International Rivalry and Secret Diplomacy in East Asia, 1896-1950

Bruce Elleman

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• ISBN:
  9781317328155
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Ciencias sociales
• Subtopic: Estudios asiaticoamericanos

East Asia was a major focus of struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War of 1945 to 1991, with multiple "hot" and "cold" conflicts in China, Korea, and Vietnam. The struggle for predominance in East Asia, however, largely predated the Cold War, as this book shows, with many examples of the United States and Russia/the Soviet Union working to exercise and increase control in the region. The book focuses on secret treaties, 26 of them, signed from the mid-1890s through 1950, when secret agreements between China and the USSR, including several concerning the Chinese Eastern Railway, gave Russia greater control over Manchuria and Outer Mongolia. One of the most important was negotiated in 1945, when Stalin signed the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty with Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalists, that included a secret protocol granting the Soviet Navy sea control over the Manchurian littorals. This secret protocol excluded the US Navy from landing Nationalist troops at the major Manchurian ports, thereby guaranteeing the Chinese Communist victory in Northeast China; from Manchuria, the Chinese Communists quickly spread south to take all of Mainland China. To a large degree, therefore, this formerly undiscussed secret diplomacy set the underlying conditions for the Cold War in East Asia.

Treaty 1

3 June 1896—Sino-Russian Treaty of Alliance

Throughout the 19th century, Russian expansion in the Far East revolved around finding ways to increase its influence in China. Japan’s victory in the first Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895) gave Russia the opportunity it was looking for. A major breakthrough took place in 1896, when Russian diplomats bribed Qing government officials to permit the construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway in Manchuria. This treaty was signed in Moscow on 3 June 1896 by the Russian Foreign Minister Alexey Lobanov-Rostovskii and the Chinese Viceroy Li Hongzhang. It is variously called the Li-Lobanov Treaty or the Sino-Russian Secret Treaty of 1896. Its contents were first published in 1922 (See Figure 1.1a, 1.1b, and 1.1c)

Figure 1.1a 3 June 1896 Sino-Russian Treaty of Alliance, as supplied by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, Moscow

The proposed railway was the largest foreign territorial concession in China. When the Chinese Eastern Railway was completed at the turn of the century, it accounted for over half of all railway mileage in all of China. As simply one point of comparison, Great Britain’s 22 mile railway from Canton to Kowloon represented only 1% of the foreign-run railways in China, while France’s 289 mile railway in Yunnan province accounted for just over 12%, as did Germany’s railway in Shandong. On 6 July 1898, a second agreement allowed a branch line, called the Southern Manchurian Branch, to be built to connect with the port cities of Dalian and Port Arthur (Lüshun).

Prior to the construction of a modern road system and the growth of commercial airlines, railways were undeniably one of the most important components of China’s internal transportation and commercial network. This was especially true in Manchuria, where river navigation into the interior was cut off every winter by ice. Both in terms of foreign-owned railway mileage and China’s total railway mileage, therefore, the Chinese Eastern Railway was arguably the most important foreign concession in China. While the 1896 Treaty originally said that the railway would be handed over to the Chinese government in 15 years, this was later changed to 60 years. In 1924, when negotiating a secret agreement with Zhang Zuolin (see Treaty 15), it was set at 30 years or, in other words, by the year 1954 (or 1956 if the original treaty is used). While the South Manchurian Railway was handed over in 1952, Soviet troops remained in Port Arthur (Lüshun) through 1955, finally withdrawing on 31 May 1955, the 31st anniversary of the signing of the 31 May 1924 Treaty. However, at least one source says Lüshun was not reincorporated into China until 11 October 1955, or 59-and-a-half years after the 3 June 1896 treaty was signed. ¹

Twentieth-century Asian history has shown that control of the Manchurian railways also had strategic importance. Russia’s control of both the Chinese Eastern Railway and the South Manchurian Railway allowed it to transport huge numbers of troops into Manchuria during the Russo-Japanese War. After the war, Russia retained the former railway line, while it was forced to cede the latter to Japan. When Moscow won back control of this railway in 1924, it still made up 14% of all of China’s railway mileage, and when joined with Japan’s railway, the two accounted for 22.5%. ²

During the next 30 years, the struggle between Russia and Japan to take full control of the Manchurian railway system continued unabated. During 1921, China’s preeminent railway expert, Chin-chun Wang, wrote a letter to Foreign Minister W. W. Yen warning that further conflict over the Chinese Eastern Railway might arise in the near future:

Manchuria has twice been the battle field in recent years, and will be the bone of contention for more international conflicts, unless the statesmen of today can arrange matters in such a way as will ameliorate the situation. The Chinese Eastern [Railway] plays a most important part and constitutes a most important factor in the Manchuria question.

Wang further explained why China had to make its move soon if it wished to take total control over the Chinese Eastern Railway:

Today presents the only and most unexpected opportunity for some solution of the problem, for it is the first time for many years that Russia and Japan are really at loggerheads, while other Powers are in no position to interfere as they used to do. ³

Secret Sino-Russian treaty of 1896 ⁴

His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China and His Imperial Majesty the Tsar of Russia, desiring to maintain the present situation of peace in the Far East, and to prevent future aggression by other powers upon the territory of Asia, have determined to conclude a treaty of mutual assistance. Therefore, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China has specially appointed His Excellency Li Hung-chang, Imperial Commissioner and Plenipotentiary of the first class, Grand Tutor of the Heir Apparent, Grand Secretary of the Wen-hua Place, Stern-and-resolute Earl of the first rank, and Superintendent of Trade for the Northern Ports; and His Imperial Majesty the Tsar of Russia has specially appointed Prince Lobanov, Imperial Commissioner and Plenipotentiary, Finance Minister, member of the Cabinet and of the Imperial Council and Privy Councillor, as their respective plenipotentiaries, who, having exchanged and examined their credentials and found them in proper form, agree to the following stipulations:

Article I

In the event of a Japanese invasion of the territory of Russia in Eastern Asia, or the territory of China, or the territory of Korea, the present treaty shall be considered as having been involved, and measures shall be taken according to the treaty. In such an event both contracting powers promise to dispatch all the military and naval forces that can be mobilized for mutual assistance; they shall also supply each other with munitions and provisions as far as possible.

Article II

Having entered into the present treaty of mutual defense, neither contracting power can conclude a separate peace agreement with the enemy without mutual consultation.

Article III

Should an emergency arise during the war, Russian warships shall be allowed to enter all ports on the coast of China; in case of need, the local authorities shall give aid to the best of their ability.

Article IV

In order in the future to facilitate the rapid and safe transportation of Russian troops for opposing the enemy, and for the supply of munitions and provisions, the Chinese Government agrees to let Russia construct a railway through the territory of Heilungkiang and Kirin to connect with Vladivostok. However, the construction of this railway is not to be used as a pretext for the infringement of Chinese territory, or for encroachment on the lawful rights and privileges of H.I.M. the Emperor of China. The Chinese Government will entrust the Russo-Chinese Bank with the management of the (railway) matter. The Chinese Minister to Russia and the Bank shall consult on the spot and decide upon the terms of the contract.

Article V

When Russia is engaged in the defensive measures against the enemy provided for in Article I, she may use the railway as provided in Article IV for the transportation of troops, provisions, and munitions. In peacetime, Russia may also use this railway for troops and provisions in transit. Apart from temporary stops due to changes of trains, they shall not be allowed to stop over for any other reason.

Article VI

The agreement shall be effective for fifteen years, beginning with the date on which the contract mentioned in Article IV shall have been ratified and put into effect. Six months before the expiration of this treaty, the two contracting powers shall negotiate for its extension.

Special provision

The plenipotentiaries of both contracting parties agree that the Sino-Russian treaty concluded on this day shall be rendered into the Chinese and French languages in duplicate copies, to be signed and have seals affixed. The Chinese and French copies have been compared and found to be without error. In case of dispute the French text shall be the decisive version.

Concluded on the 22nd day, 4th month, and 22nd year of Kuang-Hsü, which is May 22nd, 1896 (o.s.) [June 3, 1896], at Moscow.

Notes

1 www.worldstatesmen.org/China_Foreign_colonies.html.

2 Ralph William Huenemann, “The Dragon and the Iron Horse: The Economics of Railroads in China, 1876-1937” (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1982), 111.

3 C. C. Wang received his education through the doctorate level at Peking University, Yale University, and the University of Illinois, and in January 1920, was appointed Director-General of the Chinese Eastern Railway. English-language letter from C. C. Wang to W. W. Yen, 3 May 1921, WJDA, 03-32, 242(2).

4 The full terms of this treaty appear at www.chinaforeignrelations.net/node/237; A second version, with slightly different wording and without the special provision at the end, appears in John V. A. MacMurray, Treaties and Agreements with and Concerning China, 1894–1919, Volume 1: Manchu Period (1894–1911) (New York: Oxford University Press, 1921), 81.

Treaty 2

28 April 1899—Anglo-Russian agreement

While Japanese, Russian, and German interests were primarily in northern China, British and French interests were primarily in southern and central China. This demarcation was even spelled out in an 1899 agreement between Great Britain and Russia, in which Great Britain promised not to seek railway concessions north of the Great Wall, while Russia likewise promised not to move into the Yangzi River basin. Great Britain promised not to interfere if Russia demanded additional “concessions for railways, which, starting from the main Manchurian line in a southwesterly direction.”

This agreement was part of an ongoing process of dividing up China...