In the immediate aftermath of the 2007 Kenyan Presidential election, the country entered into a political, economic and humanitarian crisis. Post-election violence erupted leading to estimates of over 1,000 people being killed by police, criminal gangs and militia groups, and 660,000 displacements, as opponents of President Mwai Kibaki alleged electoral manipulation (CBS News 2008; Kenny 2019). Tensions were deeply rooted in Kenyaâs political history. The sequence of events surrounding the conduct of the vote count were the immediate sparks for the conflict, however. An announcement from the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) about the result was expected by 10am on Sunday 30 December at the latest, three days after the poll, But there were repeated delays. Rumours circulated that the results were being rigged by the ECK to favour the President (Throup 2008). In its evaluation of the election, the European Union Election Observation Mission (2008, 1) concluded that:
Kenya fell short of key international and regional standards for democratic elections. Most significantly, the electoral process suffered from a lack of transparency in the processing and tallying of results, which undermined the confidence in the accuracy of the final result of the presidential election⌠. This overall conclusion is all the more regrettable, since in advance of the tallying process and despite some significant shortcomings in the legal framework, the elections were generally well administered and freedoms of expression, association and assembly were generally respected.
Kenya 2007 highlights the high stakes involved in delivering elections and the consequences of getting it wrong. Kenyaâs experience was evidence that fragile multi-party systems can quickly fall apart under intense political pressure (Cheeseman 2008). It wasnât a gerrymandered electoral system that was to blame, or the role of money in politics â the traditional sources of concern about electoral integrity. Instead, it was the logistical delivery of the electoral process.
Problems with the delivery of elections are not uncommon and found in established democracies alongside electoral autocracies and transitioning democracies, however. The 2000 US Presidential election infamously exposed shortcomings in Americaâs electoral machinery with confusing ballot papers, faulty equipment, queues at polling stations, problems with absentee ballots and citizens missing from the electoral registers (U.S. Commission on Civil Rights 2001; Wand et al. 2001). In the UK, at midnight on Friday 7 May 2010, with the result of the UK general election unclear, the BBC News carried the headlines that the election had been marred by widespread errors with electoral administration. Hundreds of voters in Chester were unable to cast a ballot because of an out-of-date electoral register; long queues formed in Sheffield and Leeds leaving voters âlocked outâ when polls closed at midnight; polling stations in Liverpool reported that they had run out of ballot papers. Some dissatisfied voters staged sit-ins to protest against what they called âdisenfranchisementâ (Channel 4 News 2010). âIt sounds like a disgrace from beginning to end, the way that this election has been handledâ, exclaimed the BBCâs TV presenter David Dimbleby, who was questioning the Chair of the Electoral Commission, Jenny Watson, live on air as the news unfolded (BBC News 2010). Elsewhere, the completeness and accuracy of electoral registers have been questioned in Ireland (James 2012, 185â90) and New Zealand (Downes 2014). Poor ballot paper design invalidated many votes in Indonesia (Schmidt 2010; Sukma 2009) and Scotland (Denver, Johns, and Carmen 2009). Over 1,300 votes were lost in a knife-edge Western Australian Senate recount race (Lion 2013). In the 2013 Malaysia election, election officials were criticised for not shaking the bottles of indelible ink, meaning that some citizens could wash off the ink and double vote (Lai 2013). Most bizarrely, in the small village of Wallsburg, Utah, part-time election officials forgot to run the election. Twice. First in 2011, and then again in 2013. To the hilarity of the US media, County Clerk Brent Titcomb said local officials in the sleepy hamlet of approximately 300 residents had forgotten to advertise for candidates: âThey just went on without doing anything ⌠close to the election day, they called to ask what they should doâ (Associated Press 2013). A local resident commented that âthey got in a whole bunch of troubleâ (Smart 2015).
Elections, it is often said, are the most complex logistical event to be organised during peacetime. These anecdotes and examples routinely catch headlines as they are picked up by journalists and quickly circulated over social media, suggest that societies often fail to deliver elections successfully. But there has been relatively little academic attention on the management of elections. This begs the question of whether, if we begin to turn over the rocks and look underneath, we will find fundamental problems in elections up and down the land, even in established democracies? Or will we instead find that elections are generally well run by dedicated, professional and hard-working electoral officials? Are they officials who donât deserve the tough press and populist criticism that they receive?
This book aims to provide some tools and methods to find out and consider what can be done to improve the delivery of elections, which will be of use worldwide. This introductory chapter begins by arguing that the study of the delivery of elections, electoral management, has been fundamentally overlooked in the academic literature. The concept of electoral management is defined and arguments made for an inter-disciplinary approach to the topic. Evidence is provided of the considerable variation in the quality of delivery worldwide. The chapter explains why electoral management matters. An overview of the book ahead is then set out.