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Part I
Foreign policy and alliances
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1 Introduction
The topic of this book
The topic of this book is the alliances of Syria during the years between 1963 and 1989. Syria, the self-proclaimed ‘beating heart of the Arab nation’, played a pivotal role in regional politics. The alliances of Damascus have often been considered paradoxical and hard to explain. Allied to revolutionary Iran and at odds with Ba’thist Iraq, hostile or friendly towards the Gulf monarchies, on the brink of war with Turkey or Israel: the tale of Syria’s regional relations is rich and complex. The country therefore provides a stern test for any theoretical explanation of alliances. Syrian politics has been dominated since the early 1960s by the Ba’th party, the purest expression of Pan-Arab ideology. The Ba’th, more than any other political force, incarnated the strive towards Arab unity as well as a strong anti-imperialist stance. How did this ideological orientation shape the alliances of Syria? Did the policy-makers in the country pursue a more narrowly defined national interest, or did they act according to the predicaments of Pan-Arabism? In order to answer this question, the book will look at the development of Syria’s key alliances. It will show how, despite the continuity in Ba’th rule, the foreign policy of Syria changed dramatically throughout the years of this study. This readjustment was clearly shaped by changes at an external level, but it also coincided with the new leadership of Hafez Al-Assad. Under the new presidency Syria abandoned its stance of unlimited revisionism in favour of more limited regional goals. This foreign policy was more in tune with the geopolitical reality of the region, as it was based the power gap between Syria and its regional rivals.
This book is also a study of alliances more generally, albeit building on the Syrian case: how they are formed and why they endure or collapse. Alliances are a central component of a state’s foreign policy. They are the cornerstone of every grand strategy, the most visible sign of continuity or rupture when a new regime comes to power. Furthermore, alliances shape history. To think of their relevance in world politics, one can try to imagine how different things could have been without the World War II alliance that defeated Nazi Germany and its allies, or how crucial the Israeli–American alliance has been to Middle East politics. This book focuses specifically on the alliances of one authoritarian regime, the Syrian Arab Republic. How did leaders in Damascus choose their allies? Were their choices driven by systemic or domestic considerations?
The argument
The question I seek to answer in this book is rather straightforward: what factors drove the Syrian state to form or break its alliances? Most of the explanations of Syrian (and more broadly Middle Eastern) alliances provided by the literature are based on structural realist or constructivist approaches. According to the former, alliances are mainly a reaction to a growth in power or threat by regional or international actors. For proponents of the latter, ideology, identity and perceptions (and in the case of Syria its Pan-Arabism) shape foreign policy and alliances. Both explanations, however, capture only partially the complex nature of Syrian alliances. Syrian foreign policy and alliances were clearly shaped by the difficult geopolitical environment in which the Syrian state found itself from its foundation. Surrounded by bigger and often hostile neighbours, Damascus often had to ‘balance against threats’. Ideology, however, also played an important role. During most of the 1960s, Syria had been the maverick of Arab politics, a bastion of radical Pan-Arab ideology. Syrian policy-makers had shown a high degree of hostility towards other Arab powers, accused them of a lack of commitment towards the Pan-Arab cause. This changed sharply in the following decades, when Syrian foreign policy lost its ideological nature.
An approach based on neoclassical realism will allow a focus on the interaction of international and domestic factors and its effect on the alliances of Syria. This research maintains that the alliance choices of Syria have to be analysed within the broader context of a reshaping of the country’s foreign policy. Syria’s regional goal changed from unlimited to limited revisionism, leading to an adjustment in its alliance pattern. This change was a result of both systemic and domestic factors. The regional dynamics and unfavourable balance of power in the Middle East system shaped the alliance choices of Syria. This unfavourable balance of power was worsened by the 1967 rout at the hands of Israel. Despite this resounding defeat, Syrian foreign policy did not immediately adjust to the new situation on the ground. On the contrary, the Jadid regime in power during the last years of the decade pushed Syria towards more radical positions. Significant changes to Syrian foreign policy and alliances only took place in 1970 when the new regime led by Hafez Al-Assad took power.
Methodology and contribution
This book builds a model of alliances in order to explain the choices of the Syrian Arab Republic during the years between 1963 and 1989. A model differs from a theory as it does not seek to find ‘laws’ that apply to all cases but has the (rather less ambitious) goal to explain more specific phenomenon or phenomena. The model built by this analysis seeks to explain how an authoritarian regime chooses its allies. It recognises that alliance formation is a multi-layered and complex phenomenon. It therefore seeks to ‘simplify’ its different dimensions and provide a linear yet comprehensive explanation of the alliance process.
The model of the book is based on the neoclassical realist paradigm. The study is based in neoclassical realism inasmuch as it seeks to re-introduce some of the topics and analytical features of classical realism that had been left out from the realist mainstream with the positivist and structural turn. Neoclassical realism has been chosen because it allows the author to incorporate a domestic factor within a realist (and structural) based analysis. Classical and neoclassical realism are theories of foreign policy as well as theories of International Relations: a model based on these theories is therefore a better fit for a study that seeks to analyse outcomes at a state rather than systemic level.
This research is qualitative and based on the use of a limited number of case studies: one state and its key relationships. The analysis is divided in two parts: the first provides an overview of the foreign policy of the country to illustrate the change from unlimited to limited revisionism. The second part focuses on Syria’s key relationships. For each alliance, the book provides a historical analysis in order to explain the formation, strengthening or termination of the alliance itself. The use of qualitative analysis and a small number of case studies presents both advantages and disadvantages. The use of quantitative analysis and statistical methods might have offered a broader, more comprehensive analysis of the issue. A mixed approach, using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, might have therefore been preferable for a study that aimed to create a theory of alliance formation in the mould of the balance of power. A qualitative approach has been chosen because of the specific focus of this study. This book focuses on the interaction between systemic and domestic factors. The complexity of this interaction would have been harder to capture in a quantitative analysis. The focus on a small set of alliances will allow an analysis of the details of the ‘complex’ relationship between systemic and domestic dimensions.
The six case studies of this book are Syria’s relationships with Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia (also referred to as the KSA), Iran and the Soviet Union (referred to throughout this volume also as the USSR). This is by no means a comprehensive list of all the alliances of Syria. These case studies have been chosen because of their relevance based on two criteria.1 The first is the presence of an alliance or a temporary alignment between the country and Syria during the period of this study. Countries such as Israel or Turkey, that had no relations or only hostile ones with Damascus during the years of this study, have been excluded. The second factor is the country’s influence in the Levant sub-region during the period of this study. Countries such as Algeria have entertained positive relations with Syria, but because of their distance and relative lack of involvement in the Levant region, their influence remained largely symbolic. An extra-regional power such as the USSR has therefore been included because of its important role in regional politics.
The dates of the study have been chosen because of their relevance in Syrian and Middle Eastern politics. In 1963 the Ba’th party took power for the first time in the country. The Ba’th has ruled the country continuously since the 1963 coup d’état. The year 1989 is an important date for the Middle East as it is for world politics. During the Cold War the competition between the two superpowers had strongly influenced regional politics. In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, the Syrian regime had to readjust its foreign policy to a unipolar Middle East. This systemic change will represent the cutting off point for this study, although Chapter 11 of this volume will include a discussion of the alliances of Syria after 1989.
This research relies mostly on secondary sources. These include the main works on the modern history and politics of the Middle East and the Levant. The rich literature on the politics and external relations of Syria, as well as on other Middle Eastern countries, is also widely used. These secondary sources are in some sections complemented with newspaper and magazine articles from the period covered by this study.
This book seeks to contribute to two separate literatures. The first is the study of the alliances of Syria, and more broadly to the field of Interna...
