Fusing with Europe?

Sweden in the European Union

Lee Miles

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780815389125
• eBook ISBN: 9781351157827
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Political Economy
• Index: Economics

Informed by his profound knowledge of contemporary political affairs and the current debate on European integration in Sweden, Lee Miles investigates Sweden's experiences of being a full member of the European Union since 1995. Widely regarded as one of the leading authorities on Scandinavian relations with the European Union (EU), the author proposes a micro fusion perspective offering an insightful new conceptual framework through which to understand Swedish views on European integration and the influences on national EU policy. The volume also includes a Foreword by Wolfgang Wessels, Jean Monnet Professor and the founder of the fusion theory.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Sweden as a Case Study

Sweden is a country that always seems to have attracted labels and interest from political scientists. Consensual democracy,¹ integrative democracy,² social democratic welfare state,³ the middle way,⁴ committed neutral,⁵ and reluctant European⁶ are all terms that have been associated with or coined to describe Sweden in the twentieth century. Franklin D. Scott, for example, has argued that, in Sweden, social democracy 'was realised almost as fully as law could achieve' and that 'there had arrived an extraordinary, only half-appreciated, equalisation of privilege'.⁷ However, since 1 January 1995, anew phrase has been added to the list-that of'full member of the European Union (EU)'. Yet, the post-1995 years have not been easy for Sweden especially in relation to the country's relationship with Europe (see, for example, Miles 2001). Even as this book is being written (in 2002-03), the country continues to sustain high levels of public opposition to Swedish participation in further European integration and, to a lesser extent, to the country's full membership status. In all, the post-1995 period has been a time of much soul-searching and substantial national adaptation in which many of these familiar phrases are open to scrutiny and doubt.

This author has devoted much of his writing time to assessing how Sweden has coped with the demands of full EU membership. For him at least, this Nordic country is a source of substantial interest. Sweden therefore provides a comparatively recent example of an advanced European industrial democracy adapting to membership of an ambitious supranational organisation (see Redmond 1997; Miles 1996). It is also because Sweden was long regarded as a 'reluctant European' that for many years rejected notions of supranationalism (see, for instance, Miljan 1977; Miles 1997a; Gstohl 2002). The reluctant Swedes spent several decades jostling with the paradox (see Waite 1973) of attempting to secure a close economic relationship with the (then) European Community (EC) without requiring them to accept full membership status at the same time. Even now, many years after Sweden acceded to the Union, the country continues to be regarded by many outside observers as one of the more problematic members of the Union (see Lindahl 2000; Miles 2001) especially given the fact that the Swedes only voted narrowly (by 52.2 to 49.6 per cent) in favour of joining in the 1994 accession referendum in the first place. Moreover, few Swedes seem to share the vision of a federal Europe and this author has coined the phrase 'federo-sceptics' to describe them (see Miles 2001). Sweden therefore represents a suitable laboratory animal because levels of national adaptation - at least amongst Swedish society (see Miles 2000a) - are far from complete.

Swedish scepticism is also deeply rooted because, as Archer (2000) succinctly puts it, there is a widespread belief that Nordic or in this case, Swedish, is better. For many years Sweden represented the pinnacle of an advanced industrial society in Europe and offered itself as a model of a mature consensual parliamentary democracy, a social democratic welfare state and a (mostly successful) corporate market economy (Einhorn and Logue 2003). She enjoyed, for the most part, significantly higher standards of living than the EC/EU average and many of the member states. Hence, Sweden has suffered from a noticeable (if declining) superiority complex. With the onset of severe economic recession in the early 1990s, Sweden sought to join the Union not because the political elite were convinced ultimately of the merits of European political integration, but rather on the basis of economic reasoning, which suggested that EU membership would help to secure future economic prosperity (see Bieler 2000; Miles 1997a). From a rather simplistic perspective, Sweden joined the 1995 enlargement convoy because many Swedes believed as much in the perception that their country was in decline as that the European Union was 'on the up'.

Using Sweden as a case study may also highlight any regional motives underpinning the attraction of full EU membership. The Swedes - along with the Danes and Finns - have sought to introduced a stronger 'northern dimension' to the Union - perhaps indicating the underlying tensions between northern (i.e. Nordic) and continental European perspectives on European integration (see Miles 1995a). In any case, Sweden may hold the mantle of the largest country in the Nordic region (in terms of population size), but it remains, nonetheless, one of the Union's small states perched on the northern periphery of Europe. It would seem, to this author at least, that there are sufficient reasons to warrant further investigation of Sweden's experiences as a EU member.

Why another book on Sweden by this author in particular? The answer to this question is quite simple. This book represents the next stage in the author's continuing fascination with Swedish perspectives on European integration. Nevertheless, this should not imply that this is simply the third in a trilogy of works begun in the mid-1990s. It should be remembered that the previous works - principally introducing and then polishing the conceptual frameworks of the Swedish and membership 'diamonds' - sought to analyse the influences on Swedish policy-makers between from 1958 (see Miles 1997a; 1998a; 2000a; 2002a).

Rather, this book marks a new conceptual departure utilising a new perspective focusing on somewhat different elements in the Swedish-EU relationship. Until now the focus of the work has been on assessing the influences on Swedish policy-makers and attempting to understand conceptually the constraints on their EU policy options. The focus has not essentially been on how Swedish EU policy-makers value their country being in the Union. Although the author's primary focus is not necessarily on disaggregating the Swedish decision-making process, this book seeks to move attention onto evaluating the perceptions of Swedish policy-makers using a fusion perspective (see Chapter 2). In particular, the author argues that Swedish policy-making is fast becoming fused with that of the European Union and, on this basis, Sweden's policy-making has become further supranationally-orientated.

Existing Literature on Sweden and European Integration

The subject of Sweden and European integration is not virgin territory and a number of authors have sought to explain the dynamics affecting Swedish policy-making on EU questions. What follows is a rather brief and selective overview of where we are so far, in order to comment on the strengths and weaknesses of the existing literature. For convenience, the author has concentrated on the existing literature available in English - since these are the ones with the widest academic circulation - and broadly grouped the works into general categories, concentrating only on those that have already used Sweden as a case study. It is also worth mentioning an obvious dilemma in any study of this kind, namely that the vast majority of the literature quoted is written in English. This is not in any way to ignore the value and importance of Swedish-only sources, such as the excellent works of Tallberg (2001), Johansson (2002) and Bryder et al. (2004). Rather it is a reflection of the fact that this book is directed at a wider audience, including non-Swedes, and thus, where possible, the author has chosen literature translated into or quoted primarily in English as a first preference. Of course, there will also always be those who are critical becasuse their favourite theory has been ignored, but the author merely intends to assess where we are today with the study of Sweden and European integration.

The groups are also not clearly delineated and/or inclusive, nor do they represent a cohesive cohort of scholars subscribing to one particular viewpoint or school of thought, for there are as many differences within the groups as there are between them. There is, as always, some subjective interpretation about what fits within each group. With those caveats in mind, the groups are: foreign policy analysis (FPA); small states; globalisation; European integration, comparative approaches and identity politics. A brief overview will now be given of each one.

Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA)

This broad approach examines changes in Sweden's EU policy through the application of theories developed as part of the foreign policy analysis (FPA) subsphere of international relations (IR). There are several instances where such ideas have been applied to the foreign policies of the Nordic countries - (see Gustavsson 1999). One such example has been the application of predominantly behavioural analyses of foreign policy, such as that developed by Charles F. Hermann (see 1989; 1990), to Sweden. Magnus Jerneck (1993) and Bengt Sundelius (1994) - as well as Pedersen (1996) in the case of Denmark - have argued that Hermann's foreign policy change model can explain aspects of Nordic EU policies.

Jerneck and Sundelius focus on the period during which the Swedish government decided to seek EU membership (ending in 1990-91). By 'Hermannising' the Swedish case, Jerneck argues, for example, that Swedish relations with the European Union fit broadly into three phases, each of which can be explained using Hermann's terminology. Swedish policy-makers moved progressively during the three phases from adjustment change to an eventual international reorientation (Jerneck 1993: 28-30). The first phase (1984/85-87), representing an instance of Hermann's adjustment change, was essentially a period of renewed Swedish interest in the European Community. The second phase (1987/88-90) saw Sweden moving from programme change towards widespread problem/goal change. This era marked a significant retreat on the part of the Swedish government from previous ambitions of preserving unrestricted political autonomy (see Miles 1997a). It encompassed the acceptance of the February 1992 European Economic Area (EEA) agreement and eventually allowed the government to view the EEA treaty as 'an intermediate solution' (Jerneck 1993: 30-31). The final phase (1990-92) featured the movement from Hermann's problem/goal change to the more substantial international orientation change and included the key turning point when the Social Democratic government declared its intention to apply for full EC membership (October 1990). Neutrality also lost its 'almost sacrosanct status' (Jerneck 1993: 30).

Similarly, Sweden's step-by-step decommissioning of 'active neutrality' is perceived by Sundelius as a 'national policy adjustment' (Sundelius 1994: 183) in which the concept of'external shock' is a fundamental factor underpinning foreign policy reorientation. Interestingly, the effect of these external influences, such as the break-up of the Soviet Union, would enable changes in the goals of Swedish foreign policy to be accompanied by 'a remarkable lack of any sense of failure' (Sundelius 1994: 198) on the part of the country's foreign-policy-makers. The new pro-EC policy line was regarded by most key figures in the governmental apparatus as a logical consequence of a new situation.

Hermann's foreign policy approach - with its seven stage decision-making process (see Hermann 1989; 1990) - also incorporates the importance of domestic restructuring in underpinning foreign policy change. It highlights 'the domestic political agony, the considerable internal bargaining and the organizational strife' (Sundelius 1994: 183-84) that accompanied changes in Swedish foreign policy. It was perceived as essential that the decision of the governing Social Democrats to go for EC membership in 1990 was backed by key business and labour interest groups (see Miles 1997a) and thus was preceded by a lengthy process of building political and bureaucratic support for the Social Democratic government's new pro-EC membership policy line. Hermann's agents of external shock and domestic restructuring operated in tandem, helping to initiate foreign policy change in the Swedish case.

Gustavsson (1998) applies a slightly different FPA approach to the Swedish EC policy during 1990 which led ultimately to Sweden submitting a full membership application in July 1991. He argues that such foreign policy change is the result of a three-step procedure: (1) there are a number of sources (domestic and international factors) that are; (2) mediated by individual decision-makers who act; (3) within the decision-making process in order to bring about a Hermann typology of change in policy (adjustment change, programme change, problem/goal change and international orientation change). Gustavsson's model is quite convincing - improving on that offered by Hermann in that it is clearer on the second stage actor-driven role within foreign policy change. The former's approach to foreign policy change sees the cognitive processes of individual decision-makers 'as a crucial step that sources of change must necessarily pass through in order to influence the outcome' (Gustavsson 1999: 90).

Although, as others have done, Gustavsson identifies that structural sources such as the post-1989 changes in Eastern Europe altered the preconditions for Sweden's traditional EC policy, his study explains more clearly how these structural dynamics were perceived by key figures in the Social Democratic government (Gustavsson 1998). He argues that the altered perspective of (then) Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson (an element of the second stage in his procedure) ensured that the premier became the driving force for change. It led Carlsson (constituting part of Gustavsson's third stage) to form a strategic partnership with the (then) Minister of Finance, Allan Larsson, to push forward policy change through a potentially divided Swedish Cabinet. By presenting the change in the midst of an acute balance of payments crisis that erupted in mid-October 1990, they redefined Swedish EC membership. Ultimately, they altered it from a political to an essentially economic issue of discussion aiding the timing of the foreign policy change. According to Gustavsson, the changes in EU policy was not an example of a Hermann-style international orientation change - as Jerneck believes - but an instance of problem/goal change. Gustavsson's second stage explains the timing of alterations in foreign policy. Although there would probably have been movement in the basic goals of Swedish EU policy at some time, given the prevailing structural conditions, a strategic partnership of leading actors decisively influenced when this happened (Gustavsson 1999: 89).

Yet there are some general deficiencies with all the FPA approaches considered here. In the first place, there is a potential spatial or time dimension problem with all these FPA applications. In spite of Jerneck's attempts to use Hermann's model to explain foreign policy adaptation over a five-year period, the models applied above are better at explaining flagship changes in foreign policy covering shorter periods of time and usually ones with fairly clearly delineated cut-off points. Otherwise, it is hard to differentiate within these 'behavioural' FPA approaches when a foreign policy change starts and when it is complete. Furthermore, different but often interconnected aspects of foreign policy can operate on varied timescales and spatial dimensions. Given that some elements of Swedish EU policy - for instance, Single European Market (SEM) access - seem to have been achieved more quickly than others, it does beg the question whether we can regard any foreign policy change as having anything like a uniform effect.

Next, there is a question of selective application. Although most FPA approaches are directed at explaining foreign policy change, they have difficulty in accounting for why stable foreign policy exists even when there are obvious conditional factors that make change very attractive. In short, why is it that many aspects of Swedish foreign (and even EU) policy have been relatively constant even once membership status was secured?

Finally, there is the issue of reciprocal pressure between the national and supranational levels. As White has commented, the state-centric focus of European FPA is often criticised for finding it hard to come to terms with countries that participate in organisations such as the EU (White 1999: 38; 2001). Full membership introduces a new supranational relationship that national foreign policy-makers and structures have to accommodate, resulting in changes in how foreign policy is made at the national level (see Manners and Whitman 2000). This is a relatively dynamic process in which, firstly, elements of national foreign policy-making are being fused and/or shared with other member states and the Union's supranational institutions from above and secondly, there are more domestic actors now wanting to influence foreign policy from below. Perhaps FPA approaches simply cannot cope with such poorly delineated problems and complex operational settings?

Overall, these FPA approaches are most useful when analysing flagship changes in foreign policy covering short timescales and often crisis situations where the perspectives of key actors are most transparent. They are less useful for analysing longer-term national adjustment, especially the impact of continuous, but also dynamic, structural factors such as those stemming from full EU membership and a longer-term European foreign policy. On the one hand, the influence of the EU on Swedish foreign policy tends to be ever present, yet simultaneously rather unpredictable. On the other, the Union's influence rarely provokes the crisis situations that FPA approaches are better suited to analysing.

Possibly a more successful attempt to utilise FPA techniques over long periods of EU policy is the work of Hallenberg (2000). Using aspects of Goldmann's stability model, which emphasised that changes in foreign policy require a detailed depiction of the policy-making system and stabilisers upon foreign policy within that system (Goldmann 1982; 1988), Hallenberg provides a brief assessment of Swedish foreign and security policy since 1995. Consequently, it remains a sectoral rather than event-based approach, unlike those of Jerneck, Sundelius or Gustavsson.

Potentially, the notion of stabilisers - whether political, administrative, international or cognitive - could explain why, for example, the Swedes have not dropped their commitment to non-alignment completely. Stabilisers within the Swedish policy-making system ensure that those advocating the maintenance of the status quo remain powerful. However, Hallenberg does not really focus on the issue of stabilisers, but s...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• List of Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction
• 2 The Fusion Perspective
• 3 Institutional Dimensions
• 4 Polity Aspects
• 5 Policy Dynamics
• 6 Case Study: Monetary Policy
• 7 Case Study: Security Policy
• 8 Reflections in 2003
• Bibliography
• Index