für Deutschland feared globalization. This ratio was 76 per cent in France among supporters of the Front National, 57 per cent among supporters of the Party for Freedom in the Netherlands, and 48 per cent among supporters of the 5 Star Movement in Italy (de Vries and Hoffmann, 2016: 17).1 For such groups, globalization has various connotations with, for example, ‘greedy’ bankers, international trade, migrants and refugees ‘exploiting’ social services, robots taking factory jobs, tourism making palpable the disparities between the locals and the tourists, and emigration leading to the flight of young generations from their hometowns.
The second approach tends to explain the sources of, especially right-wing, populism with reference to ethno-nationalist sentiments rooted in myths about the distant past. This approach maintains that strengthening the nation by emphasizing a homogenous ethnicity and returning to traditional values is the only way of facing the threat from outside enemies, be it globalization, Islam, the European Union, or refugees (Rydgren, 2007). This approach could be named the ‘anti-elitist approach’. Accordingly, a growing number of people throughout the EU believe that elites have pushed forward liberal rights such as gender equality, gay rights, mobility, ethnic diversity, multiculturalism, and environmental protection etc. against the will of the ordinary people, who believe themselves the main constituents of the nation. However, the study conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation in August 2016 reveals that the anti-elitist approach is a much less decisive factor than the anti-globalization approach in demands for changes outside the political mainstream. The study found that anti-elite sentiments are not only common among right-wing or left-wing populist parties, but also among supporters of other political parties (de Vries and Hoffmann, 2016).
The third approach has a different stance towards the rise of populist movements and political parties. Rather than deeming political parties and movements a response to outside factors, this approach underlines the strategic means employed by populist leaders and parties to appeal to their constituents (Beauzamy, 2013). In this approach, populism is depicted as a political style employed by some party leaders.
An eclectic use of these approaches is probably more reasonable in analysing the rationale behind the growing popularity of populist movements and parties. However, one could also argue that the first approach is more applicable to the Western and Southern European context, while the second is more appropriate for explaining East European populism. Since the third approach concentrates on the organizational capacity and style of populist leaders and parties, it is beneficial for understanding different kinds of contemporary populisms.
Mabel Berezin (2009) conceives a different classification to explain the main analytical approaches to the new European right. She contends that there are two analytical axes on which European populisms display their nuances: the institutional axis and the cultural axis. In the institutional axis, the primary subjects of inquiry are the parties’ local organizational capacity and their agenda-setting policy-recommendation capabilities at a national level to tackle unemployment-related issues. In the cultural axis, of importance are the intellectual resources to offer answers to the detrimental effects of globalization, readiness to accommodate xenophobic, racist, and Islamophobic discourses, and capacity to utilize memory, myths, past, tradition, religion, colonialism, and identity. Using these two axes when analysing contemporary European populisms may provide the researcher with an adequate set of tools for understanding their success and/or failure at local and national levels. One can start to understand why, and how, many populist parties in Europe become popular in particular cities, but not the entire country, and the role of non-rational elements such as culture, past, religion and myths in consolidating the power of populist parties.
It appears that right-wing populism becomes victorious at the national level when its leaders manage to blend the elements of both axes – such as economic resentment with cultural resentment – to create the perception of crisis. Only when socio-economic frustration (unemployment and poverty) is linked to cultural concerns, such as immigration and integration, can right-wing populists distinguish themselves from other critics of the economy. For this reason, right-wing populists capitalize on culture, civilization, migration, religion and race, while left-wing populists prefer to invest in social-class-related drivers. As Ernesto Laclau (2005a) noted, a situation in which a plurality of unsatisfied demands and an increasing inability of the traditional institutional system to absorb them differentially coexist, creates the conditions for a populist rupture. This rupture may be right-wing or left-wing populism, depending on the historical path each country has taken.
Populist parties across Europe, and beyond, also draw on different political imaginaries and different traditions, construct different national identity narratives, and emphasize different issues in everyday life. As Ruth Wodak (2015: 2) well illustrates, some parties in Europe gain support by associating themselves with a fascist and Nazi past, as in Austria, Hungary, Italy, Romania, and France. Some parties gain legitimacy through the perceived threat from Islam, as in the Netherlands, Denmark, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland. Others endorse an Evangelical/Christian fundamentalist rhetoric, as in the US. Some establish their legitimacy through Euroscepticism, as in Finland and Greece. Other parties build legitimacy through an Islamist ideology and a perceived threat originating from unidentified enemies outside and within, as in Turkey (Kaya, 2015a). One could argue that populist parties in different national settings often follow a path-dependent lineage when choosing rhetoric and discourses to mobilize their constituents.
The European public seems to have a consensus about the most important challenges they are currently facing in everyday life. The Heads of State or Government of 27 members of the EU (the UK did not attend) and the Presidents of the European Council and European Commission convened in Bratislava on 29 June 2016 to diagnose the present state of the European Union, and to discuss the EU-27’s common future without the UK. The Bratislava meeting resulted in the ‘Bratislava Declaration’, which spelt out the key priorities of the EU-27 for the next six months and proposed concrete measures to achieve goals relating to: (1) migration, (2) internal and external security, and (3) economic and social development, including youth unemployment and radicalism. These topics had been outlined in advance by the European Council President, Donald Tusk, and generally reflect the issues which most concern European citizens.2
One puzzling feature of populism is that it does not really fit into conventional conceptions of the left-centre-right political spectrum. For instance, in Latin America, populist movements have often been associated with the political left, which receives strong support from the urban working class. However, in Europe, populist movements have been considered more a right-wing phenomenon, which is often fuelled by peasant or worker support of nationalist myths and ideologies. But the distinctions are certainly not clear-cut, as left-wing populist movements may contain elements of right-wing nationalist ideology, and even European fascist and Nazi movements had distinctly socialist components in their political agendas (Howard, 2000). Nonetheless, one distinction between left-wing and right-wing populists is the former’s reliance on the idea of re-educating people, which stems from the socialist teachings they grew up with. Right-wing populists instead rely on the so-called common sense of people.
Features of a populist style
There is no unique definition of the term ‘populism’. Drawing on the writings of Edward Shils (1956) in the aftermath of World War II, some scholars take it as an ideology (Mudde, 2004, 2007, 2016b). Other scholars read populism as a strategy utilized by various political parties to generate and sustain power through plebiscites, referenda and public speeches (Barr, 2009). Still other scholars are more content with defining it as a discourse based on the assumption that populism is a part-time phenomenon instrumentalized by populist individuals whenever it is necessary to build a stronger link with ‘the people’ (Wodak, 2015; Hawkins, 2010). Based on a Gramscian interpretation, some scholars, on the other hand, tend to see it as a political logic (Laclau, 2005a, 2005b). In his seminal work, Peter Worsley (1969: 247) states that populism is not a phenomenon specific to a particular region, nor is it the unique bastion of any ideological side of politics; it is rather an aspect of a variety of political cultures and structures.
The political communication strategy employed by populist parties splits society into the ‘pure people’ and the ‘corrupt elite’, and posits that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. The current academic debate identifies political populism along four general patterns of action and argumentation. Populist parties: (1) refer to an assumed common sense that is opposed to present institutional arrangements. In opposition, they often call for stronger elements of direct democracy, for example through referenda; (2) see themselves as opponents of a mandated political establishment and criticize the political elite of a country for being corrupt, self-serving and out of touch with the problems of the people; (3) try, using attention-grabbing marginal positions, to mobilize those groups of the population who are critical of politics, or even apolitical; and (4) tend to polarize and personalize politics by often using friend or foe arguments and by significantly simplifying political issues (Mudde, 2004).
Most populist parties in the European space reject today’s institutional framework for European integration. Populist parties are often considered by scholars as pragmatic, post- or non-ideological. However, the absence, or explicit rejection, of a doctrine of reference, does not imply the absence of certain core principles. The symbolic core of populism may consist of the following three elements (Taggart, 2000 and Franzosi, Marone and Salvati, 2015): (1) a recurrent use of the concept of ‘the people’, which is often referred to as an organic body and in which ‘ordinary citizens’ stand as the exclusive source of political legitimacy, as opposed to an elitist idea of the political realm; (2) anti-elitism stressing the rejection of the political class as a whole;3 and (3) condemnation of the traditional institutions of representative democracy. Representative institutions, therefore, become a barrier to the realization of a ‘true’ democracy ‘from below’, where sovereignty is truly in the hands of the ‘people’ and politicians are mere executors.
Altogether, these three dimensions give rise to a uniform attitude which is exhibited by both leadership and political activists. Populism often emerges as a partic...
