De Facto States in Eurasia

Tomáš Hoch, Vincenc Kopeček

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367785468
• eBook ISBN: 9780429534256
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This book explores the phenomenon of de facto states in Eurasia: states such as Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Transnistrian Moldovan Republic. It examines how they are formed, what sustains them, and how their differing development trajectories have unfolded. It argues that most of these de facto states have been formed with either direct or indirect support from Russia, but they all have their own internal logic and are not simply puppets in the hands of a powerful patron. The book provides detailed case studies and draws out general patterns, and compares present-day de facto states with de facto states which existed in the past.

Section 1

De facto statehood

Understanding the concept

1.1 Terminology

Emil Aslan Souleimanov

In a recent article, Galina Yemelianova reminds us of the post-Second World War roots of the idea of the de facto state. This idea appeared in the field of political science in the 1980s in response to the “new sovereignty game”, reflecting the process of decolonization in Africa and Asia that saw the emergence of dozens of “factual” states (Yemelianova 2015). Back then, many newly emerging states possessed the formal attributes of independence, including formal external international recognition while lacking the basic capabilities to police their own territories. These states were termed quasi-states, a term coined by Robert Jackson as early as 1990. According to Jackson (1990), quasi-states, typically found on the African continent, were products of decolonization, and therefore lacked the “natural” and protracted process of evolutionary state-building. A second group of states, those marked by the capacity to govern themselves even while lacking formal international recognition, were branded secessionist, de facto, or unrecognized states.

Reflecting on these tumultuous developments, a great number of seemingly synonymous terms have been used interchangeably with de facto state, which appears to be the dominant and most frequently used concept as of today (e.g., Berg and Mölder 2012; Caspersen 2008a; O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011). As Laurence Broers et al. have noted, this has resulted in a profusion of terminology surrounding de facto states. Various other qualifiers or adjectives have been used to designate them: quasi-, para-, pseudo-, shadow-, phantom-, self-proclaimed, etc. (Broers, Iskandaryan, and Minasyan 2015). In fact, the use of these various terms, each of which is imbued with semantic nuances, has somewhat obscured the research field. As Harvey and Stansfield (2011) have pointed out, much confusion is due to the ad hoc, case-study-dominated literature on de facto states. Terminological consensus aiming at filtering (and standardizing) the widely swinging meanings and nuanced usages which were emerging in the literature were missing.

We shall review several key concepts and their attributes and definitions. For instance, Kolossov and O’Loughlin have used the term “pseudo-state”, which they define as “islands of ‘transitional’ or ‘incomplete’ statehood”. Both authors locate pseudo-states in what they term the “zones of contact between empires and civilisations” from the Balkans to Afghanistan (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999, 155). These authors also offer a different definition of quasi-states, which they – unlike Jackson – regard as a certain form of criminal entity, a sort of parallel universe, run, in some instances, by drug barons, as may appear in urban ghettos as well. In contrast to quasi-states, pseudo-states are institutionalized entities with more or less established governments, significant control over their territory, and the attributes of states except for formal recognition (Kolossov and O’Loughlin 1999, 152–155).

For his part, Kolstø speaks of quasi-states, which he defines differently than Jackson. Jackson spoke of quasi-states as entities that “appear to be juridical more than empirical entities”, emphasizing that they are “creatures of non-competitive international norms” (Jackson 1990, 26). In his understanding, quasi-states possess juridical sovereignty, but such weak states are not in a position to provide for their populations and are ineffective in terms of their institutions and authoritative domestic power. Inquiring into the different empirical context of the post-bipolar world, Kolstø refers to quasi-states as lacking external sovereignty, while he does not question their ability to police their own territory or provide for their populations (Kolstø 2006). Kolstø uses various terms – de facto states, para-states, unrecognized states, pseudo-states – interchangeably, but he prefers the term quasi-states. At the same time, in an attempt to eliminate this terminological jungle, Kolstø points to the Jacksonian concept of quasi-states as matching the recently coined concept of failed states, while the term quasi-states is reserved for unrecognized states only (Kolstø 2006, 723).¹ Taking on the phenomenon of de facto states as contested entities with separatist pasts, Deon Geldenhuys (2009, 7) utilizes the concept of contested states, which he defines by the “internationally disputed nature of their purported statehood, manifested in their lack of de jure recognition”.

However, it was not until Scott Pegg’s (1998) international law-focussed study of unrecognized states – in fact, the first book-long monograph ever to have been published about the matter – that the term de facto state itself was coined in the late 1990s. According to him,

[t]he de facto state is a secessionist entity that receives popular support and has achieved sufficient capacity to provide governmental services to a given population in a defined territorial area, over which it maintains effective control for an extended period of time.

(Pegg 1998, 26)

Pegg suggested six key criteria that a de facto state should fulfil. First and foremost, de facto states are marked by an “organized political leadership which has risen to power through some degree of indigenous capability” (Pegg 1998, 26). The notion of “organized political leadership” implies a condition that is weaker than an established government, as Pegg admits, pointing to the two out of four case studies from which he draws – Tamil Eelam and Somaliland – in addition to the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Eritrea, which have come to possess standard governments. While he emphasizes that de facto states are a product of the local population and enjoy its support, this definition would exclude puppet states. Pegg stresses the organized political leadership’s basic ability to police its territory and provide government services to the local population, which are duties embedded in the crucial Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933). Pegg’s fourth key criterion is the capability of states to enter into relations with other states, as mentioned in the Montevideo Convention, which he treats rather lightly, since he believes that de facto states perceive that they have this capability, even though their perception is not shared by the international community. Pegg introduces a temporal threshold of existence of two years in order for political entities to be regarded as de facto states, along with a criterion of widespread international recognition, which de facto states usually lack (Pegg 1998).

This definition has been criticized on the grounds of being somewhat vague. In an attempt to better delineate what accounts for de facto states, in an edited volume devoted to this increasingly salient phenomenon, Caspersen and Stansfield (2011) work out three fundamental criteria: (a) de facto independence, including territorial control, for a period of at least two years. (De facto states are in control of most of the territory they claim, including its capital city and key regions, although this does not prevent them from claiming more territory.); (b) de facto states do not enjoy full international recognition. (Although some of them may enjoy partial recognition, they are not regarded as members of the international system of sovereign states.); and (c) de facto states show an aspiration for full, de jure, independence, either by means of a formal declaration of independence, the holding of a national referendum on independence, or other means that explicitly illustrate the secessionist entity’s desire for separate statehood.

Although different definitions and names are used for these entities, Pegg (2008) claims that there is a fairly widespread consensus surrounding the basic elements of how to define a de facto state. In his words, disagreements come only around the edges of the definition while not disputing the basic elements of it (Pegg 2008, 1). Thus following Pegg (1998), Kolstø (2006), Caspersen and Stansfield (2011), and with regard to the Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (1933), we consider de facto states to be regions that have a defined state territory, permanent population and their governments are in control of the entire territory they claim, or at least most of it. Their state authorities perform state administration, they have the capacity to enter into relations with other states, they have been seeking independence for at least two years while failing to gain international recognition of their independence (or they have been recognized by only a few countries). Based on this conceptualization, six present-day entities (as of 2018) are commonly considered as de facto states: Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria, Northern Cyprus, and Somaliland (e.g., Kolstø 2006; Caspersen 2008b; Berg and Toomla 2009; Pegg 2017).

Note

1 It should be, however noted that Kolstø himself uses the term de facto states in his texts from 2010 onwards (see Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2012 or Pegg and Kolstø 2016).

Literature

1. Berg, Eiki, and Martin Mölder. 2012. “Who Is Entitled to ‘Earn Sovereignty’? Legitimacy and Regime Support in Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh.” Nations and Nationalism 18 (3): 527–545.
2. Berg, Eiki, and Raul Toomla. 2009. “Forms of Normalisation in the Quest for De Facto Statehood.” The International Spectator 44 (4): 27–45.
3. Blakkisrud, Helge, and Pål Kolstø. 2012. “Dynamics of De Facto Statehood: The South Caucasian De Facto States between Secession and Sovereignty.” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies 12 (2): 281–298.
4. Broers, Laurence, Alexander Iskandaryan, and Sergey Minasyan. 2015. “Introduction: The Unrecognized Politics of De Facto States in the Post-Soviet Space.” Caucasus Survey 3 (3): 187–194.
5. Caspersen, Nina. 2008a. “Separatism and the Democracy in the Caucasus.” Survival 50 (4): 113–136.
6. Caspersen, Nina. 2008b. “From Kosovo to Karabakh: International Responses to De Facto States.” Südosteuropa 56 (1): 58–83.
7. Caspersen, Nina, and Gareth Stansfield. 2011. Unrecognized States in the International System. London: Routledge.
8. Geldenhuys, Deon. 2009. Contested States in World Politics. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
9. Harvey, James, and Gareth Stansfield. 2011. “Theorizing Unrecognized States: Sovereignty, Secessionism, and Political Economy.” In Unrecognized States in the International System, edited by Nina Caspersen and Gareth Stansfield, 11–26. London: Routledge.
10. Jackson, Robert H. 1990. Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
11. Kolossov, Vladimir and John O’Loughlin. 1999. Pseudo-States as Harbingers of a New Geopolitics: The Example of the Transdniestr Moldovan Republic (TMR). In Boundaries, Territory and Post-modernity, edited by David Newman, 151–176. London: Frank Cass.
12. Kolstø, Pål. 2006. “The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States.” Journal of Peace Research 43 (6): 723–740.
13. O’Loughlin, John, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal. 2011. “Inside Abkhazia: Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State.” Post-Soviet Affairs 27 (1): 1–36.
14. Pegg, Scott. 1998. International Society and the De Facto State. Aldershot: Ashgate.
15. Pegg, Scott. 2008. “The Impact of De Facto States on International Law and the International Community.” Conference Paper. Opening the World Order to De Facto States – Limits and Potentialities for De Facto States in the International Order. Brussels: European Parliament. http://unpo.org/images/professor%20scott%20pegg.pdf.
16. Pegg, Scott. 2017. “Twenty Years of De Facto State Studies: Progress, Problems, and Prospects.” In The Oxford Encyclopedia of Empirical International Relations Theory, edited by W. R. Thompson et al. Oxford: Oxford University Press. http://politics.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.001.0001/acrefore-9780190228637-e-516.
17. Pegg, Scott, and Pål Kolstø 2016. “Lost and Found: The WikiLeaks of De Facto State–great Power Relations.” International Studies Perspectives 17 (3): 267–286.
18. Yemelianova, Galina. 2015. “Western Academic Discourse on the Post-Soviet De Facto State Phenomenon.” Caucasus Survey 3 (3): 219–238.

1.2 De facto statehood

Overview of the research

Tomáš Hoch

Academic studies on de facto states have, quite logically, mostly focussed on the post-Soviet space, where most of the contemporary de facto states are located. Though the post-Soviet de facto states are relatively small in terms of both population and area (discussed in more detail in Chapter 1.3), their existence has numerous consequences. The failure to find a solution to these prolonged conflicts represents a problem not only in the economic and political sphere but also for social development and international security. It is therefore unsurprising that during the past quarter of a century, de facto statehood has been an imp...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of maps
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Note on the transcription and usage of geographical names
• Acknowledgement
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• Section 1 De facto statehood: understanding the concept
• Section 2 Russian territorial expansion and de facto states in the first half of 20th century
• Section 3 The emergence of de facto states
• Section 4 How de facto states are sustained and instrumentalized
• Section 5 Why de facto states fail
• Conclusion
• Index