Complex Adaptive Systems, Resilience and Security in Cameroon

Manu Lekunze

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781032178066
• eBook ISBN: 9781000020212
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: African History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Complex Adaptive Systems, Resilience and Security in Cameroon comprehensively maps and analyses Cameroon's security architecture to determine its resilience.

The author examines the key actors involved in Cameroon's security and evaluates the organisational structures, before analysing the different security systems that arise from the interplay between the two. He also shows how these security networks can be better conceived as complex adaptive systems, interdependent on other environmental, economic and societal systems. In this regard, security actors become security agents. Finally, arguing that security should be pursed from a resilience perspective, this book seeks to comment on the contemporary situation in Cameroon and its possible trajectory for the future.

Providing a timely assessment of security in Cameroon, this book will be of interest to scholars and students of African politics and Security Studies.

1 Geopolitics, indigenous ambitions and security in Cameroon

Introduction

It is very difficult to understand contemporary security in Cameroon without considering Cameroon’s history and the political and security issues which shaped that history. This chapter invites readers to think about the historical and political context in which contemporary Cameroon and its security systems emerged. In many ways Cameroon’s history is unique compare to its peers in Africa. It has a tripartite colonial heritage, which stems from the partition of the former German colony of Kamerun between France and Germany and reunification years later. While there was fierce fighting for decolonisation in Cameroon, independence finally came as a fudge. This chapter argues that this fudge persists to date in one form or another. Indeed, the country has witnessed only two presidents since independence, neither of whom have deviated significantly from the prevailing politics of the 1960s.

This chapter begins with an investigation into the nature of governance, especially security governance, in the different polities which covered the territory colonised by the Germans. It goes further to account for the politics and the consequent security situation that ensued during German rule, after the partitioning (during the First World War in 1916 and the interwar years), after the Second World War and during the post-independence era.

At the forefront of the demands for independence in Cameroon was the Union de Population Camerounaise (UPC) and its version of complete and immediate independence referred to as upcism. Considering that many of the Francophone African elite (except for Sékou Touré) favoured gradual independence, upcism was unique in Francophone Africa. This made Cameroon stand out among the French colonies and protectorates. The war of independence initiated by upcism and the resulting la guerre contre subversif (the war against subversion) launched by the French is argued to be one of the most significant determinants of security in Cameroon throughout its history and today.

On Kamerun

The area now known as Cameroon was occupied by numerous kingdoms or chiefdoms, with traditional customary structures of governance. The nature of these governance systems varied across the territory. It constituted a continuum which stretched from extremely centralised to extremely decentralised (Owona 1973). For example, the now North-West, West and Northern regions maintained centralised governance systems. Ultimate authority was in the hands of a powerful monarch (Cosmas 2008, 70; Geschiere 1993, 152; Takougang 1994; Terretta 2010b). The king or the tribal leader retained ultimate responsibility for security.

In other parts of the country such as the South-West, the Littoral, South and East regions, customary governance was more decentralised. For example, the Bakundu and the Bakweri of the South-West region, the Douala of the Littoral region and the Maka of the Eastern region had decentralised systems (Cosmas 2008, 70; Geschiere 1993, 152; Terretta 2010b; Le Vine 1964). The Bakundu and the Bakweri decentralised system was characterised by the village being the basic socio-political unit. The village was made up of several lineages which were divided into extended families (this is still so in many of the villages).

In such systems villages were typically self-governing communities with a village council as the main unit of governance. The village council was headed by Moele mboka for the Bakundu or Sang’a Mboa for the Bakweri (which both translate as ‘father of the village’) (Ebune 2015, 10; Takougang 1994, 11). The council was made up of lineage heads, members of regulatory or secret societies, priestly associations and titleholders. The main function of the council was to ‘settle disputes among the villagers and to ensure the security of the village’ (Ebune 2015, 10). Decision-making powers were mostly vested in the council and the father of the village or chief was mostly symbolic. This sort of arrangement, exemplified by the Bakundu, persisted in most parts of South-West, the Littoral, South and East regions.

Under German, British and French rule, already existing customary structures were used, or similar customary structures created (where they did not exist) to administer the territory. This created micro-states of villages, tribes and clans headed by chiefs. The British called it ‘indirect rule’; a system which empowered local chiefs and their customary institutions to provide public goods such as security (Takougang 1994, 17; Fokwang 2009, 58). Due to this long heritage, the post-independence Cameroonian state, like many other African states (Ghana, South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique), maintained a customary system alongside a modern state system (Mallett 2010). In this context, it is no surprise that the modern Cameroon state is teeming with a variety of actors involved in governance. The pre-colonial and colonial governance in Cameroon predetermines and predisposes Cameroon to an overarching security system which is made up of multiple actors and security systems.

In 1884, the Germans declared Cameroon their colony. This took most people by surprise. The British were more established in Cameroon in the nineteenth century with extensive trading and Christian missionaries. Indeed, the language used for intertribal communications in towns such as Victoria or Douala before the imposition of German or French was pidgin English (Schler 2005). Names of towns such as Victoria, Hickory Town and Joss Town indicate the level of British influence in Cameroon in the late nineteenth century. In fact, it was Alfred Saker (a British missionary) who founded Victoria in 1858 (Takougang 1994, 13).

When colonisation became inevitable, the local chiefs clearly demonstrated their desire to live under British annexation rather than French or German. The Douala notables wrote several letters to Britain requesting protection or annexation. In the absence of a quick response to the letters, Douala chiefs were forced to sign treaties of protection with the Germans. Indeed, when the British arrived late to realise that Douala had already signed with the Germans, they incited the Bakweri to revolt against the Germans (Owona 1973, 28). This shows that the German regime over Kamerun was established by force, in opposition to the express wishes of the people. This set the precedence for governance in Cameroon.

As Germany consolidated its rule over Cameroon, it extended its territory from the Atlantic coast to Lake Chad, conquering territories both to the east and the west. In 1911, according to the Treaty of Fez, the French ceded parts of French Equatorial Africa to Germany. This area was added to Cameroon and named Neukamerun (New Cameroon) (Owona 1973). With the defeat of Germany in central Africa in 1916 during the First World War, its territories were taken over by France and Britain. The French took the lion’s share (roughly 80 per cent) while the British took a smaller part (roughly 20 per cent) (Rechniewski 2017, 57). The French reunited the part earlier ceded to Germany in the Fez Treaty to French Equatorial Africa. The rest of the French part was administered as a separate region of AEF (Le Vine 1964, 32). The British part was further divided into Southern Cameroons and Northern Cameroons. These territories were administered as an integral part of Nigeria (Owona 1973, 33; Takougang 2003).

The above arrangement was recognised by the League of Nations when it was formed and thus, Cameroun, Northern Cameroons and Southern Cameroons become League of Nations mandated territories. Contrary to the letter of the League of Nations’ mandate on the administering of the former German and Ottoman territories, the British integrated their part of Kamerun into Nigeria. Similar to the French, it was administered just like other British colonies. The state of affairs in these two parts of Kamerun and perhaps a sense of nostalgia for things past, inspired increasing growth in pan-Kamerunian nationalism (Le Vine 1964, 37). The idea of reunification was increasingly debated on both sides of the Mungo (Takougang 2003).

In the context of security systems, which are the subject of this book, there are several factors to draw from this history. First, the forceful grouping of Africans in complete disregard of their cultures or their own local politics by colonisation. Second, the circumstance of German annexation of Cameroon where the people expressed a preference for Britain but were forced into annexation by Germany. Third, the defeat of Germany in Kamerun during the First World War led to a breakdown of law and order with the indigenous peoples fighting each other. This meant the new colonial powers had to restore order as well as impose their own regimes. The French immediately declared military rule in their part of the territory in 1916 (Le Vine 1964, 32). As will be shown in subsequent sections and chapters below, militarisation of governance was the hallmark of French rule in Cameroun. Today, governance is significantly shaped by French governance history in Cameroon.

The key historical events outlined above set the precedence for governance in Cameroon. As will be shown below, it appears that for more than 100 years now Cameroonian governments have been imposed against the preferences of the people. The machinery to impose and maintain such regimes has enjoyed many decades of continuous improvement. The systems discussed in subsequent chapters are therefore a product of this history.

On Cameroun and the Cameroons

As the Second World War came to an end, political awakening rose across Africa, Asia and the entire colonised world. The creation of the United Nations (UN) recognised the right to self-determination for all peoples. Furthermore, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) made some colonial practices seem illegal or morally reprehensible. The aspirations of the UN and the triumphalism over the defeat of Nazism and fascism in Europe created a view of colonialism which rejected ‘the civilisation mission’ notion. Colonisation was viewed as an enslavement and exploitation exercise. The emergence of the USA and the USSR as global powers forced the stranglehold of the European empires on Africa and Asia to weaken. The pre-war international system dominated by European empires was simply unsustainable. In these circumstances, decolonisation became inevitable. The question was: how, when and how fast?

The answer to the above question will share the course of Cameroon history. The French favoured a gradual and limited form of decolonisation while the UPC aimed to achieve complete and immediate independence and reunification with the Cameroons (Terretta 2010b, 228). The vision of the UPC was an independent Cameroon within the boundaries of Kamerun. This was completely opposed to the ideas of independence nursed by the French at the time. After 1955 the tempo of the debate for independence in French Africa increased. France only offered a negotiated autonomy with solid association with France in the context of the Loi-Cadre.

The French approach meant autonomy for the African elite but never complete independence for the colonies and their populations (Terretta 2010b, 245). It proposed to create a community or federation of French African states coordinated from France. In other words, France would devolve certain powers to the African states but would retain power over money, diplomacy and the military. In referenda organised in the different territories, all French African territories accepted this, except Guinea with its leader Sékou Touré (Marcum 1959, 6). This negotiated autonomy within a French federation (French Union) was the sort of arrangement to which upcism was completely opposed. The fact that only one territory opposed this arrangement shows how radical upcism was at the time.

Consequently, the politics of independence within the colonies was divided into gradualism and upcism. The gradualists were those convinced by the French to favour the Loi-Cadre approach to decolonisation such as Félix Houphouët-Boigny of Côte d’Ivoir and Léopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal. The interminable rule of Félix Houphouët-Boigny and Léopold Sédar Senghor provided the stability to implant gradualism. Their example was also used to sell gradualism in places where resistance to it was fierce, such as Cameroon. In a post-colonial context, gradualism is neo-colonialism. Gradualism continues the French project of creating Frenchmen and women of Africans (évolués) and exploiting Africa for economic and strategic ends.

In the specific case of Cameroon, gradualism can also be understood or interpreted as ‘covert French sovereignty’ over Cameroon. This approach to colonialism was not new as the French resisted the conversion of Cameroon into a League of Nations mandated territory. Indeed, in 1919 a French minister referred to Cameroun as ‘colonial Alsace-Lorraine’ (Le Vine 1964, 34). It was argued that full French sovereignty was applicable. When this resistance could not be sustained, they accepted the mandate in full knowledge that they did not intend to uphold their obligations under the mandate. In practice, Cameroon became a French colony like any other French colony. This book argues that accepting the need to make changes in public while devising mechanisms to maintain colonialism in private is at the core of gradualism and French foreign policy in Africa.

On the other hand, upcists such as Reuben Um Nyobe and Felix Moumie of the UPC in Cameroon stood for the complete and immediate independence and reunification of all the territories of former Kamerun. Upcism embodied the spirit of the times in terms of the black power movement, the civil rights campaigns and the decolonisation movements around the world. The idea of self-determination, the UDHR and the teachings of individuals such as W. E. B. Du Bois, Mahatma Gandhi, Kwame Nkrumah, Che Guevara and Franz Fanon contributed to shaping the ideas of upcism. The general idea of black dignity and the uniting of African tribes was key to upcism. The French also accused upcism of flirting with communism, which its leaders denied vehemently (Terretta 2010a, 202).

For Cameroon, the decolonisation debate was more complex due to its complicated colonial history and the ‘radical’ position now held by the upcists (Takougang 2003). Indeed, colonialism itself had raised awareness among the tribes that they could actually collaborate to form bigger polities instead of the microstates of tribes which existed before colonialism. The value placed on otherwise mundane items by the Europeans also convinced the Africans of the wealth of their lands. Colonialism showed them the power of collective bargaining. As a former colony of Germany, there was some nostalgia for Kamerun. The necessity of comparing three (German, British and French) colonial regimes made politics even more complex.

The desire of the indigenous peoples to take charge of their destinies was clearly seen in the petitions to the League of Nations and European governments. These were mostly written by the Douala who claimed to write for the entire indigenous population of Kamerun (Schler 2005, 93). The upcists championed reunification, which at the time was not much favoured by the status quo. The confidence to take on the French was further raised by the defeat of France during the Second World War and its subsequent humiliation in Indochina. A Cameroon such as under German rule increasingly became an attractive option. Upcism and gradualism divided Cameroon, creating the political climate for Cameroonian politics from the late 1940s.

The internal geopolitics of Cameroun showed possibly three political zones: the North, the South and the West. The North is considered as from Adamawa northwards to the external boundaries in the extreme north. The South is considered from Adamawa southwards covering the East down to Douala and borders at Bangangté. The West is considered from Bangangté right up to Dschang (the area generally referred to as Bamiléké country). Due to geographic proximity, cultural similarity between the Bamiléké and the majority of Southern Cameroons, and its political stance on reunification (echoing upcism), it is argued that the Southern Cameroons was an appendage of the West. This had an impact on politics in Cameroun even before reunification.

Within this context, the North was generally docile thanks to strong traditional governance structures. The Fulani conquest established governance structures and inculcated a culture of respect and deference to authority. Acquiring control of these structures made it easier to establish rule over the North. The Germans and the French figured out how to ally with the Northern elite to retain support from and control of the North. By the middle of the twentieth century it can be said that the North was conformist to the status quo. While in close proximity to the Bamiléké with extensive links and intermarriages, the Bamoum of the West region showed significant political culture similarities with the North. Loyalty to the status quo was also characteristic of the Bamoum. In other words, political culture wise, the Bamoum can be considered more as the North than the West.

The South can be referred to as ‘Westernised’ and ‘Christian’ to a large extent. These are the people who maintained contact with Europeans (or the outside world) for hundreds of years. Indeed, as far back as the fifth century bc Mount Cameroon was mentioned by the Carthaginians. The Portuguese also appeared on the River Wouri, which they called Rio dos Camarões (river of prawns) from which the name Kamerun, Cameroon or Cameroun was derived in the fifteenth century AD (Le Vine 1964, 16). This contact also made them organise society in ways that seem to borrow from exposure to the rest of the world. These groups include the Bakweri, Douala, Basa and the Bulu and areas such as Tiko, Victoria, Douala, Big Batanga, Kribi and Campo and the towns and villages close to these areas (Le Vine 1964, 45). The closeness of these people to the Europeans made them desire to enjoy the same freedom and to construct states like the Europeans. Here and among these people, Kamerunian national...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of acronyms
• Introduction
• 1 Geopolitics, indigenous ambitions and security in Cameroon
• 2 African security, complex adaptive systems and resilience
• 3 Societal security: customary, religious, civil and private
• 4 Modern state security: civilian and military
• 5 The organisation of security and emergent systems
• 6 Resilience amid a plethora of security threats and incidents
• Conclusion
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Index