The Evolving Relationship between China, the EU and the USA

A New Global Order?

Jing Men, Simon Schunz, Duncan Freeman, Jing Men, Simon Schunz, Duncan Freeman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429649295
• Subtopic: Diplomacy & Treaties
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book closely scrutinizes the individual and collective roles played by China, the EU and the USA in contemporary world politics.

Examining the three actors' respective strategic and policy positions on and behaviour towards the flux of the contemporary global order, the analysis focuses on three major issues and challenges: foreign and security policy; economics and trade; and climate change and energy. Discussing their relative power, as well as their interests, beliefs and positions on a set of decisive issues, this book explores bilateral relations between the three powers and the ways in which they may interact trilaterally in a broader global context to shape international politics.

Written by a stellar line-up of experts from the fields of politics and international relations, The Evolving Relationship between China, the EU and the USA will be of huge interest to students and scholars from within these fields, as well as policy-makers and practitioners more generally.

Part I
Introduction

1 Introduction

Jing Men, Simon Schunz and Duncan Freeman

Introduction: global politics in flux

Ever since the dawn of the millennium, global politics has been very much ‘in flux’ (Posen 2012; Lieber 2016). Power shifts are underway that point to a relative decline of Western players, especially the United States (US) and the European Union (EU), vis-à-vis emerging actors such as China, whose growing, especially economic clout has led to demands for a greater say in global politics (Quinn 2011; Subramanian 2011; Walt 2011; White 2013; Chen 2016). Although the debate about the ‘decline of the West, rise of the rest’ is far from settled (Zakaria 2009; Lieber 2012; Nye 2012), it is undeniable that global politics is becoming more multipolar across a variety of issue areas, with the centre of gravity increasingly shifting from the Atlantic to the Asia-Pacific. While the precise contours of a new global order that is to substitute the Western, transatlantic model of liberal institutionalism have yet to take shape, it seems highly likely that its parameters will be strongly determined by the interactions, whether cooperative or confrontational, of major powers.

This edited volume sets out to contribute to the debate on the prospects of a novel global order by focusing on the individual and collective agency of a set of such major powers, based on the premise that they are among the ones who will decisively shape future global structures. It focuses on three players that are already key to contemporary global politics given their overall economic, political and security primacy and bound to remain central to it in the future: one player which has been dominating the post-WWII international system (the US), a second actor that has (re-)‘risen’ in the last couple of decades (China) and a third one whose constitutive parts dominated global politics in the 19th and early 20th centuries and which has become a global actor in its own right since the fall of the Iron Curtain but is now struggling to keep up with global developments (the EU). The volume discusses these actors’ relative power and their interests, beliefs and positions on a small set of decisive issues as well as the foreign policy strategies – grounded in domestic politics – they deploy both vis-à-vis each other and towards major global political challenges. In so doing, it examines their bilateral relations, but also – where applicable – the way they interact trilaterally in a broader global context to shape global politics.

This introductory chapter prepares the ground for the various contributions to this volume by outlining its rationale, including the choice of key themes, and briefly foreshadowing its contents.

Examining the evolving relationship between China, the EU and the US

In a global political context that is in flux, key actors are equally in the process of re-constructing their roles and strategies so as to enhance their chances of impacting global structures on issues considered relevant. China, the EU and the US are no exception to this rule.

Each of them has only recently engaged in revisions of its strategic outlook on the changing global context. China has in many respects been well served by the structure of international relations of the post-Mao period after it adopted a policy of ‘reform and opening’ under Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s. Although dominated by and designed for Western powers, especially after the fall of the Soviet Union, the system permitted China the space to pursue its focus on economic development and cautious global engagement under Deng’s slogan of ‘keeping a low profile and biding our time’. Nevertheless, China has been forced to address its increasing global importance, for instance through the use of the formulation of its ‘peaceful rise’ under President Hu Jintao. Global developments, especially shifts in economic power in the past decade following the economic crisis that began in 2008, and the advent of a new leadership under Xi Jinping, have prompted new policies and formulations that raise questions over their intent. As a primary beneficiary of economic globalisation, China has reiterated its commitment to the globalised economy, while asserting that reform is necessary (Xi 2017). At the same time China under Xi has declared with greater clarity its intention to occupy a role at the centre of the global system. While declaring its support for the existing order, its policies such as the Belt and Road Initiative, which is said to consist of policy coordination, infrastructure connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people exchanges, but which is also claimed to provide global public goods and even global governance, and concepts advanced such as the ‘community of a shared destiny for mankind’ offer an ambiguous at best token of China’s actual commitment to global institutions that it argues require democratisation. China’s official strategic doctrine remains largely defensive, but its rise evinced through increased economic, technological and military power poses unresolved questions in its relations with other actors.

In the case of the EU, a thorough analysis of the implications of multipolarity for the conduct of its foreign policy (EEAS 2015) resulted in a strategic re-orientation that is embodied in the 2016 EU Global Strategy (High Representative 2016). Contrary to its past desire to ‘upload’ its own model to the global stage, strive for ‘effective multilateralism’ (European Council 2003) and shape ‘what is considered as normal’ – in line with its image as a ‘normative power’ (Manners 2002) – the EU has become a more ‘modest’ global player in reaction to changing global geopolitics and in the wake of the financial and economic crises. The central concept of its Global Strategy is arguably the notion of ‘principled pragmatism’, which in practice translates into an approach intended to ‘partner selectively with players whose cooperation is necessary to deliver global public goods and address common challenges’ (High Representative 2016: 12). Having such a strategy of ‘issue-specific partnering’ and actually implementing it are two different steps in the foreign policy cycle, however (Brighi & Hill 2012), which is why the Union’s de facto adaptation to the new global context must remain subject to empirical scrutiny for the time being.

Finally, US foreign policy had undergone a pragmatic shift during the Obama era (2009–2017), which paired an attempt to ‘lead from behind’ on security issues with a ‘globalist approach’ relying on multilateralism on economic and other issues such as climate change (Tocci & Alcaro 2014: 370; White House 2015). Under President Trump, the US then moved towards a perception of multipolarity as a primarily competitive scenario. The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy translates the President’s ‘America First’ agenda into a foreign policy guided by ‘principled realism’, which combines sovereignty concerns and hard power display with opposition to multilateralism (White House 2017). Just like the EU’s foreign policy, Trump’s strategic rhetoric and external action may not always be congruent, requiring empirical scrutiny.

As each of these players is trying to (re)define its place in a global context that is rapidly changing (partially in reaction to their own doings), their bi- and trilateral relationship(s) are also evolving. Where the EU-US relationship was arguably of central significance for much of the post-WWII period, it has increasingly come under pressure, notably by the rise of the BRICS including China (Tocci & Alcaro 2014). The resilience of transatlantic relations, and that of the institutions created by the US and Europe at the global and regional levels to pursue their interests and shared values – from the United Nations (UN) to the Bretton Woods institutions and the security architecture built around the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) – is increasingly put to the test. Since at least the 2000s, and in reaction to this pressure, both the EU and the US have therefore inter alia intensified their bilateral relations with major emerging economies. China has taken a very prominent place in this regard.

EU-China relations evolve around an intricate dialogue structure that was developed in the wake of the 2003 EU-China ‘Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, which has been broadened and deepened ever since, notably in line with the EU-China 2020 ‘Strategic Agenda for Cooperation’ (EU-China 2013). The EU’s strategy has from the start acknowledged China as a competitor, but also saw it as a potential collaborator in global politics. In March 2019, a Commission communication on ‘EU-China – A strategic outlook’ assessed the EU’s relations with China as follows (European Commission 2019: 1):

China is, simultaneously, in different policy areas, a cooperation partner with whom the EU has closely aligned objectives, a negotiating partner with whom the EU needs to find a balance of interests, an economic competitor in the pursuit of technological leadership, and a systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance. This requires a flexible and pragmatic whole-of-EU approach enabling a principled defence of interests and values.

This points to an ambiguous relationship involving delicate balancing acts as the EU and the China move into the 2020s, heavily conditioned by the global role of the US.

Turning to the US’ relations with China, the Obama era witnessed an intensification of relations. Obama’s self-depiction as the ‘US first Pacific President’ and his country’s ‘pivot to Asia’ also meant a certain rapprochement with China, which remained however simultaneously a competitor that had to be ‘rebalanced’ (Davidson 2014; Silove 2016). The Trump administration’s assessment of China is then again a wholly different one: as US President, Trump has repeatedly denounced what in his view constitute unfair trade practices by China. His 2017 National Security Strategy goes as far as considering China as one among several ‘rival powers … aggressively undermining American interests around the globe’ (White House 2017: preface).

From China’s perspective, the relationships with the EU and the US constitute important elements of its view of the global system, but they are far from being seen in equal terms. The relationship with the US has long been the prevalent concern of China. The US, as the primary global power, dominates China’s economic and security concerns. China has sought to avoid direct conflict and confrontation and insists that a cooperative relationship is possible, based on the formulation of a ‘new type of great power relationship’ advanced by Xi Jinping. The EU is seen as having less potential for a conflictual relationship than the US, primarily due to its lack of direct security presence in East Asia. The EU is considered to be an economic partner, although this also brings potential for both cooperation and friction.

After coming to power, Xi Jinping promoted the concept of a ‘new type of great power relationship’ with Washington and received Trump in Beijing. The Chinese government asserts that cooperation with the US is necessary for China’s development. At the same time, the Chinese government actively promotes its political system, economic model and culture in contrast to the US while seeking to revitalise its national dream of power and prosperity within the current international order. Therefore, its leadership is eager to maintain a stable and workable partnership with the US and emphasises shared interests between the two sides. The first two decades of the 21st century are regarded as ‘a period of important strategic opportunity’ for China, but with the US designating China as a strategic rival and escalation of a US-China economic war that has been looming since the beginning of the Trump presidency, the Chinese government is concerned that Sino-US relations will be defined by confrontation.

While China considers the EU an important international player, its importance is not comparable with that of the US. Therefore, the Sino-EU partnership is always influenced by the Sino-US relationship. For instance, in 2003 the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the EU and China was created partly in reaction to US unilateral action in Iraq against the opposition of major EU member states. In 2005, the EU proposal to lift its arms embargo against China was abandoned to a large degree due to the pressure from the US. For its part, prompted by the election of President Trump and the increasing conflict in the relationship with the US, China has sought to find common ground with the EU, notably on global governance matters such as trade and climate change, but significant differences remain, evidenced by the EU, at least partially, defining China as a ‘systemic rival’ in 2019.

Taking their current strategic and policy positions on and behaviour towards the aforementioned fluidity and each other as a starting point, this edited volume intends to closely scrutinise the individual and collective roles played by China, the EU and the US as the three corners of what can be referred to as a ‘global triangle’ in contemporary world politics. It does so by focusing on three major issues representing key challenges for each of them and for global politics on the whole: foreign and security policy, economics and trade and climate change and energy. The choice of these issues seems intuitive, as they cover essential areas of global politics related to key needs common to all of humanity: security, prosperity and the planet’s material living conditions. Each of them constitutes a field of global governance in which major powers have particular responsibility for providing leadership – assuming that the joint management of security, of economic globalisation so as to guarantee citizens’ prosperity and well-being, and the stewardship of global resources are indeed in their collective interest.

Each of these issue areas is examined in a doubly ‘de-centred’ fashion (Fisher-Onar & Nicolaïdis 2013) that does not privilege either the perspective of one of the three analysed players or that of traditional Western International Relations (IR). Rather, it attempts to give each actor’s perspective equal weight while remaining committed to conceptual and theoretical pluralism. First, when it comes to decentring in the sense of a plurality of actor perspectives, this volume examines the ‘triangle’ from the point of view of each of its corners, that is, for each policy domain the triangle is analysed – in three different chapters – through a prism focusing on China, the EU and the US, respectively. Each chapter is written by one or more scholars with expertise on one of the three players, and who in most cases also hail(s) from that country/region. This pluralism of perspectives is intended as a step towards an analysis that perceives the future of the global order as a largely ‘open terrain’ that – while building on existing institutions and practices – might be shaped by new ideas and practices emanating from each of the three players or evolve through their continued interaction.

Second, decentring is pursued by opting for an agnostic approach to the choice of conceptual-theoretical lenses through which to study the China-EU-US relationship and its contribution to global order. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Pages
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• List of abbreviations and acronyms
• Part I Introduction
• Part II Foreign and security policy
• Part III Economics and trade
• Part IV Climate change and energy
• Part V Conclusion
• Index