1 Introduction
Mats Bergman, Kęstas Kirtiklis, and Johan Siebers
For most people, talk about “scientific models” probably calls to mind things such as the double helix model of DNA or the Bohr atomic model. Some may also think of economic or sociological models, or perhaps of novel computer simulations or data modelling in contemporary “big data” contexts. But for those of us trained in the communication disciplines, the term “model” will likely at first evoke an image of boxes connected to each other with arrows and the like, purporting to portray the process of communication in some fashion. Such models of communication are staples of many textbooks and introductory courses; but they have also played a notable role in shaping media and communication studies as we know it.
The history of models of communication reflects the evolution of scholarly attempts to grasp the essence of communication and give it clear graphic or verbal form, but it is also an upshot of institutional and scientific ambitions. Early efforts to craft a proper discipline out of the sprawling mass of communication inquiries largely coincided with the formulation of the so-called transmission model of the communication process in the post-WWII period (cf. Pietilä, 2005, pp. 106–109). As communication theory advanced from linear schemas toward more sophisticated interactional and transactional representations, a distinctive tradition of modelling was formed (cf. Nicotera, 2009). Of course, the proverbial transmission model, with its characteristic focus on the transfer or circulation of messages, soon became a favourite target of critics—often reduced to a convenient proxy for a multitude of “positivistic” and “scientistic” sins. But it also stimulated the articulation of alternatives, such as ritual or constitutive models. This schism between basic model conceptions remains one of the most pervasive conceptual divisions in communication theory.
Yet, the principal models of communication on the market are predominantly products of the era of broadcasting and mass communications. This can cast doubt on their validity and expediency in an age distinguished by digital media and online sociality; but the momentous transformations of our communicational environments may also necessitate a reconsideration of communication modelling on a more elementary level. Arguably, there are indications that such a reassessment is underway, reviving longstanding issues and raising novel questions concerning the nature, functions, and prospects of modelling in communication inquiry. Does our transformed communicative milieu, in which Watzlawick’s well-known axiom one cannot not communicate (Watzlawick, Beavin and Jackson, 1967, p. 51) seems to acquire a yet broader meaning, demand wholly new conceptions or rather a fresh look at models previously dismissed? Even the perennial battle between the transmission model and the constitutive model—still the predominant “models of models” in the field—appears to be taking on a new relevance in the contemporary scene. Has the transmission model been unfairly dismissed? Was James Carey right when he claimed that models of communication have a “dual aspect”: an “of” mode that tells us what the process of communication is and a “for” mode that produces the very behaviour described (Carey, 2009, p. 24)? If so, how should we assess the cognitive and practical impact of the different models crafted by scholars? Is it possible to reconcile the descriptive and prescriptive aspects of communication models in some kind of unified framework, or should we simply pick our sides? How can we build a representative and useful model of a constitutive conception of communication as meaning-making? Is such a thing feasible at all? Does digitalisation and datafication, on the one hand, and the alleged crisis of representation, on the other, call for a more radical overhaul of our traditional conception of communication modelling than hitherto imagined (cf. Genosko, 2012)? Is communication something that can ever be satisfactorily captured in models? Is the project of communication modelling in fact something of a chimera—or is it rather the case that “one cannot not model” when engaging in discourse about communication?
This volume tackles such basic issues concerning communication modelling—and many others besides. The essays collected here represent a variety of viewpoints and theoretical commitments. Still, in their different ways, all of the authors delineate fresh perspectives on the nature and function of communication models, whether diagrammatic or verbal, in media and communication studies. Although several of the essays describe and explicate models that may be of practical use in more empirical domains of media and communication studies (such as journalism studies and film studies), this collection belongs primarily to the domain of communication theory, with an emphasis on the philosophy of communication. At the same time, it addresses a number of epistemic and methodological problems that may at some point face all communication scholars in their labours.
As the book reassesses old models and delineates new theoretical options, it is at the same time deeply cognisant of the achievements of the tradition of communication modelling and acutely aware of its shortcomings. Beyond the calls for fresh models brought on by changes in technological and social modes of communication, many of the essays suggest more deep-seated reasons for expanding communication modelling beyond its established parameters. Again, this is manifested in diverse ways, ranging from proposals for metatheoretical frameworks of modelling to philosophical probes into the ontological and epistemological dimensions of the model of communication. Thus, this volume not only supplements earlier efforts to scrutinise the use of conceptual models in the field (e.g. McQuail and Windahl, 1993; Genosko, 2012; Cobley and Schulz, 2013), but also pushes the discussion toward unexpected directions—hopefully opening up productive paths for future communication inquiries.
The book has been organised into three broad thematic parts. In many instances, the individual chapters can be read as entering into implicit critical interchanges with each other regarding the best way to approach communication modelling; but all of the chapters stand on their own feet. The contents are introduced in the next section of this chapter, but these brief descriptions cannot do justice to the rich and inspiring ideas contained in these pages. We hope the reader will find the contributions as enjoyable and thought-provoking as we have.
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The chapters of the first part of this book tackle fundamental issues concerning the nature and prospects of communication models. Complementing and challenging each other, the contributions explore the ontology and epistemology of communication models as well as the relationship between theorising and model-building in communication inquiry. The chapters exhibit a broad array of theoretical perspectives and constellations, from empiricism and realism to pragmatism and constructionism. In one form or another, all of the authors address the perennial tension between transmissive and constitutive models in communication theory, but always with novel twists thrown into the mix. In these discussions, Robert T. Craig’s (1999) influential proposal for a “constitutive metamodel” emerges as one focal point. Therefore, it is fitting that the first substantial article of this volume is Craig’s “Models of Communication in and as Metadiscourse”, a fresh look at some pivotal questions associated with the metamodel.
Craig’s chapter zooms in on the relationship of models constructed by communication theorists and models formed in ordinary metadiscourse. With ample empirical support from discourse-analytical studies, he argues that the conceptual modelling of communication in everyday discourse is much more varied and interesting than scholars normally assume. This, Craig suggests, supports his thesis that all models of communication imply practical orientations toward communicative activity and can therefore be assessed in terms of their pragmatic implications. The chapter illustrates the potential fruitfulness of translating between the explicit models of communication theory and the largely implicit models of ordinary metadiscourse; and it concludes with a timely call for more systematic studies of the methodologies of such translations.
In the following chapter, Lydia Sánchez and Manuel Campos situate the issue of modelling within a broader debate concerning empirical/descriptive versus constitutive/prescriptive approaches in communication research. The article advocates “conjectural realism”, according to which nature has endowed us with the capacity to represent its underlying causal structures in conjectural theories and models. The authors critically assess idealist and relativist tendencies in the communication disciplines, and they reject the social-constructionist view that there are aspects of human communication that are not susceptible to empirical study. The upshot of Sánchez and Campos’s analysis is a division of labour, where the description and modelling of objective causal realities of communicative phenomena is a job for basic research, the use of such findings for the improvement of social institutions and practices is regarded as applied science, and the determination of broader aims and finalities is deemed to be a task for political philosophy.
Mats Bergman’s contribution probes the representational character of communication models, focusing on the comprehensive model of communication as a type. After a critical review of certain structuralist tendencies in communication modelling, the article moves on to consider the turn toward pragmatic and pluralistic alternatives that emphasise the “for” dimension of models. Bergman then argues that a pragmatist conception of sign, rooted in the philosophy of C. S. Peirce, can provide a fruitful framework for discussing model-relations. The essay concludes with some reflections on the prospects of the general model of communication.
In “Turing Machines and Communication: Two Modelling Relations”, Eli Dresner delineates how Turing machines may be applicable to the modelling of communication processes. According to this novel interpretation, the same formal construction can be used to model two different perspectives on the relation between cognition and symbolic manipulation, from which two ways of modelling communication may then be extrapolated. In the first, communication is conceptualised as the transfer of coded outcomes of internal symbolic processes. It can therefore be construed as a version of the transmission view of communication. The second proposed extrapolation models communication as a process in which symbolic representations are created and accumulated through a joint social process. Thus, Dresner concludes that this application of Turing machines provides an apt formal tool for the explication and development of constructivist conceptions of communication.
In the final chapter of Part 1, Kęstas Kirtiklis argues it is actually a transmission model—rather than a constitutive view, as in Craig’s original proposal—that can provide the best metamodel for the field of communication studies. According to Kirtiklis, transmission is better expressed in Laswell’s “formula” (“Who/Says What/In Which Channel/To Whom/With What Effect?”) than in the well-known Shannon-Weaver scheme. Kirtiklis maintains that this transmission perspective holds the following advantages over the constitutive metamodel:
- The transmission model is more explicit, better defined, clearer, and more suitable for theoretical analysis and heuristics than the rather tacit constitutive model.
- The components of communication listed in the transmission model—the participants in communication, the channel, the message—can be regarded as formal and therefore compatible with many different theoretical standpoints.
- Transmission thinking is reflective: the analysis of the components involves constant reflection whether there are any missing elements. The transmission model is explicitly open to critique and improvements.
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The theme uniting the chapters collected in the second part, “Modelling the Histories and Institutions of Communication”, is the relationship between communication models and conceptions of the practice of communication inquiry. The chapters offer reassessments of largely neglected viewpoints and novel proposals for the writing of communication history, and also some new approaches to modelling the broader social and institutional aspects of communication.
Discussing modes of historical narrative in writing the history of communication, Emanuel Kulczycki suggests that writing history always implies at least some form of presentism (i.e. projection of contemporary conceptions and models on past theorising). He distinguishes between “strong presentism”, which entails that communication historians believe that they are describing and investigating the same communicative reality, communication practices, and concept of communication as various past thinkers; and “weak presentism”, which assumes that the past can be described and assessed in terms of present concepts and ideas only when we simultaneously re-actualise and re-contextualise past ideas. Kulczycki argues that the main difference between the two is grounded in differences between ontological and epistemological levels—philosophical realism and constructivism respectively—and calls for a balance between the two approaches.
In “The ‘Mediated Social Communication’ Approach: An Early Discursive Mass Communication Model”, Silke Fürst and Philomen Schönhagen turn to the classics of German communication theory in order to reconstruct the model of communication behind the Mediated Social Communication (MSC) approach, which is specifically aimed at comprising the roles of sources, journalists, receivers, and addressees. The authors argue that this approach is particularly relevant for the present situation, when we no longer speak of broadcasting but of “multi-directional” or “many-to-many” flows of communication, and the user is conceived as a “prosumer” or “produser” and the journalist is recognised as a “forum leader”. This approach not only differs from traditional one-way process-based audience studies, but also from the discursive approach rooted in the theory of the public sphere, which still regards the audience as one entity. The MSC approach, in its turn, conceptualises mass communication as an interactive process between diverse social groups or collectives, enabled by journalistic mediation.
Thomas Schmidt delves further into relationship between journalism studies and communication models, explicating the relevance of Carey’s ritual model of communication for the institutional studies of journalism. Although he acknowledges that economic and political factors are indispensable for understanding media routines, Schmidt argues that they do not do justice to journalism as cultural practice. Thus, he maintains that we need to move away from the usual focus on interactions between macro- and meso-levels and put more emphasis on the interplay between factors on the meso- and micro-levels, and also take into account the perspective of the practitioners. For this purpose, the chapter introduces a novel model of cultural institutionalism, understood as a strategy to identify the intersection of individual, organisational, and institutional dimensions within journalism. Building on Carey, this model differentiates between three clusters in which journalists articulate and mediate institutional and cultural values, reflecting three dimensions of what cultural institutionalism in journalism may look like: journalism as cultural institution, journalism as media regime, and journalism as news logic.
In “A Figurative Approach to Mediatisation Studies”, Łukasz Wojtkowski searches for a model appropriate for the process of mediatisation. Focusing mainly on the so-called institutional version of mediatisation theory, Wojtkowski suggests that a viable theoretical framework can be obtained by combining its account of the long-lasting process of media-related modernisation with Norbert Elias’s processual approach to social development. According to the author’s proposal, the composition of three elements—social practice of particular figurations, figurative social institutions, and long-lasting communicative figurations of power—can deliver a complete model of mediatisation as a transformation process. In Wojtkowski’s assessment, figurative sociology provides a promising start for mediatisation studies, but in order to fulfil this potential, it has to be reformed at theoretical as well as at empirical levels.
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The third part of this book explores lines of thought that aim to provide vocabularies or schemata with which less obvious, more difficult to define, but no less essential aspects of the phenomenon of communication might be expressed, theorised, or modelled. The views presented here share a common interest in the ontological and hermeneutical dimensions of communication, but they do not present a shared set of assumptions or claims. While they can be brought into dialogue with each other—and the reader is invited to do so—they are not in all aspects straightforwardly compatible with each other, thus testifying to the intrinsically varied nature of the field of communication theory. These contributions represent original explorations along different paths, perhaps in the sense of Heidegger’s notion of “Holzwege”, the forest paths that result from our forays into the forest but that have no common end-point. The authors in this part all pursue courses off the beaten track, aiming to find new ways of talking about communication.
In his contribution, Johan Siebers connects the Aristotelian-Thomist metaphysics of being with communication theory, showing that the classical philosophical idea of esse contains a communicative dimension in the idea of ontological generosity. He uses philosophical theorisations of the mystical experiences of unity and ecstasy to provide the coordinates for a communication model that articulates this communicative dimension in being as universal, groundless, creative, self-giving act and indicates how we might start to think about the way this dimension relates to concrete instances of communication.
José Gomes Pinto discusses the relation between theories and models from the point of view of Luhmann’s communication theory and Kant’s epistemology. Basing himself on Luhmann, Pinto argues that communication has no inherent purpose, and that this means that no definitive models, in the sense of measures and predictive schemata, can be made for communication processes. There is an inherently emergent or transgressive aspect to communication. This refers the communication theorist to the Kantian distinctions between the legislative nature of transcendental concepts and the merely legitimate nature of empirical concepts. As communication models always refer to emergent realities, a critical reflection on communication practices presupposes a territory of common sense—we might say established communicative practice—within which the reflection takes place. This means that communication theory becomes a historical discipline, exploring, charting, and critiquing the cognitively constitutive function of media. Pinto makes use of Aristotle’s theory of rhetoric and Kittler’s media theory to further outline this idea of communication as dynamic and at once situated in, as well as constitutive of, cognitive contexts.
A recurrent theme in this section is the question of ...