Introduction
The proposal for an international tribunal had already been mooted as a preventive measure in 1991, and again in early 1992, with the aim of prosecuting war crimes.2 It only gained momentum, however, in response to worldwide public outrage following the exposure of Serb-run detention camps in northern Bosnia in August 1992. The graphic news reports of camp conditions with video footage of emaciated inmates, combined with the tacitly acknowledged failure of Lord Carringtonās yearlong peace conference, underscored the international failure to end the carnage.3 A new initiative was called for to demonstrate that the crimes would not go unpunished.
Initially, there was considerable reluctance amongst leading international players to setting up a tribunal and as an interim measure a so-called Commission of Experts was established in its place. The Commission served to appease world public opinion, while creating the impression that something was being done to address the war crimes, but was beset by obstacles from the outset. It lacked both resources and funding, and there were disagreements as to its role and purpose within the UN and amongst major world powers. Also, the practical difficulties of collecting evidence in a war zone, where the priority was the protection of UN troops on the ground, were overwhelming.
One of the main difficulties faced by the Commission of Experts (and later the ad hoc tribunal) was the refusal of leading international players to recognize the true nature of the war and act accordingly. Instead, over a year into hostilities, major world powers led by Britain and France continued to characterize the conflict as a civil war, born of ancient ethnic hatreds, with atrocities on all sides. This assumption of equivalence of guilt between the parties deflected from Serb responsibility and allayed public concern while facilitating ongoing negotiations with the main perpetrators, in particular Slobodan Milosevic, the Serbian president, and Bosnian Serb leader Radovan KaradžiÄ.
To view international policy in Bosnia in the summer of 1992 in its full perspective, it is worth noting the situation in the area prior to the discovery of the camps.
Yugoslavia 1991
Ironically, it was the Bosnian president, Alija Izetbegovic, who in the first half of 1991, together with the Macedonian president, Kiro Gligorov, made the greatest effort, through a series of āYu-summitsā, to hold Yugoslavia together in the knowledge that its disintegration would be likely to unleash violence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and possibly Macedonia.4 The declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia in June 1991, however, compounded by the collapse of Lord Carringtonās plan for a loose confederation in mid-October 1991, prompted the Bosnian parliament to vote later that month to declare Bosnia a āsovereign republicā. The aim, according to Izetbegovic, was to ensure equal status for Bosnia with the other republics in the event of the secession of Slovenia and Croatia.5 During the conflict in Croatia in 1991, Bosnia proved a vital base for JNA operations, exacerbating the tension between the ethnic groups.6
Bosnian Muslim leaders at this time were also preparing for resistance in the case of escalation of the war to Bosnia, in part through the newly formed Patriotic League, which had a civilian and a military wing, the latter mainly comprising former JNA officers of Muslim ethnicity. In this, however, Bosnia was faced with almost insurmountable obstacles. A blanket arms embargo7 imposed on Yugoslavia by the UN Security Council in September 1991 meant that Bosnia, virtually landlocked, had no access to the means of self-defence against the might of the JNA, then one of Europeās largest armies. Each republic also had its separate Territorial Defence (TO), but at the end of 1991, an order came from Belgrade to Bosnian TO staffs to surrender their heavy weapons. This was endorsed by President Izetbegovic to appease the JNA and only rescinded the following March.8
From early 1991, Serbian Autonomous Regions (SAOs) began to be established in both Croatia and Bosnia.9 From late August, the JNA participated in attacks on majority-Croat areas, together with the SAO Krajina special police (MUP),10 in order to connect Serb-held territory.11 Systematic acts of violence and intimidation were carried out by the JNA, Serbian paramilitaries and police against the non-Serb population, with the objective of driving them out of SAO Krajina.12 On 1 October 1991, Dubrovnik came under siege by the JNA, civilians came under attack and the city was cut off by land and sea till late December.13 More serious still were the JNA operations in Eastern Slavonia. In August 1991, the multi-national town of Vukovar came under siege and fell in November, followed by a massacre of civilians in nearby Ovcara.14
Two days later, on 20 November, the Bosnian president appealed to the UN for peacekeeping troops.15 Following the international recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in December 1991, the situation in Bosnia rapidly deteriorated. JNA tanks and artillery were withdrawn from Croatia to Bosnia, and heavy artillery positions were set up around Sarajevo and other large Bosnian towns in the winter of 1991ā1992.16 The JNA openly favoured Serbs in its personnel policy, with non-Serb officers heavily pressured to resign. More than 90% of all JNA officers were now Serb or Montenegrin.17
By this time, the JNA had some 90,000 troops in Bosnia, it controlled most armouries and munitions stockpiles and could call on over 40 fighter planes, 6 helicopters and hundreds of tanks and heavy artillery. Added to this were thousands more troops stationed in Serbia and a sizeable number of Serbian paramilitary groupings. The Bosnian territorial forces numbered about 50,000, but possessed mainly small arms and, until 1993, just a single tank.18 At the Bosnian Serb Assembly session of 27 March 1992, KaradžiÄ recommended that, where possible, territorial units formed by the crisis staffs should be placed under JNA command. Once the JNA formally withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina they all, including the Serb territorial units, became part of the Bosnian Serb army, or Vojska Republika Srpska (VRS).19
The international response consisted of a series of abortive ceasefire agreements and setting up an international peace conference as a basis for negotiating a peace deal acceptable to all sides. The blanket arms embargo imposed in September 1991 was extended to Yugoslaviaās successor states.20
Bosnia, 1991ā1992
By early May 1992, large swathes of territory in North-Western, North-Eastern and South-Eastern Bosnia, and around Sarajevo, had already been taken over by the JNA in coordination with Serbian paramilitaries and the special police forces. Attempts at resistance by civilians and forces loyal to the Bosnian government varied from municipality to municipality but were largely unsuccessful due mainly to the disparity in weaponry.
North-Western Bosnia
By the time Bosnia and Herzegovina gained independence in April 1992, a considerable amount of territory in North-Western Bosnia was already under the control of the JNA and Serb paramilitary groups, following the establishment of SAO Bosanska Krajina. There is also evidence of detention camps in existence by 30 April.21
The strategy of destruction in the Prijedor municipality (44% Muslim, 43% Serb, 6% Croat and over 6,000 Yugoslav) had begun over six months earlier, despite the absence of any threat against the Serb inhabitants.22 Serb officials began building their own administration, parallel to the legitimate authorities, which included a Serb police force with secret service functions.23 In the early hours of 30 April 1992, JNA forces and Serb police took control of Prijedor, setting up checkpoints, occupying its most important buildings and taking over municipal administration organs and large companies. Police officers were obliged to pledge loyalty to the new Serb authorities, and Muslim police commanders were replaced by Serbs. Non-Serbs were removed from functions in the municipal assembly and administration and prohibited from entering the building. Shortly afterwards, Serb soldiers and reserve police officers levelled the predominantly Muslim old town with heavy machinery and destroyed the local mosque.24 On 31 May, Serb nationalists ordered all non-Serbs to mark their houses with white flags or sheets and to wear a white armband if they left their homes.25
The shifting demographic balance in favour of the ethnic Muslim population had become a central issue in the municipalityās political life in the prelude to hostilities. After the declaration of independence in Croatia and Slovenia in June 1991, Serbian nationalist propaganda became increasingly visible, with Serbs being encouraged to arm themselves, allegedly to prevent a repetition of the massacres of Serbs which had occurred in World War II. A large simultaneous influx of Serbs from Croatia exacerbated the situation.26 In August 1991, Serbian paramilitaries took over the Mt Kozara transmitter station, and TV Sarajevo was replaced by broadcasts from Banja Luka and Belgrade.27 The economic situation began to deteriorate as a r...
