India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum (IBSA)

The Rise of the Global South

Oliver Stuenkel

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781138789081
• eBook ISBN: 9781317656135
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The establishment of the IBSA as one of the principal platforms of South-South cooperation is one of the most notable developments in international politics during the first decade of the twenty-first century. While the concept is now frequently referred to in discussions about the Global South, there has not yet been a comprehensive and scholarly analysis of the history of the IBSA grouping and its impact on global order.

This book:

• Offers a definitive reference history of the IBSA grouping (India, Brazil and South Africa) – a comprehensive, fact-focused narrative and analytical account from its inception as an ad hoc meeting in 2003 to the political grouping it is today.
• Situates the IBSA grouping in the wider context of South-South cooperation and the global shift of power away from the United States and Europe towards powers such as Brazil, India and South Africa.
• Provides an outlook and critically assesses what the IBSA grouping means for global order in the twenty-first century.

Offering the first full-length and detailed treatment of the IBSA, this work will be of great interest to students and scholars of International organizations, international relations and the global south.

1 The history of IBSA

First steps

• A disconnected South

• Why IBSA? Three motivations

• IBSA’s origins

• Joint action: IBSA and the patent case

• IBSA at the WTO: uniting the South

• Conclusion

After providing a brief overview of relations between India, Brazil and South Africa after the end of the Cold War, this chapter recounts the intellectual origins of IBSA, the motivations that led the three countries to create the grouping, and two instances of successful cooperation—one immediately before and one after IBSA’s birth in June 2003.

IBSA is a unique model of transnational cooperation based on a common political identity. Our three countries come from three different continents but share similar worldviews and aspirations.

(Manmohan Singh¹)

What unites these nations from different continents are “big political ideas,” which are best summarized in the premise of South-South solidarity.

(Suzanne Graham²)

International politics, as are all forms of politics, is not only about who gets what, but also, and perhaps more fundamentally, about how people are treated.

(Philip Nel³)

A disconnected South

Both economic and political ties between India, Brazil and South Africa historically have been relatively insignificant.⁴ There are some exceptions. For example, India was the first country in the world to isolate the apartheid regime in South Africa in 1946 and raise the issue at the UN, aside from recognizing the African National Congress (ANC) and allowing them to build a mission in New Delhi.⁵ Yet overall, interaction during most of the Cold War was sporadic and of little long-term consequence.⁶ Largely due to their limited participation in the global economy and the geographic distance between the three countries, India, Brazil and South Africa knew little about each other until the early 1990s. Trade between the three, as Figures 1.1–1.6 show, grew during the 1990s, but remained very low as a percentage of the three countries’ overall trade.

It was only in 1994 that India reestablished political and economic ties with post-apartheid South Africa by setting up a joint India-South Africa ministerial commission. Despite such efforts, however, South Africa only represented 1 percent of India’s total exports during the period 1995–2002 (see Figure 1.2).⁷ This was largely due to trade barriers and the lack of transport and communication infrastructure between the two countries.

Brazil and South Africa, for their part, had closer ties than India and South Africa during the apartheid period, yet they were only minor trading partners. Brazilian governments initially kept bilateral relations with the apartheid regime despite international condemnation, and in the 1960s, Brazil was the most important Latin American exporter to South Africa.⁸ In 1974, Brazil’s President Ernesto Geisel decided to end bilateral relations with South Africa and openly condemned the apartheid regime.⁹ In the early 1990s, economic and political relations were once again established and President Fernando Henrique Cardoso became the first Brazilian president to make an official visit to South Africa in 1996. Yet similar to India-South Africa relations, trade ties between Brazil and South Africa remained insignificant throughout the 1990s (see Figure 1.8).

Figure 1.1 Brazilian exports to India and South Africa as a share of total Brazilian exports

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Figure 1.2 Indian exports to Brazil and South Africa as a share of total Indian exports

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Figure 1.3 South African exports to Brazil and India as a share of total South African exports

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Figure 1.4 Brazilian imports from India and South Africa as a share of total Brazilian imports

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Ties between Brazil and India remained least significant of all—largely due to the great geographic distance that separates the two. Until well into the 1960s, there was not a single trade agreement between them, and no more than 20 Indian visas were issued for Brazilians annually, most of them for diplomats.¹⁰ As Brazil’s former Foreign Minister Lampreia points out, alignment was often spontaneous and coincidental, rather than planned.¹¹ While Brazil was geopolitically tied to the United States, India turned out to be much more aligned with the Soviet Union.¹² In 1976, at a time when the communist party was still prohibited during the military dictatorship in Brazil,¹³ a constitutional amendment was passed to make India a socialist republic.¹⁴ Ten years later, India unofficially invited Brazil to turn into a full member of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to balance leftist radical countries, but Brazil declined and preferred to remain an observer.¹⁵ Throughout the decades bilateral ties remained minimal, and in 1990, fewer than 100 Brazilians lived in India (see Figure 1.9).¹⁶

Figure 1.5 Indian imports from Brazil and South Africa as a share of total Indian imports

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Figure 1.6 South African imports from Brazil and India as a share of total South African imports

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Yet after the end of the Cold War, Brazil and India began to liberalize their economies and pragmatically decided to diversify their partnerships. While not abandoning traditional allies in Europe and North America, Cardoso carefully articulated and implemented Brazil’s new global strategy, which involved stronger ties with other developing countries such as India. Cardoso visited India in 1996; President Narayanan paid a return visit in 1998. Yet despite this political approximation, trade ties remained extremely weak. Trade with India represented less than 2 percent of Brazil’s overall economic exchanges between 1990 and 2000.¹⁷

Figure 1.7 Trade between India and South Africa in US$ million

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Figure 1.8 Trade between Brazil and South Africa in US$ million

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

Things changed when Brazil’s President Lula da Silva took office. Early on, he envisioned stronger ties with India. Critics pointed out that the weak commercial links between the two did not justify a political alliance, reflecting that Brazilian foreign policy has traditionally been dictated by trade links. Lula, on the other hand, envisioned a political alliance as a starting point, from which trade links would be systematically fostered.¹⁸ The creation of IBSA and a stronger emphasis on South-South ties is generally seen as a key element of President Lula and his Foreign Minister Amorim’s foreign policy strategy between 2003 and 2010.¹⁹ This move proved highly innovative. As Faria, Nogueira and Lopes point out, “irrespective of Brazil’s insertion in any specific moment in history (equidistant, pragmatic, autonomous …, responsible, assertive, etc.), the focus regarding national development was always tied to the relationship with the North—the motor of the global economy.”²⁰

Figure 1.9 Trade between Brazil and India in US$ million

(UNCTAD statistical database (UNCTAD STAT), unctad.org/en/pages/Statistics.aspx)

The institutionalization of the trilateral IBSA grouping, then, symbolized, more than anything, a genuine effort to revise this tradition of mostly focusing on the world’s established powers. No longer did Lula seek to design South-South ties complementary to relations with the North; from now on, they would be built in their own right.²¹

Why IBSA? Three motivations

As this brief historical overview shows, economic ties between IBSA countries were weak at the beginning of the twenty-first century, despite a low-level rapprochement during the 1990s. Why, then, did the three countries decide to create the IBSA Forum? What led these governments to devote efforts and resources to increase relations with faraway partners? What are the incentives for cooperation between India, Brazil and South Africa in the different working groups and nongovernmental forums?

We can point to three broad motivations that led decision makers in the three countries to initiate discussions about the creation of a platform. The first is to obtain greater independence and autonomy from established actors, i.e. the Group of 7 (G7), by diversifying partnerships. The concept of autonomy can be described as the capacity of a state to implement decisions based on its declared objectives, without interference by other actors or events beyond its borders. Autonomy requires the mobilization of power resources in the periphery: regional alliances against the center, integration (political and economic), and the improvement of negotiation techniques constitute the strategies to achieve this goal.²² The IBSA Forum can thus be understood as an attempt to gain autonomy and greater independence from the economic core by diversifying partnership and strengthening economic and political ties to non-traditional members outside of their region. Senona writes that the goal of IBSA must be “political and economic cooperation aimed at unshackling and empowering these emerging, but still developing...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The history of IBSA: first steps
• 2 Towards institutionalization
• 3 IBSA’s institutional structure
• 4 Does IBSA matter?
• 5 The politics of South-South cooperation: towards a new paradigm?
• 6 IBSA: rising democracy promoters?
• 7 Conclusion
• Appendix: timeline of events
• Select bibliography
• Index
• Routledge Global Institutions Series