The Chinese Communist Party in Action

Consolidating Party Rule

Lance L.P. Gore, Zheng Yongnian

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367198961
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429534188
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

Much is written about China and the role of the Chinese Communist Party, but without exploring in detail the nature of the party and how it operates. This book provides an in-depth assessment of the current state of the Chinese Communist Party. It outlines the huge size of the party – 88 million members with 4.3 million organizations at the grassroots level. It sets out how the party has developed over time, how the party is organized and how its ideology is formed and transmitted. It discusses how the party acts in the different areas of China's economy, society and government, at local, regional and national levels. It explores the party's role in the formation of policy, including foreign policy, and assesses the impact of different factions and of the current anti-corruption campaign. Overall, the book demonstrates how embedded the Communist Party is in all aspects of Chinese economy, society and politics, and how its position continues to be consolidated.

Part I

Overview

1 The Chinese Communist Party

An interpretation

Zheng Yongnian

This chapter attempts to provide a cultural-institutional interpretation of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and demonstrate how the CCP, conditioned by the Chinese culture, has been actively undertaking efforts to consolidate itself in the form of modern emperorship, namely, the one-party system, by institutionalizing its relations with other political and social actors. During this process, the CCP has accommodated democratic elements to respond to the changing socio-economic and political demands of the Chinese population, albeit not to the point of transforming itself into a political party like those in the West, or embracing a western type of democracy.

The CCP’s openness or inclusiveness has enabled it to accommodate democratic elements. “Democratic accommodation,” however, is not “democracy.” Democracy, as is commonly understood in the West, has certain distinctive features such as having free and competitive elections on a periodic basis, a multi-party system, checks and balances, and respect for civil liberties including freedom of political expression, freedom of speech and freedom of the press. By contrast, “democratic accommodation,” as it is used in this chapter, refers to the process of introducing democratic elements or features to an existing political system which is widely regarded as non-democratic. In this case, the CCP may introduce certain democratic elements but this should not be readily construed as the CCP committing itself to the ideals of democracy per se. Rather, by accommodating democratic elements, the CCP could continue to dominate over other political and social actors.

The chapter is divided into several sections. In the first two sections, I will define the CCP as an open political process and identify the institutions and means that the CCP uses to operate this process. In the next three sections, I will explain why the CCP can be interpreted from a cultural perspective before I explore how the CCP has transformed itself from traditional emperorship to a modern organization. In the following sections, I discuss how the CCP in the contemporary era has developed into an organization characterized by what I call “internal pluralism” which has enabled it to integrate Chinese traditional meritocracy and modern elements of democracy.

The CCP as an open political process

In the West, scholars simply refer to China’s political system as the one-party system. They believe that the fall of this system is inevitable simply because checks and balances do not exist in this system. The issue is to explain how the CCP has sustained itself and survived in drastically changing environments. To understand the sustainability of the CCP, we have to make sense of what the CCP is and how it organizes itself and its relations with other actors. The nature of the CCP affects its longevity. Elsewhere, I have discussed why the CCP is a transformed modern emperorship. It is highly organized emperorship which exercises domination over the state and society.¹ In other words, the CCP is an entirely different breed of political party from those in the West, wielding power in a similar way to that of Chinese emperors in the past.

I interpret China’s one-party system as a “hegemonic regime,” in Robert Dahl’s term.² A hegemony is a system in which one man or one organization rules the country. To understand the political process of China’s one-party system is to understand the process of what I call “hegemonization.” Hegemonization is the key feature of the CCP and its relations with other political and social actors. It involves two dimensions, namely, domination and legitimation. More concretely, the term “hegemonization” connotes three basic tendencies. First, the CCP wants to maintain its domination over other political and social actors. Second, it maintains its domination by accommodating other political and social actors and soliciting their loyalty. Third, hegemonization is therefore an effective tool of legitimation. In this context, I argue that changing relations between the CCP and other political and social actors is a dual process of domination and legitimation. This dual process indicates that the CCP embraces an open and inclusive political system.

Arguing for hegemonization as an effective mode of legitimation places its emphasis on the interaction between the CCP and other political and social actors. By doing so, I attempt to highlight the following points. First, the interaction between the CCP and other political and social actors is not a zero-sum game. Although hegemonization implies the CCP’s domination of other political and social actors, other actors are not completely powerless as for the situation to be otherwise would deny the CCP of its legitimacy. Second, these actors are active in this process, just as the CCP is. Politics is relational, so is power. Legitimation means that the CCP solicits loyalty from other political and social actors through non-coercive means, with their voluntary acceptance. The two processes of domination and legitimation are struggles between the CCP and other political and social actors. Third, hegemonization is thus a dynamic process of mutual transformation between the CCP and other political and social actors. To acquire legitimacy through hegemonization does not mean that the CCP can simply impose its will on other actors, or that these actors accept CCP domination without resistance or negotiations with the CCP. It is an interactive process between the two actors, and their continuous interactions lead to mutual transformation. Figure 1.1 elaborates the dual process of domination and legitimation, a process established by the CCP to maintain a hegemonic political order.

Figure 1.1 Hegemonization: domination and legitimation.

Source: created by the author. See Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 134.

The left column in Figure 1.1 represents the dual process of domination and legitimation of the CCP over other political and social actors. “A” represents the CCP, and A¹, A², A³ … represent other political and social actors such as the state (including the government, the National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultant Conference), mass organizations (e.g., the Chinese Communist Youth League, the All China Federation of Trade Unions and the Women’s Federation) and other social organizations (e.g., chambers of commerce and various forms of non-governmental organization). By accommodating other political and social actors within the boundary of the hegemony, the CCP solicits loyalty from them and their acceptance makes these actors a part of the political process.

Moreover, the CCP is a part of society, the sphere in which it organizes consent and hegemony. According to Antonio Gramsci, if one organization is to become hegemonic, it has to combine the interests of other organizations and social forces with its own interests so as to create a national and popular collective will.³ Similarly, the CCP cannot achieve national leadership, and become a hegemonic organization, if it confines itself only to its own organizational interests or the interests of other political and social actors upon which it has built its hegemonic position. Instead, to sustain and reproduce its hegemonic position across different historical periods, the CCP has to transcend other interests by taking into account the aims and interests of other political and social forces, linking these with its own interests to become their “universal” representative. By doing so, the CCP realizes a dual process of domination and legitimation in its relations with social forces.

Society, however, is also the sphere where the subordinate social forces could organize their opposition, struggle for power and construct an alternative hegemony – a counter-hegemony. The right column of Figure 1.1 points to a possible counter-hegemony. When the CCP is challenged or perceives that it is challenged by different actors within a possible counter-hegemony (e.g., B, B¹, B², B³ …), it tends to use coercive measures against these actors. It is at this juncture that the CCP departs from the practice of all political organizations in the liberal-democratic model where political pluralism is the norm. In the case of the CCP, it does not allow a counter-hegemony to develop. Achieving that goal through coercive measures is not always effective and may indeed be counterproductive due to changing socio-economic environments. Therefore, while not surrendering the option to use coercive measures at any point in time, the CCP actively engages and transforms social forces by accommodating them. The CCP is increasingly embracing an open and inclusive political process and is characterized by what I call “internal pluralism,” a process which will be discussed in the later section. In this same process, the CCP realizes self-transformation. To understand the nature of this openness, institutions and means that the CCP has employed to deal with other players have to be identified, in addition to coercion.

CCP as an open process: its institutions and means

Those who have predicted the inevitable fall of the CCP tend to have overwhelmingly emphasized the role of coercion as the means which the CCP employs in its interaction with other political and social actors. If this is the case, confrontation between the CCP and other actors becomes inevitable; so does the fall of the CCP. However, if hegemonization is a dual process of legitimation and domination, as defined in this chapter, it is not difficult to find other non-coercive means or institutions that the CCP employs in interacting with other actors. At least, two other means or institutions, namely, bargaining and reciprocity, could be identified. Coercion, bargaining and reciprocity have formed a coherent body of institutions that governs the CCP’s relations with other political and social players. Table 1.1 outlines the main characteristics of these three institutions and how they affect the CCP’s relations with other players.

Table 1.1 Institutions of legitimation and domination

Institutions	Justification	Motives	Process	Goal
Coercion	Necessity of unified leadership and centralization	Party control and coordination	Personnel appointment and campaign, and so on.	Forced local compliance
Bargaining	Mutually advantageous	Self-interest	Negotiations	Conflict resolution
Reciprocity	Mutually acceptable	Justification to other, obligation	Self-adjustment, deliberation	Voluntary cooperation

Source: created by author. See Zheng Yongnian, The Chinese Communist Party as Organizational Emperor: Culture, Reproduction and Transformation (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 134.

Broadly speaking, these three institutions can be defined as follows:

• Coercion can be defined as a process in which the CCP employs coercive means such as the nomenklatura system, massive campaigns and direct control to solicit compliance from other players. If the CCP perceives the possibility of the formation of a counter-hegemony or a direct threat to the regime, it will appeal to the most coercive means, namely, crackdown, to eliminate the possibility. Coercion is unilateral, aiming at guaranteeing the CCP’s control over other players, and thus maintaining its survival and domination.

• Bargaining is a process in which the two actors (the CCP and other players) resolve conflicts between them through various forms of bargaining. It is bilateral and both sides utilize their resources to promote their mutual interests or to maximize their respective interests. Bargaining has been widely employed by both the CCP and other players, both governmental and non-governmental organizations.

• Reciprocity refers to a process in which the two actors (the CCP and other players) achieve voluntary cooperation between them through self-adjustment and deliberation. Reciprocity is based on obligation, with each side behaving in a mutually acceptable way or with each side’s behaviour justifiable to the other side.

By taking bargaining and reciprocity into consideration, not only the functioning ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• Introduction
• PART I: Overview
• PART II: Organizational and ideological integration
• PART III: Elite politics in the reform era
• PART IV: The party in the state, society and economy
• PART V: The party and foreign policy
• Index