Demobilisation and Reintegration in Colombia

Building State and Citizenship

Francy Carranza-Franco

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781351124621
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Global Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book investigates demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration (DDR) in Colombia during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. The six large peace processes and amnesties that took place in Colombia over this period were nation-led, providing an interesting case study for the wider DDR literature, which has historically focused on Africa and Asia. The continuous process of creating and demobilising illegal armed groups has been pivotal in building the Colombian state. Although the peace settlements and amnesties have brought renewed cycles of violence, they have also been key to the negotiation of democracy and citizenship rights for both ex-combatants and wider sectors of the population.

Here the author analyses the role of DDR programmes in building state and citizenship. Comparing DDR during Alvaro Uribe's presidency and the peace process with the FARC guerrilla under the presidency of Juan Manuel Santos, the book draws on extensive fieldwork conducted with local authorities, officers on the ground and ex-combatants themselves. It details the process of creating and implementing DDR policy and explores the difficulties, challenges and security dilemmas ex-combatants may face in integrating within a post-conflict society in social, economic and political dimensions.

Bringing us right up to date with the implementation of the FARC's peace process and the challenges ahead in the reintegration of ex-combatants under a new president, this book will be of interest to scholars and researchers of politics and development in Colombia, and to those with an interest in peace-building, state-building and DDR in other countries and conflicts.

1 Continuous demobilisations

State-building without peace

Giustozzi (2012) identifies four main schools of thought on DDR: first, what he calls the neo-liberal school, which emphasises the reintegration of ex-combatants in economic activities, mainly in the private sector, as well as the establishing of democratic institutions and market liberalisation of the economy. Although this school is the dominant approach implemented by the UN and the World Bank, it has been criticised, as these expectations may be unrealistic in war-torn societies that lack an economic system able to absorb the former fighters into the workforce. Second, the developmental school, which focuses instead on structural changes in power and economic relationships. It assumes that addressing the root causes of conflict is a precondition for the reintegration of ex-combatants. Depending on the author, this approach may or not be understood as compatible with neoliberal policies and market liberalisation. Third, the school of politics first emphasises the political will and international commitment to implement policies that provide both economic and personal security to the former fighters. Finally, there is the security first school that claims that power-sharing arrangements will create stability and democratisation through the inclusion of members belonging to opposite factions in the creation and reform of security forces, a process that has been called Security Sector Reform.

However, Giustozzi argues that all these schools of thought have in common the neglect of the relationship between DDR and state-building. Furthermore, he points out that the creation of DDR programmes does not necessarily contribute to state-building, in particular when these institutions are part of short-term international interventions that dismantle the entire programme when the task or the funding ends (Giustozzi, 2012). Alternatively, this relationship emerges as more relevant when analysing the impact of DDR in the process of state formation: e.g. in the creation of modern welfare to benefits veterans of regular armies (Campbell, 2003), or in the extension and creation of citizenship rights (Pereira, 2003).

Moreover, Baas (2012) and McMullin (2013, p. 7) have claimed that the debates on DDR tend to focus on the practice of multilateral organisms in the design and implementation of DDR programmes, which are not always related to the needs perceived by the governments or warring factions involved in the negotiation of the peace processes. Thus, it has been argued that international-led DDR programmes prioritise the security concerns and economic agendas of the countries that dominate the international political order, while ignoring the social and political reality of the local governments and communities (Cramer, 2006, p. 258; Kriger, 2003, p. 20; Muggah, 2010, p. 2; Ottaway, 2002).

In the same line, Ottaway (2002) posits that the intervention of international actors in war-torn societies contradict the historical process of state-building. That is, while the international community expects quick transitions from collapsed societies to Weberian state models, in reality the internal processes of building institutions is slow and marred by violence. Wesley (2008) has also said that the concept of state-building has been narrowly defined by the international community, limiting its meaning to activities related to international interventions in two areas of technical collaboration in the building of state institutions – mainly in regard to the creation of bureaucracy – or by assuming, temporarily, state functions for what has been called “failed states”. Thus, it is expected that in the long term, this replacement of state functions will somehow lead to an efficient and sustainable state apparatus that resembles western states in an idealised manner: security and the rule of law; transparent and efficient bureaucratic institutions; the provision of basic services to the population nationwide; democratic processes and norms; and a market-led economy.

Moreover, Berdal and Zaum (2012) have shown several problems in the understanding of state-building by the international literature in war-torn societies: (a) the policy-making literature assumes the weakness of the state as the primary source of conflict, ignoring the various ways and processes through which the state is formed; (b) informal structures of governance and war economies that originated during the conflict are resilient and adaptable, thus interventions by outsiders – i.e. limited in time and resources – face important difficulties in transforming them to more western-like forms of governance; (c) political economy analyses are important to understanding the continuation of violence in post-war situations; as well as (d) the continuities and breaking points in the relationship between state-building and conflict; and (e) that the role of outsiders in post-conflict situations is varied, and certainly international community interventions may have perverse and unintended effects.

Call (2008) has defined state-building as “actions undertaken by international or national actors to establish, reform, or strengthen the institutions of the state and their relation to society (which may or may not contribute to peace-building)”. He also points out that although there are different approaches of what “state” means, there is some consensus on the basic Weberian definition of the monopoly of force and legitimacy through the building of institutions for policy-making and management in basic areas of state functioning such as security forces, taxes, justice, financing, agriculture, trade, etc. Yet he argues that the relationship between state-building and peace-building is not necessarily straightforward, as tensions may arise in several areas, including the gaps between the terms negotiated in the agreement and the actual state capacity and legitimacy to implement it in a sustainability manner; between short-term and long-term goals; between international and national interests; and between the motivations of the elites that negotiated the deal and the needs of the general population.

Thus, although the classic definitions of the state by Weber, which focused on the monopoly of force, legitimacy and centralised power and by Tilly, which focused on the centralised and autonomous control of the population, imply the creation of functional links with the people in a defined territory, the forms of doing so varies across time and societies (Di John, 2008; Fritz and Menocal, 2007). Furthermore,

[D]emocratisation and state-building often push in opposite directions […]. State-building calls for considerable concentration of power, authority, autonomy and competence in state political and bureaucratic institutions. Democratisation, on the other hand, has an inherent tendency to disperse power and slow down decision-making processes through the creation of multiple veto players and checks and balances.

(Fritz and Menocal, 2007)

More to the point, Mann (2004) has also recognised that the development of Latin-American states has followed a different historical path than the process of state formation in Europe or the United States, this due to a lesser pressure over power elites by external military threat, thus creating fewer incentives to develop strong armies and fiscal systems. In addition, Latin-American countries are characterised by the continuation of sharp ethnic differences instead of the homogenisation of the population that has underpinned the idea of “nation” in western countries and by integration into the international and globalised economy rather than the need for developing an internal one. All such elements have generated higher levels of inequality and lower accountability when compared to Europe and the US. Thus, he posits that the challenge for Latin-America – and Colombia in particular – is the strengthening of democracy by reducing class inequality and incorporating the very heterogenic population as citizens within the state.

In the same line, the Colombian researcher Fernán González (2016) has shown that, while the process of state formation in Europe was underpinned by the development of inter-state wars, in Latin America, the internal wars played a major role in the process of state formation, but that did not guarantee the strengthening of central powers or control nor democratisation. Specifically, in cases such as the Colombian, the continuous creation of illegal armed groups had played a main role in negotiation and articulation between the regions and the central state. Thus, the continuous violence must be understood as an open-ended negotiation of economic and political relationships in which the different regions and their populations articulate in a subordinated manner to the national economy. In other words, the cost of monopolisation in the use of force and in the administration of justice in the country is high; thus the central state delegates its functions to regional powers, which in turn results in a constant (and violent) negotiation with the regions and the development of mechanisms for indirect rule (González, 2016).

Fritz and Menocal (2007) have posited that “the political settlement sits at the heart of the state-building process”, as it creates links between the state and society and provides legitimacy to the rulers; yet these settlements are constantly renegotiated over time. This chapter then, makes a brief historical account of the process of mobilising and demobilising armies and groups in Colombia by analysing the peace settlements and the petitions made by the rebels for their demobilization and disarmament.

In the first section I describe the settlement products of two civil wars between the Liberal and Conservative Parties (the Thousand Days War and La Violencia); in the second, I study the petitions made by the liberal and communists guerrillas for their demobilisation in 1953 and 1957; and in the third I study the peace settlements between the government and the guerrillas in the 1990s (M-19, EPL, CRS, MAQL, PRT and the MIR-COAR). This analysis shows that most of these peace processes achieved the successful dismantling and disarmament of rebel groups, yet the unfulfillment of the petitions and agreements on judicial benefits, security, political participation, development, state reforms and considerations for the victims played a role in the continuation of violence (see Table 1.1). Furthermore, the petitions of the armed groups made evident the weaknesses – or unwillingness – of the state in providing security, democracy and development, urging the building of state institutions and the extension of citizenship to wider parts of the population. This, despite the systematic killing of rebel leaders who had given up their arms and of other civilian leaders not necessarily linked with the rebels but voicing similar grievances.

The civil wars between the Liberal and Conservative Parties

The modern Colombian state is the product of continuous cycles of mobilisation and demobilisation of armed groups. After its independency from Spanish rule in 1810, and throughout the nineteenth century, nine different civil wars took place in the country, apart from two wars against Ecuador and over 50 smaller conflicts between the regions or between them and the central government (Villamizar, 1998). These wars were to define the shape of the state on structural issues such as the model of governance (centralism or federalism), the relationship between the regions and the central state, the creation of two political parties (liberal and conservative) and the balance of power between them (González, 2016; Tirado, 1990). In consequence, Colombian history is also full of amnesties and pardons,¹ as a way of solving the dridlock produced when the government could not obtain a decisive victory over the rebels (González, 2016). Certainly, more than 63 pardons and 25 general amnesties benefited different rebel groups between 1820 and 2001 (Aguilera, 2001).

In 1885, the Conservative Party in power was successful in imposing the centralist model, eliminating the federal states and making them administrative units named departaments, over which the President would have direct control through the establishment of bureaucracy at all levels (Tirado, 1990). The Liberal Party reacted by declaring a new war against the government to defend the federalist model, but they were defeated a year later. Thus, in 1886, a new constitution was drafted by the conservatives, establishing an authoritarian and centralist government, and in 1887 the Catholic church restored its lost political and economic power (González, 2016). All this resulted in the violent repression of grievances flagged up by the Liberal Party, such as freedom of expression, a free press, and the suppression of both fiscal monopolies and the centralised management of public finances by the National Bank. Additionally, in 1892, the representation of the Liberal Party in the Congress was reduced to one person and was completely eliminated by 1896 (Medina and Sánchez, 2003; Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001).

Not surprisingly then, all these tensions ignited a new civil war between both parties that started in October 1899 and took the name of the Thousand Days War, and the country entered the twentieth century in the midst of one of the bloodiest conflicts in Colombian history, which extended throughout the entire territory. Despite the military superiority of the national army, the conservative government lost important battles.² The conservative president San Clemente was deposed and replaced by Manuel Marroquín, who declared total war on the liberal guerrillas, officially naming them mere criminals instead of politically motivated groups, which allowed the expropriation of their property.³

The liberal forces had resisted the offensive but were divided into three different factions (from the provinces of Cauca-Magdalena-Bolívar, Santander and Panamá) and after one big defeat at battle of Palonegro they fragmented even further into guerrilla-type groups spread all over the country (Bergquist, 2001; Sánchez and Aguilera, 2001). In March 1902, the commander of t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of acronyms and names
• Introduction
• 1 Continuous demobilisations: state-building without peace
• 2 DDR design: security or development
• 3 Social reintegration and DDR organisations: DDR programmes and ex-combatants’ NGOs
• 4 Economic reintegration
• 5 Political reintegration
• Conclusion
• Index