The Purpose of India’s Security Strategy

Defence, Deterrence and Global Involvement

Gautam Sen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367435929
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000758085
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book comprises the journey of the Indian nation state and its tryst with destiny, where successive political leaderships, while governing India, contributed to a better understanding of the idea of India, its political and strategic culture, and the role that its military has had to play to develop that culture. Hence, the journey has been from the backwaters of 'defensive defence' to create a credible deterrence capacity as well as a doctrine to implement the same through political will and enter the domain of global involvement in the strategic, non-strategic as well as non-traditional areas of security. Thus, the title of the book The Purpose of India's Security Strategy: Defence, Deterrence and Global Involvement. It is hoped that this book will serve as a referral document to understand the polemics of the development of a strategic culture in India for an era which will be dominated by the information age and artificial intelligence, without forgetting that the Indian political leadership has come of age to understand the role of the military in the process of nation building.

PART I
FROM DEFENCE TO DETERRENCE 1947–79

1. INTRODUCTION

Defence policy in military terms refers to a set of doctrines aimed at safeguarding the national integrity of a nation from all possible external threats and strategic pressures. These doctrines postulate a range of postures, from the passive to the aggressive, depending on a nation’s economic and technological capabilities and political ideologies. In the case of India, a shift occurred in its defence policy from a passive defence posture in the Fifties to a deterrence posture in the Seventies.

Issues related to India’s security have historically gone through three distinct phases: Phase I, from 1947 to 1961; Phase II, from 1962 to 1971; and Phase III, the post-1971 period. During Phase I, the Indian defence policy was greatly influenced by the constraints of a limited budget and non-availability of a sophisticated industrial and technological base within the country, and, thus, India’s policy remained passive in nature.

In Phase II, the new dimensions of perceptions of threat from across the international borders were added. However, during this phase, India acquired major expertise in producing sophisticated conventional weapon systems. Also, during this phase, India was repeatedly involved in armed conflicts with China and Pakistan. Hence, the Indian defence policy during this period was aimed at preserving national integrity.

It is only during Phase III that we find India’s defence policy emerging as a concrete policy – offensive in tactical nature, with a view to containing any prospective enemy in its own territory, if the need arises. In this phase, India proved its superior military capabilities in comparison to its immediate South Asian neighbours (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma and Sri Lanka). The existence of a vast technological infrastructure to manufacture all types of sophisticated weapons also came to light. In the nuclear field, India took the political decision to test an underground nuclear device and became a potential candidate to join the nuclear club. Also, it took the significant step of buying the complete technology to produce the Anglo-French Jaguar Deep Penetration Strike Aircraft (DPSA). During this phase, one witnessed protracted debates in the Indian Parliament on matters related to defence procurements. Even the Indian academic community, along with the media, showed significant interest in Indian defence needs and policies.

The change in defence policy to a deterrence posture took place due to the changes in the strategic environment, and the growth in the Indian technological and economic base helped in implementing the same. According to the World Bank report of 1971¹, India was categorised as one of the ten largest industrialised countries in the world. Foreign exchange reserves during the past five years had grown at a considerable pace. Real national income was estimated to have increased by 7.4 percent in 1977–78. Similarly, industrial production during the first six months of the financial year 1978–79 grew to 9.2 percent, while the growth in agriculture during 1977–78 was of the order of 13.6 percent over the previous year. New Delhi was systematically increasing defence expenditure every year.

This rationale of increased defence efforts may be seen in the larger framework guided by the strategic images that the Indian decision-makers attached to the role of India in South Asia. Undoubtedly, no other Indian Ocean state could defeat India’s armed forces in a conventional war, and even the People’s Republic of China (PRC) would face great difficulties following its probable easy successes in the mountainous border areas.²

The changes in the strategic environment occurred in three principal ways. The first, the emergence of China, from being a conventional to a nuclear power. Even with its limited nuclear force, China could now hit every strategic target inside India. This definitely required reshaping of the Indian defence policy orientation, especially because India lacked a nuclear retaliatory force. The most viable defence policy would have been the development of a conventional military capability to deter any Chinese invasion into Indian territory across the international border.

The second was the relegation of Pakistan to the status of a lesser power after the Bangladesh War. While this meant that India would not have to consider Pakistan as a major military threat, any future military confrontation with it would definitely get the oil rich Middle Eastern countries involved as brother Islamic states. In such a scenario, India had to be prepared not only to safeguard its national integrity but also evolve military capabilities to deter the involvement of the Middle Eastern countries.

The third was that a China-Pakistan collusion in the event of an armed conflict with either of these countries could not be ruled out. This specially was so at a time when Sino-US relations had taken a new turn (a major change in the international strategic environment). Hence, India needed to maintain a credible deterrence posture to offset the same. To achieve this, India not only entered into a diplomatic treaty with the Soviet Union but also secured extensive cooperation in the field of defence technology.

In order to study the evolution of India’s defence policy to a deterrence posture, as noted earlier, we have to divide the analysis in three time phases. The first phase (1947–61) is marked by the development of a passive defence posture. This posture was adopted due to the legacy of the British Indian defence policy in which the Britain Indian Army was primarily intended to function as an external resource in time of need to undertake British military campaigns in any part of the world.

The strength of the British Indian Army during peace-time was, thus, always a fraction of what it was often expanded to during its involvement in campaign operations (e.g. during the two World Wars). The dependence of India on Britain for defence matters was total. Britain was under the obligation and constant liability to reinforce India with troops in time of need. The British Indian Army, with the sole function of covering any land approach to India and having limited numerical strength and firepower, constituted a passive defence posture. Thus, on the eve of independence, the newly formed Indian armed forces were just sufficient to maintain internal security and guard the frontiers against potential aggressors from amongst the neighbouring states.

This passive defence posture inherited from the British by the Indians, coupled with a narrow industrial base, poor economic situation and the post-independence drive for rapid industrialisation, resulted in severe budgetary restraints on defence spending all through the Nehru era. Not that Nehru was unaware of the defence needs for India, but the competing claims on India’s scarce economic resources required rationally that defence expenditure be kept at a minimum in order to divert maximum efforts for economic development. Furthermore, as we shall discuss, in the first phase, Nehru’s decision to adopt a non-aligned policy entailed certain security arrangements.

Nehru, already impressed with the centralised planning methods of the Soviet Union, decided to keep potential aggressors at bay by his foreign policy of incorporating the five principles of peaceful coexistence, especially with China³, and directed all the energies of the nation towards the development of heavy industries, nuclear power programmes and social mobilisation schemes. Thus, the British legacy of limited defence capabilities, coupled with Nehru’s view of the world that India was protected by the balance of power rationale, along with his determination to bring about a total industrial revolution in the quickest possible time, reinforced the policy to adhere to a passive defence posture.

The study of this first phase will, hence, focus on the British Indian defence policy and its extension in the post-independence period. The analysis of the post-independence policy up to 1961 will reflect Nehru’s view on India’s defence needs. This analysis will also indicate that the entire defence spending during this period was kept well below 50 percent of the annual growth rate of the Gross National Product (GNP) on an average. (From 1947–61, the GNP grew at the rate of 4.6 percent annually and defence spending was kept at under 2 percent of the GNP, on an average.)

The policy of keeping the defence industries strictly under government control and the ideological rationale behind this indicate the government’s policy of maintaining strict budgetary constraints on all aspects of defence production while the nation was undergoing a massive industrialisation process. Given this scenario, it is easy to visualise the direction of a defence policy which would have been passive in nature.

The second phase, covering 1962 to 1971, gives us enough data to evaluate India’s economic development and increase in the technological base, essential for defence pro...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Content
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Part I From Defence to Deterrence 1947–79
• Part II India’s Security Strategy and Global Involvement 1980–2017
• Appendix India’s Defence Strategy in the Next Decade
• Bibliography
• Author's Profile