Organized crime has always existed in Russia, before and after the October revolution in 1917, and especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. Briefly reviewing the history of Soviet and post-Soviet organized crime in Russia can help us to understand the contemporary situation (Gilinskiy, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2002, 2006; Gilinskiy and Kostjukovsky, 2004, Siegel, 2005, 2012; Varese, 2001; Volkov, 2002). In general, the development of Russian organized crime can be divided into three specific periods.
Late 1970s to mid-1990s
From the end of the 1970s, there was the rise of a new generation of criminals (so-called sportsmen or bandits) and, more generally, the consolidation of contemporary organized crime. Its activities were initially related to traditional black market racketeering â drugs, arms, and weaponsâdealing, and control over gambling and sex businesses. Due to the immense opportunities created by the fall of the Soviet Union and the liberalization and democratization processes, from the end of the 1980s, there was a merging of organized crime with legal businesses and political structures. This included small illegal businesses and legal âcooperative societiesâ, large illegal businesses under the protection and with the participation of leaders in the Communist Party and state devices, and the illegal exchange of currency and speculation (fartzovka). Scandals involving the illegal manufacturing and sale of cotton, fruit, caviar, and fish in the 1970s and 1980s revealed for the first time the close alliances that teneviki (shady dealers) and traditional criminals had with executive staff and official leaders of the Soviet Republic (the first secretaries of the central committees of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, Moldova, Georgia, and Kazakhstan were all involved in scandals at some point), the central bodies of the Communist Party, and government and law enforcement bodies.
These years formed and shaped the relationship between different organized crime groups. For instance, in the 1990s, there were four criminal, mafia-like communities in St. Petersburg (the Tambovs, Azerbaijans, Chechens, and Kazans), dozens of criminal associations (e.g., Komarovs), and hundreds of criminal groups. The larger criminal organizations conducted racketeering, drug trafficking, âprotectionâ of small- and middle-scale businesses, market trade, sex businesses, car theft, the selling of nonferrous metals across the border (through Estonia), gambling, and the production and trafficking of fake liquor. Falsification of strong drinks is a traditional criminal business. In the 1990s, large amounts of Absolut vodka, French cognac (Napoleon), Italian liquor (amaretto), and others have appeared in commercial spots that were produced in the city and the local region. The result of international criminal cooperation was that greater amounts of adulterated strong drinks from Poland, Hungary, the Netherlands, and Germany were produced and sold as authentic (at corresponding prices) in Russia.
The Center for Deviantology (Sociology of Deviance) of the Sociological Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences has been involved in crimino-logical studies of the black market and the relationship between the economy and organized crime since 1993. According to different studies, business in St. Petersburg and other regions of Russia was divided among criminal communities. Excellently organized informational services enabled them to track and monitor all commercial structures; the moment a new commercial structure started making a profit, it aroused the interest of criminal groups. As one businessman interviewed asserted: â100% of commercial structures are embraced by rackets.⌠Racketeering penetrates all the enterprises except those of military-industrial complexes and some foreign firms.â According to the officers of the Federal Service Security, criminal associations controlled about 90% of legal businesses.3
There were two levels of racketeering: Tribute money extracted from small kiosks and shops (âblack racketâ) and money obtained from commercial enterprises. In the latter case, one can distinguish various indirect, disguised types of rackets: Payments for âguardingâ, for âservice in the field of marketingâ in compliance with contracts for âcooperationâ, or for âservicesâ (e.g., recovering debts). The âtaking careâ of commercial structures by criminal organizations included having their representatives on administrative and managerial bodies.
On the basis of information from our respondents, we are in a position to single out typical situations in which businessmen were forced to commit crimes. Bribery was required in the following situations: When registering businesses, when renting premises from state bodies, when acquiring licenses to operate from state bodies, for obtaining low-interest bank credit, when reporting to tax inspectors, and when completing customs formalities. A current taxation rate amounting to 80%â85% required concealment of revenues, as businesses could not survive in competition with other firms if revenues were revealed honestly.
Most of the state-owned business enterprises found themselves âunder the protectionâ of bandits. They were âguardedâ by some gangs against other gangs, for which they paid a âtributeâ and rendered (obligatory) services. In particular, criminal organizations included their ârepresentativesâ on councils of directors and boards of business enterprises, organizations, and banks. Thus, legal and illegal businesses merged.
The rigid normative regulations in some kinds of economic activity and the absence of such regulations in other fields resulted in businessmen ignoring the law in some cases and/or making their own âlawâ in others. The synthesis of legal and illegal elements in the countryâs economy engendered fake goods and services.
Sophisticated crimes, such as bank fraud, were connected to computer engineering, but new technologies were also used in areas such as the falsification of alcoholic beverages, manufacturing of drugs, theft of automobiles, and development of new weapons. To some extent, the new developments in the field of computer engineering initially passed through criminal structures. Growing attention was being paid to attracting scientific staff (chemists, programmers, economists, and lawyers) who were engaged in criminal business.
The narcotics business was one of the least visible, well-established forms of organized crime in Russia. The struggle against the narcotics mafia was complicated by widespread corruption within law enforcement and state organizations and was part of the political games that Russia played with countries that exported drugs (Azerbaijan, Chechnya, and the nations of Middle Asia).
The theft and illicit trade in (resale of) vehicles was another type of criminal activity, as well as gambling. In cities, clients were engaged in uncomplicated gambling (card playing, dice, backgammon, etc.) in so-called dens (katran). These activities involved very large amounts of money. The majority of the clients of these dens were representatives of the criminal world. The other significant part of this business was street gambling, which consisted of games like âthimblesâ, âthree cardsâ, and street raffles. Independently from the playing rules, clients never won. Modern organizers of street raffles paid about 20% to their criminal group for protection (krysha, literal meaning, âroofâ) and contractually paid a percentage to the patrol service of police (PPS). Criminal organizations also provided protection (âcoverâ) to massage companies, saunas, escort and âcall girlsâ firms. Street prostitution had no clearly marked locations; it was usually organized around bus and train stations and hotels. Hotel prostitution had existed from Soviet times until the present day. All the hotels in the city were divided among criminal groups. Criminal organizations also facilitated the exporting of prostitutes across the border.
