India-China Maritime Competition

The Security Dilemma at Sea

Rajesh Basrur, Anit Mukherjee, T.V. Paul, Rajesh Basrur, Anit Mukherjee, T.V. Paul

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429814433
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This edited volume critically examines the concept of the "security dilemma" and applies it to India–China maritime competition. Though frequently employed in academic discussion and popular commentary on the Sino-Indian relationship, the term has rarely been critically analysed. The volume addresses the gap by examining whether the security dilemma is a useful concept in explaining the naval and foreign policy strategies of India and China. China's Belt and Road Initiative and its expansive engagement in the Indian Ocean Region have resulted in India significantly scaling up investment in its navy, adding ships, naval aircraft and submarines. This volume investigates how the rivalry is playing out in different sub-regions of the Indian Ocean, and the responses of other powers, notably the United States and prominent Southeast Asian states. Their reactions to the Sino-Indian rivalry are an underexplored topic and the chapters in this book reveal how they selectively use that rivalry while trying to steer clear of making definite choices. The book concludes with recommendations on mitigating the security dilemma.

This work will be of great interest to students of strategic studies, international relations, maritime security, and Asian politics.

1 Introduction

The Indian Ocean and the India–China security dilemma

Rajesh Basrur, Anit Mukherjee, and T.V. Paul

The rise of India and China has attracted considerable academic and policy interest. Notably, the 2017 border standoff at Doklam, in Bhutan, was the focus of global attention as China publicly threatened to use force against India. But, the land border aside, there is also a growing rivalry at sea, especially in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).¹ The accelerated growth of India’s economy and concomitantly of its military capabilities have generated the widespread perception that it is a rising power that will play an expanding role in the international system. This in turn has triggered widespread debate about the possibilities and limitations of India’s rise, as well as its potential to alter the military balance of power in Asia and the Indo-Pacific. India believes it is a benign power and has appropriated to itself the role of a “net security provider” in the region. This role has been increasingly challenged by China’s enhanced presence—its economic, diplomatic, and military power—in the IOR. As of now, in comparison with maritime tensions in East Asia—Sino-Japanese differences on the Korean peninsula and the multi-sided South China Sea dispute—the competition in the IOR between India and China is not as tense. However, with the launching of China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and reports of its new “base” in Djibouti, combined with the persistence of the India-Pakistan rivalry (which has been exacerbated by China’s military assistance to Pakistan), the potential for military tension remains substantial.² Apart from China’s increased presence in the Indian Ocean, one has also to consider US interests and ambitions since it is a de facto “resident power” by virtue of its military bases in the region. Complicating matters further and adding to the narrative of nascent great-power rivalry, the United States is currently transforming its relations with India while responding to the geopolitical challenge posed by the rise of China. How is the India–China rivalry playing out in the Indian Ocean? More specifically, is there a security dilemma between the two and, if so, how is it shaping their military strategies? What technological trends and developments in the naval arena are shaping this rivalry? And what is the US perspective towards these developments in the region?

While addressing these questions, this book focuses on two major themes. First, all its authors examine aspects of the security dilemma underlying India–China maritime competition. The concept of the India–China security dilemma, while frequently appearing both in academic discussions and in popular commentary, has rarely been critically interrogated. The authors examine whether the security dilemma is a useful and relevant concept in explaining the naval and foreign policy strategies of India and China.

Second, this volume analyses how India–China maritime rivalry is developing in the Indian Ocean Region and beyond. More specifically, how are regional and Indian Ocean littoral countries responding to this rivalry? The reactions of other states to Sino-Indian rivalry is an underexplored topic, and chapters in this book reveal how they selectively use great-power rivalry while trying to steer clear of making definite choices. Presenting the perspective of countries like the Maldives, Mauritius, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and others shifts the focus away from the calculations and interests of India and China and illuminates the agency and diplomatic manoeuvres of these countries.

The next section explains the main rationale for this book and its broad themes. The section that follows highlights its content. We conclude with some suggestions on avenues for further research.

The India–China security dilemma

The rise of China is an accepted geopolitical fact, epitomized not just by its island-building activities in the South China Sea, but also its expansive vision of the Belt and Road Initiative. This vision includes plans for increased Chinese economic and strategic engagement in the Indian Ocean Region. Both these activities have caused some alarm in India, especially the frequent ship and submarine visits to the region by the PLAN (People’s Liberation Army Navy). In response, India has significantly scaled up its investment in the Indian Navy, adding ships, naval aircraft, and submarines to its naval capabilities. In addition, it has enhanced its ties with the Indian Ocean island states and with the United States, the resident great power in the region. Are India and China therefore locked in a security dilemma?

The term “security dilemma” captures a central feature of interstate relations. It refers to a situation where steps taken by one state to enhance its security result in counter-actions by another, leading to a net decrease in security for both. As Robert Jervis argues, “many of the means by which a state tries to increase its security decrease the security of others” and therefore invite counter-measures by others.³ In essence, the concept highlights the risk of war or intense rivalry between states that are essentially defensive: in the anarchic states system—where there is no regulator and hence mistrust is ubiquitous—a state’s efforts to strengthen its security tend to generate insecurity in others, which can lead to an action-reaction process of spiralling tensions and in some instances, war.⁴

Much of this literature was developed during the Cold War for analysing the relationship between the US and the USSR. The existing theoretical literature on the security dilemma does not focus to any great degree on specific relationships in Asian strategic politics. But considerable effort has been devoted to investigating India–China relations from this perspective.⁵ The latter has focused on two questions. First, is a security dilemma critical to understanding the relationship? Most analysts believe it is, though there are differences over its intensity. Second, is the security dilemma the same or similar in intensity for both countries? Most authors either assume it is or do not consider the point. Asymmetry in security dilemmas is rarely captured in the literature. This volume critically interrogates these questions and examines different aspects of the India–China security dilemma.

The chapters in this book add to our understanding of the India–China relationship and also contribute to enriching the theoretical literature in a number of ways. First, the analyses presented here reveal the complexity of security dilemma politics by highlighting how states respond to their predicaments in different ways. Given the constraints on its financial capacity, India has focused on a combination of limited internal and external balancing to augment its military, economic, and political position. The former includes the beefing up of its military capabilities and infrastructure development, while the latter involves the establishment of a series of strategic partnerships, chiefly with the United States and Japan. In contrast, China, lacking strong partners, has focused on internal balancing via naval power projection to counter what it sees as the potential threat from India and its partners, particularly in the IOR. It has additionally resorted to external balancing through its partnership with Pakistan, though this has limitations given the political uncertainties to which that country is perennially subject.

Second, this book draws attention to an area that has been largely neglected in the literature: the idea of a “cascading security dilemma,” wherein one security dilemma could potentially shape or trigger another. Hence, for instance, US–China tensions and competition tend to contribute to the India–China security dilemma. Similarly, India’s actions to counter China tend to accentuate Pakistan’s security dilemma and its calculations about what it needs to satisfy its security interests. This suggests that the concept is more than a two-nation game and that the actions of third states can accentuate the security dilemma between two countries.

Third, a distinguishing feature of this book is that it looks at how regional states are responding to the India–China rivalry. As mentioned earlier, some of the chapters examine sub-regions: mainly the Bay of Bengal, the Southwest Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia. In doing so, the book focuses on the perspectives and actions of various countries in these regions. Do they see the emerging India–China rivalry as a threat or an opportunity? How are they responding to great-power rivalry and interests?

Fourth, the authors in this book have been asked to recommend measures that can potentially mitigate the India–China security dilemma. This is important, as we often find in the policy community an impression that India–China rivalry is a matter of geopolitical destiny. This certainly is not the case, so we have encouraged our authors to suggest measures that can lessen the severity of the security dilemma. Some of their recommendations are idealistic, for instance calls to resolve the border dispute. However, others—such as allowing more frequent military-to-military, and especially naval, cooperation—may be easier to implement.

Structure of the volume

Geoffrey Till’s chapter focuses on the key question of how growing naval capabilities and emerging technologies are shaping strategic stability in the IOR. Till addresses a provocative and important question: is naval development in the Indian Ocean likely to prove inherently destabilizing and even dangerous? His short answer is that this depends on the paradigmatic perspective adopted by the major powers, i.e. whether they will embrace a Westphalian or a post-Westphalian approach. In addition, Till also examines the emergence of new technologies under four conceptual trends—nuclear and other transformational weaponry, the size of assets (big versus small), the question of access, and the offence/defence balance. In his conclusion, he focuses on steps to mitigate the security competition and makes two major recommendations. First, the navies in the region need to come to some form of “professional agreements about the tactical conduct of naval operations.” On this matter, he highlights the importance of Code for Unplanned Encounters at Seas (CUES)-type agreements. Second, he calls for greater naval cooperation than that currently existing in the Indo-Pacific region. This chapter is unique in examining emerging technological trends and their profound influence on foreign policy and should attract the attention of both naval theorists and practitioners.

Collin Koh’s chapter analyses the maritime strategies and capabilities of China and India in detail. In his view, the security dilemma at sea stems from a genuine conflict on their disputed land frontier. The inherently ambiguous character of the maritime domain makes the perceptions of each central to the threat it sees emanating from the other. On the one hand, New Delhi’s concerns about Beijing’s Indian Ocean reach revolve around the PLAN’s blue-water shift, especially in submarines, and regional port access, in particular with respect to Pakistan. On the other, Beijing remains wary of India’s role within what it sees as a broad US-led containment scheme that allows the Indian Navy to leverage on these likeminded partners’ blue-water assets to undermine Chinese interests throughout the Indo-Pacific littorals. A key finding is the asymmetrical nature of the two security dilemmas. As noted above, states caught in a security dilemma may react very differently to their situation depending on their specific positions in the international system. The Indians have responded to the dilemma primarily by external balancing, the Chinese mainly by internal balancing. Overall, Koh’s analysis directs our attention to the complexity of the security dilemma as a concept and underscores that it is not a simple one involving a straightforward competitive spiral between adversaries. His chapter is also useful as he presents original data sets on Chinese naval visits to the Gulf of Aden, visits of Indian naval ships to Vietnam, the gradual “Sinicization” of the Pakistani Navy, and similar matters.

Yogesh Joshi and Anit Mukherjee’s chapter focuses on India’s changing naval strategy in response to growing Chinese naval capabilities in the Indian Ocean Region. Conceptually, it presents the idea of a “cascading security dilemma,” that is, the way in which one security dilemma shapes another. In addition, it also highlights how a shift in the severity of a security dilemma leads to changes in military strategy—a topic that has not attracted much attention. The authors argue that as a result of changing security dynamics and perceptions, there has been a change in Indian military strategy towards China from deterrence “by denial” to deterrence “by punishment.” It thereafter describes the broad contours of India’s current naval strategy and its land-versus-sea dilemma. This chapter, informed by a “deep dive” into Indian military journals, provides much insight into thinking and debates within the Indian military vis-à-vis China.

Darshana Baruah and C. Raja Mohan’s chapter focuses squarely on India–China competition in the Bay of Bengal, with special attention given to Bangladesh, Myanmar, and Sri Lanka. Until recently, this region was considered a strategic backwater, but, as the authors show, the Bay of Bengal is growing in prominence as a result of Sino-Indian competition. Their chapter examines Beijing’s deepening partnerships with the littorals of the Bay of Bengal and India’s response to this development. While describing the growing competition between India and China in their engagement with the region, they also argue that there is room for cooperation, especially with respect to connectivity. But for this to happen, they contend, Beijing will have to be more transparent in its activities. The authors conclude by suggesting some measures to mitigate competition through military-to-military engagement and to explore the idea of joint projects for infrastructure development. Despite these recommendations, the authors are generally pessimistic in their outlook and predict “some friction” across the Indo-Pacific.

Sumitha Narayanan Kutty’s chapter examines India–China interactions in the strategic islands of the Southwest Indian Ocean. More specifically, it focuses on the response of the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles to India–China rivalry. Her chapter is novel as the perspectives of these island-countries have rarely been explored in the academic literature. She argues that India has been able largely to preserve its traditional security relationships, but with varying outcomes. India has been more successful in maintaining relationships across political lines in Mauritius and Seychelles, less so in the Maldives (though this shows signs of changing in the case of the Maldives as we write this introduction). China has thus far exercised some restraint in directly challenging India’s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• 1 Introduction: the Indian Ocean and the India–China security dilemma
• 2 Naval development and international stability in the Indian Ocean Region
• 3 China–India rivalry at sea: capability, trends, and challenges
• 4 The security dilemma and India’s naval strategy
• 5 The emerging dynamics of Sino-Indian rivalry in the Bay of Bengal
• 6 India–China rivalry and the strategic importance of the Maldives, Mauritius, and Seychelles
• 7 India–China maritime competition: Southeast Asia and the dilemma of regional states
• 8 The US response: naval architecture and plans
• 9 Conclusion: mitigating the security dilemma in the Sino-Indian rivalry
• Index