Introduction
Revisiting securitization and the âconstructivist turnâ in security studies
Michael J. Butler and Zena Wolf
Over a generation after Richard Ullman (1983) issued a clarion call for the redefinition of security, scholars and practitioners alike continue to seek a deeper understanding of the contingent processes that lead to specific constructions and interpretations of security and insecurity by agents engaged in the process of socialization and meaning-making â a process Ole WĂŚver (1995) labeled âsecuritization.â This introductory chapter sets the stage for the range of applications and assessments of securitization contained in this book. It does so primarily by chronicling the larger shift in the security studies field toward critical approaches which, in turn, paved the way for the aforementioned âconstructivist turnâ and in particular the development of securitization as a concept (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006).1
This chapter situates the so-called âconstructivist turnâ in relation to the emergence of critical security studies â a broader ontological shift itself explained by a convergence of social forces and intellectual factors detailed below. Following this origin story, we turn to a synthetic review of the scholarship concerning the âconstructivist turnâ in security studies, and in particular what we consider to be its signal contribution: namely, the concept of securitization. This effort at providing a brief and synthetic intellectual history of securitization helps set the stage for the articulation of three common overarching concerns around which the inquiries and investigations advanced in this volume are oriented.
Both individually and collectively, those inquiries and investigations seek to contribute to a more robust understanding of securitization theory and practice. To that end, the contributions to this volume are motivated by two distinct but inter-related analytical objectives: namely, to examine how securitization works as a process, as well as to assess its explanatory strengths and weaknesses as a concept. These analytical objectives are not only related, but also mutually reinforcing. Indeed, when taking into account various security issues and actors, the contingent and specific dimensions of the securitization process have significant implications not only for political and policy outcomes, but for our very understanding of security (Williams, 2003).
Confronting a ânewâ security environment
Theoretical insights in the social sciences are undoubtedly a by-product of prevailing intellectual and social-historical contexts, and the interplay between them (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006). To this end, the end of the Cold War radically recast prevailing notions of the structure of the international system (Booth, 1997). Indeed, the dust from the Cold War had hardly settled before these and other emergent challenges led to proclamations of a post-Cold War ânew security environmentâ (Kaplan, 1994; Buzan, 1991a). This structural transformation in turn left scholars and policymakers alike without a singular, fixed account of the international security environment around which to base their analyses and actions. The resulting intellectual and policy vacuum stimulated greater recognition of the possibility of a ânewâ security environment in which security actors, threats, and responses alike are subject to an ongoing social and political process of definition, redefinition, and contestation.
New actors, new threats
In reality, the emergence of a ânewâ security environment was a gradual process stemming back decades. The point of origin of the concept itself remains the subject of continuing debate, but from our standpoint, the more meaningful conversation is one that engages with extant structural dynamics producing, or perhaps revealing, a dizzying array of security challenges and unleashing a contested and politicized process to define and prioritize them. The extent to which these dynamics have led to a redefinition of the security landscape, elevating non-state actors and non-traditional âthreatsâ such as transnational terrorism, ethnic conflict, state failure, natural resource wars, ecological disasters, cyberattacks, abject poverty, and systematic discrimination and oppression on the contemporary security agenda, is an important consideration underlying this volume (Krahmann, 2005; Matthews, 1989).
A particular target of most efforts to re-orient security studies to confront a ânewâ security environment is the singular emphasis of realist theory on militarized interactions between competing states striving to advance national interests. This emphasis is itself a by-product of realismâs essential precept that the state is the central actor in international politics (Baldwin, 1997). The statist orientation of realism and its deliberate emphasis on power, order, and competing interests rendered the theory highly useful for describing security threats and proscribing security responses in a Cold War world in which these factors were predominant. However, given the elevation of social inequality, gender inequity, poverty and relative deprivation, resource scarcity and environmental degradation, crime, health, external and internal migration, and the like within the ânew security environment,â the utility of a cognitive lens that places a premium on states, material interests, and military capabilities seems limited at best.
The degree to which non-state actors (NSAs) including multinational corporations (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), transnational terrorist networks, paramilitaries, private military contractors (PMCs), policy thinktanks, peace advocates, and the like have altered and eroded the power and influence traditionally enjoyed by nation-states is instructive in this regard. Consider, for instance, the emergence and significance of ISIS, and before that al-Qaeda, on the security agendas and policies of much of the international community; the role of NGOs such as the Coalition for an International Criminal Court in shaping international law and institutions; or the impacts of remittances from migratory workers to the economies of many developing countries. These and other similar examples point to two related components of structural change with great import for contemporary security thinking and practice: one, the rise to the fore of non-state actors as security actors; and two, the potential for that emergence of non-state actors to undermine state capacity in the security realm.
The âdark sideâ of interdependence
Suppositions of a ânew security environmentâ are dependent not only on the emergence of new actors, but also on a recognition of new (or previously overlooked) sources of insecurity. From an empirical and policy standpoint, the emergence of ânew world disorderâ (Zartman, 2008) in the Cold Warâs wake spawned a plethora of new (or previously overlooked) security threats and challenges. Included among these were the increasing frequency of intra-state conflicts, the rampant spread of small arms and light weapons (SALW), the simultaneous increase in both failing and predatory states, environmental degradation and population displacement, and the blossoming of transnational terrorism and crime.
At an abstract level, these sources of insecurity can be understood as unintended outcomes or ânegative externalitiesâ produced by the complex interdependence animating the past several decades of globalization. The presumed or supposed benefits of such interdependence are oft-celebrated (Keohane & Nye, 2001; Friedman, 2007). Yet the depth and expanse of networked interactions between and among societies and individuals is not without its hazards. Most notable among these is the increased sensitivity and vulnerability of an ever-greater number of actors to a wide range of security threats (Baldwin, 1980). Indeed, to a very real extent, âglobalizationâ can be said to be the main impetus driving the emergence of a range of new or newly salient security threats and challenges.
Certainly, the political, social, economic, cultural, and ideational processes of globalization, as well as the backlash against these processes, pose a very real security challenge, in the form of a boiling over of frustrations about the transformations wrought by these processes into violence. Yet it is not just a turn to violence within, between, or across societies by globalizationâs âdiscontentsâ that is important here. The increasing intensity and extensity of global interdependence has also created a degree of densely networked and weakly governed interconnectedness in commerce, transport, energy and natural resources, migration, and information technology that has raised both the profile and stakes of activities within these issue areas, wiping away the âhighâ and âlowâ politics dichotomy commonplace in a previous generation. At the core of the issue is the degree to which economic, social, and ecological processes are linked to political instability and volatility and, in turn, violence (Homer-Dixon, 1999).
The degree to which these mutually constitutive and reinforcing dynamics are gaining traction in the field of security studies is in turn fostering challenges to what were not so long ago considered to be discrete and mutually exclusive phenomena associated either with a âsecurityâ or âdevelopmentâ agenda, as opposed to the intersection or combination of the two (Collier, 2003). The evident and undeniable emergence of new security actors, threats, and challenges as briefly introduced here has had significant impact on the activities and agendas of security practitioners at the local, state, regional, and global level. Indeed, the story of the ânew security environmentâ is one in which, nearly three decades on from the end of the Cold War, security planning and postures remain in a seemingly perpetual state of flux.
The emergence of critical security studies
From an intellectual standpoint, the extant changes in the security arena described above inspired profound challenges to the conventional wisdom concerning the nature of security and how to provide it. As the impact and implications of actors and threats which were traditionally overlooked or marginalized became ever more real and profound, fundamental challenges to the prevailing ontology of security itself emerged. From their earliest origins, critical approaches to security studies have exhibited a shared concern with exposing the âintellectual hegemonyâ of realism and challenging its attendant assumptions (Booth, 1991, p. 318). Indeed, in these anti- or counter-hegemonic aspirations, we can most readily discern the overt influence of critical theory more generally on security studies beginning in the 1980s, albeit with deeper roots (C.A.S.E. Collective, 2006).
In the quest to redefine security, the intellectual position articulated by Critical Security Studies (CSS) met significant resistance. This resistance was predicated on the presumption that increased elasticity in the definition of security portended a potentially dangerous loss of meaning (Deudney, 1990; Ayoob, 1997). Much of this opposition came from neo-realist scholars who sought to preserve a narrow, traditional reading of security in order to maintain the âintellectual coherenceâ ostensibly provided by prevailing orthodoxies in the security studies field (Buzan, WĂŚver, & de Wilde, 1998).
The âtraditionalâ approach2
The introduction of the term ânew security environmentâ signaled an effort to refine, if not supplant, the traditional approach to security and its emphasis on nation-states, material interests, and coercive power (Krause and Williams, 1996; Wyn Jones, 1996). An accepted point of reference for over a generation in institutional contexts ranging from NATO (Vershbow, 2016) to the UNDP (UNDP, 1994), this term had the unintended effect of underscoring realismâs role as the paradigmatic progenitor of the security studies field (Crawford, 1991).
Steeped in a Machiavellian appreciation for power, a Hobbesian pessimism regarding human nature, and a Clausewitzian belief in the notion of war as the paramount policy instrument, from its earliest discernible origins in the aftermath of World War II, the security studies field has long rested on a set of key propositions derived from realist thought. Indeed, under the guise of celebrating a ârenaissanceâ of the security studies field, Walt (1991) equated security studies with the study of
[âŚ] the conditions that make the use of force more likely, the ways that the use of force affects individuals, states, and societies, and the specific policies that states adopt in order to prepare for, prevent, or engage in war.
(Walt, 1991, p. 212)
In doing so, the field was reduced to a single fundamental concern with âthe threat, use, and control of military forceâ (Walt, 1991, p. 212; emphasis in original).
Following from this a priori proposition, the orthodox approach to security studies produced and reinforced several fundamental (and inter-related) bedrock concepts in the field â concepts that later became central objects for interrogation by those critical of prevailing orthodoxies in the security studies field. One such concept is that of self-help anarchy, and its proposition that the absence of a central governing authority necessarily produces an environment in which states exist in a self-help relationship with one another (Herz, 1950). From a security studies perspective, the chief implication of this assumption regarding the structure and animus of the international system is that anarchy provides the âpermissive conditionsâ for war; absent any global Leviathan, states can and will do ...