Plastic now pollutes our entire Planet.
Governments are trying to tackle the environmental catastrophe⊠and this is hurting some businesses.
It is all proving that the move away from waste is going to be a struggle.
The move will save a lot of money in the long run, but big business is only interested in profits. Shareholders focus on the short-term.
And⊠we are forever encouraged to consume.1
Making money is the centerpiece of corporate responsibility, according to Milton Friedman. Thus, the (value) clash between environmental concerns and the business-as-usual view goes to the very core of the controversy and conflict that this chapter addresses, as will be explicated in the following paragraphs and sections. At the same time, the complexity of the stakeholder divide is such as to give rise to a number of crucial mergers, meaning that critical questions about the depth and relevancy of their differences may be inescapable.
Stakeholder doctrine or theory has a very recent origin in that R. Edward Freemanâs Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (1984) is commonly construed as the alternative to Friedman and similar laissez-faire capitalists who support a Privatize-Deregulate-Decentralize program. Referring explicitly to Freeman as âthe father of stakeholder theoryâ, Norman E. Bowie contrasts Freemanâs approach to business management with so-called âstockholder theoryâ.2 Like Freemanâs stakeholder theory, this concerns the parties, be they individuals or groups, which deserve recognition and consideration for the specific objective of managing the business. However, unlike the broad criteria that theorists like Freeman adopt and endorse, the relevant defenders of traditional business interests take a ânarrowâ view by virtue of ascribing primacy to investors, ie stockholders or shareholders as stakeholders.3 Therefore, the responsibilities of managers consist first and foremost in acting as their agents. In the event that there are no monetary or market interests at stake, the profit versus humanity tension comes to define the relationship between shareholders and those (non-shareholders) who cannot be counted as stakeholders on narrow terms. Broad stakeholder theory opposes this, in part, because the implied exclusivity makes it impossible to account for the modern business environment as an empirical phenomenon.4 Thus, managers must and, mutatis mutandis, should be broad or holistic in their approach and outlook, in effect, to avoid being left behind. Realistically and pragmatically, they should consider anybody who can affect or is affected by the activity or policy of the business, firm, corporation or organization as stakeholders.5 Besides real-world necessity and effectiveness as regards the goal of doing and staying in business successfully, a broad approach and outlook also secures an idealist component, though; and this commits managers to manage the business on the basis of values, including values that derive from singular and substantive morality (cf ethics). Unlike the narrow stakeholder versionâs declared respect for ethical customs and the deconstruction of value objectivity that results from an analysis of the Privatize-Deregulate-Decentralize program, broad stakeholder theorists do not reduce all (market) preferences to wants, nor do they accept the consequences of such a meta-strategy, inter alia, the idea that important values like freedom are linked with subjectivist and/or relativist philosophies that, in turn, explain why that particular individual or that particular group are owed rights that match liberal or libertarian perceptions â whereas yet other rights (allegedly) fall outside the domain of valid claims. The main point is that the broad line of reasoning has a universal and humanistic foundation for freedom and liberty (although the objects of the rights permit second-order diversity or variation); and reapplies this across the value-spectrum. Furthermore, broad stakeholder theorists are skeptical about the (narrow) private/public contrast as a phenomenon that imputes an inevitable value clash, as if the interests of the government or, even more broadly, the community are bound to pull in the opposite direction of our good; with stakes in autonomy (as opposed to hegemony), self-determination (as opposed to Big Government) and non-interference (as opposed to third-party control) and, on the other and broad side of the divide, welfare (as opposed to (in)human vulnerability through unmet basic human needs), solidarity (as opposed to strict individualism and/or group egoism), and cooperation (as opposed to competition over scarce resources).
In the case of both versions of stakeholder theory, however, a certain âmissing linkâ can be observed.6 More precisely, to make the leap from business management to international law, stakeholder theory has to be supplemented with additional premises to make transferrable frameworks possible, even if these do not provide exhaustive accounts of the realm. Since neither narrow nor broad stakeholder theory was originally designed to accommodate general jurisprudence, it is hardly surprising that such a (re)constructivist effort can only be stretched so far. That said, attempts to formulate a âstakeholder jurisprudenceâ have to contain answers to at least some of the key questions with which legal experts access their disciplineâs interpretative platform.7 The list includes inquiries into philosophical topics like: (1) âWhat is international law?â thereby inquiring about international lawâs nature and origin and, ipso facto, its sources of norm-creation and, as an aspect of this, the difference (if any) between legislation and adjudication;8 (2) âWherein lies international lawâs purpose?â thereby inquiring about necessary and immanent properties; (3) âAre moral principles conditions for the legal validity of the system of international norms?â thereby inquiring about that same systemâs legitimacy and/or authority in a manner that may or may not debunk the distinction between conceptual and normatively-substantive questions;9 (4) âWhat is the relationship between international law and national law?â thereby inquring about international lawâs status, in addition to its (possible) distinctiveness or unique character; (5) âWhat are the limits for state sovereignty?â thereby inquiring about the constituent elements of international jurisdiction, something which, in turn, gives rise to questions about; (6) the scope of responsibility-ascriptions and accountability-securing strategies in the event of norm-violation (tribunals, courts, etc) and â in the cases where the accused are found guilty of crimes â questions about the consequences that attach or should attach, namely; (7) âWhat are the offendersâ debts and just deserts?â thereby inquiring about the victim-satisfaction that is owed under international law, together with the legal/moral need for punishment (cf retribution), or alternatively; (8) the provision of non-punitive measures that secure future peace and security as goals, inter alia, deterrence, rehabilitation of offenders, and social reconciliation, thereby also inquiring about the stakes of the community and, furthermore; (9) the rationale for generalized consideration, an aspect which may not only draw on law and morality, but also on democracy, thereby extending the inquiry to questions about; (10) global(-ization) imperatives for the regulation of the behavior of states, such as âDoes participartory politics constitute a requirement at the national and international level?â10
