Part I
Conceptual and theoretical perspectives
Introduction
Backdrop and context
On 10 January 2019, the National Council of Provinces (NCOP) passed the Traditional Khoisan Leadership Bill, allowing for the traditional leadership of these indigenous peoples to be represented in the House of Traditional Leaders. Despite some sections of the Khoisan society rejecting the Bill and arguing that it did not recognise their first nation status or answer their question pertaining to land, and other associated issues, at least, this was a landmark decision because after 25 years of democratic rule, the leadership of the first nation peoples of the land known as South Africa was now formally recognised by the African National Congress (ANC)-led government. They could sit in formal structures with fellow traditional leaders of other ethnic groups and deliberate over national affairs. This was after more than 350 years of colonialism and apartheid which had effectively dismantled the leadership and indigenous political structures of the people who are now collectively referred to as Khoisan, but were known as the Khoikhoi and San, or derogatively classified as “Hottentots” and “bushmen” by the white settlers. The backdrop to this Bill is expressed in several years of petitions and representations by the Khoisan people, to the government of South Africa. The foregoing were efforts meant to make the government restore and recognise their indigenous governance systems. What is poignant about this development is that even in a democratic dispensation, it took close to a quarter century for the first nation peoples, to take their rightful place in the House of Traditional Leaders. This is just one case of so many historical injustices which have not been addressed in post-apartheid South Africa, but which continue to shape and define the lives of many citizens. Some of these historical continuities are embedded in among others: social and economic dynamics, race identities/relations, gender relations, social inequalities and a minimal sense or a porous national collective identity and/or responsibility. What is crucial in this summation is that these entrenched social and economic realities were evident during all the years of colonial and apartheid rule, and they were consciously and deliberately sculpted, shaped, defined and then entrenched by different settler governments and their organs of civil society.
This book’s points of departure are based on an understanding that these colonial-apartheid vestiges seem not be diminishing because they are products of a well-designed and ingeniously orchestrated process of social engineering which hinged on locating and then locking African people in, among others: inferior colonial-apartheid education and health-care systems, exploitative migratory labour relations and spatial injustice. For this book, the first phase of social re-engineering should start with the deconstruction of the former areas. Flowing from this understanding, the purpose of this chapter is to lay the foundation for the rest of the book’s arguments and then provide its rationale which calls for the social re-engineering of the South African society. Its main thrust is to provide both the historical context whence this present South African society emanates and then proffer a theoretical foundation where this chapter’s arguments and discussions rest. As noted in the Preface of this book, the government and organs of civil society have not been able to build a new society after apartheid similar to the Good Society. Arguably, their actions and efforts have fallen short of this ideal because they were not informed by the tenets of social re-engineering. In this book, for South Africa to effectively erase the residues of colonialism and apartheid, there must be concerted efforts from the state to chart a resolute agenda of social re-engineering, aimed at consciously redoing and deconstructing what colonialism and apartheid had effectively created: a distorted society and a highly unequal and fragmented country which seems to be intact after a quarter century of democratic rule.
Nevertheless, for the state not to fall into the pernicious and nefarious actions of the colonial and apartheid eras, social re-engineering should be predicated on the social policy approach as well as driven by a democratic developmental state. A qualification is made here because what is envisaged in this book is not a replication of the East Asian developmental states, but a state that is somewhat a hybrid that borrows some of the progressive features of the former, but one that is underwritten by a democratic tradition. Social policy in this developmental state would be the main vehicle that could be used by the aforementioned state form to effectively and efficiently socially re-engineer South Africa. However, it is important to note that there are several variants of social policy and all of them would not be ideal for a task of this nature. This observation is made while acknowledging the fact that the current social policy of the country has not been able to socially re-engineer South Africa but has merely managed to ameliorate the harsh socio-economic conditions in the country, that directly impact ordinary people, in the last 25 years of democratic rule. This issue is closely examined in Chapter 5. Thus, the social policy that is taken as best suited to socially re-engineer South Africa is what is referred to in this text as Transformative Social Policy, which could be a viable option for post-apartheid South Africa. This issue is discussed at length in both Chapters 1 and 5. In proceeding with the discussion, it is important to first illuminate the contemporary socio-economic and political conditions in South Africa. After 25 years of democratic rule and freedom, how does South Africa look like?
The features of a highly unequal and fragmented society
South Africa became a democratic country after the historic elections of 27 April 1994 (even though they were held between 24 and 29 April of the same year). Immediately after this, the first democratic government to be in charge of national affairs made strides to rectify the inherited imbalances and inequities inherited from the past colonial and apartheid systems. Turok (2008, p. 115) aptly observes that the
democratic government inherited one of the most distorted socio-economic structures in the world, polarised by apartheid into black and white; privileged and oppressed. That some people have escaped from each category does not diminish the structural character of the divide.
Following Terreblanche (2002, p. 6), it is acknowledged here that what the ANC government inherited were outcomes of a well-orchestrated process of social engineering where the colonial powers and white colonists firstly created political and economic power structures that put them in a privileged and entrenched position vis-à-vis the indigenous population groups; secondly, they deprived indigenous peoples of land, surface water and cattle; and thirdly, reduced slaves and indigenous people to different forms of unfree and exploitable labour. These three threads have run ominously through South Africa’s modern history, from the mid-17th until the 20th century. Thus, after 1994, a lot of effort went into the repealing and replacing of past racist and unjust policies and legislation to pave way for what the ANC referred to as a “caring society.”
In this regard, it can be noted that the first ten years of democracy were primarily geared towards policy reforms and the development of new polices, and laws, with many of them coming into effect alongside past bureaucratic practices. These were mainly expressed as White Papers governing various spheres of public policy, ranging from agriculture, education, health, mining, social welfare, tourism and transport, among others. In all these initiatives, it can be said that the major one here was the promulgation of the country’s Constitution in 1996, which followed the Interim Constitution of 1993. One of the pillars of this new Constitution was the Bill of Rights which entrenched socio-economic rights. Flowing from this, the country’s social service provision would be informed by the rights-based approach. These ideas are firmly embedded in the Constitution (Republic of South Africa, 1996), which guarantees to all citizens the right to dignity as one of its central values and connotes the inherent worth of the human being and his or her humanity (Patel, 2005). The goals of the rights-based approach include achieving social justice, a minimum standard of living, equitable access and equal opportunity to services and benefits, and a commitment to meeting the needs of all South Africans with a special emphasis on the needs of the most disadvantaged in the society (Patel, 2005). For instance, Sections 26 and 27 of the Constitution recognise the state as taking reasonable legislative and other measures within its means to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights, expressed as social services. In Section 26, the right to adequate housing is addressed and Section 27 enshrines the right to health-care, food, water and social security.
In addition, Section 28 focusses on the right of the child and Section 29 ensures that education must unconditionally be provided by the state. It is noteworthy that this had never happened before in South Africa as previous Constitutions had only entrenched the rights of the minority white group. And later in 1983, under the Constitution of the Tricameral Parliament, some rights of the Coloureds and Indians were recognised. Therefore, it can be seen that on the realignment of the state, a lot of work went into changing the nomenclature and structure of the inherited colonial and apartheid state forms to fit into the mould of a democratic one. It can be appreciated that the task that was before the new government in the new dispensation was not only arduous but at times seemed insurmountable. In the same breadth, such work could not be put on hold while the challenges or wrongs and distortions of colonialism and apartheid were being dealt with. The state had to move and act in the best interests of the previously disadvantaged majority population, the African people – taking us back to the analogy of “fixing the car while it is moving.” The Presidency (2003, p. 2) notes that the attainment of democracy in 1994 presented the government with twin challenges: significant institutional transformation and at the same time introducing new policies in line with the democratic Constitution. Secondly, the government had to deal with the legacy of apartheid within South Africa, while also facing new challenges of integrating the country in a rapidly changing global environment. This is because, among other issues, South Africa’s first democratic government inherited a fragmented, unaccountable and racially divided governance system consisting of Homeland administrations (sometimes also referred to as “Bantustans” or “self-governing territories”), national and provincial administrations, as well as separate administrations for certain racial groups. The Homeland administrations were poorly organised and resourced, largely without local government, and the services they provided were determined by the apartheid state (The Presidency, 2014, p. 20).
After ten years of democratic rule, it could be discerned that even though a lot of progress had been made, nevertheless, the country was still bogged down in economic and human development deficits of the past. In its Ten-Year Review, the government had noted in this way:
Given that Apartheid sought to systematically exclude the majority from political participation, and given that the Apartheid State had become increasingly isolated, authoritarian and corrupt, and given the high levels of political violence in the decade prior to the first democratic elections, there is no direct comparison between this era and the advent of democracy. There can therefore be no direct comparison to pre-1994 indicators, given the quantum nature of the change in governance.
(The Presidency, 2003, p. 10)
Accordingly, the government pointed out that progress had been registered in the following areas, with regard to the South African polity:
•voice and accountability
•political stability
•government effectiveness
•regulatory quality
•integrity and legitimacy of the state and the rule of law
•efforts to expose and deal with corruption.
(The Presidency, 2003, p. 10)
The Presidency (2003, p. 102) sums up the developments in the first decade of democracy in this way:
The advances made in the First Decade by far supersede the weaknesses. Yet, if all indicators were to continue along the same trajectory, especially in respect of the dynamic of economic inclusion and exclusion, we could soon reach a point where the negatives start to overwhelm the positives. This could precipitate a vicious cycle of decline in all spheres. Required are both focus and decisiveness on the part of government, the will to weigh trade-offs and make choices, as well as strategies to inspire all of society to proceed along a new trail. If decisive action is taken on a number of focused areas, the confluence of possibilities is such that the country would enter a road of faster economic growth and job creation, faster and more efficient provision of quality services, increased social cohesion and reduction of the paradigm of exclusion prevalent among sections of society.
After the first decade of democracy, it was discernible that there was some progress that was attained, but the challenges of poverty, inequality and unemployment continued to encumber the government’s efforts of transforming South Africa. What was also clear is that the new socio-political and economic dispensation brought forth new demands, challenges and needs. Some of the former emanated from the non-responsive and uncaring nature of the apartheid state as well as arose out of the democratic space that was created after the fall of apartheid. The reason for this was that during apartheid, the government of the day did not have to meet the needs of all South Africans, or even justify why it was not doing so. But the new democratic government had to meet the needs of all South Africans and therefore the task was much onerous than that of the apartheid regime. Also, the inherited social ills continued to stifle the country’s development prospects. With the Fifteen-Year Review, it was becoming abundantly clear that the legacy of colonialism and apartheid had not been erased and was still shaping contemporary living conditions of the vast majority of South Africans. After 15 years of democratic rule, the government seemed more reflective in its reporting of the progress that had been made since the attainment of democracy:
The review indicates that government has been making progress towards meeting its objectives. This applies to both the overarching long-term RDP goals and the more specific objectives for the Second Decade of Freedom. At the same time, those objectives have not yet been achieved in full and new challenges have arisen. What broad strategic framework would enable government to overcome persistent or new challenges and move to, and sustain, a higher trajectory of growth and development that reduces poverty and unemployment? Midway through the Second Decade of Freedom, the foundation of the first decade and new initiatives since 2004 have enabled South Africa to notch up to a faster trajectory of growth and development. But it is not yet enough. The challenges proved more deep-seated than recognised, and success brought new challenges. The state had to learn new ways of doing things as it implemented, but was it decisive and flexible enough? In the midst of this, the global environment has become less predictable and less favourable than expected.
(The Presidency, 2009, p. 115)
By the Twenty-Year Review, it was apparent that the vestiges of colonialism and apartheid were intact in some respects, despite a lot of progress being made in raising the human development profile of the country:
From an economy in crisis, the democratic government has made enormous strides in addressing the legacies of apartheid. In the past 20 years, growth and employment have improved markedly, despite the global setback of the 2008 recession, while investment has improved. The state has taken bold steps to diversify the economy and build our industrial base with a greater emphasis on labour absorbing employment. In addition, positions of power in the economy have become more representative. More work is required to increase equity in ownership, work organisation and pay, to reduce unemployment, especially in the former so-called ‘Homelands’, and to increase the number of small and medium enterprises.
(The Presidency, 2014, p. 101)
The Presidency (2014, p. 101) further observes that from the late 2000s, three major new challenges emerged. First, workplace conflict began to threaten production and investment. Second, the rising price of electricity and the need to address climate change posed far-reaching questions about South Africa’s traditional heavy dependence on coal-based energy. Finally, the dependence on short-term portfolio capital flows to finance investment, with the associated high deficit on the current account, led to increasing instability after 2008 – reflected in the highly volatile exchange rate. Hence, the key challenge was to ensure that the country accelerated its drive towards higher levels of economic growth and employment absorption, and towards a more inclusive economy (The Presidency, 2014). Clearly, the new government had set itself targets to transform South Africa and was able to evaluate the progress that was attained or could not be achieved in its various policy documents, especially the White Papers, legislative reforms and the review documents just referred to. However, it is important to ascertain the obtaining status quo in terms of the living standards of the South African citizenry. Indeed, the facts about South Africa’s standing globally and continentally are still somewhat a paradox. South Africa is the 35th largest economy in the world (measured by current Growth...