Closing the Integration Gap in Criminology

The Case for Criminal Thinking

Glenn D. Walters, Glenn Walters

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000733921
• Subtopic: Criminology
• Index: Social Sciences

Closing the Integration Gap in Criminology: The Case for Criminal Thinking offers a multi -stage model of theory integration that organizes verified risk factors around the construct of criminal thinking to provide an exemplar working paradigm for criminology. In the model, once relevant risk factors have been identified, they are organized into triads —three-variable networks of antecedent, mediating, or moderating effects—and then those triads are combined into clusters of thematically related constructs.

While debate continues to rage over how to handle the burgeoning number of theories in criminology, little significant progress has been made in reducing the number of criminological theories. This book argues that theoretical integration is vital to the continued viability of criminological theory and to the growth and development of criminology as a scientific discipline. It posits that criminal thinking may be useful as a core variable in constructing a useful integrated theory for criminology, and maps out a plan for scholars to organize information for further study.

The innovative theoretical approach in this book is essential reading for students, academics, and researchers in both criminology and forensic psychology concerned with the reduction of crime via scientific inquiry.

Part I

Integration in Criminology

Chapter 1

An Integrated Theory of Crime

Vital Mission or Fool’s Errand?

Several hundred theories of crime have been proposed in the two hundred and fifty or so years since criminology became a recognized field of investigation and member of the social science fraternity. Although many of these theories are significant only from a historical standpoint, there are still plenty of theories being taught, researched, and used by criminologists and criminal justice practitioners today. In the most recent edition of Vold’s Theoretical Criminology, Bernard, Snipes, and Gerould (2016) review 62 contemporaneous theories of crime. These theories range in scope from the very narrow to the very broad, but all are designed to explain crime in some way, shape, or fashion. And while each of these theories has demonstrated some ability to predict and/or explain crime, each suffers from serious limitations. Thus, while most of these theories have the capacity to advance our understanding of law-violating behavior, none is capable of accounting for more than 10–20% of the total variance in crime (Elliott, Huizinga, & Ageton, 1985). One might logically assume that this has led to strident calls for greater theoretical integration in the field of criminology. Although such calls have gone out, most have gone unheeded. In fact, the calls themselves have often been muffled by partisan bickering and the belief that one discipline is all one needs to answer important questions in criminology.

Criminology can be defined as the interdisciplinary study of crime and delinquency, where ideas from such diverse disciplines as sociology, psychology, anthropology, biology, economics, and law are shared, contrasted, and in some cases, combined (Jeffery, 1978). Given the diversity of thought and opinion that mark criminology, it could be argued that this is a field ripe for integration. Logic, however, must sometimes give way to reality. Sociologically oriented criminologists have traditionally been suspicious of individual-level explanations of crime, even though three of the most popular criminological theories—differential association (Sutherland, 1947), general strain (Agnew, 1992), and the general theory of crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990)—make strong individual level arguments. Even today, a robust anti-biological bias exists in the minds of some sociologically oriented criminologists, despite strong evidence that biosocial factors play a role in crime and delinquency (Beaver, Nedelec, da Silva Costa, & Vidal, 2015). Diversity, as has been repeatedly pointed out in a general cultural context, is considered a strength by some and a weakness by others. To the extent that diversity is viewed as a threat or weakness by certain segments of the criminological community, it goes to show how far we still have to travel before we achieve theoretical integration in the field of criminology.

Theoretical integration in a field like criminology means reconciling the differences between disciplines that contribute to the field. Before this can occur, however, it is imperative that we understand why some disciplines have received favored status and others have been overlooked, marginalized, or excluded. One can understand how researchers and scholars may feel more comfortable with constructs, methods, and procedures from the discipline in which they were trained. What is unacceptable is dismissing views from other disciplines out of hand, based simply on their unfamiliarity. Examples of some of the unfounded claims and criticisms that have been leveled against individually oriented theories of crime are reviewed by Moore (2011) and Walsh and Wright (2015). According to the perspective adopted in the present book, a major reason why biological and psychological theories of crime have been unjustifiably dismissed by some criminologists is fear. It is fear that leads many citizens to reject cultural diversity in the larger society, and it is fear that drives some criminologists to reject one or more of the disciplines that are indispensable in forming a comprehensive understanding of crime and criminal justice.

The notion that diversity creates fear and fear inhibits integration in the field of criminology is important in understanding some of the factors that stand in the way of theoretical integration in criminology. Fear of diversity, however, is only part of the problem. Another part of the problem is that the field of criminology lacks a coherent strategy by which to pursue and achieve integration. This has contributed to theoretical fragmentation in criminology and an abundance of single-variable and overly simplistic models and theories of crime (Ericson & Carriere, 1994). In some ways, the field has become less rather than more integrated over time. A strategy designed to merge the fragments and achieve integration is offered in Chapters 4–10 of this book. The proposed strategy relies on a cross-section of ideas from two of the most influential twentieth-century philosophers of science: Karl Popper (1999), famous for his emphasis on falsifiability in evaluating scientific theories, and Thomas Kuhn (1962/2012), best known for his thesis on the structure of scientific revolutions. Popper’s and Kuhn’s views on scientific methodology and theoretical paradigms, as well as how methodology and paradigms can be used to promote a program of conceptual integration, are described next.

Popper and Kuhn

Karl Popper’s (1999) account of scientific methodology evolved from his desire to distinguish between scientific and non-scientific theories in a process he referred to as demarcation. He eventually arrived at the conclusion that scientific theories were falsifiable, whereas non-scientific theories were not. By comparing a scientific theory like Einstein’s general theory of relativity to a non-scientific theory like Freud’s psychoanalysis, Popper began by stating that only Einstein’s theory was falsifiable. What he meant by falsifiable was that a scientific theory makes testable claims that future research can potentially reveal as false. If the claims of a theory are too broad to be proven false, then the theory should not be considered scientific. The act of selecting a scientific theory to guide a field of thought, said Popper, follows a slow, gradual path in which the claims of the theory are tested against empirical reality. Null hypothesis testing (Fisher, 1966) and consistency testing (Meehl, 1995, 2001) are two ways falsifiability is evaluated. As the incorrect predictions or lack of corroboration of a theory begin to mount, scientists will revise the theory or replace it with a new one. Within Popper’s philosophy of science, one never “proves” a theory, but rather, fails to falsify it.

In his highly influential book, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Thomas Kuhn (1962/2012) advanced the notion that scientific development proceeds by leaps and bounds rather than in graduated steps, as Popper (1999) proposed. One of the first scientific revolutions Kuhn investigated was the transformation from a geocentric to a heliocentric view of the solar system. Even without high-powered telescopes, the ancient Greeks were able to identify seven “planets”—Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, Saturn, the moon, and the sun—all of which were believed to revolve around the earth, in what became known as the geocentric or earth-centered view of the solar system. Anomalous findings, such as the fact that Mars moved backward relative to the other planets before moving forward again, lay challenge to this claim. Although individual scientists had questioned the geocentric model since the days of the ancient Greeks, this model served as normal science in astronomy until the eighteenth century when astronomers fully embraced the Copernican heliocentric or sun-centered view of the cosmos, nearly two centuries after it was originally proposed. The crisis created by the geocentric model’s inability to explain a growing number of anomalous findings led to a paradigmatic shift in which the heliocentric model replaced the geocentric model as normal science.

Whereas Popper pursued a purely deductive philosophy of science, Kuhn advanced a philosophy of science based on both inductive and deductive logic. According to Kuhn, revolutionary science was largely inductive, whereas normal science was a more deductive exercise in which scientists engaged in puzzle solving, as he put it. Where Popper believed that science progressed incrementally, in small gradual steps, Kuhn proposed a model in which science was continuously evolving, with periodic revolutions marked by dramatic paradigm shifts. Kuhn maintained that a new paradigm need not explain everything the old paradigm did, although it should explain most of the anomalies that led to rejection of the old paradigm to warrant its acceptance by a community of scientists. A scientific revolution may occur over a period of years or over a period of centuries. The discovery of the double-helical structure of DNA (Watson & Crick, 1953) as a paradigm shift in genetic biology is an example of the former and the Copernican revolution in astrology is an example of the latter. Kuhn viewed scientific revolutions as holistic all-or-nothing events that brought about a change in more than just scientific understanding and principles. Various non-scientific elements, such as habits, customs, cultural values, and lexical structure, were also changed as part of Kuhn’s scientific revolution.

Popper and Kuhn are often positioned at opposite ends of the philosophy of science spectrum, making it seem as if their views are inherently incompatible. A more accurate appraisal would be that Popper and Kuhn were investigating different questions. Whereas Popper was concerned with the methodology scientists use to unlock the mysteries of the universe, Kuhn was more interested in the evolution of science within the context of the wider culture in which scientists operate. Hence, Popper considered deductive reasoning the optimal method for achieving incremental improvements in scientific understanding, whereas Kuhn regarded rapid shifts in the guiding paradigm of a field as the nature of scientific revolutions. According to Popper, science consists of a series of steps designed to accumulate knowledge by replacing old ideas with new ones. Kuhn, on the other hand, viewed science as a more fluid and less rational process, tracing its path through several revolutions as one paradigm replaced another in directing the activities of scientists working in a field. A principal goal of the next 11 chapters of this book is to illustrate how the philosophy of science models proposed by Popper and Kuhn can contribute equally to integrated criminological theory if situated at different points in the integration sequence.

The Purpose of this Book

This book is guided by a general purpose and several more specific objectives. The general or overriding purpose of this book is to illustrate how criminal thinking can be used to integrate criminological theory. Beyond this general purpose are several more specific objectives, one of which is to review prior attempts to integrate theory in criminology and another of which is to propose a novel approach to integrated theory in criminology. The discussion on integrated theory in criminology is followed by chapters on definitional issues, classification schemes, and assessment protocols centered around criminal thinking. Other specific objectives pursued in this book include examining the developmental roots of criminal thinking and providing a comprehensive analysis of how criminal thinking can further our understanding of criminal development, maintenance, and decision-making. Two additional specific objectives of this book are to identify ways through which criminal thinking and other social cognitive variables can be addressed and modified to help protect high-risk individuals from a criminal lifestyle and assist those already committed to a criminal lifestyle in desisting from future crime. The general purpose of this book, in conjunction with and in juxtaposition to the nine or ten specific objectives discussed in this section, is to provide a framework for using criminal thinking to close the integration gap in criminology.

The First Part of this Book

There are two parts to this book. The first part encompasses the opening four chapters of the book and the second part contains the final eight chapters. In Chapter 2, an overview of prior attempts at theoretical integration in criminology is provided. The chapter begins by examining some of the more popular integrated criminological theories and conceptualizations, starting with Elliott, Ageton, and Canter’s (1979) integrated theory of delinquency. To simplify matters, this discussion is organized around the three main approaches to theoretical integration in criminology: end to end, side by side, and up and down. The chapter ends with a review of Hirschi–Elliott’s debate on falsification versus integration and what this means for the future of criminological theory.

Latent structure, the topic of Chapter 3, asks whether a construct is continuously (dimensional) or categorically (taxonic) organized below the level of observation. Continuous latent structure means that individual differences are a matter of degree. Categorical latent structure means that individuals differ by kind. This is another way of saying individual differences on a continuous construct are quantitative, whereas individual differences on a categorical construct are qualitative. Much of the chapter consists of a review of studies using Meehl’s (1995, 2001) taxometric method to assess the latent structure of crime-related constructs (criminality, delinquency, conduct disorder, antisocial personality, psychopathy, and criminal thinking).

Guided by research showing that the latent structure of crime-related constructs is continuous, Chapter 4 adopts a risk assessment approach to variable selection. This approach is grounded in the assumption that continuous latent structure is compatible with cumulative risk and the identification of risk factors. Once the differences between clinical and theoretical risk assessments are clarified, the chapter delves into falsification, as originally conceptualized by Popper, as a way of selecting relevant theoretical risk factors. This is then followed by a review of the second stage of the multi-stage model of theory integration, in which antecedent, mediating, and moderating triads are constructed. A working paradigm, consistent with Kuhn, is the goal of the third stage of the multi-stage model, whereby triads are combined, and the resulting clusters pruned, in a process referred to as elaboration.

Conclusion

Although we must wait until we reach the end of this book before deciding which part of the current chapter’s secondary title is most accurate (i.e., integration as a vital mission or fool’s errand), I would argue that theoretical integration deserves serious consideration when it comes to criminology. In fact, to decide for or against theoretical integration without examining all the evidence would be foolish. We therefore continue our search for evidence relating to the feasibility of theoretical integration in the field of criminology by reviewing previous efforts to integrate criminological theory in Chapter 2 of this book.

Chapter 2

A Brief History of Theoretical Integration in Criminology

It would be a mistake to assume that there has never been a concerted effort to craft integrated theory in criminology. While theoretical integration in criminology has lagged behind such practice-oriented fields as clinical psychology, which has at least one journal devoted exclusively to integration, the Journal of Psychotherapy Integration, it has by no means been ignored. A more candid assessment would be that many scholars in the field of criminology are skeptical of what they consider the disappointing results obtained when theoretical integration has been attempted in the past (Barak, 1998). Several mainstream theories, in fact, integrate concepts from other models. Sampson and Laub’s (1993) age-graded theory, for instance, borrows heavily from the life-course tradition as well as from Hirschi’s (1969) social control model, whereas Agnew’s (1992) general strain theory began as an attempt to apply Merton’s (1957) classic strain theory to individual delinquents, but was soon expanded to include features of low self-control (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), techniques of neutralization (Sykes & Matza, 1957), delinquent peer associations (Sutherland, 1947), and routine activities (Cohen & Felson, 1979). The emphasis of the present chapter is on efforts to integrate entire theories, beginning with the first such integrated theory, Elliott, Ageton, and Canter’s (1979) integrated theoretical perspective on delinquent behavior.

The Integrated Theoretical Perspective on Delinquent Behavior

In constructing their integrated theoretical perspective on delinquent behavior, Elliott et al. (1979) sought to assemble three major criminological theories—classic strain theory, social control theory, and social learning theory—into a single integrated theory. They began by integrating strain theory with social control theory, operating under the assumption that high levels of strain and low levels of control would increase a person’s risk for future delinquency. As part of their second step, they integrated the strain‒social control composite with social learning theory. From social learning theory, they adopted the premise that the rewards and punishments a person anticipates from engaging in criminal and prosocial behavior are instrumental in shaping future delinquent behavior. According to Elliott et al. (1979), these social rewards and punishments are administered by friends, family, and school officials, with friends and peers providing the greatest impetus for delinquent behavior. According to this integrated model, there are two pathways to delinquency. The first path sta...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Routledge Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Figures
• List of Tables
• Preface
• Part I: Integration in Criminology
• Part II: Integrating with Criminal Thinking
• References
• Index