Leo Strauss in Northeast Asia

Jun-Hyeok Kwak, Sungwoo Park

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429560378
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Political Philosophy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book analyzes the reception of Leo Strauss and his political philosophy in Northeast Asia. By juxtaposing the central idea of Strauss's political philosophy with the question of modernity, the contributors explore the eclectic adaptations of Strauss in Northeast Asian countries as a philosophical appropriation across cultures.

Examining how Strauss's philosophy was first introduced in Northeast Asia, the book sheds light on the similarities and differences in experiences, challenging the dominant approach which attributes various receptions of Strauss in Northeast Asia solely to sociopolitical circumstances. This book also seeks to move beyond a China-centric approach to investigate the possible transcultural appeals of Strauss's political philosophy by exploring the cases of Japan and South Korea.

Appealing to a wide network of scholars and practitioners in East Asia engaged in rethinking cultural particularities, this volume will be attractive to upper-level undergraduate students, graduate students, and advanced researchers in political philosophy, political theory, and Asian politics.

Part I

General overview

1 Introduction

The reception of Leo Strauss in Northeast Asia

Jun-Hyeok Kwak

Prologue

In Northeast Asia, public interest in Leo Strauss and his political philosophy has been rapidly declining in recent times. This is certainly a surprising phenomenon, particularly in China where Strauss’s popularity underwent a tremendous increase during the emergence of neoconservatism in the United States a decade ago. However, “Straussian hermeneutics” is still regarded as an important method of interpretation by scholars in the field of the history of political philosophy. And the key issues underlying the methodological premises of Straussian hermeneutics, such as the problem of modernity, attract sincere scholars and stimulate scholarly debates. Furthermore, we observe that some intellectuals in Northeast Asia present “Straussianism” as a sort of sinister cult, and show animosity toward scholars who identify themselves as “Straussians.” This academic atmosphere indicates that the recent decline of public interest in Strauss in Northeast Asia can be considered as nothing but a trend that drifts along with the fluctuation of public interest in sociopolitical issues.

As a matter of fact, the recent decline of public interest in Leo Strauss thoroughly invalidates the cogency of the currently dominant approach to the reception of Strauss in Northeast Asia. Most of the scholarly works on the reception of Strauss in Northeast Asia are interwoven with the question that Mark Lilla once addressed in his magazine article (Lilla 2010): “Why is Leo Strauss popular in China?” With an idiosyncratic suspicion about the reception of Strauss in Northeast Asia, they stress the immense surge of scholarly interest in Strauss in the past but they pay far less attention to the ongoing philosophical appropriations of Strauss and his political ideas in recent times. Disclosing the selective adaptations of Strauss’s political ideas, some scholars have endeavored to examine the recent decline of “Strauss fever” in China (Shaw 2017; Kroll 2017). However, they do not go beyond what Mark Lilla foreshadowed vaguely with the word “strangeness” in the reception of Strauss in China. In other words, they do not pay due consideration to the scholarly readings of Strauss in Northeast Asia and their ingenuity in the sense of philosophical appropriation across cultures. What they consciously or unconsciously intend to uncover is the Chinese or Northeast Asian cultural and sociopolitical contexts that provide the rationales for the selective adaptations.

More importantly, there are only a few scholarly works that analyze the reception of Strauss in Japan and South Korea. Almost every work in English journals on the reception of Strauss in Northeast Asia is focused on China. This is not only because Chinese scholarly debates about Strauss and his political ideas have been much more vibrant than the analogous debates in Japan and South Korea. The rapidly changing global environment spurred by the rise of China has inevitably increased academic interest in the Chinese reception of Strauss. However, Western unfamiliarity with the other two Northeast Asian cases has fostered an undesirable distortion that invokes uncanny similarities between the three cases with an agenda of Asian values or Confucian traditions in East Asia. The unique evolution of Straussianism in China, which has frequently been juxtaposed with the return to Confucian tradition and the relentless criticism of liberal democracy, cannot single out a set of distinctive features that could be shared with the other two countries. By the same token, the eclectic adaptations of Strauss’s political ideas in China cannot be attributed solely to sociopolitical contexts that have not been experienced in the other two countries. The result is that the relentless search for historical evidence arising from the peculiarities of the Chinese experience in the reception of Strauss cannot completely escape the transcultural appeal of Strauss’s political philosophy to Northeast Asian scholars.

Based on these observations, in analyzing the reception of Leo Strauss in Northeast Asia, we will be exploring a philosophical encounter between East and West in which the philosophical appropriation of Strauss and his political philosophy in non-Western practices can be appropriately accounted for. More specifically, this volume seeks to accomplish three tasks. First, juxtaposing the central idea of Strauss’s political philosophy with the question of modernity which has been taken seriously throughout the reception of Strauss in Northeast Asia, we will elaborate on the eclectic adaptations of Strauss in the Northeast Asian countries as a philosophical appropriation across cultures. Second, examining how Strauss’s philosophy was first introduced into the Northeast Asian countries, we will shed light on the similarities and dissimilarities between the different experiences in Northeast Asia which ultimately challenge the dominant approach that attributes the various receptions of Strauss in Northeast Asia solely to sociopolitical circumstances. Third, readdressing the central themes of Strauss with the tension between philosophy and society, we will investigate the possible transcultural appeal of Strauss’s political philosophy to Northeast Asian societies.

Hermeneutics and the philosophic life

Most scholars who favor Leo Strauss and his political philosophy express directly or indirectly that they have experienced a rare “wonder” (thaumazein) for the great thinkers after reading his interpretations of classical texts. For example, Heinrich Meier recalled that “through nothing and no one have I learned to read better, more attentively, more fruitfully than through reading Strauss” (2011, 20). As we can see from the chapters by Shozo Iijima, Mingkun Li, and Yong-Min Kim in this volume, this is the same for the Northeast Asian scholars who first introduced Strauss into the countries of the region. They were fascinated with the erudition of Strauss which covered such a broad range of the history of Western political philosophy, and simultaneously they found in his books a new way of addressing Western thinkers which was not bound solely to particular historical contexts but tied to the relentless quest for knowledge about perennial sociopolitical problems. But it is doubtful that they considered themselves “Straussians.” They addressed Strauss’s hermeneutics, while they often confused his textual reading with “textualism,” which interprets a text without considering its historical context. And they were sympathetic with Strauss’s critiques of historicism and positivism, though they seldom put forward the central topics of his mature works, such as the quarrel between ancient and modern and the tension between politics and philosophy. In fact, the early reception of Strauss in Northeast Asia can be characterized as a time for “learning” through his works what had been forgotten in the history of Western political philosophy.

This characteristic of “learning” in the early reception of Strauss is still predominant in Northeast Asia. It is partially driven by the success of the book, History of Political Philosophy, written by Strauss and his students. This book has been widely recognized as a good guide to the original texts, this being indicated as the primary goal of the book in the preface to the first edition in 1963 (Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey 1987, xiv). However, the success of the book is not the only reason that makes the trait of the early reception of Strauss sustainable. The prolongation of the trait of “learning” has also been spurred on by the traditional Confucian idea of “learning” (xue) in Northeast Asia which emphasizes its combination with “practice” (xi) and ultimately directs the learner toward self-fulfillment and social transformation. “Learning” particularly in Confucianism is integrated into the self-cultivation of a person to be a “gentleman” (junzi), a man of perfect virtue, and the completeness of learning is bound up with practicing (jianxing) what one has learned (Cheng 2004). At this juncture, despite the differences between Strauss and Confucianism as elaborated by Shiqi Tang herein, Strauss, who confronts the questions driven by political philosophers in the past, attracts students who wish to understand their philosophical and sociopolitical problems by reading the classical texts of the great thinkers. It is notable that the trait of “learning” is particularly strong in South Korea where the few who are sympathetic to Strauss’s hermeneutics refer to themselves as Straussians.

The emergence of the issue of esoteric and exoteric writing in Northeast Asia signifies a departure from the early reception of Strauss. The departure can be taken as an advance in the study of Strauss in the sense that his works are no longer perceived as a mere guide for “learning” classical texts, but as a genuine political philosophy for considered criticism. Both defenders and critics of Strauss carefully read his works with what Nathan Tarcov defines in his chapter as the “dual meaning of political philosophy” in Strauss’s works. Defenders put forward the priority of the philosophical over the political life in his works by taking account of his assertion on esotericism as the justification for philosophy over politics swayed by opinions in a political community. For instance, Sungwoo Park maintains in his chapter that the deeper meaning of political philosophy as “the political treatment of philosophy” needs to be interpreted as an emphasis on the limited role of a political philosopher as a commentator on philosophical errors in politics rather as a utopian teacher of statesmen. In contrast, critics pejoratively describe this esotericism as an indication of the endorsement of the rule of the knowledgeable few. In a similar vein, Shiqi Tang in his chapter criticizes Strauss for advocating a hierarchy of human souls, juxtaposing it with the ancient Chinese teaching that the distinction between the knowledgeable few and the common people is not determined by natural capability but by different degrees of endeavor in self-cultivation.

The most enthusiastic appropriation of Strauss’s esotericism in Northeast Asia can be found in the works of Xiaofeng Liu and Yang Gan who are known as the pioneers of the study of Strauss in China. As Mingkun Li mentions in his chapter, Liu and Gan delve deeply into the recovery of classical Chinese classics through the lens of Strauss. For them, Strauss’s call for the return to classical philosophy bears the urgent need for rehabilitating ancient thought that is firmly rooted in a particular society. At this juncture, the Strauss–Kojève debate in which Strauss refuted Kojève’s Hegelian conception of “the universal and homogenous state” serves as the source for their repudiation of any universalism that tries to override ancient Chinese thought in favor of modern Western discourses (Liu 2013a, 144–161; Gan 2002, 32–34, 2003, 73–100; cf. Strauss 2000 [1961], 192–211). At the same time, Strauss’s praise of the philosophic life leans precariously toward the side of the teacher of statesmen, having been employed to justify the education of “leaders” (danganzhe jieceng) or future “legislators” (lifazhe) for sociopolitical reform (Liu 2013b, 191–192, 2006, 239–270; Gan 2002, 79–82). At the practical level, their return to classical philosophy revolves around a liberal education that aims to teach students the classical texts in East and West. However, they can hardly avoid the criticism that their concerns with contemporary China have made them depart from their initial purpose of a liberal education. Notably, their longing for “good politics” (haozhengzhi) is likely to discard what Strauss means by the actualization of the best possible by chance.

“Overcoming” the modernity

Haig Patapan in his chapter points out that Strauss’s questioning of modernity can make a significant contribution to East–West dialogue. In particular, evidencing the process of modernization in Asia as “Westernization,” he maintains that students of Eastern thought can learn from Strauss, whose vivid criticism of modernity in the form of technology and the scientific knowledge related to it clearly discloses the origin of the crisis of the West. By the same token, he claims that Westerners can learn from a close study of classical Eastern works that can reveal what has lapsed into oblivion through the modernity of the West. The first path to East–West dialogue has been carried out successfully in Northeast Asia. The problems of modernity scrutinized by Strauss have been studied seriously by Northeast Asian scholars who find fault with modernity and its negative impact on their societies. Not only relativism, but nearly all the issues raised by Strauss with respect to modernity have caused many intellectuals to reflect that the problems of modernity originated in Western societies. On the contrary, the second path to East–West dialogue hasn’t yet been taken to any meaningful degree. Paradoxically, as elaborated by Jianhong Chen in his chapter, Strauss’s counsel on a genuine meeting between East and West awakens Chinese scholars to recovering their own way of life (cf. Strauss 1989, 43–45). For them, China cannot be ready for the meeting if she does not regain the original vigor of her civilization which has been subordinated to modern Western rationalism.

At this juncture, what should be added to these discourses on East–West dialogue is modernity’s multiplicity in Northeast Asia. Both embracing and resisting the modernity imposed by the violent incursions of Western imperialism into the region, Northeast Asian thinkers have shaped diverse trajectories of modernity. And these complicated facets of modernity in Northeast Asia can hardly be simplified through modern Western rationalism. The proponents of Sinicization, including Qichao Liang, envisioned “Chinese-style modernization” as opposed to individualistic Western rationalism, which was perceived by them as spiritually corrupting civilization (Yu 2010, 161–168), and the Japanese intellectuals of the Kyoto school in the interwar period wished to overcome modernity by restoring a commonality with the traditional culture, including earlier Japanese piety (Harootunian 2000, 34–94). In this context, Takashi Kibe in his chapter deals with the multiplicity of modernity by placing Yukichi Fukuzawa at the center of Japanese modernity. At first glance, he takes into account Strauss’s explication of modernity as a linear understanding of modernity. However, his primary purpose is to shed light on the teleological sense of civilization hidden beneath Fukuzawa’s conception of “relative thinking” into which the particularity of Japanese civilization was significantly thrust. The conclusion of his chapter is that the Japanese trajectory of modernity cannot avoid Strauss’s criticism of modernity.

Whatever justification there may be for the multiplicity of modernity in Northeast Asia, the practice of nation-building appears to be bound to contradict Strauss’s criticism of modernity. The propensity toward such a judgment has been prevalent among Japanese and South Korean scholars who are conversant with the quarrel between ancients and moderns in Strauss’s political philosophy. In contrast, Xiaofeng Liu and Yang Gan have embarked passionately on the scholarly effort of constructing a new Chinese governance. Putting forward “virtuous politics” (dezheng) as a universal value of the state, Liu debunks liberals and their models of liberal democracy with the basic standards of a just state in which national security and virtuous unity are placed before individual freedom and rights (Liu 2013b, 185, 189–191). Interestingly, differing from his critical point of view on modernity, he does not intend to eschew the problems of the modern nation-state. As Zheng (2013) points out, his idea of the state, which is deeply influenced by Carl Schmitt, is virtually formalized in the vision of a nation that should be ready to compete with other nations for its preservation (Liu 2001, 2006, 142–182). Gan goes further in proposing a Chinese-style modernization in which the legitimate direction of constitutional reform is based on his theory of the “Integration of Three Traditions” (tong santong): Confucian tradition, Mao Zedong’s tradition, and Deng Xiaoping’s tradition (Gan 2007a, 2007b, 3–49). His vision of constitutional reform indicates how far Gan is from Strauss, since this can hardly dispel its inher...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgments
• PART I: General overview
• PART II: Leo Strauss across culture
• PART III: The places of Leo Strauss in Northeast Asia
• PART IV: Leo Strauss and Northeast Asia
• Index