International Mediation in the South African Transition

Brokering Power in Intractable Conflicts

Zwelethu Jolobe

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781351020565
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book challenges the conventional understanding of South Africa's transition to democracy as a home-grown process through a comparative analysis of Commonwealth and United Nations mediation attempts.

Approaching power transition through the lens of South Africa, Zwelethu Jolobe raises questions about how methods and types of mediation are understood, and their appropriateness for certain stages of negotiation processes. International Mediation in the South African Transition calls into question the generalisations about the determinants of success by international third parties in resolving internal conflicts. It moves from the position that the success of a mediation effort depends on the examination of the time horizon of a conflict and on the contribution the mediation effort plays in improving the relationship between the belligerents. The book argues that the international community, particularly the Commonwealth and the United Nations, played a profound and beneficial role in the political transition to end apartheid.

International Mediation in the South African Transition will be of interest to students and scholars of African politics, conflict resolution, international relations and global governance.

1
Introduction

Conventional wisdom has it that South Africa’s negotiated transition to democracy was a home-grown process with no significant international mediation. The general argument is that the two main protagonists, the South African government and the African National Congress (ANC) simply rejected any form of mediation, as a significant and sufficient amount of trust had developed between them, mainly through various confidence-building measures in the 1980s. Authors such as inter alia Sparks (1994), Waldmeir (1997), Harvey (2001) and Esterhuyse (2012) detail such encounters in depth. International participation in the transition in the form of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group in 1986, and the United Nations Observer Mission, that intervened after negotiations broke down in 1992, are either viewed as failed attempts, or do not conform to mediation (Saunders, 2014: 4). The conclusion reached is that sufficient trust existed between the parties because of the confidence-building measures among the adversaries before the formal negotiations, and this was enough to make international mediation unnecessary. Further, both parties thought that the likely outcome would be better for them without such mediation (Saunders, 2014: 1).

This book problematises these conceptions about the negotiation process in South Africa on two counts. First, no such trust existed between the government and the ANC throughout the entire negotiation process. While these 1980s encounters did improve understanding between the intermediaries representing government officials, and certain representatives of the ANC, this cannot be equated to trust between the government and the ANC. Building trust was not their function. Their importance was that they were a forum that facilitated the exchange of communication between the government and the ANC in their search for negotiated solutions. These secret forums, the book will argue, are a type or method of mediation. Further, the basic points of discussion in these forums, i.e. linking the release of political prisoners and unbanning of prohibited political parties with the initiation of a political process, emerged within the context of the Commonwealth mission. The Commonwealth’s Eminent Persons Group resolving formula, the “Negotiating Concept,” was prophetic; it embodied the basic ingredients that formed the basis of negotiations between the ANC and the government, leading to the Groote Schuur Minute on 2 May 1990, and Pretoria Minute on 6 August 1990. In this unfolding political process there was no love lost between the government and the ANC. The book will closely examine this contribution by the Commonwealth and locate the analysis within the negotiation process. The reasons why historians of the South African transition have not examined the significance of the Commonwealth mission, and the way it synchronised crucial preconditions, has to do with the way in which international mediation is understood, the second item of contention.

Second, the South African literature misconceives the complexity of international mediation and fails to problematise it. Thus, when questioning the role of international mediation in the transition, the examination is not done within the context or in relation to the scholarly literature on mediation. Mediation is either defined by a method or individual e.g. a Richard Holbrooke, George Mitchell, Kofi Annan, Thabo Mbeki or a Western Contact Group as in the case of Namibia, where disputants are directly mediated, and its success is equally misconstrued, i.e. it produced an agreement, the parties rejected it, people stopped fighting, etc. Thus, the Commonwealth mission is dismissed because the South African Defence Force sent them packing via air strikes in neighbouring countries, and the United Nations Observer Mission did not directly mediate the Multi-Party Negotiation Process. No attempt is made to evaluate success or failure within the context of scholarly debates on mediation outcomes. Through an examination of these scholarly debates on international mediation, the book will show that international mediation can cover a wide range of third-party activities: from simply providing good offices for the parties to negotiate, to assisting them in creating a resolving formula to their conflict, in which the mediator uses resources to leverage an agreement. Mediation is a political process and the mediator can assume different roles in that process, and there is no obligation on the part of the conflicting parties to accept the mediation ideas or proposals. Therefore, the task is to understand what type or method the Commonwealth’s mediation was, and how it performed in that phase of the conflict. Similarly, the United Nations Observer Mission was created by a Security Council Resolution. There was a political process that occurred before that involving discussions between the international community, the conflicting parties and the deployment of a Special Representative. This was equally a distinct type or method of mediation.

Further, there is no consensus in the literature on the criteria for success. Some scholars explain success as a situation in which both parties to the conflict formally or informally accept a mediator. Others measure successful mediation as producing an agreement. Others point out that mediation is successful when it leads to the termination of hostilities and the advent of democratic governance. Distinguishing success from failure is further complicated when a mediation effort produces a ceasefire without achieving a lasting resolution for the conflict, i.e. the issues remain, and the violence flares up. Others point to a more long-term perspective on mediation success that goes beyond the ending of violence and examine the contribution of international mediation to the conflict-resolution process. The point is that if the two significant international interventions in the South African transition (the Commonwealth and United Nations missions) are examined within a scholarly canvas, i.e. within the context of scholarly debates, concepts and analytical properties of mediation, very different conclusions about their significance will be reached.

Aims of the book

The aim of the book is to do just that and to make two contributions: (1) to the rich scholarship on the South African political negotiations; and (2) to the rich scholarship on international mediation. The book will examine the two international attempts at mediation in the South African transition. At a first glance, one might expect glaring differences between the approaches of the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group (EPG) and the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa (UNOMSA) in assisting the South African negotiated transition. Both occur in different phases of the negotiation process, and the EPG is regarded as a failure and UNOMSA a success. Yet a closer comparison of their approaches along several dimensions illustrates important similarities in the ways and means of third-party actions. While the generally accepted verdict on each differs, the book will argue that the international community, particularly the Commonwealth and the United Nations, played a profound and beneficial role in the political transition to end apartheid.

This book compares these distinct roles and approaches in mediation by the Commonwealth and United Nations. The main question the book addresses is under what conditions international mediation brings about peaceful change. Following William Zartman’s approach, international mediation in the South African transition is examined as an exercise in which international organisations had interests and operated in a context of power and cost-benefit calculation. The book argues that the Commonwealth and United Nations had an interest in the conflict and in obtaining an outcome and played distinct roles. The comparative analysis not only contributes to the existing literature on international mediation but also calls into question the generalisations about the determinants of success by international third parties in South Africa’s negotiated transition.

Through the comparative analysis, the book will raise general questions about the methods or types of mediation and their appropriateness for certain phases of a conflict-resolution phase and call into question the generalisations about the determinants of success by international third parties in South Africa’s negotiated transition. It moves from the position that the success of a mediation effort depends on the examination of the time horizon of a conflict and on the contribution the mediation effort plays in improving the relationship between the belligerents. Through the comparative analysis, the book focuses on success measured in two ways and corresponding to the different stages of the conflict-resolution process. The first success is getting disputing parties to the table. In this stage, the goal of mediation is to get each party to agree that they have a shared understanding of the conflict or problem, a shared understanding that a negotiated solution is possible, to produce a commitment towards a negotiated solution, and to overcome preconditions as a barrier towards the opening of settlement negotiations. The second is success in having the parties reach an agreement because of mediation. Once parties agree that a mutually acceptable resolution to their conflict is possible, the next goal of mediation is to find ways of arriving at an agreement.

Mediators are therefore called upon to do different things for the conflicting parties depending on the history and dynamics of the conflict. For example, if a negotiation process is underway and then subsequently experiences crisis and breakdown, the task of the mediator is to restore communications between the adversaries and explore conditions each was imposing on the resumption of talks (Mitchell, 2003: 80). Under these circumstances, mediation is assessed on its ability to break the deadlock and resume talks, not on its ability to get the parties to reach agreement. By contrast, if belligerents are yet to even explore the possibility of talking, then the task of the mediator is to “sound out both sides to see if there might be any readiness to engage in talks i.e. if the elusive will exists on both sides, and if it did what conditions for meeting might be imposed” (Mitchell, 2003: 83). A third scenario is the task of the mediator once representatives of the parties in conflict are already at the table. Here the methods and skills required would be those akin to a chairperson of the actual face-to-face talks, using power, leverage and the like.

Chapter outline

The book is divided into five chapters. Chapter 2 examines the main research debates regarding international mediation strategies, their efficacy and their consequences for the peace-making process. The chapter will show that while the literature on international mediation has made progress towards understanding the conditions under which mediation processes help resolve conflict, there is a lack of consensus regarding the question of strategy in international mediation, and how to conceptualise success. The challenge is to develop a better understanding of the conditions under which different mediation strategies are more effective, and how they shape the outcome of a conflict management process (Wallensteen and Svensson, 2014). More importantly, it is to also think differently about success, i.e. success should be measured by what contribution the mediation makes to transforming the relationship between the belligerents, and how it does this. This chapter will also explain the research design of the book.

Chapter 3 provides analysis of the South African conflict. This is important; any attempt to understand the negotiation process, and any resolving formula put forward by mediators, must understand what is being negotiated, what are the fundamental issues, and how the resolving formula talks to the issues. It also reveals the complexity of mediation. The chapter will show that the root of the South African conflict was white minority rule. The basic demand of the African National Congress and its allied organisations that resisted racial domination during this period was for the universal franchise and the right to be included as equals in all aspects of society. At the centre of this conflict was the system of apartheid. Successive National Party governments devised various methods to co-opt Africans on unequal terms to maintain white minority rule. These methods were repeatedly rejected and rendered unworkable. The Commonwealth mediation occurs at the point where parties were beginning to explore negotiation possibilities. Its contribution therefore is not only with regards to whether they were able to get parties talking, but what the consequences of its resolving formula were.

Chapters 4 and 5 analyse the case studies. Both chapters will trace and provide a detailed analysis of the stage of the negotiation process in which the mediation occurs. It is important to critically examine the time horizon of the conflict and negotiation process to truly appreciate the contribution the mediation effort plays in altering the relationship between the belligerents. For example, while the EPG may be considered a failure from one respect, if we locate its contribution in terms of the time horizon of the conflict, its resolving formula was prophetic; the resultant secret facilitative mediation by Michael Young had all its elements as the basic points of discussion between government intermediaries and ANC envoys. However, if we merely confine our discussion up to the point where the EPG abort its mission, then it is clearly a failure. In Chapter 4, the discussion will also include the evolution of the South African question in the Commonwealth. The government’s response to the EPG was shaped by these politics. Similarly, to understand the success of the United Nations mission in Chapter 5, and its contribution in getting parties to back to the table and then agreement, it is important to trace the negotiation process in South Africa after Mandela was released, and how parties committed to negotiations, and discuss the fundamental issues of contention. The United Nation mediation and formula comes at a specific point in this process. At the heart of the matter was the issue of political violence and its relationship to the negotiation process.

Chapter 6 will contrast these approaches across several dimensions to develop a better understanding of the range of third-party actions that may be appropriate and effective in the different stages of the negotiation process. Moving from Curran et al.’s (2004) comparison of George Mitchell and Richard Holbrooke’s mediation in Northern Ireland and Bosnia-Herzegovina respectively, the chapter will offer a set of categories into which the actions of the EPG and the United Nations can be characterised (Curran et al., 2004: 516). These categories are embedded in framework that analyses the basic choices for those involved in third-party roles. Third parties face three decisions (Curran et al., 2004: 516). First, they must “determine their basic objectives,” e.g. to get parties to the table, to restore communication between parties once talks have broken, to foster an agreement, to delay the conflict, to model a more constructive process or to break a deadlock. A mediator’s objective will be determined by the stage of the conflict-resolution process. Second, mediators must “choose their fundamental role,” e.g. neutrality or bias. Mediators must decide how they want to alter the perception and behaviour of the belligerents. Some mediators don’t simply listen and suggest; they steer the belligerents towards an agreement and some form of muscle might be necessary (but not always) in the context of an impasse. Third they must consider their “best means of influence on the situation,” e.g. forceful, persuasive, facilitative, etc. With these choices, mediators must form a “winning coalition” (i.e. coalition strategy) which contains three overlapping strands: “an issues strategy, with respect to the substantive aspects of the agreements sought, a process strategy with respect to the choices of process for the mediation, and a timing strategy with respect to the timing of their efforts” (Curran et al., 2004: 516).

Bibliography

Curran, D., J. Sebenius and M. Watkins. 2004. “Two Paths to Peace: Contrasting George Mitchell in Northern Ireland With Richard Holbrooke in Bosnia – Herzegovina,” Negotiation Journal 20(4): 513–537.

Esterhuyse, W. 2012. Endgame: Secret Talks and the End of Apartheid. Cape Town: Tafelberg.

Harvey, R. 2001. The Fall of Apartheid: The Inside Story From Smuts to Mbeki. Hampshire: Palgrave.

Mitchell, C. 2003. “Mediation and the Ending of Conflicts,” in J. Darby and R. MacGinty, eds. Contemporary Peacemaking: Conflict, Violence and Peace Processes. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Saunders, C. 2014. “The Dog that didn’t Bark: The Absence of Significant International Mediation in the South African Transition to Democracy,” Mediation Arguments, No. 5. Pretoria: Centre for Mediation in Africa.

Sparks, A. 1994. Tomorrow Is Another Country: The Inside Story of South Africa’s Negotiated Revolution. Sandton: Struik Book Distributors.

Waldmeir, P. 1997. Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid. New York: Norton.

Wallensteen, P. and I. Svensson. 2014. “Talking Peace: International Mediation in Armed Conflicts,” Journal of Peace Research 51(2): 315–327.

2
International mediation

Mediation is one of the most common methods of dealing with and resolving social and political conflicts. Irrespective of the society, conflict, or type of organ-isation, and their location in time, and irrespective of the development of the society, mediation has always been a method of managing conflict and practice of settling disputes through third parties. Mediation is therefore as common as conflict and is more likely to occur in an environment where disputes are long-drawn-out and complex, where the disputants’ own conflict management efforts have reached a deadlock, where neither side is prepared to bear further costs or escalation of the dispute, and when disputants are prepared to break their deadlock or stalemate by cooperating ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• 1 Introduction
• 2 International mediation
• 3 Historical background: the structure of the South African conflict
• 4 Getting to the table: the mission of the eminent persons group
• 5 Getting to agreement: the United Nations Observer Mission to South Africa
• 6 Contrasting roles in international mediation: lessons from South Africa
• Index