Reflexivity

Theory, Method, and Practice

Karen Lumsden

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781317432746
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Reflexivity is valuable in social research because it draws attention to the researcher as part of the world being studied and reminds us that the individuals involved in our research are subjects, not objects. By being reflexive we acknowledge that we cannot be separated from our biographies.

This volume reviews key debates concerning reflexivity in theory, methods, and practice. It mounts a defence of reflexivity against new materialist and post-qualitative critiques and the pressures exerted on scholars from the neoliberal marketized university system which privileges fast academia at the expense of slow, reflective scholarship. While defending reflexivity, this book also those identifies issues which plague mainstream sociological operationalizations of a positivistic form of reflexivity. It argues for the extension of reflexivity into domains otherwise neglected in public accounts, and a shift from reflexivity as an individualized quality of the researcher (used to judge peers and navel-gaze) to a feminist, collaborative, reflexive sensibility which is mindful of the wider contexts shaping the construction of knowledge(s), experience(s), and of the role of research communities.

Providing examples of reflexivity in action from academics at different stages of their careers, Reflexivity will appeal to students and researchers interested in fields such as Sociology, Qualitative Research Methods, Criminology, Ethnography, and Ethics of Research.

1 Feminism and reflexivity

Challenging the myth of ‘hygienic research’

Introduction

A feminist methodology of social science requires that … the mythology of ‘hygienic research’ with its accompanying mystification of the researcher and the researched as objective instruments of data production be replaced by the recognition that personal involvement is more than dangerous bias – it is the condition under which people come to know each other and to admit others into their lives.

(Ann Oakley, 1981, p. 58)

This chapter discusses the influence of feminist research methods and theories on the reflexive turn in the social sciences. The work of feminists in the 1970s was crucial for recognizing and drawing attention to the male-centric nature of social research prior to that period: research done by men, for men, and in the interests of men (Golde, 1970; Easterday et al., 1982; Harding, 1987; Warren, 1988; Stanley and Wise, 1993; Cosslett, Lury, and Summerfield, 2000). As the above quote demonstrates, feminist writers such as Ann Oakley (1981) highlighted the hygienic nature of research accounts which failed to acknowledge that the researcher is part of the world that he/she is studying and that participants are not merely objects of research.

According to Maynard (1994), defining what feminism means in terms of doing research is no easy matter. For Kelly (1988), feminist research is distinguishable via ‘the questions we have asked, the way we locate ourselves within our questions, and the purpose of our work’. It is the methodological and epistemological aspects which distinguish feminist research from other positions, not the methods utilized. There has never been one correct feminist epistemology resulting in one correct feminist methodology for women’s studies. Instead, feminist scholars ‘work within, against, and across epistemologies, often combining elements from different perspectives’ (Fonow and Cooke, 2005, p. 2213). Crucially, feminist research begins with the recognition that the personal ‘as lived experience’ underlies all behaviours and actions (Stanley and Wise, 1993, p. 205), and it involves the practice of ‘consciousness raising’ (MacKinnon, 1989). Moreover, the gender of research participants (or the researcher) does not make a study any less ‘feminist’ (Kelly, 1988).

Feminists have long stressed the need for a reflexive approach in social research (Roberts, 1981) and May (1993) argues that these extensive criticisms cannot be ignored. Reflexivity challenges the notion that the researcher is an invisible voice and an authority (Stanley, 1990). Stanley and Wise argue that for academic feminists, ‘research’ and ‘life’ should not ‘be compartmentalized or analytically unpacked using separate intellectual means’ (1993, p. 1). In the edited collection Beyond Method, Fonow and Cook (1991) define reflexivity as the tendency of feminists to reflect on, examine critically, and explore analytically the nature of the research process. In line with feminist research more generally, they view reflexivity as a source of insight and as a means of consciousness-raising:

The process of reflection is seen as ‘enlightening’ due to women’s oppressed position that enables a view from ‘bottom-up’ and stems from women’s capacity to deal with inequality through intimate knowledge of their oppressors.

(Fonow and Cook, 1991, p. 13)

Qualitative researchers using critical, feminist, race-based, or post-structural theories all routinely use reflexivity ‘as a methodological tool to better represent, legitimize, or call into question their data’ (Pillow, 2003, p. 176). However, most researchers fail to define or discuss how they are using reflexivity ‘as if it is something we all commonly understand and accept as standard methodological practice for critical qualitative research’ (Pillow, 2003, p. 176).

As we will see below, reflexivity under feminism is about investigating the power embedded in one’s own research and about doing research ‘differently’; the latter of which arises from the ethical and political problems and questions raised by feminists about traditional research methods. Pillow (2003) gives the example of reciprocity in feminist research, as a means through which to ‘hear’, ‘listen’, ‘equalize’ and do research ‘with’, instead of ‘on’ the researched. Letherby describes reflexivity in feminist research as the ‘relationship between doing and knowing: how … we undertake research (the process) relates to the knowledge we present at the end (the product)’ (2004, p. 116). This means that there is an array of means through, and places in which, reflexivity can be employed in feminist research. In a more pragmatic vein, Hardy and Bryman highlight four ways in which feminist researchers can locate themselves in the research. The first involves ‘locating the researcher on the same critical plane as the researched’, including the context of their lives. Second, is the need to make clear the grounds for conducting the research (i.e. what procedures are used and why?). The third form of reflexivity involves researchers exploring their own personal biographies including reflecting on the influence of social class, race, ethnicity, gender, age, sexuality, religious beliefs, etc. (2004, p. 139). This includes how these might impact on the analysis (see Chapter 3). Fourth, they highlight the role of emotions in research, particularly those of the researcher. This includes acknowledging that the emotions and impact of research can continue long after the research is completed (see Chapter 4).

Feminist scholars have also openly reflected on the development of their own intellectual work. These accounts give us an invaluable glimpse into the craft of knowledge construction and ‘reminisces about the motivation, interpretation, and process of doing research and producing scholarship’ (Fonow and Cook, 2005, p. 2219). Examples include Laurel Richardson’s (1997) Fields of Play, which contains what she calls a ‘pleated text’ of essays written by her over 10 years; and Nancy Naples’ (2003) Feminism and Method, in which she reflects on the epistemological and theoretical foundations of the methods used during her career. (See also Chapters 5, 6, and 7 on reflexivity in action).

This chapter begins by outlining the various theoretical and methodological feminist approaches to qualitative research and reflexivity. It starts by outlining feminist empiricism. Empiricist feminists believe that knowledge springs from experience and that women’s experience carries with it special knowledge which is necessary to challenge oppression. The chapter then outlines feminist standpoint epistemology which gives priority to the voices of the less powerful and the marginalized, and the ways in which the definition of experience varies within feminist standpoint theory (Skeggs, 2007 [2001]). This includes Harding’s (1991) work on ‘strong objectivity’/‘strong reflexivity’ and Collins’ (1991 [1986]) black feminist standpoint which draws attention to women’s marginal status (‘outsider within status’) and highlights the value of intersectionality in studies of race and gender. The chapter then considers critical race theory and reflexivity, including Ben Carrington’s (2008) article on the importance of reflexive autobiography within sociological work in understanding the complexities of racial identity formation. This is followed by a consideration of postmodern feminism and the work of writers such as Judith Butler (1990), queer theory and queer methodologies, including James McDonald’s (2013; 2016) concept of ‘queer reflexivity’.

Feminist theory, methods, and reflexivity

Feminist empiricism

Second wave feminism and feminist research grew out of failings in western social science and understanding, including the invisibility of women and the lack of focus on gender-related issues and the ways in which research and the construction of knowledge took place (Hardy and Bryman, 2004). Feminist empiricism was first generated by feminist research in biology and the social sciences as an epistemological strategy for justifying the challenges to traditional assumptions arguing that:

… sexist and androcentric biases can be eliminated by stricter adherence to existing methodological norms of scientific inquiry; only ‘bad science’ or ‘bad sociology’ is responsible for their retention in the results of research.

(Harding, 1991, p. 111)

Drawing attention to the male-centric nature of social research, writers such as MacKinnon argued that the knowledge produced was partial and gendered: ‘men create the world from their own point of view, which then becomes the truth to be described’ which resulted in a ‘male epistemological stance’ (1982, p. 23; see also Golde, 1970; Easterday et al., 1982; Harding, 1987; Warren, 1988; Stanley and Wise, 1993). Traditional feminist empiricism adopted positivist mainstream methods and interpretations of qualitative approaches while assuming the existence of a single category of ‘women’ (Stanley and Wise, 1993).

Contemporary feminist empiricism¹ has various similarities in its approaches, which include being ‘empiricist’ in that ‘empirical success is held to be a necessary condition for accepting scientific theories, models, or auxiliary hypotheses as justified’ (Intemann, 2010, p. 780). To summarize, contemporary empiricist feminism is:

• Contextualist: with regards to the aims, cognitive values and methods governing particular research contexts.

• Normative: in that ‘… aims, cognitive values, methods, and other background assumptions are not always independent of social, ethical, and political values’.

• A social epistemology: the focus of objectivity and justification is scientific communities, not the individual scientist her/himself.

Traditional feminist empiricism was criticized and rejected by many feminist researchers for its scientific stance towards women as ‘objects’ of study and for ignoring the power relations inherent in the practice of social research and in relationships between the researcher and the researched (Oakley, 1981; Stanley and Wise, 1993). Sandra Harding, whose work is discussed below, was one feminist who endorsed standpoint feminism over feminist empiricism.²

Feminism standpoint theory

Feminist standpoint theory emerged as an alternative to feminist empiricism and is exemplified in the work of, for instance, Dorothy Smith (1979; 1987); Nancy Hartsock (1981; 1983a; 1983b); Hilary Rose (2004 [1983]); Sandra Harding (1986), Patricia Hill Collins (1991 [1986]), Jane Flax (1990), and Alison Jagger (2004). For example, in The Science Question in Feminism, Harding (1986) demonstrates how feminist criticisms highlighted issues concerning the social structure and uses of the sciences, and the origins, social meanings, agendas, and theories of scientific ‘knowledge-seeking’. She develops a feminist standpoint theory of knowledge and addresses the problem of the western scientific worldview or mind set. As Dorothy Smith (1986, p. 6) writes:

A sociology for women must be able to disclose for women how their own social situation, their everyday world is organised and determined by social processes which are not knowable through the ordinary means through which we find our everyday world.

In dealing with the question of how to justify the results of feminist research, feminist standpoint theorists argue that knowledge is socially situated (Harding, 1991). Nancy Hartsock first described feminist standpoint theory in her book, Money, Sex and Power (1983c). She claims that women’s unique standpoint in society ‘provides the justification for the truth claims of feminism while also providing it with a method with which to analyse reality’ (Hekman, 1997, p. 341). Hartsock’s feminist standpoint is rooted in the Marxist distinction between essence and appearance, and permits discovery of the ‘real’ relationships between people (i.e. marriage) which are mystified by patriarchal ideology (Ramazanoglu, 1989). For Hartsock, it is the material oppression which women experience in everyday life which provides them with a different standpoint from that of men, and therefore access to different knowledge of the essential relations which subordinate women to men (Ramazanoglu, 1989).

Therefore, standpoint theory draws on women’s situation and women’s perspectives from everyday life as resources in the development of feminist research. It focuses on gender differences between men and women and their situations as a scientific advantage for those who can utilize such differences (Harding, 1991). Women’s perspective involves the mediation of ideological dualisms such as nature versus culture, reflected for instance via the gendered division of labour (Harding, 1991). Dominant knowledge claims based in the lives of men are ‘partialities’ which distort the ‘picture of natural and social life’ provided by the sciences (Harding, 1991, p. 121). According to Harding (1991), experience in itself is not a reliable ground for deciding which knowledge claims are preferable. Instead, for a position to count as a standpoint, we must insist on an ‘objective location’ and women’s lives should be viewed ‘as the place from which feminist research should begin’ (Harding, 1991, p. 123). For standpoint feminists, knowledge emerges through the struggles that the oppressed face. Thus, standpoint feminism requires one to ‘open their eyes’ to social conditions and oppression.

In Whose Science? Whose Knowledge (1991) Harding further develops her feminist analysis of science, technology, and knowledge, arguing that women need sciences and technologies which are for women in every class, race, and culture. She highlights how the benefits of the sciences had tended to flow towards white, middle-class, western men, ‘male men’ (1991, p. 5).³ Harding argues that standpoint approaches allow one to ‘appropriate and redefine objectivity’ and that objectivity cannot be defined as requiring value neutrality (1991, p. 134). This involves acknowledging the social situated nature of beliefs and using this as a resource for generating these beliefs. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: the reflexive turn and the social sciences
• 1 Feminism and reflexivity: challenging the myth of ‘hygienic research’
• 2 New materialism, post-qualitative inquiry, post-humanism, and diffractive methodologies: exploring the ‘posts’
• 3 Reflexivity and ethnography: gendered interactions and emotions in fieldwork with boy racers
• 4 Emotions and reflexivity in social research
• 5 Reflexivity in action: journeys through the professional and the personal – part 1: reflections on ‘becoming’ an academic and imposter syndrome
• 6 Reflexivity in action: journeys through the professional and the personal – part 2: writing to inquire in the midst of thin air
• 7 Reflexivity in action: journeys through the professional and the personal – part 3: precarity, performativity, and politics in the life of an academic researcher
• 8 Reflexivity, power, and politics: taking sides in research
• 9 Reflecting on user engagement, dissemination, and knowledge transfer in academic and police settings
• Index