The Unwinding of Apartheid: UK-South African Relations, 1986-1990

Documents on British Policy Overseas, Series III, Volume XI

Patrick Salmon, Martin Jewitt, Patrick Salmon, Martin Jewitt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429994845
• Topic: Historia
• Subtopic: Historia africana

This volume examines diplomatic relations between the United Kingdom and South Africa from 1986 to 1990, when deadlock gave way to the first stages in the unwinding of apartheid.

By the middle of 1986, the South African Government had succeeded in containing the township revolt, but its hesitant moves towards reform had brought the end of apartheid no closer. The intransigent figure of President P.W. Botha ensured a continuing stalemate until his reluctant departure from office in August 1989. The subsequent election of F.W. de Klerk marked the beginning of irrevocable change, symbolised by the release of Nelson Mandela from prison in February 1990. This volume documents the role of the United Kingdom in keeping pressure on the South African Government, building contacts with the African National Congress (ANC) and giving decisive encouragement to President de Klerk's reform initiatives. It reveals recurrent differences of approach between the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. However, it also shows that despite her frequent confrontations with the international community in general, and the Commonwealth in particular, Mrs Thatcher repeatedly brought pressure to President Botha and strongly supported President de Klerk during his first crucial months in office. Her part in bringing about change in South Africa was fully appreciated by Nelson Mandela, whose first meeting with Mrs Thatcher concludes the volume.

This book will be of much interest to students of British politics, African studies, foreign policy and International Relations in general.

Chapter I
Sanctions and Stalemate

August 1986 – December 1987

No. 1 Minute from Mr Culshaw to Mr Fergusson, 7 August 1986¹ Confidential (FCO 105/2352, JSS 020/5 Part D)

South Africa: Longer Term View

At his last meeting with FCO Ministers before departing on holiday, the Secretary of State discussed longer term prospects for South Africa. He is keen that our necessary preoccupation with the immediate pressures and problems should not prevent us taking a longer term view of South Africa. He has in mind that this should be done entirely within the FCO, and not with undue haste. The aspects which he has mentioned as deserving of inclusion in any analysis are:

—the likely effect of measures agreed at the Commonwealth Review Meeting;²

—the possible impact of further, more severe, measures;

—internal pressures on the South African Government to accelerate the rate of reform;

—the capacity of the Front Line States to step up the pressure on South Africa, including by the application of sanctions;

—the danger that conflict in South Africa along racial lines could escalate and in time become tantamount to civil war;

—the likely attitude of Western countries, and in particular our European partners, if armed conflict did become widespread in that way;

—the impact of such a deteriorating situation on British public opinion and therefore on HMG’s policy options.

I must stress that the above represents only examples of aspects of the problem which the Secretary of State believes to be important. He has not taken a view on what shape any such study should have, nor has he examined in detail the copious amount of work which has been done on these subjects in the past. He feels, however, that since the Review Meeting is now behind us, there may be a small breathing space in which analysis of these longer term problems can begin. The ‘Doomsday’ possibilities, which should not be ignored, will need of course to be treated with particular discretion.

R.N. CULSHAW

No. 2 Minutes from Mr Flesher (No. 10) to the Prime Minister, 14–15 August 1986¹ Confidential (PREM 19/1970)

Tambo

As you know it has been envisaged that the Foreign Secretary would see Tambo before his negotiating mandate runs out at the end of September.² You agreed to this proposal a little while ago but were concerned to ensure that we were not seen to be running after him.

The Foreign Secretary considers that the lapse of time since his own visit to South Africa is sufficient to consider setting up such a meeting, and I gather that there will be an opportunity to make contacts in the next day or two with a view to a meeting in the first week of September. This would be before the informal Foreign Ministers meeting set for the weekend of 6/7 September.

Do you agree that the Foreign Office can begin preliminary contacts to set up a meeting on the timescale I have described?³

TIM FLESHER

Tambo

I have related your comments to the Foreign Office. They say they are very much aware of the need to avoid being seen to run after Tambo and for that reason would prefer the meeting to be in this country. If the meeting was held elsewhere and the Foreign Secretary had to make a special trip, it would look more as if we were paying court to Tambo rather than the other way round. I think there is some force in this argument. It is after all the ANC⁴ who refused to meet the Foreign Secretary in the context of his visit to Southern Africa. If they now see him in this country it will be seen as a climb down by them.

Are you content for the Foreign Office to proceed on the basis of a meeting in this country if one can be arranged without our being seen to run after Tambo?⁵

TIMOTHY FLESHER

No. 3 Sir G. Howe to Sir O. Wright (Washington), 1 September 1986, 5.30 p.m.¹ Tel. No. 1531 Confidential (FCO 105/2388, JSS 021/6 Part B)

From SAfD.

Talks with Crocker.

1. The Secretary of State had 45 minutes of talks with Crocker on the afternoon of 1 September.² These followed discussions and lunch with Fergusson earlier in the day. Following are the main points.

2. Prospects for progress. The Secretary of State said that we remained sceptical whether recent letters from State President Botha to the Prime Minister and President Reagan signified a real shift in the South African position.³ Crocker said that President Reagan had not yet replied but would probably do so this week. The reply would point to the need for clarification of the South African position on a number of issues. The aim would be to avoid closing doors. It would in any case be difficult to do serious business with the South Africans until the current sanctions round had been completed. but (in confidence) Secretary Shultz was likely to pay a visit to the region, including South Africa, in October.

3. Crocker added that the Americans had upped the level of their contacts with the ANC.⁴ Shultz had indicated that he was ready to see Tambo.⁵ The Americans were not chasing the ANC but wanted an opportunity to explore their position. A meeting with Shultz might cause ripples vis-à-vis the South Africans. The Secretary of State said that he himself hoped to see Tambo later this month. He would welcome the opportunity to press the case against violence and for the Africans to make the running on an EPG type formula⁶ (which would have the double advantage of making clear publicly that they were not irrevocably committed to violence and of putting the SAG⁷ on the spot). Crocker agreed that there was a case for urging the ANC to take a constructive initiative rather than just sit and wait.

4. The Secretary of State said that he had been impressed by the range of South Africans he had met, including for example the head of the Broederbond,⁸ who wanted P.W. Botha and his supporters to make a fundamental shift of position. But there was little sign of a change of heart by the State President.⁹ His feeling was that even if the ANC agreed to the South African demand for a formula committing them to abandon rather than suspend violence, this would not be enough for P.W. It was not just a question of semantics. The right formula could only be served as a bridge once the will to negotiate was there. He therefore was personally very cautious. We were not in any event free agents because of our Presidency of the EC. There was not much enthusiasm among our partners for more exploration for the sake of exploration. Events of the past nine months had enhanced the view in Europe that we were in for a long haul and it was better to take things in slower tempo.

5. Congress. Crocker believed that by the time of the Secretary of State’s visit Mr Shultz would be able to offer a clearer picture of how the Administration proposed to handle the current Congressional mess.¹⁰ Of the two options which had been put to the President (the way things were going in Congress, a ‘pocket veto’ appeared out of the question), a further executive order did not appear viable. The alternative was a Presidential veto combined with a statement of what would be acceptable to the President in a repackaged bill. The Secretary of State explained our own likely timetable: discussion among EC Foreign Ministers at the informal weekend at Brocket Hall on 6/7 September followed by a political decision in the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council on 15/16 September. The indications were that our partners would want to hold to the Hague package. Crocker said that this would fit well: the President was unlikely to have to make an announcement before 19/20 September, and it would be better if the Europeans had meanwhile moved first since their position was more moderate.¹¹

6. The Secretary of State asked about the substance of the Administration’s position. Crocker said that air links were regarded as a minor throw-away item. He realised how difficult this issue was for us, but there was no need for all Western countries to adopt precisely the same measures. The Senate bill went well beyond what was acceptable to the Administration. The aim would be to try to reduce its scope. Various import bans were particularly objectionable because of their indiscriminate nature. The Administration would certainly want to eliminate last minute additions such as textiles and agricultural imports. They were seriously concerned about coal, less because of its impact on US/SA trade (the Americans imported very little South African coal) than because of its global impact on South African employment and export base. If the Europeans could take a decision short of the full Hague list of import bans, this would help the Administration greatly. A ban on coal imports would also cause problems for Japan. The Secretary of State thought it most unlikely that anything could be done to avert an EC ban on coal imports. He asked about the inclusion of uranium (and extension of the ban to Namibia) in the Congressional bills. Crocker indicated that the Administration would try to have both put right.

7. Arms Embargo. When the Secretary of State asked about proceedings in the arms embargo committee, Crocker said that there appeared to have been uncertainty on both sides whether the United States and British positions were solidly together. The answer was that we were. The United States supported the restrictive British position on the arms embargo committee and had hoped there would be no negotiation on the working paper. However, the text appeared to have improved by osmosis. The Secretary of State said that if the UK/US vetoed a draft resolution which spelt out what everyone else thought was implicit in the arms embargo it could be very embarrassing. It therefore appeared in our interest to try to improve the text so as to maintain an element of constructive ambiguity. We and the Americans share the same objectives, but it looked as though things had passed the point of easy veto. (Fergusson added that we continued however to have major problems with operative paragraphs 3 and the present working paper.) Crocker said that he would have another look at the instructions to the US mission, which were very restrictive. So far, the issue had not been considered above his level.

8. Voluntary Resolution. The Secretary of State commented that if we were faced with a rerun of SCR 569 there might be some advantage in acquiescing in a further voluntary resolution, insofar as it was becoming increasingly difficult to veto mandatory resolutions which incorporated measures which we were already implementing.¹² Crocker agreed that SCR 569 constituted a precedent. He asked whether we had detected any evidence of reason to expect help from the French. The Secretary of State said their position was enigmatic. Chirac had spoken robustly against sanctions. But the Chirac/Mitterrand double act at The Hague¹³ had been very imprecise and our subsequent impression had been that Raimond¹⁴ was reining back the French position from Chirac towards Mitterrand. Fergusson suggested that the French were trying to play both ends against the middle, particularly since it had become clear that there was no domestic advantage in sticking to the Chirac line.

9. Other matters. Crocker said that if and when the President vetoed whatever bill emerged from Congress he expected the statement to include the following further elements:

(a) the announcement of a new Ambassador (Perkins, as advertised in the press, assuming agrément was forthcoming) to South Africa.¹⁵

(b) a challenge to Congress to help by providing funds (at present unavailable) to develop regional transport links in South Africa, mainly via Mozambique. The aid director had returned from the area with new ideas.

On (b), the Secretary of State said that we had committed funds but security was a problem. His conclusion was that unless the South Africans curtailed the activities of RENAMO or FLS¹⁶ defences improved, the West had reached the limit of what it could do to help. Crocker said that he was not sure that security was the only problem. There was also a need for additional funds. He would like to see an injection of private money (General Motors were talking about moving from Port Elizabeth to Beira).

10. For information addressees. The above is strictly for your background information.

No. 4 Letter from Mr Budd to Mr Powell (No. 10), 4 September 1986¹ Confidential (PREM 19/1970)

Dear Charles,

EC Foreign Ministers' Informal Weekend: South Africa

South Africa is bound to feature prominently in discussion among EC Foreign Ministers at Brocket Hall this weekend. The Foreign Secretary intends to concentrate his colleagues’ minds on how the EC can play a constructive role and on what further efforts can be made to promote genuine dialogue in South Africa. However, given the lack of any real evidence that the South African Government are prepared to take the steps called for in the Hague European Council communiqué, the further restrictive measures listed therein will undoubtedly be discussed.

It was clear from discussion in the Political Committee on 2 September that mo...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Series Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• List of plates
• Abbreviations for printed sources and unpublished documents
• Abbreviated designations
• List of persons
• Document summaries
• I Sanctions and Stalemate August 1986 - December 1987
• II The Long Haul January 1988 - January 1989
• III From P.W. Botha to F.W. de Klerk January - November 1989
• IV The Release of Nelson Mandela December 1989 - July 1990
• Index