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1 Theoretical overview
1 Introduction
A closer look at the literature on post-war studies indicates that researchers have mainly dealt with four types of post-war situations, which differ from one another. They include studies on: (1) post-World War issues, (2) post-Cold War issues, (3) post-interstate war issues, and (4) post-civil war issues. Post-war studies also cover an array of topics ranging from post-war politics to music, and sorcery to reconciliation. Since this book investigates Sri Lanka, a post-civil war society, this theoretical overview chapter has been restricted to post-civil war studies. Moreover, I will also focus on the political aspects of the theoretical debate, due to the fact that two of the larger themes that define this study, i.e. democracy and reconciliation, are essentially political issues. One of the primary objectives of this chapter is to demonstrate that, so far, no serious attempt has been made to understand the relations between democracy and reconciliation. The present study addresses this vacuum.
First, this chapter clarifies the distinction between war and conflict in order to establish that Sri Lanka is a post-war society, not a post-conflict state. The relation between civil war and democracy has been one of the favorite subjects for research, many researchers have particularly delved into the correlation between war-ending and democracy. Researchers have also been intrigued by the nature of relations between post-war peace and devolution of power. Of course, reconciliation is one of the popular themes in post-war studies. These topics have been examined in the following sections. The last section of the chapter deals with research questions, which guided this study and the multiple methodologies adopted.
2 Conflict and war
War and conflict are not the same. This study proceeds with the notion that Sri Lanka is only a post-war society and not a post-conflict one, by clearly defining the differences between war and conflict. A discussion on this distinction was necessitated by the fact that many observers, at times, call Sri Lanka a post-conflict society. For example, Derges (2013) published her book with the title Ritual and Recovery in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka. Similarly, Mampilly’s (2012) book chapter was entitled The Nexus of Militarization and Corruption in Post-Conflict Sri Lanka. Many of the commentators who use the term “post-conflict” operate on the assumption that the conflict, which caused the war, has been resolved. Calling Sri Lanka a post-conflict society is erroneous because what was resolved in 2009 was the problem of violence while conflicts, in fact, have since exacerbated. Hence, this book has been written on the premise that Sri Lanka is only a post-war, not a post-conflict society.
The term “war” probably is one of the most abused concepts by all sorts of people including politicians and policymakers. One may talk about, for example, the war on drugs, cyberwar, and so on. However, war has a specific political meaning. The political or social science definitions of war mostly describe the concept as a conflict with large-scale violence. For example, according to Johnson (1935), war is an “armed conflict between population groups conceived of as organic unities.” Organic unities, for example, could include such groups as race, tribe, states, religion or political parties, and economic classes (Johnson 1935). Although it is individuals who fight wars, they represent large and organized groups. Emphasizing the involvement of organized violence, Kallen (1939) defined war as “an armed contest between two or more sovereign institutions employing organized military force in the pursuit of specific ends…” (373). In the same line of argument, Howard (1994) claimed that “trade wars and tariff wars may involve conflicting interests, but unless there is an element of organized, sanctioned and purposeful violence, these are not war” (1).
Moreover, it is important to note that war involves a special category of violence, not just any violence. Violence used in war is often large scale and used to kill the enemy. However, killing is not the final objective of war. Wars are waged to achieve an objective, mostly political in nature, by killing or destroying the enemy. Many analysts argue that the objective is to impose the will onto the enemy or the other party. For example, von Clausewitz (1997), one of the most popular war strategists, stated that war is “an act of violence intended to compel our opponents to fulfil our will” (5). Imposing the will is also seen prominently in many other definitions of war. Meanwhile, the term “will” could also be replaced with the term “control”. Wars are waged to control the opponents or to resist such control. Therefore, in sum, war could be understood as high-intensity violence undertaken by organized groups to achieve specific, mostly political, objectives.
The confrontation that took place in Sri Lanka was not an international war where only sovereign entities were involved. The Sri Lankan battle was often called a civil war because it mostly took place within the country, and one of the actors involved, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to be precise, was a non-state actor, or armed group. Therefore, for the purpose of this study, the definition of civil war is more significant than the generic notion of war. Clearly defining a civil war has not been an easy task as debates are often marked by disagreements. Small and Singer (1982) defined a civil war as “any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides” (210). Some commentators, including Small and Singer (1982), used an annual death threshold to define civil wars. Early studies used a threshold of 1,000 annual battlefield deaths to define civil war. However, due to the problems inherent in using death rate to define nature of the conflict, the method was later abandoned. Sambanis (2004) produced a lengthy list of criteria to define civil wars, which includes, for example, the domestic nature of the conflict, the politically and militarily organized nature of the conflict parties, the government’s involvement as a principal party to the conflict, the local roots of the insurgents, sustained violence, intermittent peace treaties, and so on. Analyzing civil wars through a framework called the Enduring Internal Rivalries, DeRouen and Bercovitch (2008) defined civil wars as “internal conflicts between a government and an insurgency with at least 10 years of armed conflict in which there are at least 25 deaths – regardless of whether or not these years are consecutive” (59).
Many of the benchmarks used by various researchers fit into the Sri Lankan conflict. It was between a sovereign state and a non-state armed group, it lasted for about three decades, thousands of people including combatants and civilians have been killed, there had been intermittent peace talks and treaties, and, despite the highly internationalized nature of the conflict, the war was largely domestic in nature. Hence, it is safe to assume that what existed in Sri Lanka was a civil war.
Conflict, on the other hand, is not necessarily a violent phenomenon. Its major characteristics are the incompatibility of goals and values. Some of the early definitions of conflict failed to capture the essence of nonviolent behavior of the conflict parties and identified conflict with war. For example, Coser (1956), for the purpose of his study on social conflicts, defined conflict as “a struggle over values and claims to scarce status, power and resources in which the aims of the opponents are to neutralize, injure or eliminate their rivals” (8). Coser’s definition sounded very much like the description of war. Subsequent definitions, however, emphasized goal incompatibility as the central character of conflict. For example, Stagner (1967), highlighting goal incompatibility as the central character of conflict, defined it as a situation where conflict parties believe that the goals they desire cannot be achieved by both parties at the same time. In other words, Stagner (1967) maintained that, when in a conflict, parties believe that the desired goal can be achieved by only one party in the situation.
However, goal incompatibility alone cannot create a conflict. Parties need to take action to achieve their goals in the incompatible situation. Goal incompatibility and action combined creates conflict. Johan Galtung’s triangle of conflict emphasized the significance of action. Galtung (1996) argued that conflicts have three interrelated elements: context, attitude, and behavior. The context, or conflict situation, denotes the goal incompatibility, attitude refers to the psychological process associated with the conflict, and behavior means the actions parties undertake to achieve their goals. In the same line of argument, underlining the significance of hostility, Bartos and Wehr (2002) defined conflict as “a situation in which actors use conflict behavior against each other to attain incompatible goals and/or to express their hostility” (13). Hence, one could safely assume that conflict may be defined a as set of actions undertaken against each other by parties with incompatible goals. The action does not necessarily have to be violent. They can be nonviolent actions including, for example, persuasive arguments, refusal to work, petitioning, and so on (Vinthagen 2015). Meanwhile, conflict parties could engage in violent action as well. Looting, assaults, riots, terrorism, and genocide are some of the major forms of violence (Burton 1997). When conflicts involve large groups of people and violence becomes large-scale and organized, they turn into war.
In Sri Lanka, the roots of the ethnic conflict can be traced to the colonial era. The Tamils were engaged in a nonviolent campaign to achieve their goal of regional autonomy since independence in 1948 (Wilson 2000). Hence, the conflict existed before parties opted to use organized violence. The Tamil youth began to form organized militant groups in the late 1970s and the violence soon transformed into a civil war (Wickramasinghe 2014). The war continued for about 30 years with all the adverse consequences that come with a brutal armed conflict. Eventually, the Sri Lankan state won the war, convincingly defeating the LTTE in May 2009. The end of the war resolved only the problem of violence, as hostility and goal incompatibility between the two ethnic communities still remain strong. In other words, there are ethnically-oriented issues that still remain unresolved. Hence, in Sri Lanka, the conflict between the Sinhalese and the Tamils continues without the violence.
3 Democracy
In terms of research on civil wars and post-war issues, one of the subjects that has attracted the attention of investigators has been the nexus between democracy and civil war. For example, Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) examined the impact of democracy, the strength of the state, and the political opportunity structures on civil and insurgent violence. Arguing that the entry of irregular leaders and irregular political transitions increase the risk of insurgent violence, Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) concluded that their research “results lend strong support to the claim that political opportunities, as measured by irregular political leader changes, indeed appear to be associated with civil war onset” (308). Irregular leaders emerge when one head of government leaves office through irregular means and another leader takes charge through irregular means (Gleditsch and Ruggeri 2010).
Many analysts have identified positive relations between democratization and the onset of civil war. For example, Huntington (1968) suggested that democratization involves mass mobilization and democratic mobilization could trigger violence if and when political institutions fail to accommodate anticipation. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) also endorsed the theory that democratization could contribute to intrastate violence as well. However, they believed that there may be differences between the short- and long-term impact of democratization on violence. In terms of long-term impact, they maintained that the consolidation of democracy has the capacity to promote peace and stability. The problem was with short-term impact. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) maintained that “the beginning stages of transitions to democracy often give rise to war rather than peace” (2). They claim that this was not a new phenomenon, as one can observe the trend since the French Revolution. Meanwhile, Mansfield and Snyder (2005) also claimed that not all democratization processes lead to violence. The danger lies only in “states that lack the strong political institutions needed to make democracy work” (2). A study undertaken by Cederman, Hug, and Krebs (2010) confirmed the association between democratization and the possible onset of civil war. Introducing a new period-finding algorithm, Cederman et al. (2010) maintained that their study confirmed the links between democratization and civil war. They also maintained that autocratization could also trigger internal violence. In conclusion, they claimed that, while democratization might require “some time” for civil war to begin, the collapse of democratic institutions might “more or less” instantly produce the outbreak of civil war (387).
In the recent past, researchers have also turned their attention to the nexus between civil war termination and post-war governance. Civil wars may be terminated through two primary means: (1) negotiated settlements or (2) violence. A violent ending would lead to the victory by one party and defeat to the other. Researchers have been intrigued by the question whether negotiated settlement or violent termination is conducive to democracy and democratization in the post-war period. An often-cited work by Wantchekon (2004) found that civil wars have been good for democracy. With the assistance of some of the existing measures of democracy, Wantchekon (2004) claimed that about 40 percent of all civil wars, which took place between 1945 and 1993, facilitated the enhancement of democracy. He argued that Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua have witnessed some of the most impressive gains in terms of democratic stabilization after civil war. Wantcheckon (2004) summed up his argument by stating that “democratic states can be created directly from anarchy” (32). This finding goes against the conventional wisdom that civil war may lead to dictatorship.
Licklider (1995) claimed that groups in civil war, who have been killing each other with considerable enthusiasm, cannot come together to form a common government. His analysis of 91 civil wars in the post-World War II period, supported the assumption that in identity-based civil wars, negotiated settlements are more likely to collapse, leading to the resumption of the war. Meanwhile, a military victory for one side seems to prevent the likelihood of resumption of the war, because the losing party’s ability to remobilize is destroyed with the end of the war (Licklider 1995). Gurses and Mason (2008) believed that civil war outcomes may influence the nature of post-war governance. Their study found that the negotiated settlement of civil wars promotes democracy, while the violent ending of the war may undermine democracy. They claimed that more inclusive policies and democratic structures could emerge from civil wars if they lead to a balance of power between the warring parties. Defining democracy essentially as a political system where the transfer of power occurs through free and fair elections, Wantchekon and Neeman (2002) argued that power-sharing arrangements between warring parties could lead to democracy. If and when the conflict parties cannot agree on a power-sharing arrangement, the status quo, i.e. the conflict, continues. However, when they agree to settle the conflict by designing a power-sharing arrangement, they could choose, for example, a foreign power or the people of the country as arbitrators of the settlement contract. By selecting the internal arbitrator, the citizens of the country would create democracy (Wantchekon and Neeman 2002). An arrangement that requires the citizens to serve as guarantors provides advantages both to the warring parties and the citizens, leading to the consolidation of democracy. Joshi (2010) also emphasized the balance of power as one of the preconditions for post-war democracy. He argued that a stable balance of power between the government and the rebels that ensures the continuation of the settlement agreement and guarantees access to political power and economic resources could lead to democracy (Joshi 2010).
Meanwhile, there are scholars who argue that military victory for one side, especially the rebels, is conducive to democracy. For example, according to Toft (2010), democracies that stem from negotiated settlements do not last long. On the other hand, a military victory of one party promotes democracy. She argued that both means of ending civil wars, i.e. the negotiated settlements and military termination, have mutual benefits and mutual harm. However, civil wars ended by military victory are more “likely to stay ended” (Toft 2010, 2). Since both means have mutual benefits, Toft (2010) recommended a hybrid strategy to deal with the problem of civil wars. Similarly, Fortna (2008) claimed that, compared to military victory by one party, negotiated settlements are less conducive to democracy. Fortna and Huang (2012) claimed that their study found no evidence to support the argument that war ending influences post-war democratization. Hence, the literature on the nexus between civil war and democracy remains extremely inconsistent.
The central thesis of this book is that the violent end of the war not only undermined democracy, but also hampered ethnic reconciliation in Sri Lanka. This argument has been further elaborated in Chapter Six. In this study, we treat democracy not as a form of government governed by a set of electoral procedurals, but as a governing system that guarantees liberty and equality for all citizens and fosters public good (Weale 1999; Pennock 1979; Kelly 2012).
4 Reconciliation
Reconciliation, a popular concept among peace scholars and activists, remains a loosely defined and vague idea. Increasingly, all post-conflict issues or discourses are linked to reconciliation, because of the lack of clear-cut definitions and proper understanding of the concept. At times, conflict resolution itself is called reconciliation despite the clear distinction between the two subjects. Rationalizing the complications or the vagueness of the concept, the IDEA handbook on reconciliation, claims that “reconciliation means different things to different people. Its significance varies from culture to culture, and changes with the passage of time” (IDEA 2003, 19). Conciliatus, the root word of the term reconciliation, means “coming together” (Kumar 1999, 1). Mindful of the differences between the act of coming together of former enemies and the projects undertaken to promote reconciliation, the handbook points out that “reconciliation is a complex term, and there is little agreement on its definition. This is mainly because reconciliation is both a goal—something to achieve—and a process—a means to achieve that goal” (IDEA 2003, 12).
According to Brouneus (2008), “reconciliation is a societal process that involves mutual acknowledgment of past suffering and the changing of destructive attitudes and behaviors into constructive relationships toward sustainable peace” (294). Kumar (1999) also points out “strictly speaking reconciliation implies a process, that of restoring the shattered relationship between two actors” (1). Again, paying particular attention to the process, Bar-Tal (2000) argues that “reconciliation is not a necessary process in every intergroup conflict. It only applies to those intergroup conflicts that last for a long time and involve extensive violence” (355). Pruitt and Kim (2004) reiterate that “the process of relationship repair is commonly called reconciliation” (218). In this study, we define the term reconciliation to means the act of coming together of former enemies after the end of the conflict....
