Conflict in India and China's Contested Borderlands

A Comparative Study

Kunal Mukherjee

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429677625
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

For a long time, India and China have been seen as the rising economic giants on the Asiatic mainland. Studies of the conflicts which have plagued the borderlands of India and China however have tended to only analyse individual case studies without attempting to compare and contrast the situation in these conflicts.

This book compares and contrasts the situation in India's disputed borderlands – Kashmir and the Indian north eastern states – with China's contested borderlands – Xinjiang and Tibet. The book looks at the root causes of the conflict and how these conflicts have evolved and changed their character with the passage of time. Analysing how the countries have dealt with their territorial disputes from the 50's till more recent times, the author shows to what extent these state policies have exacerbated the already strained situation. Using primary data collected primarily through interviews, from the people/inhabitants of these conflict zones, the book throws new light on the problem. This bottom up approach allows the people to speak and provides a different understanding of the nature of the conflict, which may very well be the way forward for long lasting peace.

A comparative study of the conflicts in the contested borderlands of China and India, the book will be of interest to scholars studying Asian security studies and Asian Politics particularly and Defence and Security Studies more generally.

1 How do we understand and make sense of conflicts in contemporary Asia?

The theoretical background

Before we go into the details of the actual conflict, it is first very important to have some understanding of the theoretical background of these conflicts. What are the theories that can help us understand these ongoing conflicts? These conflicts are so complex that it is very difficult to put them in a box and put a label on them. They are multifaceted and multidimensional. And because they are ongoing in one way or another, they are subject to change and hence very difficult to categorise. These conflicts are in constant motion and have been changing all the time. They are in a state of constant flux, which makes it very difficult to put a single and simple label on it. All four of our case studies here have been in constant motion since the two countries came into existence in the late 1940s. With time they have changed their colour, identity and character. For instance, the way these conflicts existed in the 1950s is very different from the way the conflict exists today. These are indeed very complex situations that we are looking at. That said, we can tease out some characteristic features. These conflicts are partly associated with secessionist nationalism and identity. They can also be seen partly as ethnic conflicts. They can also be seen as civil wars. No one theory will be sufficient to capture the conflict in its entirety due to the complex nature of these conflicts. Therefore, it becomes necessary to analyse multiple theories and take them up collectively for discussion. We will be able to get a nuanced understanding of the conflict only if we take these theories up collectively or more correctly different aspects of these theories for discussion. In this connection, the ‘new wars’ thesis, the nationalism thesis and the theories associated with ethnic conflict and civil wars all deserve special mention. Since two of our conflict zones (Kashmir and Xinjiang) are often seen as epicentres of Islamism by the Indian and Chinese establishments, Islamism also deserves some attention. These theories, taken up collectively, throw considerable light on our four case studies. In other words, there are elements of the nationalism thesis, the ‘new wars’ thesis, and elements of the ethnic conflict thesis all co-existing in Kashmir, the Indian northeast, Xinjiang and Tibet. Let us first start with the ‘new wars’ thesis.

The ‘new wars’ thesis

The post-Cold War period has witnessed the rise of a new group of conflicts which scholars like Mary Kaldor have called ‘new wars’, to differentiate the current group of conflicts from earlier wars that are in keeping with the classical definition of warfare. Although Kaldor’s thesis was originally formulated in an East European context at an earlier period, the theory has considerable explanatory power and it is without doubt that the theory travels far and wide. Most scholars in Western universities have used the theory to gain an understanding in war-torn zones in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Going beyond these conventional case studies, we can also use Kaldor’s theory to understand conflicts in different parts of contemporary Asia, especially in India and China’s contested borderlands. In other words, Kaldor’s theory is very useful and can help us understand the situation in Indian Kashmir, the Indian northeast, Chinese Xinjiang and Tibet.

It should be noted though that conflicts classed as ‘new’ are, strictly speaking, not really post-Cold War conflicts. When we look at the origins of any conflict, we are dealing with both long-term factors and short-term factors or triggers that ultimately lead to the outbreak of the conflict. And some of the long-term factors can be traced back to pre-Cold War times. Whilst peeling back the layers, historians (especially military historians) have a tendency of looking at the long-term factors, whereas political scientists deal more with contemporary issues. The case studies chosen for purposes of this book are ‘new’ in the sense that they are still ongoing in one way or another, and the levels of violence have escalated more than ever in recent times since the end of the Cold War. In other words, although the roots of the conflict can be traced back to the late 1940s of the previous century when these two countries first came into existence, the levels of violence have gone up since the early 1990s.¹ Furthermore, many of our case studies have gone on to acquire traits and characteristic features associated with the ‘new wars’ theory. In this sense, our case studies can be studied as ‘new wars’.

Kaldor’s ‘New Wars’ theory is most certainly a powerful argument and travels far and wide, and is able to give us an insight into most present-day conflicts, including the case studies that we are looking at. The early chapters of the book, ‘Old and New Wars’, look at some of the characteristic features of what Kaldor calls ‘new wars’. First of all, ‘new wars’ refer to contemporary conflicts that have come into existence in the post-1990s.² This is a new form of political violence which must be differentiated from earlier or old or traditional wars like the First World War or the Second World War. In these new war contexts, Kaldor has argued that it has become increasingly difficult to distinguish between the ‘local’ and the ‘global’, the ‘political’ and the ‘non-political’, the ‘private’ and the ‘public’, and acts of repression, which refers to internal attacks, and acts of aggression, which refer to external attacks. These conflicts need to be understood and analysed within the broader framework of globalisation. We notice pronounced identity politics, human rights abuses, strong presence of the paramilitary and participation of the diaspora. New wars are also funded very differently to the way old wars were funded. For instance, the money required to fund these conflicts might come from the diaspora community as opposed to state revenue which was the case during earlier times. In these situations, we also see a blurring of the distinctions between war, organised crime and large-scale violation of human rights. Although these conflicts might appear to be localised, they may actually involve a whole range of transnational connections. New wars also arise in a context where the autonomy and sovereignty of the state is being undermined. Finally, they take place in a context of poverty, corruption, administrative failure, poor governance and criminality.

Let us now see how many of these features actually fit in with our case studies. In South Asia, the Kashmir conflict has been going on for many decades now. Although the Kashmir conflict is very complex and multidimensional, at its very heart, it is a secessionist nationalist movement. So it is undermining the sovereignty of the state, in this case India. Reliable numbers of separatist groups are, of course, hard to ascertain. Some of the earlier estimates have suggested that the various insurgent groups combined would amount to 6,000–8,000 active combatants, of which 1,000–2,000 of them are Islamists from the neighbouring AFPAK [Afghanistan-Pakistan] region. This brings us to a second feature of the new wars thesis about transnational linkages. Although it may appear at a superficial level that the Kashmir conflict is happening in the northwestern parts of India, there are strong connections with Islamist groups from both Pakistan and Afghanistan. Daniel Byman writes,

Al Qaeda used its training camps in Afghanistan to support various insurgent and terrorist groups throughout the Muslim world, helping fighters in Kashmir…. the haven in Afghanistan enabled Al Qaeda to knit together the various strands of the global jihadist movement. Different groups sent fighters to Afghanistan for training and sanctuary, and there they developed personal connections with members of other groups.³

In relation to Islamist networks operating all over South Asia cutting across national boundaries, Ian Talbot also writes that ‘Afghanistan provided another potential training base, alongside those in Azad Kashmir, for preparing Islamic irregular forces for the covert war in Jammu and Kashmir’.⁴ Furthermore, in the recent past there has also been involvement of the Kashmiri diaspora, e.g. those based in Britain. In this connection, the Birmingham-based JKLF [Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front] deserves special mention. The reason why the British Kashmiri diaspora and neighbouring Islamist groups have participated in this conflict is partly because some feel very strongly about their collective sense of Islamic identity, i.e. the ummah which refers to the worldwide Muslim community. In Islam, the Muslim world is often seen as one big family, and people residing in different parts of the Islamic world have a shared identity that they are part of the same family. In other words, everyone is related and are each other’s brothers and sisters. So if a non-Muslim power like India or China is oppressing Muslims in Kashmir or Xinjiang, British-born Kashmiri Muslims are likely to respond and retaliate because some might feel strongly about their collective sense of Islamic identity. Thus, identity politics, a point that Kaldor talks about, is quite pronounced in the Kashmir conflict. Human rights abuses are quite common in Indian Kashmir and happen on a regular basis. Kashmir happens to be one of the most militarised parts of the world, and this heavy presence of the military has often paved the way for all kinds of human rights violations to take place. Kaldor talks about the heavy presence of the paramilitary in contemporary conflicts. In Indian Kashmir, in addition to the presence of the Indian Army, there is a heavy presence of different sections of the Indian paramilitary like the BSF [Border Security Force], the CRPF [Central Reserve Police Force] and the Rashtriya Rifles. ‘Currently the RR/Rashtriya Rifles has primary responsibility for counter-insurgency operations in the hinterland in the state of Jammu and Kashmir’.⁵ It is often members of the paramilitary who cause the human rights abuses, since they take the law into their hands and there is no accountability. Human rights abuses may also be caused by Islamist groups but violations caused by the Indian Army and security personnel are well known. In relation to human rights abuses in India’s borderlands, it has been said,

numerous international human rights organisations have also maintained an active interest in condemning human rights abuses throughout the region, Amnesty International being among the most prolific in its issuance of reports. On 8 November, 2013, it highlighted how ‘for decades’ the Armed Forces Special Powers Act has enabled serious human rights violations to be committed by soldiers in Jammu and Kashmir and parts of northeast India.⁶

The conflict also happens in a context of widespread corruption, criminality and administrative failure. Thus, some of the features which Kaldor discusses in her book can be found in Indian Kashmir.

The conflict in the Indian northeast is very complex and has multiple layers. At its heart it is a secessionist movement, especially amongst groups in Nagaland, who argue that they are Indian by force and not by choice. Many Naga Christian groups have argued that they do not feel a sense of oneness or identification with a Hindu majority India. With many of the conflicts in the Indian northeast being separatist in nature, they are increasingly undermining and weakening state authority and state sovereignty. Although these conflicts may appear to be localised and confined to the Indian northeast especially to the states of Assam, Nagaland and Manipur, there are strong transnational connections between insurgent groups in India and across the international border. For instance, insurgent groups in the Indian northeast like the ULFA [United liberation Front of Assam] and the NSCN [National Socialist Council of Nagaland] have maintained linkages with insurgent groups in contemporary Myanmar like the KIA [Kachin Independence Army]. Many from the Kachin community in northern Myanmar are Christian and share a sense of solidarity with the Naga community in India who are also mainly Christian. Just as the Naga community in India feel oppressed by a Hindu majority India, the Kachin community in Myanmar also feel oppressed by a Buddhist majority Myanmar. It is in this context that they try to help each other. Identity politics is also very pronounced in the Indian northeast. A lot of the separatist groups in the Indian northeast have complained about the continuous flows of migration taking place from Bangladesh into the northeastern states, and how this migration is increasingly diluting and eroding the Northeast’s Mongoloid and tribal ethos and identity. In relation to Bangladeshi migration, Willem Van Schendel writes that Bengali cultivators began to move beyond the delta to places like the Indian northeast and the Arakan in western Myanmar and that ‘this was the beginning of a long-term trend, continuing today, in which tens of millions of Bangladeshis left their homeland in search of a better life’.⁷ What has aggravated the situation is that the central government in New Delhi has not done very much to stop this migration and thus has to a large extent failed in the protection and preservation of northeastern identity. Like Kashmir, there is a strong presence of the Indian Army and different sections of the paramilitary in the northeast. The different sections of the Indian paramilitary include the BSF, the CRPF and the Assam Rifles. This point on heavy presence of security personnel takes us to a related point on human rights violations. Since the northeast like Kashmir is heavily militarised, this militarisation has paved the way for all sorts of human rights abuses to take place. For instance, there have been regular reports of how security personnel have raped women and children. In relation to human rights violations it has been said,

in its 2008 report, ‘Getting Away with Murder’, Human Rights Watch pointed out that aside from violating international human rights norms and treaties, the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (which will be discussed in great detail later) provides impunity for the armed forces and paramilitary. Impunity is present in two forms: de facto impunity in which the state fails to prosecute due to lack of will or capacity, and de jure impunity in which laws protect perpetrators of human rights abuse, making it extremely difficult to bring cases against perpetrators. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act provides de jure impunity in that members of the armed forces are not prosecuted in civilian courts, and under the provisions of the Act many human rights violations are not deemed criminal. Yet it also provides a form of de facto impunity as military courts responsible for prosecuting soldiers have often failed to investigate human rights violations or been simply unwilling to bring charges against military personnel.⁸

Finally, the insurgency in the northeast takes place in a context of criminality, corruption and administrative failure. Levels of corruption are notoriously high.⁹

When we look at China’s contested borderlands, we find some of the features of the Kaldor argument here as well. For instance, in both Xinjiang and Tibet, we see pronounced identity politics. The Uyghurs in Xinjiang have argued that they are Muslim and have more of a sense of oneness with other Muslim especially Turkic countries than with a Han-dominated China. It is believed that a certain kind of international Islam which has been on the rise in recent years has strengthened Uyghur identity and has galvanized activist separatist groups into further action. In other words, China is increasingly becoming part of the Islamic revival, which has become a global phenomenon over the last few decades. Furthermore, when the PRC [People’s Republic of China] came into existence in 1949, it was established as an atheistic state which has made it hard for Muslim communities to practise their faith. The conflict in Xinjiang has been primarily about identity. Separatist Uyghurs see themselves as a distinct nation and as a part of East Turkestan or Uyghuristan. The central government in Beijing has tried to dilute Uyghur identity through continuous flows of Han migration which Uyghur separatist groups have often complained about. The situation in Xinjiang is very similar to the situation in Tibet. Like the other case studies, although a very complex and multifaceted situation, at its very core the situation in Tibet is inextricably linked with national identity. Tibetans are predominantly Buddhist and have argued that since the Chinese invasion in the 1950s, the state has actively been involved in sending Han people from China proper to supposedly develop the Tibetan region which has paved the way for what many call ‘culture genocide’. Many Tibetans fear that they will become a minority in their own land due to the Han migration and interracial marriages introduced and encouraged by the state. Both Xinjiang and Tibet are heavily militarised which has paved the way for all kinds of brutality, crackdowns and human rights violations to take place. We also see the strong participation of the diaspora community here. For instance, there is a strong Uyghur presence in Munich in Germany and in North America. The Uyghur diaspora, through the World Uyghur Congress, has especially been active in raising awareness about the situation in Xinjiang internationally. Rabiya Kadeer deserves special mention in this regard. Finally, both these conflicts need to be analysed within the context of globalisation. Both provinces are rich in mineral resources, which China needs to exploit to raise its economic status and international profile. China’s obsession in becoming a global player in world affairs would mean the central government would need to tap into borderland resources more effectively. Xinjiang, for instance, is likely to become the largest oil-producing base for China in the years to come. In relation to Beijing’s interests in Xinjiang, Yufan Hao and Weihua Liu write,

Due to its large size and political-geographical location, Xinjiang is critical to China’s national strategic security and economic growth. The Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region is China’s largest administrative division and spans over 1,660,001 square kilometres, accounting for about one sixth of China’s land territory, with immense energy and resources. Located at the centre of the Eurasian continent, Xinjiang possesses a significant geopolitical status, and is an important passageway on the new Eurasian continental bridge and the nexus with the countries along the Silk Route and the Islamic circle.¹⁰

Islamism

Since two of our case studies (Kashmir and Xinjiang) are seen as hotbeds of radical Islam by sections of the political elite in New Delhi and Be...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 How do we understand and make sense of conflicts in contemporary Asia?
• 2 The Uyghur conflict in Chinese Xinjiang
• 3 The case of Tibet and Tibetan nationalism
• 4 Insurgency in Kashmir
• 5 The conflict in the Indian northeast
• 6 Comparing India’s borders with China’s borders
• 7 Methods of peacebuilding and the way forward
• Concluding remarks
• Index