Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics

South Africa and the 'Congo Crisis', 1960-1965

Lazlo Passemiers

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367660581
• eBook ISBN: 9781351138147
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: History

Decolonisation and Regional Geopolitics argues that as much as the 'Congo crisis' (1960-1965) was a Cold War battleground, so too was it a battleground for Southern Africa's decolonisation. This book provides a transnational history of African decolonisation, apartheid diplomacy, and Southern African nationalist movements. It answers three central questions. First, what was the nature of South African involvement in the Congo crisis? Second, what was the rationale for this involvement? Third, how did South Africans perceive the crisis?

Innovatively, the book shifts the focus on the Congo crisis away from Cold War intervention and centres it around African decolonisation and regional geopolitics.

Part I

Setting the scene

1 Centring Africa

In a few days we shall come to the end of the Sixties. In some parts of the world it will be, indeed has already been described alliteratively as the ‘Swingin’ [sic] Sixties’, or the ‘Sexy Sixties’. But the ten years from January 1, 1960 to December 31, 1969, as far as Africa is concerned, has been a decade of decision and definition, in the sense that many colonial countries regained their rightful place in the family of nations.

Kenneth Kaunda¹

1960 was ‘The Year of Africa’. No fewer than 17 African countries, including the Democratic Republic of the Congo, celebrated their independence in that year alone.² This new dawn for Africa coincided with the start of the ‘Global 1960s’, a term used to describe the decade’s revolutionary changes that shaped much of the modern world.³ The African continent underwent a period of rapid decolonisation that began to introduce an era of post-independence politics. After being oppressed by colonial rule, many Africans obtained the freedom to devise and implement their own social, political, and economic models to move the continent forward. However, Congo’s turbulent First Republic (1960–1965) – a period colloquially known as ‘La Pagaille’ (a disorderly shambles) by the Congolese and ‘the Congo Crisis’ in the Anglophone world – quickly tainted this moment of hope.⁴ The Congo Crisis was characterised by secessions, rebellions, general political and economic instability, and significant foreign interference. The growing pains of independent Congo exposed the difficulties of building a nation-state and the hazards of neo-colonialism. Consequently, the Congo Crisis became a symbolic event for 1960s Africa upon which the hopes and fears of an entire continent were inscribed.

For better or worse, most of Africa followed suit throughout the decade and decolonised – except for the Southern African region.⁵ The Portuguese colonial regime in Angola and Mozambique, together with the white minority governments of Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe) and South Africa stubbornly held on to power, despite growing protest and resistance from their black population. In the case of South Africa, the ruling National Party (NP) intensified its notorious apartheid policy and increased its brutal suppression of political protest. As a result, the decolonisation and overthrow of colonial and white minority rule in Southern Africa, particularly apartheid South Africa, became a cause célèbre for the progressive world.

The social and political turns of the Global 1960s also coincided with increased tension among the Cold War powers that continued to spill over into different theatres across the world. American involvement in the Cuban Bay of Pigs fiasco, the island’s subsequent missile Crisis, or the escalation of the Vietnam War, popularly exemplify the internationalisation of the Cold War in the regions contemporaneously referred to as the ‘Third World’.⁶ The decade’s most well-known Cold War intervention in Africa happened during the disorderly shambles that was Congo’s First Republic. The interference by superpowers like the United States of America (US) and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), or actors like the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and Cuba significantly shaped the evolution and outcome of these conflicts. Cold War powers were eager to control the decolonisation process of the Third World.⁷ In so doing, both East and West hoped to forge strong ties with the Third World’s emerging non-aligned nations.⁸

Studies that use the Cold War as an analytical framework dominate the historiography of foreign intervention in Congo’s domestic conflict. This trend is particularly true for the involvement of the US. Countless publications discuss how Washington reacted to and manipulated the Congo Crisis as part of its Africa policy.⁹ John Kent and Lise Namikas have illustrated that while the intensity of involvement varied from administration to administration, the US continuously meddled in the affairs of independent Congo.¹⁰ Washington feared that a communist-aligned Congo would pose a significant threat to the stability of neighbouring regions and considered a western-orientated Congo vital to the US’ Cold War strategy in Africa.¹¹ As a result, Washington supported those Congolese politicians it regarded as moderate or anti-communist, providing their governments with substantial military and financial aid.

Less has been written about the involvement of the other Cold War superpower: the USSR. Moscow’s meddling during the Congo Crisis was mainly a response to the interference of the US. The USSR sided with those Congolese actors who seemed to favour ‘scientific Socialism and a Soviet-style model’ or simply ‘represented anti-American radical nationalism’.¹² Unlike the US, most of Moscow’s assistance in Congo was political, and only a few examples of actual military aid exist. Sergey Mazov and Alessandro Iandolo have revealed that while the USSR was extremely vocal about ‘imperialist’ meddling in Congo, it was opposed to starting a hot war in Africa.¹³

There has also been an increased interest in the interference of smaller Cold War powers. In the case of Cuba, Piero Gleijeses or Frank Villafaņa’s studies detail Ernesto ‘Che’ Guevara’s assistance to the Congolese rebels and the role of anti-Castro Cuban pilots flying for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on behalf of the central Congolese government.¹⁴ Though Cuba was aligned to the USSR, Havana chose its own path in intervening in the Congo Crisis. Cuba was the only communist power that sent troops to Congo to fight.¹⁵ Less is known about the role of the PRC. Yet it is clear that between 1963 and 1965, Peking provided Congolese rebel factions with political propaganda, financial assistance, and some military instruction and arms.¹⁶ Due to the widening Sino–Soviet split, the PRC’s intervention was partly an attempt to counter the growing influence of the US and USSR in Africa.¹⁷ However, further research needs to be conducted to better understand the extent and nature of this Chinese interference. A body of work that investigates the involvement of smaller western powers has also appeared. This list includes publications on Belgium, Britain, Canada, Israel, and Ireland.¹⁸ In the case of Belgium and Britain, the protection of economic interests was the main driving force behind their meddling. While each had their reasons for intervening and held specific ideas about the Crisis, the position of these smaller western actors tended to align with that of the US.¹⁹

Alanna O’Malley has skilfully illustrated that much of this Cold War struggle for Congo’s political future was fought through the United Nations (UN).²⁰ The international organisation played a crucial role in determining the trajectory of the first three years of Congolese independence. The Congo debacle was also used by the UN to ‘determine the course and the pace of decolonisation’ elsewhere.²¹ Despite the growing power of the Afro-Asian bloc in the UN, the western states – particularly the US – fairly successfully used the international organisation to push forward their policy in Africa and subdue the influence of the USSR.²² Part of the literature on the UN intervention in Congo includes the role and suspicious death of UN secretary-general, Dag Hammarskjöld.²³ Despite several investigations, the mystery of what caused Hammarskjöld’s aeroplane to crash near Ndola on 18 September 1961 remains unsolved.

While these studies provide invaluable insight into the internationalisation of the conflict in the context of the Cold War, a glaring gap in the historiography remains. Namely that of Africa’s involvement. The role of African actors in the continent’s Cold War battlegrounds has been neglected in the historiography, even if – as Elizabeth Schmidt noted – ‘the most consequential external intervention was intracontinental’.²⁴ This fact is certainly true for Congo’s pagaille. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of abbrevations
• Acknowledgments
• 1960 map of Southern Africa
• 1960 map of Congo
• PART I: Setting the scene
• PART II: South African involvement
• PART III: South African motives and perceptions
• PART IV: Conclusions
• Index