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1 Introduction
When Malaysia1 achieved independence in 1957, the 6.3 million people on the Malay Peninsula were almost evenly divided between the indigenous Bumiputeras2 (sons of the soil) and non-Bumiputeras. By 2016, the total population of Malaysia had increased to over 31.7 million (Malaysia 2017) with 61.5 per cent of the total population classified as Bumiputeras. Chinese constitute 21.0 per cent, Indians 6.3 per cent and other Malaysians 0.9 per cent. Non-Malaysian citizens number 3.26 million and comprise 10.3 per cent of the total population. As a multi-ethnic country, the achievement of a cohesive national identity and national integration has been a core goal in Malaysiaâs nation-building process, particularly following the ethnic riots of May 19693.
Contending visions of nation-building
Malaysia became an independent state in 1957; however, the country has been a âstate without a nationâ. Malaysiaâs multi-ethnic society has been characterised by Shamsul (1996 and 1998) as possessing contending visions of nation-building or ânations-of-intentâ based on âtwo social realityâ contexts: âauthority-definedâ social reality (defined by people who are part of the dominant power structure) and âeveryday-definedâ social reality (experienced by the people in the course of their everyday lives). Since the âauthority-definedâ social reality is only observed and interpreted whilst the âeveryday-definedâ social reality is experienced, they are rarely identical (Shamsul 1998, 26). Shamsul (1996, 328 and 1998, 26) defines the ânation-of-intentâ as the form of a nation shared by a number of people who perceive themselves as members of that nation. At the level of an âauthority-definedâ social reality, the ânation-of-intentâ has a Bumiputera-based identity (âauthority-definedâ national identity),4 in which Bumiputera culture is at the core of Malaysian national identity5 (Shamsul 1996, 323 and 1998, 24). At the level of an âeveryday-definedâ social reality, the ânation-of-intentâ is categorised into at least three identities: the non-Bumiputera group, the non-Muslim Bumiputeras6 and the radical Islamic Bumiputeras7 (Shamsul 1996, 324 and 1998, 24). Each group has its own ânation-of-intentâ. The non-Muslim Bumiputeras call for Christianity and native religions to be given equal status to that of Islam, while the radical Islamic Bumiputeras reject the secular and modernist component of national identity in favour of pure Islam (Shamsul 1996, 324 and 1998, 24â25). Both these Bumiputera groups accept the âauthority-definedâ Bumiputera-based national identity in principle. By contrast, the non-Bumiputera group, led mainly by Chinese, favours a more pluralised national identity in which the culture of each ethnic group is accorded equal status.
As the second largest ethnic group, Chinese make up approximately 20 per cent of the population8. In addition, the Chinese community has played a significant role in the Malaysian economy. Thus, the influence of the Chinese ânation-of-intentâ cannot be discounted. Politically, the Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)9 is a component party of the government coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN)10. The BN has been dominated by the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO)11, and the MCAâs influence within the BN has been limited. However, the MCAâs participation has been essential in promoting BNâs multi-ethnic image. The BN has had to balance the communal demands of its component parties to maintain its legitimacy as a multi-ethnic coalition. Furthermore, the BN has needed to be responsive to Chinese demands to prevent the loss of numerous Chinese voters to the opposition Chinese party, the Democratic Action Party (DAP)12. The DAP, which strongly emphasises the defence and development of Chinese interests and identity, has usually been the largest opposition party13. The party is believed to have won approximately 20 per cent of the peninsular votes and approximately 50 per cent of the Chinese votes (Crouch 1996, 71). In the 2008 and 2013 elections, the dynamics of the DAP within the Chinese community became more powerful. The number of DAP parliament seats increased from 12 in the 2004 election to 28 and 38 in the 2008 and 2013 elections, respectively14.
The Chinese community has also contributed significantly to the Malaysian economy. In 2004, they owned 39.0 per cent of the countryâs capital compared to the Bumiputera share of 18.9 per cent15 (Malaysia 2007). An estimated 80 per cent of the small- and medium-size industries in the manufacturing sector, the main engine of the Malaysian economy, are Chinese owned (Lee Kam Hing 1997, 102). Chinese entrepreneurial skills and regional and international business networks have clearly fuelled Malaysiaâs economic growth. The Chinese economic elites have also aided the rise of Malay corporate entrepreneurs (Shamsul 1996, 341). In the shift towards the knowledge economy, Chinese capital and expertise have been crucial. Moreover, the economic importance of China as an investment location and export market has been expanding since the late 1980s. Thus, the government clearly cannot ignore the Chinese communityâs concerns, which include equitable access to economic and educational opportunities, the preservation of Chinese educational institutions and the maintenance of the multi-ethnic fabric of the nation and quasi-secular fabric of the state (Lee Kam Hing 2004a, 178). Therefore, when exploring Malaysiaâs nation-building trajectory, the ânation-of-intentâ of the Chinese community also deserves systematic investigation.
According to Tan Chee Beng (1988, 149â155), the Chinese community can be divided into three categories based on its accommodation of Malay culture and its depth of Chinese identity (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1 Typologies within the Chinese Community
Group A is numerically small, but its leaders, represented by the United Chinese School Teachers Association (UCSTA, Jiao Zong), the United Chinese School Committees Association (UCSCA, Dong Zong)16 and the DAP, exert considerable influence in shaping Chinese opinion (Tan Chee Beng 1988, 154). As active leaders in Chinese education movements, the UCSCA and the UCSTA have been responsible for the administration and operation of Chinese primary schools and have supplemented the governmentâs inadequate funding of those schools, which has resulted in these organisations becoming deeply involved in the Chinese community (Collins 2006, 305 and 317). They have championed the preservation of Chinese culture by upholding the ideals of multiculturalism, including full recognition of the cultural autonomy of non-Malays17. This is believed to be the sine qua non of national integration (Kua 1990, 13) even though some Malay leaders view it as a form of Chinese chauvinism and a threat to national integration (Freedman 1998, 260). Group A is single-mindedly concerned with Chinese interests and identity and resists policies that are believed to undermine Chinese culture and identity. Hence, this group strongly opposes the âauthority-definedâ Bumiputera-based national identity because it does not fully recognise Chinese cultural and educational autonomy (see Figure 1.1).
Most Chinese pragmatically subscribe to Group B. This group tends to be sympathetic to Group A (Tan Chee Beng 1988, 153) while recognising the need to adapt to the social, economic and political environment in Malaysia (Tan Chee Beng 1988, 153). In short, Group B does not seem to have adopted a firm position with respect to the âauthority-definedâ Bumiputera-based national identity (see Figure 1.1).
Group C consists largely of Chinese community leaders from the MCA, other Chinese parties in the BN, such as the Parti Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), and prominent Chinese businessmen who have benefited from the BN system. Whilst the MCA aims to foster, safeguard and advance Chinese interests and strives for equal status for all races18, it also acquiesces to the UMNOâs communal agenda as a pragmatic means of maintaining Chinese cultural autonomy. Therefore, many Chinese have cynically regarded the MCAâs official statement supporting the development of Chinese interests as merely a means of attracting Chinese votes during elections (Heng 1996, 52). Because the MCA has been perceived as not effectively representing Chinese interests (Mead 1988, 31), its influence within the Chinese community has been limited (Tan Chee Beng 1988, 154). Rather than focusing on the preservation of Chinese culture and identity, Group C has particularly strong concerns about socio-economic advancement (Tan Chee Beng 1988, 153). Some Chinese businessmen who have cultivated political links with Malay elites19 are willing to accept the dilution of Chinese cultural identity as long as their economic interests are guaranteed. Group C is completely at odds with the approach of Group A (see Figure 1.1) and is not strongly critical of the âauthority-definedâ Bumiputera-based national identity.
In the process of nation-building, the government has attempted to address the contradictory visions of the âauthority-definedâ Bumiputera-based national identity and the âeveryday-definedâ national identity of the non-Bumiputera group, especially the Group A Chinese20 (i.e., the differences between ânations-of-intentâ based on Malay hegemony and equality). Thus, the real challenge is to explore and establish a middle ground between the âauthority-definedâ Bumiputera-based national identity (an assimilation-based national identity) and the âeveryday-definedâ national identity of the Group A Chinese (a multiculturalism-based national identity) (Shamsul 1996, 346). The formation of a middle ground can contribute to the promotion of national identity and the construction of a cohesive society.
The second Prime Minister (1970â1976), Abdul Razak, implemented the New Economic Policy (NEP)21, called the Bumiputera policy, an ethnic-based affirmative action programme announced in 1971 after the 1969 ethnic riots, with the purpose of promoting social stability as a requirement for national integration. The NEP was based on the principle of Malay dominance. The fourth Prime Minister (1981â2003), Mahathir Mohamad, argued that national integration would be achieved through the emergence of a common Malaynised culture (Mahathir 1970, 98). In other words, Malaysiaâs nation-building process was based on Malay ethno-nationalism (supporting an assimilation approach). However, by the early 1990s, the government had shifted towards a multicultural stance by expanding the scope of cultural autonomy enjoyed by non-Malays. In 1991, Mahathir promulgated the Vision 2020 ideal, which proposed that âMalaysians of all colours and creeds are free to practise and profess their customs, cultures and religious beliefs and yet feel that they belong to one nationâ (Mahathir 28 February 1991, 405) and affirmed that âa united Malaysian nation must be a nation living in harmony and full and fair partnership and made up of one Bangsa Malaysia (the Malaysian nation) with political loyalty and dedication to the stateâ (Mahathir 28 February 1991, 404). Mahathir claimed the need for inclusiveness (recognising non-Malay cultural rights) whilst also maintaining the idea of Malay hegemony (Malay cultural dominance). The fifth Prime Minister (2003â2009), Abdullah Badawi, subsequently noted the importance of enhancing a cohesive national identity by realigning existing strategies and approaches (New Straits Times 4 October 2004). The sixth Prime Minister (2009â2018)22, Najib Razak, has affirmed ...
